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NOTE
Throughout S and H stand for 'speaker' and 'hearer' (occasionally, 'utterer' and 'audience'),
respectively. Their speech acts are to be regarded equally as utterances or marks, written, oral or
gestural, for it is a tenet of the argument made, and explicitly in response to Derrida, that the
supplementation of systems of writing adds nothing substantive to an argument for the necessary
absence of meaning intentions in speech acts; a developed Gricean theory accounts for the presence of
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The exchange between Derrida and Searle on speech acts, contrary to Searle's belief, perpetually
engages with philosophical tradition1. Many issues, figuring debates of the metaphysics of presence and
the possibility of repetition, are common currency, but equally many are not, and they connote the
'analytical' tradition. The main points of the exchange are summarised in the third section of the
introduction, and in the first two the themes of the dissertation are presented. In the four chapters it is
argued that the problems of indeterminable intentions and of non-saturable conventions can be
resolved, and that the fount of Derrida's work, the failure of intentionality to mediate, or orientate,
communication, self-consciousness and meaning is contested by the theory offered2. Rorty's rejection
of theories of intentionality and of mimetic assumptions in semantics, epistemology and the philosophy
ofmind are explored in the second section of the introduction. (It is contended, in footnotes and asides,
that the integration of the analytical and phenomenological traditions begins with theories of
intentionality)3.
1 See Searle, J.R.; 'Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida', Glyph, vol. I, ppl98-208, 1977, and Derrida, J.; 'Limited
Inc. abc...Glyph, vol. II, ppl62-254, 1977, cf. perhaps ppl69-170, 179 and 193.
2 The matters precisely at issue in the exchange with Searle, and in the early work on Husserl. Taking on the task of comparing
Derrida's work with that of certain luminaries of the analytical tradition is not perversity or bloody-mindedness, for Derrida's
arguments are wont to seem less daring when it is seen that others have addressed the issue he raises and found sound reasons to
move beyond the relativism in which he revels. It is not with a desire, all too often expressed, to trounce Derrida that this
dissertation is written, but to indicate ways in which Denida's work is of a part with lengthy and ongoing philosophical tradition,
and thereby to engage with it, providing arguments against and suggesting weaknesses. It is disappointing, and to the shame of
philosophers, that this still needs fully to be done and that Derrida is still treated so abominably. Of the many examples one could
choose one shall suffice, from an author of whom one tires of saying that he should know better, namely Scruton, R,; Modern
Philosophy: A Survey (London, Sinclair-Stevenson) 1994, p.
3 Certain remarks on the differences and convergence between these two traditions, which one might better call the semantical
and the phenomenological traditions (stemming, as Dummett and Monk show, from shared sources: see Dummett, M.; Origins of
Analytical Philosophy (London, Duckworth) 1993 and Monk, R.; 'What is Analytical Philosophy?', ppl-22 in Monk, R and
Palmer, A.; (eds.); Bertrand Russell and the Origins ofAnalytical Philosophy (Bristol. Thoemmes) 1996), are made throughout
the dissertation. It is contended that the argument to follow shows one way in which semantical analysis (apparently the preserve
of analytical philosophy), may, to elucidate the notions of convention and intention for language, be supplemented by an
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Davidson's anomalous monism, described in 1.1, is both a rejoinder to dualist, or
'representationalisf, theories of mind, and a powerful response to post-structuralist scepticism
concerning meaning and truth. It is a theory of intentionality for language and mind grounded entirely
in social coordination, cooperation and charity, unequivocally rejecting the thesis that there are
conventions of language4. A strength of the argument against Derrida and Rorty is that Davidson,
Grice, Strawson and Lewis write this condition into their theories, crystallised (in II.4) as Strawson's
distinction, one eluding Derrida, and vitiating his work on Austin5.
Derrida's theory of speech acts finds limiting cases in indexical, or demonstrative, expressions, and
they are examined in 1.2. It is found that, in both Austin's paradigmatic and Derrida's parasitical cases,
essential pragmatic, syntactical, even hermeneutical, element. However, linguistic analysis has its place, and the arguments of
Evans and Hintikka in 1.2 and 1.3 show how effectively it can overturn established views of the results of Fregean semantics (in
1.3 the results are applied to Husserlian phenomenology), a result that shows that the arguments that meaning-scepticism offers in
response to classical theories of meaning can comprehensively be challenged. In the light of the arguments given in the four
chapters to follow, Derrida's and (perhaps less so), Rorty's meaning-scepticism is (and Derrida would abhor the charge), seen to
be based on arguments, and the reification of problems, to which 'analytical' philosophy has long since provided compelling and
broadly applicable answers. One is tempted to venture further: the relativism of Derrida and Rorty, and its widespread
acceptance, evinces too narrow an appreciation of the philosophical literature, and, regrettably, little understanding that this is a
bad thing.
One should consider it an embarrassment to philosophy that many (some calling themselves pragmatists), still force an
analytical/phenomenological distinction, so much so that one hesitates to draw it to attention. (Some points are raised in
Introduction 2). The continued engagement between the traditions is invariably ignored (a randomly chosen example (repeated in
context below): Kripke introduces to Kantian epistemology the notion of possibility, wishing to show that possibility is
indefeasibly a modality in the writing of apriori conditions, and writes that aprioricity is an epistemological notion, but that the
role of possibility introduces the further condition that'... it is supposed to be something which can be known independently of
any experience'. (Kripke, S.A.; Naming and Necessity (Oxford, Blackwell) 1980, p34). This must be accounted for before the
notion of the a priori can "... get off the ground'. 'That means that in some sense it's possible (whether we do or do not in fact
know it independently of any experience), to know this independently of any experience. And possible for whom? For God? For
the Martians? Or just for people with minds like ours?' (pp34-35). As Kripke asks, what sort of possibility is in question here?)
Work explicitly bridging the divide is marginalised or unnoticed (because not written by authors in the canon), and more
mainstream works are merely flirtations (perhaps, Wittgenstein and the hermeneuticists; Heidegger on perception). Mulhall, S.;
On Being in the World: Wittgenstein and Heidegger on Seeing Aspects (London, Routledge) 1990, for all its brilliance, brings
little new to Wittgensteinian exegesis that could not be found in the major works published in the last thirty years: the
comparison with Heidegger exerts little significant influence.
Listed here are a few ideas that one must consider before making any unthinking distinction. How analytical is Wittgenstein, or
Austin, or Grice? Grice is as pragmatist a philosopher as one could find. Why do Russell and Strawson disagree on denoting
phrases, and is not their exchange a symptom of two different approaches to philosophy? What underpins Tarski's notion of
satisfaction, and is it shared with Husserl (and Freud)? What is the motivation and end of possible worlds semantics but
metaphysics? Putnam and Kripke are not unaware of this. Cavell is not a renegade from the camp of analytical philosophy, but
truly a moderator; he defends the methods of the 'Oxford' philosophers and uses them in his own reflections. (Cavell, S.; 'Must
we Mean what We Say?', ppl-43 in Must we Mean what We Say?: A Book of Essays (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons)
1969). What is Quine's source for the irreducibility of intentional idioms? It is Brentano's empirical psychology. Quine appeals
to holism and to Dewey. Why does Crane object to Quine, and to the interpretation (by others following Quine), of Brentano?
Why has Hare's study of the analytic/synthetic distinction, in which he raises many notions vital for a theory of repetition, been
ignored? (Hare, R.M.; 'Philosophical Discoveries', Mind, vol. LXIX, no. 274, ppl45-162, 1960). Why does McDowell think that
Sellars' lectures on Kant are the best source of arguments against theories of intentionality; indeed, how would one classify
McDowell's own work: analytical or hermeneutical? The work of Lewis on convention has come to exert (after some resistance),
a significant influence in the social sciences, and it is, according to Rorty's criteria, not analytical philosophy (it does not begin
from reflection upon the structure of language). Why is Davidson missing from Bernstein's survey of those theories negotiating a
path between objectivism and relativism? (See Bernstein, R.J.; Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and
Praxis (Oxford, Blackwell) 1983).
Is 'analytical' philosophy hamstrung by its use of formal, or boring, or prosaic, arguments? Or notation? One suspects that it is
simply not current, sexy. The failure to see its relevance and importance is due to ignorance and a wholly unprofessional lack of
rigour. An excellent essay considering the attempts to force an Anglo-Saxon (or what you will)/Continental divide is
Glendinning, S.; 'What is Continental Philosophy?', pp3-20 in Glendinning, S. (ed.); The Edinburgh Encyclopaedia of
Continental Philosophy (Edinburgh University Press) 1999. Cf. especially pl3 on the rejection by Evans, McDowell and
Peacocke of the thesis of intentionality without language.
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Although Davidson rejects the very idea of conventions of language, anomalous monism and the principle of charity are
predicated on the notion of what will be called in this dissertation, social, or institutional, convention, those conventions
describing human institutions or practices (such as those of politeness, marriage, dancing and so forth), those directing
coordination in social exchange. These conventions may be tacit or explicit, and they are of such significance for Lewis shows
how they can be used to write a theories of convention and intention for language.
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speakers' meaning intentions can be fulfilled, and that Sinn and noema do indeed mediate reference. In
1.3 it is argued that Sinne play the same role in a possible worlds theory of intentionality, which yet
rejects all of the elements in Husserl to which Derrida objects: directedness upon an object, the
distinction of meaning-conferring and meaning-fulfilling acts (also indicated and indicating meaning)
and the properties ofmatter and quality. It is concluded that conditions as strict as Derrida demands of
a theory of intentionality will most certainly make it unworkable, but that one need not hold such a
theory. (In IV the same is argued for convention)6.
In 1.4 a template of a theory of intentionality ranging over possibilia is presented, namely
Wittgenstein's picture theory; it is, so abhorrent to Rorty, a 'representationalisf theory, yet the
representations for which it argues are carried by simple, Leibnizean monads, depending upon nothing
for their truth, and, in their syntactical correlates, sharing (and showing) logical form with the structure
of the world. The section broaches some suggestions to the end that the late Wittgenstein, now for
Rorty an edifier, is equally in need ofmental representations7.
In 1.5 Quine's stimulus and response theory of meaning is presented. It is argued that Quine cannot
disregard intentionality, but must appeal to what Norris calls, 'apriori structures ofmind', provided in
Quine's late acquiescence to anomalous monism. The cooperative function of the principle of charity
leads Davidson to argue that a semantic theory must needs be supplemented by a syntactic, or
pragmatic, constituent, for which he defers to Grice.
Grice writes theories of speaker meaning, utterance meaning, occasion meaning and timeless
meaning for paradigmatic and parasitical utterances in conventional, cooperative situations, and his
work is discussed in II. He argues that communication between speaker and hearer is the 'transport' of
intended meaning, recognised as such by the hearer8. Arising from it is Strawson's distinction,
clarifying what Austin means by convention, and sharply distinguishing it from what commentators
(conspicuously Derrida), have taken Austin to mean.
McDowell's work on convention, and its response to Strawson on the role for semantic analysis,
begins III. A theory of convention in speech acts, of perlocution not illocution, introduces, as Derrida
says, arguments analogous to those raised against intentions. It is shown that Searle's theory of
5 Searle only intermittently displays understanding of the distinction.
6 Skinner supplies other reasons for why Derrida's conditions need not be accepted.
7
Wittgenstein's transitional work, between his 'systematic' and his 'edifying' period, contains his most sustained treatment of
intentionality, and it is ventured here, without being argued, that the continuities found (in 1.4) between Wittgenstein's work at
each of its stages, show that it can more profitably be seen as a whole. In 1.4 Wittgenstein's arguments are applied to a paradigm
ofanalytical philosophy, namely Russell, B.A.W.; 'On Denoting', Mind, vol. XIV, no. 56, pp479-493,1905.
8
Fascinating similarities between Grice's work and Husserl's are noted.
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constitutive, conventional rules for speech acts is internally inconsistent, demanding notions that it
excludes, and that Searle's conspectus of indirect, parasitical speech acts suffers the same
inconsistencies, and compels no distinction of literal and non-literal. Theories of intention and
convention, and a compelling reason for their description by Gricean analysis, await the deliverance of
Lewis in IV.
The kernel of Lewis' argument is that a theory of the conventional in language simply accounts for
the intentional. His work is predicated purely on the notion of rational, social interaction, mutual
knowledge and cooperation, and it solves the sceptical regress of intentions feared by Derrida and
Quine, and brought fully to view by Grice9. His presentation of possible languages, a unique
application of possible worlds for intentionality, constitutes the final, eloquent reply to Derrida, and
offers a theory of analyticity for language responding to Quine's objections. Mutual knowledge
conditions, when applied by Schiffer to the rigorisation of Gricean speech act theory, gives the fullest
such theory, one immune to pragmatist objections.
In the following two sections of the introduction is presented Rorty's and Derrida's meaning-
scepticism, and attendant arguments against intentionality. The discussions initiate the debates taken up
in 1.1-5, which constitute a first response to the arguments of Rorty and Derrida, although Derrida's
raise the issues in Austin which guide the rest of the dissertation. A second response, deriving from
developments of Austin's work, is found in II, a response requiring a rigorised notion of convention,
one, as argued in III, not supplied by Searle but, rather, in IV, by Lewis. Lewis' is a possible worlds
theory of intentionality, one (as described in 1.4), stating a good response to Rorty's rejection of
'representationalisf theories ofmind. A description of its genesis is provided in the following section,
in which suggestions are made to the end that Deleuze's notion of the fold and Plato's khora are
elucidated by its conditions. In IV a possible worlds theory of intentionality constitutes a third response
to meaning-scepticism.
9 See Introduction 3 for the presentation of the sceptical regress in Derrida. As said in footnote 4, owing to the fact that it reflects
on the way in which social convention can arise in a population, and not on the structure of language, Lewis' work is not, by
Rorty's criteria, analytical philosophy (and on Rorty's criteria, see Introduction 2).
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2. Rorty's Mirror Tinted
Rorty considers the old conceit that philosophers discuss eternal and compelling problems, those
perhaps, of the relation of the mind and the body, and of foundationalist claims in epistemology1. It
gives to itself the task of debunking claims to knowledge, and in so doing, tacitly or explicitly, implies
claim to an understanding of the mind and, more perniciously, of rationality, predicated on a notion of
'man-as-knower' of his activity of self-reflection or representation. Such is, for Rorty, characteristic of
the Lockean and Cartesian traditions, alternatives to which were offered by few dissenting voices2.
Attempts to resist the estrangement of disciplines caused by the rise of natural science and
philosophical schools, increased secularisation and specialisation were resisted by the men of letters,
and latterly, the work of Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Dewey continues this critical engagement with
tradition. They are edifying thinkers, rejecting claims for method in philosophy, and, explicitly so in
the cases of Wittgenstein and Heidegger, breaking with Kantian and Cartesian tradition3. They 'set
aside' the search for foundations of knowledge, and so the agonised attempts to refute sceptical
arguments. With new means of doing philosophy, even a new vocabulary, such debates initiated are
rendered otiose4. Fuelled by their example Rorty offers arguments to dismiss both the mind-body
problem and semantic theories that (he thinks) fall within the Russellian and Fregean traditions (which
he explicitly compares to Husserlian phenomenology), those which characterise a Kantian,
'representationalisf philosophy5. Indeed,
Analytic philosophy is one more variant of Kantian philosophy, a variant marked
principally by thinking of representation as linguistic rather than mental, and of
1
Rorty, R.; Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton University Press) 1979, plO. Dancy, X, Introduction to
Contemporary Epistemology (Oxford, Blackwell) 1985, pl97 counsels caution in reading Rorty: the definition of'foundational'
with which he works is never given, and, for Dancy, seems worryingly fluid.
2
Rorty (1979) p4. Rorty offers James and Nietzsche as dissenters.
3
Accounting for Dewey is less simple, for he retained a Hegelian influence, and, as described in a footnote in 1.1, the influence
ofLeibniz, in the light of the theory of intentionality advocated here, is seen to be evenmore compelling.
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Rorty (1979) pl3. For Rorty, the work ofWittgenstein, Heidegger and Dewey evinces a revolutionary philosophy on the model
of Kuhn's revolutionary science; in light of their work philosophy is now done in a new world, with different criteria of
justification and validity. Cf. Ree, J.; 'The End of Metaphysics: Philosophy's Supreme Fiction?', pp3-26 in Holland, A.J. (ed.);
Philosophy, its History and Historiography (Dordrecht, Reidel) 1985 surveys 'end of traditions in histories of philosophy,
reviewing the 'stories' needed to uphold them. Ayers, M.R.; "'The End ofMetaphysics" and the Historiography of Philosophy',
pp27-40 attempts mediation and therapy. For suggestions as to how the 'conversation of mankind' is joined, cf. Munz, P.; 'The
Rhetoric of Rhetoric', Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. LI, no. 1, ppl21-142, 1990, and Bernstein, R.J.; 'Philosophy in the
Conversation of Mankind', The Review of Metaphysics, vol. XXXIII, no., pp745-776, 1980, and (1983) pp46-49. Ayers'
arguments are continued in Hesse, M.; 'Epistemology without Foundations', pp49-68 in Holland (1985), in which she argues
that, despite Rorty's views to the contrary, philosophy still fulfils, 'local tasks', and that hermeneutics underpins epistemology in
a non-foundational way. The distinctions Rorty sets up, and the dismissals he makes, all depend upon 'logic' and 'argument'. On
the problem of defining criteria for enquiry in Kuhnian paradigms, and the consequent free-for-all in interpretation of Kuhn, see
Fox, R., 'State of the Art/Science in Anthropology', pp327-345, in Gross, P.R., Levitt, N. and Lewis, M.W. (eds.); The Flight
from Science andReason (New York Academy of Sciences) 1996. Fox refers to the '...hapless Tom Kuhn...'.
5 It might be suggested that the arguments in 1.1 show that Kant's ambition is achieved by Davidson (but without the
'representationalisf element), and that he offers a solution to Kant's scandal of philosophy: namely, the failure to find secure
foundations for empirical enquiry. (No arguments are offered in 1.1 for this conclusion, it remains a suggestion for further
enquiry).
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philosophy of language rather than "transcendental critique", or psychology, as the
discipline which exhibits the "foundations of knowledge'".
The emphasis upon language changes neither the problems bequeathed by Kantianism, nor the 'self-
image' of the discipline of philosophy, conveying still the presumption that all empirical enquiry is
always framed by presuppositions, imposed by 'man-as-knower', and is so limited7. To this Rorty
contrasts a 'Deweyan' conception of knowledge as justified belief, and counselling an openness to
novelty and revision in the light of new, conflicting evidence8. Pace Wittgenstein and Heidegger,
language is not a mirror but a tool. Wittgenstein argues that there are no necessary conditions of
linguistic representation, and Heidegger that the search for the source of necessary truth should be
replaced by tolerance of newness, or 'strangeness'. This edifying philosophy is 'historicist', warning
against the danger at the core of foundational thinking, namely the temptation to 'eternalise' language-
games or self-images. Analytical philosophy is an attempt to find non-historical conditions for
historical development, indeed, to 'escape' history; the historicist wants to extend the, for Rorty
eminently pragmatist, holistic view of knowledge, propounded by Quine and Davidson.
[Tjhey [Quine, Sellars, Wittgenstein, James] show us that the notion of "accurate
representation" is simply an automatic and empty compliment which we pay to those
beliefs which are successful in helping us to do what we want to do9.
6
Rorty (1979) plO. This is worth quoting in full in light of the many questions under consideration (see especially 1.2 and IV.l-
3). Also of importance is Rorty's claim that the difference between analytic and other philosophy is '...relatively unimportant—a
matter of style and tradition rather than a difference of "method" or of first principles'.
7 Davidson makes the same point, as shown in 1.1. Rorty (1979) p8 argues that an emphasis upon language does not change the
'Cartesian-Kantian problematic', because 'analytic philosophy is still committed to the construction of a permanent, neutral
framework for enquiry, and thus for all culture'. Cf. Kaufmann, F.; 'Cassirer's Theory of Scientific Knowledge', ppl83-213 in
Schilpp, P.A. (ed.); The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer (Northwestern University Press) 1949. Kauftnann argues that Cassirer
belongs to the (phenomenologically inclined) school ofKantians begun by Natorp (pi 85), and cf. Derrida, J.; The Archaeology of
the Frivolous: Reading Condillac (Pittsburgh, Duquesne University) 1980, pp64-65 on scientific discovery and the prior
necessity of a 'certain state of language', a medium for the conditions of discovery.
8 It is important to note that Rorty (1979) p6 reads the Deweyan conception as disabusing one of the idea that there are
constraints on what counts as knowledge; because justification becomes a 'social' phenomenon, there is no 'transaction' between
the knowing subject and reality. Cf. Cerbone, D.R.; 'Proofs and Presuppositions: Heidegger, Searle and the "Reality" of the
"External" World', pp259-278, in Wrathall, M.A and Malpas, J. (eds.); Heidegger, Authenticity and Modernity: Essays in
Honour ofHubert L. Dreyfus: Volume I (MIT) 2000. Cerbone considers Heidegger's response to the 'scandal' of philosophy
stated by Kant: the absence of a proof of the external world, arguing that prior to his detailed response Heidegger attempts a
proof along the lines of G.E. Moore, and in accordance with a notion of engaged agency. Cerbone wonders whether Heidegger's
response is strictly speaking a proof or a rejection of the problem as a pseudo-problem. Engaged agency is compared to Searle's
'Background', of which, Searle says, realism about the external world is a part; a proof thus becomes unnecessary. Cerbone is
alive to the many differences between Searle and Heidegger; his essay is stimulating and fascinating. Additionally, Cerbone
gives a foil review of the consequences for representation of Derrida's arguments. Cf. Murphy, A.E.; 'Dewey's Epistemology
and Metaphysics', ppl92-225 in Schilpp, P.A. (ed.); The Philosophy ofJohn Dewey (New York, Tudor) 1951. Murphy suggests
ways to smooth inconsistencies in Dewey's theories of knowledge. See also Reichenbach, H.; 'Dewey's Theory of Science',
ppl57-192 in Schilpp (1951).
9
Rorty (1979) p6. Wheeler, S.C.; 'The Extension ofDeconstruction', The Monist. vol. T.XTX, no. 1, pp3-20, 1986, considers the
results of similar arguments among philosophers in the phenomenological tradition, adumbrating some connections to the
semantical tradition. Wheeler writes that Derrida shows that 'concern' for reaching conclusions from arguments is 'unjustifiably
narrow'; indeed, a preference for inference in philosophy is a 'prejudice' (p3). Wheeler proceeds to give a 'rational' argument
(plO) for the acceptance of his conclusion (this appears to entail that it defers to Quine and Davidson on indeterminacy and
radical translation), in the spirit ofWittgenstein discarding the ladder up which he has climbed. Among other points raised by
Wheeler, he writes that the logical flaws in the work of Husserl and Levi-Strauss detected in Derrida's early investigations are to
be thought the child of the later work, and thus that Derrida's oeuvre displays a captivating consistency. Quine's arguments
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In denying the existence ofproblems ofmind-body interaction and of intentionality, Rorty states that,
in the philosophy of mind, arguments against Cartesian interaction leave unsolved problems. Feigl's
nomological gap between mental and physical remains, for a mental state is no more like a disposition
or an attitude than it is like a neuron firing10. Other problems derive from the work of the 'neo-
dualists'11. If, as they argue, 'mental' and 'physical' are simply aspects of a single composite organism,
ofwhich propositional attitudes are attributable (in the case of, 'event-like' mental states, such as pains
or sensations, via a physiological description), then, Rorty argues, either mental and physical entities
are identified in descriptions of events reporting two distinct ontological species (immaterial and
material), or the neo-dualists' is truly a dualism without 'ontological gap'. Rorty investigates these
solutions, identifying, for argument's sake, the mental not with material, neural events, but with the
'intentional', or 'phenomenal'. He writes that identifying pains with a coming to believe that one's
bodily tissue is damaged leaves unaccounted the fact of what it is to experience pain (the qualia, the
raw feel), and raises a host of other questions. What is it that has pain? Where is it located? How does
against conventions are given as a paradigm deconstructive argument (p4ff), and for the attack on essences, see Derrida, J.;
'"Genesis and Structure" and Phenomenology', ppl54-168 in Writing and Difference (University of Chicago) 1978, pl62.
Scholes, R.; 'Deconstruction and Communication', Critical Inquiry, vol. XIV, no. 2, pp278-295, 1988, p280 demonstrates just
how potent a tool for beginning a response to Derrida are the notions of radical translation and the indeterminacy of translation,
for in this one looks back to a meaning existing prior to sounds heard; cf. also p288.
With his arguments Rorty can (on pre-eminently Wittgensteinian grounds), make the claim that the distinction between the
'objective knowledge' of traditional systematic philosophy and less privileged discourse (edifying philosophy), is simply that
between nonnal and abnormal discourse in Kuhn's paradigms. Regarding the notion of criteria for enquiry (described above),
Rorty parses Kuhn: normal discourse has publicly accessible criteria, and abnormal discourse lacks it, and Rorty's stated aim is
to demonstrate that the attempt to explicate rationality in terms of the conditions of accurate representation is an effort to
eternalise accepted normal discourse, and that it is '...pictures rather than propositions, metaphors rather than statements, which
determine most of our philosophical convictions', and, without the Kantian picture, '...the notion of knowledge as accuracy of
representation would not have suggested itself. However, McDowell has a fascinating alternative view. McDowell, J.; 'Having
the World in View: Sellars, Kant and Intentionality: I: Sellars on Perceptual Experience', The Journal of Philosophy, vol. XCV,
no. 5, pp431-450, 1998, argues that, '...no one has come closer than Kant to showing us how to find intentionality
unproblematic...'. McDowell concurs with Sellars that study of Kant elucidates intentionality, but adds that Sellars cannot,
owing to other commitments, accept the Kantian position. Getting Kant correct on this reveals, '...how we ourselves ought to
think about intentionality' (p432). He finds a thesis in Sellars (p433), saying that certain mental episodes are characterised as
'blowings', and class humans as 'blowers', but that tire 'conceptual apparatus' employed in making these characterisations, '...is
irreducible to any conceptual apparatus that does not serve to place things in the logical space of reasons'. After finding
difficulties with Sellars' reading ofKant, McDowell takes from Kant the point that intuitions are representations in which objects
are immediately present, and that they represent '"logical" togetherness' (p472) observed via conceptual capacities, and showing
that seeings '"contain" claims about the objective environment'. For Sellars representations are guided to an independent reality.
McDowell replies, following Kant, that objects can be immediately present to consciousness in intuition, and that the due
constraints are applied by perceived objects (p473). Cf. Merleau-Ponty, M.; 'Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence', pp36-
80 in O'Neill, J. (ed.); Phenomenology, Language and Sociology: Selected Essays of Maurice. Merleau-Ponty (London,
Heinemann) (1974a) p86.
Rorty's remarks demonstrate the points at issue above: that the thoughtless distinction between schools of philosophy is
hopelessly myopic and positively deleterious: there is little real difference between the methods of 'analytical' and
'phenomenological' philosophy, and his arguments are, by his own admission, derived from Sellars, Quine, even Ryle, and as
Dolezel, L.; Heterocosmica: Fiction and Possible Worlds (The Johns Hopkins University Press) 1998, ppix-x writes: '[w]e live
in the era of post-structuralism, but this stage of intellectual history is more complex than some of its speakers would have us
believe. To be sure, in Anglo-Saxon post-structuralist academic criticism the French and German philosophical "imports" are
much more popular than the "native" analytic philosophy. But who suffers from this puzzling paradox? Analytic philosophy has
preserved the sober spirit of critical thinking at a time of bloated verbosity. This spirit, which requires controlled theory
formation and testing, precise conceptual analysis, and fair assessment of the ideas of the past, has not died but has carried us into
the computer age'. Cf. also ppl-2 and Ronen, R.; Possible Worlds in Literary Theory (Cambridge University Press) 1994, p6.
10
Rorty (1979) pl7 begins his study of mind-body interaction from the confusion diagnosed by Davidson, namely that the
grounding distinction of all previous, distinctly Cartesian, theories of mind (between the mental and the physical) is not easily
made: cf. 1.1.
11 Much of the discussion in Perry, J.; Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness (MIT) 2001, is directed at neo-dualist theories.
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one come to believe that one has a pain? Will not any such theory, Rorty asks, entail mental
representations? The identification of a thought with a series of neural events is equally unacceptable
for Rorty, for counter-examples could be given to argue that not all who have the thought have the
series of neural events. An analogy between a neural event and a written inscription compels, for Rorty,
the conclusion that there is no interesting problem of intentionality. The meaning of a written
inscription is an immaterial property bound by conventions and a context of collocution; a mental state
is experienced by a functioning physical body, and requires the working and complete correspondence
of its parts. Rorty is explicit: the relationship between an inscription and its meaning is no more
mysterious than that between a man's functional state and the parts of his body12. Functional states are
immaterial, and the problem, such as it is, of the identity of the mental and the physical, is that of
relating to this immateriality13. On Locke's mistaken account, the meaningfiilness of an inscription is a
result of its encoding an idea, but Rorty replies that reading the intentional as, on his terms, the
functional is to hold that neither brain processes nor the marks of ink on paper represent anything
suffused with an idea or thought. It is argued in 1.1 that anomalous monism is a response to Rorty's
arguments14, for it is a theory of intentionality explicitly in response to dualism and yet without any role
for mental representations, but what must be described here are the ways in which a fully worked out
possible worlds theory of intentionality challenges Rorty15.
Rorty's survey of systematic and edifying philosophy, and its appeal to dissenters, relies upon
caricatures too broad to be useful. Missing, and muddying the waters, is Leibniz, the non-pareil of the
man of letters, the most systematic of metaphysicians, and the progenitor of mathematical method in
philosophy16. By way of showing the existence of counter-examples to Rorty's survey, some broad
areas of Leibniz's response to Descartes and Locke shall be described17. This shows Leibniz to be
12 This is the Darwinian view Rorty later advocates, cf. 1.1.
13
Rorty (1979) ppl9 and 22. The main arguments against functionalist, or behaviourist, descriptions are given in Chomsky, N.;
'Review of Verbal Behaviour by B.F. Skinner'. Language, vol. XXXV.no. 1, pp26-58, 1959, especially pp31-39. Skinner holds
that stimulus/response connections are law-like, and Chomsky demolishes the theory. Quine responds to Chomsky's arguments
against dispositions, 'reinforcement' (p29), or 'guiding', in Quine, W.V.O.; 'Methodological Reflections on Current Linguistic
Theory', ppl04-117 in Harrnan, G. (ed.); On Noam Chomsky: Critical Essays (New York, Anchor) 1974. Quine's theory is
studied in 1.5, and doubt cast upon the reasons for which Rorty finds it so appealing.
14 Cf. Norris, C.; 'Reading Donald Davidson: Truth, Meaning and Right Interpretation', pp97-122 in Shusterman, R. (ed.);
Analytic Aesthetics (Oxford, Blackwell) 1989.
15 The description is, in keeping with this section, no more than suggestive, or speculative, but in defence one might appeal to
Rorty's ownmethod in Philosophy and theMirror ofNature which tolerates more generalisation and speculation.
16 One should not necessarily infer disreputable reasons for Leibniz's absence from Rorty's survey, but he simply does not fit.
Here one can only refer the reader to the work of authors of excellent work on Leibniz's singular place in the history of
philosophy, namely, Brown, S.; Leibniz (Sussex, Harvester) 1984. Indeed, on p207 Brown writes that Rorty might find in Leibniz
an 'ally' for the criticism of foundationalist philosophy. See also Jolley, N.; 1984 p2. Hoffman 1974 argues that Leibniz came to
mathematical method late, indeed, after the Paris years and the encounter with Descartes. Cf. Brown (1984) pp37-41.
17
Brown, S.; 'Leibniz's Break with Cartesian "Rationalism"', ppl 95-208 in Holland (1985). Brown argues, against accepted
interpretations of Leibniz, that Leibniz neither followed Descartes nor was a rationalist, countenancing the possibility of
'...adopting principles which are not intuitively known as a means of advancing a constructive metaphysics...'. Integral history
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resolutely anti-Cartesian, and not by any means a foundationalist philosopher in Rorty's sense. His
reflections are underpinned not by reflection on the actual structure of the world and its constituents but
by reflection on possible worlds and the states of affairs that may be instantiated in each. Each possible
world and each contained state of affairs is a monad, or a perspective, on each other world and state of
affairs, and the development of such a theory of possibilia with reference to a theory of intentionality
(by Hintikka and Lewis among many others), offers, it shall be suggested (especially in 1,3 and IV. 5), a
response to theories such as Derrida's emphasising the inevitable relativisation of utterances to
conditions imposed by their contexts.
To Descartes' denial of the possibility of a proof of the existence of the external world, Leibniz
replies that, notwithstanding his belief in the goodness of God rendering him unable to deceive,
Descartes' arguments are unconvincing: consistent with his belief in the omniscience of God and that
his creation of the world was a choice of one from an infinity of possible worlds, one might maintain,
Leibniz argues, that it is to good purpose that the constitution of the external world be a delusion18. One
might, from experience, convince oneself of its reality, but nothing constitutes conclusive proof9.
Furthermore, Leibniz rejects distinctions between primary and secondary qualities, and the conception
ofmatter as substantial and a continuum, with the capacity for infinite divisibility. (Deleuze considers
this a characteristic of the fold). Leibniz also rejects Descartes' arguments for the peculiar qualities of
size, figure and motion as characteristic ofmatter in its extension, arguing that properties of dimension
and spatial disposition are always relative to an observer20. (Again as Deleuze writes, matter is not,
'...composed of substances, but in some sense "results from" them'. It is described in 1.4 how this
occurs).
The world chosen by God could not be better; any change would upset the perfect balance of
compossibilities, indeed, this is why God chose it21. All exigencies and quiddities are worthy of
of philosophy may lionise Leibniz and Descartes, but, Brown argues, Leibniz would have one adopt a position far more
congenial to Rorty, regarding, '...past philosophy as a series of errors brought about by one-sidedness...', and advocating that
mediation between competing theories is the due method for choice between them.
18
Koyre, A.; 'Leibniz and Newton', pp239-279 in Frankfurt, H.G. (ed.); Leibniz: A Collection ofCritical Essays (University of
Notre Dame) 1976, describes how Leibniz's theory of possibilia informed his dispute with Newton. Cf. Kaufmann (1949) pl90.
One might speculate on the profit of comparing the ramifications of the denial of existence as a predicate in Derrida and Kant.
Cf. Derrida, J.; 'Difference', ppl-28 mMargins ofPhilosophy (Sussex, Harvester) 1982, p6.
Kripke (1980) p45 notes the similarity of possible worlds and counterpart theory to Everett and Wheeler's interpretation of
quantum mechanics. Cf. Girle, R.; Possible Worlds (Buckinghamshire, Acumen) 2003, ppl43-156, and Bradley, R. and Schwarz,
N.; Possible Worlds: An Introduction to Logic and its Philosophy (Oxford, Blackwell) 1979, ppl04-108.
19 Cf. Leibniz, G.W.; 'On the Radical Origination of Things', pp789-798 in Loemker, L. (ed.); Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz:
Philosophical Papers and Letters, Volume II (University ofChicago) 1956, p.
20 Brown (1984) pp42-43.
21 Without this reason he would have chosen nothing. His conditions on choice are not always pellucid, cf. Mates, B.; The
Philosophy ofLeibniz: Metaphysics and Language (Oxford University Press) 1986, p70; for instance, does he choose the world
with most 'essence', achieving 'maximum effect with minimum outlay', or one simple in law and rich in phenomena?
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In Hardt, M. and Negri, A.; Empire (Harvard University Press) 2000, the authors see a connection between the notion of
teleology in Marxian materialism and the argument of Spinoza and Leibniz, that a leading consciousness, or prophet, produces its
own people by the choice of a pre-determined possible world. This, Hardt and Negri argue, was Spinoza's contribution at the
dawn ofmodernity. Spinoza thinks the 'desire' of a prophet to create a world compelling and 'irresistible' to the multitude, and
Hardt and Negri recall Marx's remark that the prize of the communist revolution is the world. (One might also Hobbes' of the
relation between the people and the state). This Hardt and Negri place in opposition to the Machiavellian notion that revolution,
the creation of a new society, needs violent upheaval. Both The Prince and the CommunistManifesto, the authors say, drawing
upon the work of Althusser, share a common structure, negotiating a dialogue between subject and object. Both see this dialogue
as constituting a working-out, resulting in a production, of a 'self-constituting collective action'. ((2000) p63). (Hardt and Negri's
link to the res gestae of Augustus is vital, for this was written to include nothing which could be in the context of the decision¬
making of the lull Roman senate: the input of Augustus' auctoritas is problematical). The significant differences between
Machiavelli and Marx lie in the fact that the Manifesto argues for a teleology of subject and object and The Prince a Utopia.
Significantly, Althusser shows that both have consequences for practice; both view the 'present as empty for the future'.
However, the Utopian vision ofMachiavelli works to distance the subject and the object, and 'postmodern liberation' (a wresting
of the sources of repetition, or of production, from out of a handful of global sources that are 'blind to the sense' of the
'apparatuses of the reproduction of life'), requires a new theory of political subjectivity, one that views the subject as prone to a
'self-production'; for this Hardt and Negri defer to Spinoza and Leibniz, noting analogies for a full theory of self-production.
Spinoza's (and Leibniz's) response to Machiavelli could run: one requires nothing for one's self-production than what one has by
virtue of being a human being: one's individual creative powers, those shared with one's fellows. We are, as Hardt and Negri
say, the motors or repetition. The revolution is created in the space between the intentional subject and the object (in the fold).
Interestingly, considering Negri's position at the time of writing: ' [t]he kind of arms in question may be contained in the potential
of the multitude to sabotage and destroy with its own productive force the parasitical order of postmodern command' (pp65-66).
(One might have concerns that Hardt and Negri's gives too little scope for united action). The dialectic set up in the dichotomy
Hardt and Negri mark must take place in the broader dialectic of communism as a product of capitalism, as its necessary
outgrowth. Cf. especially Rigby, S.LL; Marxism and History—A Critical Introduction (Manchester University Press) 1987, and
especially Cohen, G.A.; KarlMarx's Theory ofHistory—A Defence (Oxford, Clarendon) 1978. On Cohen and the brilliant work
of Jon Elster, see Carling, A.; 'Rational Choice Marxism', ppl85-227, in Cowling, M. and Wilde, L. (eds.) Approaches toMarx
(Milton Keynes, Open University Press) 1989. See also Paxton, S., in Cowling, M. (ed.); The Communist Manifesto: New
Interpretations (Edinburgh University Press) 1998. On the translation, and so the interpretation, of theManifesto see Carver, T.
in Cowling (ed.) (1998).
Popper marks the rise of relativism (a species, for Popper, of tyranny and fascism), and links it to a pervasive view that truth
theories are incommensurable (as Popper understands the term, cf. Bernstein (1983)), and that choice between theories can be
made on grounds no more secure than those of preference and likelihood. Popper, K.R.; The Open Society and its Enemies:
Volume II, The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx and the Aftermath (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul) 1945. See
especially addendum I. Popper's solution is to offer a 'dose of Tarski's theory of truth' (p369), and to refer the reader to his own
'non-authoritarian theory of knowledge' (developed in Conjectures and Refutations and The Logic of Scientific Discovery).
Again, the connection to theories of coercion and coerciveness are clear, and cf. Nozick, R; 'Coercion', ppl5-44 in Socratic
Puzzles (Harvard University Press) (1997a). See also Pennock, J.R and Chapman, J.W. (eds.); Coercion (Chicago, Aldine-
Atherton) 1972, especially Held, V.; 'Coercion and Coercive Offers', pp49-62. The study of coercive wage offers is undertaken
in Zimmerman, D.; 'Coercive Wage Offers', Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. X, no. 2, ppl21-145, 1981. Nozick's theory of
moralised capitalist coercion (one either starves or works for one who has exercised only their Lockean natural rights), is studied
in Wertheimer, A.; Coercion (Princeton University Press) 1987, especially pp242-266. Wertheimer develops a theory of
intentionality, and, vitally, drawing on the Kantian doctrine of freedom, studying the potential for constraints to be placed on
intentional and non-intentional acts, and the ways in which one's freedom to act intentionally or non-intentionally can be
compromised. (Cf. Hardt and Negri (2000) pp63ff). Wertheimer emphasises that a theory of intentionality is a theory of freedom.
Cohen has been the most vocal critic of moralised coercion, see Cohen, G.A.; 'Robert Nozick and Wilt Chamberlain: How
Patterns Preserve Liberty', in Arthur, J. and Shaw, W. (eds.); Justice and Economic Distribution (New Jersey, Prentice-Hall)
1978, and 'Capitalism, Freedom and the Proletariat', in Ryan, A. (ed.); The Idea of Freedom (Oxford University Press) 1979.
Nozick seems to regard 'capitalism' as a purely market-based approach to ethics, and yet to face down all objections to it (that it
is unfair, unjust, immoral), on the basis that these prejudices are held in the face of all logic and 'facts or history or economics':
Nozick, R.; 'Why do Intellectuals Oppose Capitalism?', pp280-295 in (1997d) p282. Nozick is guilty of massive generalisation.
It is interesting to note that Nozick argues that intellectuals' desire for freedom from coercion contradicts their 'general leftward
tilt' (p280), and that Cohen, G.A.; 'Why One Kind of Bullshit Flourishes in France' (typescript, Oxford) (2002b) traces the
flannel of some French Marxist intellectuals to defects in French academia: the absence of peer review and the cultivation of the
cult of the solitary intellectual.
The view of Popper, and, in numerous senses, Russell (and recall his turning to Kant for his arguments for idealism), of Hegel
as amoral, and as providing a foundation for fanaticism and Nazism is demolished in Kaufmann, W.; 'The Hegel Myth and its
Method', pp21-60 in Maclntyre, A. (ed.); Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays (New York, Anchor) 1972. The essay is
particularly good, for Popper is accused of the lowest, most dishonest scholarship. Kaufmann states a principle vital for the
theory of intentionality that must be written: having received the attention of numerous great philosophers, the work of the
subject was to define its age in a way not captured in the arts and religion, and, '...the philosopher's task was to comprehend
what the religious person and the poet feel' (p21). Kaufmann also has doubts about the pragmatist adoption of Hegel (p22) and
Popper's conviction that the pragmatist theory of truth derives from Hegel. See Popper, K.R.; The Open Society and its Enemies:
Volume I, The Spell ofPlato (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul) 1945, p274. The rejection of the pragmatist theory of truth
leads to a rejection of 'criteria' theories (pp371ff).
The theory of truth Popper advocates consists of the success of a statement in accounting for the corresponding facts, or state of
affairs, and this, as he says, is derivative of a Tarskian truth theory. (See Popper (1945b) p39). Cf. Miller, R.W.; Fact and
Method: Explanation, Confirmation and Reality in the Natural and Social Sciences (Princeton University Press) 1987. Miller
argues that the relativism of Barthes or Foucault or Derrida is not justified by the multiplicity of narratives that may be written
(or read) for a text. One can relinquish the notion that fields such as literary interpretation and musical analysis have foundations
as they describe them, and 'no crisis' follows. 'For accepting a theory, approach, or explanation only requires belief in its
adequacy to cope with the phenomena' (p501). Miller's is an excellent work of admirable breadth, and on the consequences for
an approach to a theory of intentionality see ppl 17ff. One might find a connection in Doleiel, L.; Heterocosmica: Fiction and
Possible Worlds (The Johns Hopkins University Press) 1998, px. Philosophical realism, even about possible worlds, is no
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sufferance, for the actual world is the best of all possible worlds; in its balance and totality all that it
contains is for the good22. God's choice is not founded on his foreknowledge of the ways of actual
things, for all of the ways of all things are known to him. His choice ranges over all of them. The world
he chooses for actualisation is a vast network of interconnections, linking past, present and future, and
knowable only to him23: in this world Jesus dies on the cross, is denied and is betrayed and so forth (for
all the details of Jesus' life); that is, by the 'actual world' Leibniz means the, '...whole series and the
whole collection of all existent things, lest one might say that several worlds exist at different times and
different places. For the whole collection must needs be reckoned together as one world'24. In the actual
world there may be found another sense of 'possible' governing repetition: all events linked to this
world have occurred, are occuring or will occur, they are all ordained at the instantiation of the world;
this, evidently, excludes from occuring in the actual world all of the possibilities excluded by the
choice of this as the actual world25. Leibniz writes of his theory of repetition,
commitment to literary realism; indeed, Dolezel emphasises his case against mimesis. (Of interest concerning the other themes
with which this dissertation deals are Dolezel (1998) pp24-25 finding in Ingarden a possible worlds semantics. Cf. Ronen (1994)
pp2-3. Dolezel (1998) p231 discerns a possible worlds poetics in Bodmer, Breitinger and, most significantly, Baumgarten).
22 Mates (1986) p70. Although humans are given only a knowledge of a brief period of time, Leibniz writes that '...from such
slight experience we venture to judge about the immeasurable and the eternal... Ifwe look at a very beautiful picture but cover up
all of it but a tiny spot, whatmorewill appear in it, no matter how closely we study it, than a confused mixture of colours without
beauty and without art? Yet when the covering is removed and the whole painting is viewed from a position that suits it, we
come to understand that what seemed to be a thoughtless smear on the canvas has really been done with the highest artistry by
the creator of the world'. For most contemporary metaphysicians, a possible world is one in which, say, Nixon prosecutes the
Vietnam war, defeats Humphrey, and so forth, but is not interdicted; for Leibniz, this would not have been Nixon, for it does not
describe Nixon in all of his essential properties. This groups Leibniz with although Ishiguro, H.; argues otherwise.
Rescher, N.; A Theory of Possibilia: A Constructivistic and Conceptualistic Account of Possible Individuals and Possible
Worlds (University of Pittsburgh) 1975, pxi lists progenitors of theories of possibility: '...Aristotle, the Scholastics, Leibniz,
Meinong, McTaggart and the later Carnap. These writers are linked by a common tendency of metaphysical concern and
perspective that no amount of substantive disagreement can altogether remove...'. (Rescher shows that Hobbes' and Rorty's
view of intentionality as a phantom of the scholastics is echoed by Ramsey). Cf. White, M.G.; 'The Analytic and the Synthetic:
An Untenable Dualism', pp272-286 in Linsky, L. ; Semantics and the Philosophy of Language (University of Illinois) 1952, p
for a connection between modern dualists' and scholastic distinctions between essence and accident. Excellent relevant studies
are Knudsen, C.; 'Intentions and Impositions', pp479-495 in Kretzmann, N., Kenny, A. and Pinborg, J. (eds.); The Cambridge
History of Later Mediaeval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery ofAristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism, 1100-1600
(Cambridge University Press) 1982. Knudsen discusses the derivation of intentio from Al-farabi and Avicenna: their terms
ma 'qui and ma 'na are cognates of noema in Aristotle. On p492 Knudsen describes the scholastic distinction between first and
second intentions, and argues that the latter define 'conventional' signs and the former quiddities. This raises the fascinating
prospect that the approach to intentionality offered in this dissertation is of a part with scholastic tradition.
That the discussion of intentionality among the soholastics was already framed in the terms of the form-matter dichotomy,
derived from classical Greek science, is seen in Brentano, F.; Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (London, Routledge)
1995. This is nowhere described better than in Sorabji, R.; 'Intentionality and Physiological Processes: Aristotle's Theory of
Sense-Perception, ppl95-225 in Nussbaum, M. and Rorty, A.O. (eds.); Essays on Aristotle's De Anima (Oxford, Clarendon)
1992, and 'From Aristotle to Brentano: The Development of the Concept of Intentionality', pp227-259 in Blumenthal, H. and
Robinson, H. (eds.); Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy: Supplementary Volume 1991: Aristotle and the Later Tradition
(Oxford, Clarendon) 1991. See also Weisheipl, J.A.; "The Interpretation of Aristotle's Physics and the Science of Motion',
pp521-536; Wippel, J.F.; 'Essence and Existence', pp385-410, and McCord Adams, M.; 'Universals in the Early Fourteenth
Century', pp410-439 in Kretzmann, Kenny and Pinborg (1982). Sorabji is convinced that 'fruitful' interpretations ofAristotle are
frequently distortions, and recall that Brentano devotes a chapter of his work on Aristotle to conflicting interpretations. Geach
writes that the lack of a notion of intentio 'brought Greek science to an end'. (Anscombe, G.E.M. and Geach, P.T.; Three
Philosophers (Oxford, Blackwell) 1973, pp95ff). On p93 a connection is described between the notions of intentionality and of
'intensity'. Geach also shows that the Hegelian metaphor of gustation as the paradigm of an intentional relationship pre-empts
the master/slave relationship in Marx and Aquinas' discussion of form and matter.
23
Although, Leibniz allows, science and philosophy allow one to know some of the relations.
24 Mates (1986) pp70-71.
25 Likewise other possible worlds are collections of things. Mates (1986) p72. The distinction between actual and compossible is
that in contemporary metaphysics between necessary and contingent truth, and reference to entities in contexts of quantification.
(Kripke, of course, says that this is not analyticity, although Lewis, as described in IV, argues that a theory of analyticity may be
derived from notions of necessity and contingency in a possible worlds theory). Analytic statements are said to hold necessarily,
xi
[ajbout sensible things one can know nothing more, nor ought one to desire to know
more, than that they are consistent with each other as well as with rational principles that
cannot be doubted, and hence that future events can to some extent be foreseen from
past. To seek any other truth or reality than what this contains is vain and sceptics ought
not to demand any other, nor dogmatists pursue it26.
Each thing is determined in all of its aspects: Adam is one and unique, there is no other with his
properties: wife of Eve, father of Cain and so forth; such 'complete individual concepts' are not
'indeterminate', but are rather comprehensively described in their past, present and future27. Each
complete individual concept is 'compossible' with every other complete individual concept with which
it may appear, and taken together as a set, they are 'maximal'. Not every collection of complete
individual concepts arbitrarily thrown together instantiates a possible world. Each and every object in a
possible world, and their corresponding concepts, must allow no contradictions: the statements, 'A
exists', 'B exists', 'C...' (and so forth for all objects in the world), must all be consistent. There must
be no indeterminacy between propositions and concepts, for in all worlds, each concept 'mirrors' every
other in that world; there is a place in each for the role played by every other compossible object. 'Each
individual of the actual world is related to all the others, and every relation is "grounded" in accidents
of the substances related; the same would be true of any other possible world'28. If two concepts inhere
in a possible world, then they are together present or absent in every possible world; it is, as Mates
says, a transitive relation29. Each world contains everything compossible with what it contains: it is
in all possible worlds, and synthetic, contingent statements to report something thought true of this, but not all, worlds. (Mates
writes, in line with other interpretations of Leibniz, that a theory of possibilia is often hard to square with positions upheld in
Leibniz's journal). See also Mates (1986) pp73-74.
26 Mates (1986) p69. For Brown (1984) pp46-47 this paradigm of modem science belies yet a strong scholasticism. Descartes
places himself in relation to ancient and modem sceptics in his ambition to find sure foundations for philosophy and science,
aiming to assimilate the best of the lessons from both traditions, establishing piecemeal indubitable foundations and progress. It
is not the project ofCartesian rationalism to which Leibniz objects, for he uses the methods of the exact sciences and geometry,
but that Descartes never carries it out consistently and fully. Leibniz (1956) p notes the model of geometry.
27 Leibniz emphasises that being made actual does not change objects.
28 Mates (1986) pp76. Mates makes clear that, as with much Leibniz exegesis, there are ambiguities. 'Commentators have
wondered how the existence of one individual could preclude that of another, especially since Leibniz denies the reality of
relations. It is not surprising that they are puzzled, for Leibniz himself says "[i]t is as yet unknown to men, whence arises the
incompossiblity of diverse things, or how it can happen that diverse essences are opposed to each other, seeing that all purely
positive terms seem to be compatible inter se'". Mates continues (pp76-77) that the mirroring principle implies that concepts in
different possible worlds are incompossible. Adam would have been different if he had not been the husband of Eve, and Eve
different if she had not been the wife of Adam: they depend upon each other. The concept involves all of his progeny, including,
of course, ourselves. This is also a reciprocal relationship, for if any of the members of the human race had not existed, Adam
would not have existed. As Mates (pp78-80) writes, there are plainly difficulties, primarily those concerning the fact that
everything appears to depend for its existence upon that of something else.
29 Thus there are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive equivalence classes. (Mates (1986) p77). The connection between the
notions of compossibility and maximality are described in Mates, B.; 'Leibniz on Possible Worlds', pp335-364 in Frankfurt
(1976) especially pp340-341. That the relationship is one of mirroring has been established. Complete individual concepts in
worlds are compossible: they constitute a maximal set: each compatible with every other, and each relation grounded in the
absolutely simple, monadic properties of each. For Leibniz, it is of the constitution of Adam that he is father of Cain; if he is not,
he is not Adam. Furthermore, God only had choice as to whether Judas should exist, not whether he would betray: it was, plainly,
for the best that Judas did sin. On this view of possible worlds, there are no two worlds in one of which Judas sins and in the
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maximal. A world containing Adam necessarily contains Eve, Cain, Abel and so forth; it is not possible
to create a world containing Adam without it containing Eve and so forth30. Furthermore, every world
containing Adam and Eve and so forth contains every other complete individual concept that is
compossible with them31. (Leibniz's nominalism denies existence to abstract entities, or unactualised
possibilia. Statements about possiblia and abstractions are, Mates argues, compendia loquendi for
statements about actual individuals. Mates writes that references to possible objects can be replaced, so
to display the inherent quantifications)32.
The best study of the way in which Leibniz's work is a good response to dualism is Badiou's review
ofDeleuze's work on Leibniz. Badiou writes ofDeleuze and Leibniz that both conceive of'discord' or
contradiction as holding not between the true and the false, the actual and the non-actual, but between
'...possible and possible'33. Like Leibniz's monadology Deleuze's book is, '...a vision and a
conception of our world'34. While Leibniz splices this with his theology and his predestinarianism,
Deleuze does not, although both, for Badiou, conceive of the world as a continuum, an 'enlarged
chromatism', encompassing all compossible states of affairs35. Badiou writes that for both Leibniz and
Deleuze '[a] discord is the "and" of the concord', although again, one should add that Leibniz gives, in
the choice of the best possible world, an at least partial resolution of the discordance36.
second of which he does not. It is not the case that although no concept obtains in two possible worlds, attributes constituting
concepts remain the same across possible worlds. Mates (1976) pp343-344 raises problems with this notion.
30
Nothing merely similar will suffice.
31 Mates (1986) p78. 'There are infinitely many [possible] worlds, we are told, and each world contains infinitely many concepts;
every individual concept belongs to exactly one world. Since Adam exists, there is no nonactual possible world W such that
Adam would have existed if God had created W.
In view of certain controversies in the literature it is also worth pointing out that the possible worlds must clearly be restricted
to collections of concepts of created or to-be-created individual substances. God himself stands outsude the actual world, which
he created, and also outside all of the other possible worlds he considered in so doing. I [Mates] believe further that not only does
Leibniz deny reality, that is, existence in the actual world, to all abstract entities (such as numbers, geometric figures, Platonic
ideas), but that he would not reckon any concepts of these as belonging to other possible worlds. It is not a contingent fact that
these tilings do not exist; such questions as "[w]hat if, in addition to individuals, there had existed sets of individuals?", would
not, for him, even make sense'.
32 Mates (1986) pp73. 'This is not to say that it would make sense, in Leibnizean terms, to assert that a possible object is an
individual concept; presumably the individual concept of Pegasus is not a possible horse: it is not by chance that concepts, like
wishes, arc not horses'. Mates gives the necessary rephrasings on pp73-74. Cf. Mates (1976) p338. Adam, Caesar and Nixon
have complete individual concepts corresponding to existent individuals, Pegasus does not. The complete individual concepts of
fictional individuals are studied in Kripke (1980) p. A full study is Thomasson, A.L.; Fiction arid Metaphysics (Cambridge
University Press) 1999.
33 Badiou, A.; 'Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque', pp in Boundas, C. and Olkowski, D. (eds.); Gilles Deleuze
and the Theatre ofPhilosophy (New York, Routledge) 1994, p51.
34 Badiou (1994) p51.
35 Badiou (1994) p52.
36 Badiou (1994) p52. The analogy is to unresolved chords in music.
See the contributions to Iseminger, G. (ed.); Intention and Interpretation (Temple University Press) 1992, and Sheppard, A.;
Aesthetics: An Introduction to the Philosophy ofArt (Oxford University Press) chapters 6 and 7. For a comprehensive survey of
the use of possible worlds semantics in literary criticism, cf. Mihailescu, C-A. and Hamarnah, W. (eds.J; Fiction Updated:
Theories ofFictionality, Narratology and Poetics (University of Toronto) 1996. See also Pavel, T.G.; Fictional Worlds (Harvard
University Press) 1986. Pavel surveys modal semantics for application to fictional and quantificational contexts, for it,
'... proposes a representation of possibility and necessity that allows truth and falsity to apply to statements about nonactual
entities and situations' (p44). Lyotard, J-F.; 'The Differend, the Referent and the Proper Name', Diacritics, vol. XIV, no. 3, pp4-
14, 1984, raises many difficulties for direct reference. Cf. p6 and an intimation of possible worlds. See also Hutchinson, S.;
Cervantine Journeys (University of Wisconsin Press) 1992. Hutchinson makes suspect use of possible worlds semantics. A good
survey of competing theories of narratology is Culler, J.; 'Problems in the Theory of Fiction', Diacritics, vol. XIV, no. 1, pp2-l 1,
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Badiou lists three points, found in Leibniz, characterising Deleuze's notion of the fold. They go to
show that the fold is simply a possible world. The first two points may seem contradictory, but they
are, as should be clear from what has preceded, not so. Firstly, it is, like Derrida's dissemination in its
role as surplus an, ' ...antiextensioncil concept of the multiple', irreducible to any simple 'composition',
and, in its constitution and construction (like a possible world), irreducibly complex37. Secondly, the
fold is an 'antidiabetic', thoroughly anti-Cartesian, concept of events, or, with Davidson, of
'singularity'. Events, or states of affairs, are not individuated by thoughts, but by their potential for
compossibility, and it is this that permits the multiple38. Thirdly, and following closely, the fold is
categorically anti-Cartesian, '(or anti-Lacanian'), in its rejection of the idea that there is a peculiarly
human genius, instantiating mental structures, characterising the representative powers of a subject,
replacing it with the notion of the mirroring potential of ultimately simple, atomic monads. The notion
of subjectivity, or of representation, that it permits is that by which effects may be registered in
compossibility with other monads; or, in familiar terms the monad is '... a "communicating" figure of
absolute inferiority, equivalent to the world, ofwhich it is a point of view'39.
For Badiou, the fold, in forming a multiple from simple compositions, occupies precisely the point
between the absolutely perspicuous and the irreducibly opaque occupied by a possible world and each
of its instantiated states of affairs, and the notions of order out of chaos, of the choice of a possible
world for actualisation, characterise the theory of intentionality offered in 1.4. The choice of one from
the multiple permitting this 'chiarascuro', this tint, Badiou says, allows for representation, revealing the
1984. Dole2el (1998) argues that possible worlds semantics gives the needed theory ofpoesis for literary narratology. He writes
that this narrows the focus of narrative as fiction. "The universe of possible worlds is constantly expanding and diversifying
thanks to the incessant world-constructing activity of human minds and hands. Literary fiction is probably the most active
experimental laboratory of die world-constructing enterprise'. Dolegel's view is that thinking about fictional worlds is rigorised
by considering the arguments (of Russell, Meinong, Donnellan and so forth), concerning fictional, and non-existent, entities and
objects.
Dolezel (1998) p23 says that possible worlds semantics for literary theory 'respects the incompleteness', of fictional worlds.
Denying them incompleteness is to treat them as real. Cf. Ronen (1994) p9. On ppl46-147 Dolezcl considers performatives as
world constructions, and he deals swiftly with Searle's arguments for truth in fiction. Russell's rejection ofmodality is broached
in Dolezel (1998) pp2ff. All ofRussell's points in the theory of descriptions are given to the end that there is one, '...legitimate
universe of discourse'. Dolefel's criticism of Frege's difficulties concerning fictional entities are undercut by Evans' arguments
(as given in 1.2).
37 Badiou (1994) p52.
38 Badiou (1994) pp56-57. Chihara, C.S.; The Worlds ofPossibility: Modal Realism and the Semantics ofModal Logic (Oxford,
Clarendon) 1998, argues in detail that one can assess modalities without relativisation to possible worlds. Cf. also Chisholm,
R.M.; "The Structure of States of Affairs', ppl07-l 14 in Vermazen, B. and Hintikka, M.B. (eds.); Essays on Davidson: Actions
and Events (Oxford, Clarendon) 1985. Chisholm returns to a old debate between himself and Davidson: are events things or
states of affairs? Chisholm entertains no commitment to possible entities or worlds.
39 Badiou (1994) p52, 'The world as such will no longer be the fantasy of the All, but the pertinent hallucination of the "inside as
pure outside"'. Also pp61-63. In a discussion ofkhora Derrida, J.; 'Whom to Give to: Knowing not to Know', ppl51-174 in Rde,
J. and Chamberlain, J. (eds.); Kierkegaard: A Critical Reader (Oxford, Blackwell) 1995, pl58 writes of the incommensurability
of inferiority and exteriority as the 'paradox of faith'. See also 'Khora', pp231-262 in Wolfreys, J. (ed.); The Derrida Reader:
Writing Performances (Edinburgh University Press) 1998. On Schopenhauer's relation to Leibniz, cf. Htibscher, A.; The
Philosophy ofSchopenhauer in its Intellectual Context: Thinker against the Tide (Lewiston, Edwin Mellen) 1989, pp248-274.
For notions of intentionality and representation, cf. pp251-252, and Schopenhauer, A.; On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of
SufficientReason (La Salle, Open Court) 1974.
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structure of 'our world'; he adds that the multiple and the simple, and their composition, raise
difficulties for Deleuze's theory40: the ultimate simple (or one), Deleuze says, invoking his classical
heritage, is a point without matter (it is, in Leibniz's terms, khora), a vessel instantiating all of the
conditions of all possible states of affairs, yet bearing none, able to represent all compossible monads.
As Badiou says, this brings continual ambivalence concerning notions of'belonging', and 'inclusion',
of singular and composite states of affairs, but again with reference to 1.4, he says that in description
are concepts, objects and subjects, formed in states of affairs, instantiated4'.
You will then not find a case of the multiple, but a description of its figures, and, even
more so, of the constant passage from one figure to another; you will not find a concept
of the multiple, but the narration of its being-as-world, in the sense that Deleuze says
very rightly that Leibniz's philosophy is the "signature of the world" and not the "symbol
of a cosmos"; and neither will you find a theory of the subject, but an attentiveness to, a
registering of the point of view that every subject can be resolved into and which is itself
the term of a series that is likely to be divergent or without reason42.
That is, neither the relation of the one and the multiple, the one and the one, nor the multiple and the
multiple, can be made by anything other than description, narration, or 'enunciation'. For Badiou, this
neatly avoids the problems raised by Plato and Descartes regarding the possibility of clear and distinct
ideas, for Deleuze and Leibniz favour neither the clear nor the obscure, arguing that ideas must be
worked and read off from the constitution of the world, for there is a, ' tincture of the idea', obviating
the stasis of dualism or dialectic. Dualism is, both Deleuze and Leibniz agree, '...foreign to the life of
the world'43.
In the following section is given a brief conspectus of Derrida's response to Austin, framing the
substantive issues for debate in the rest of the dissertation. This is not to say that what has gone is
merely preliminary, for the case for an unashamedly 'representationalist' theory returns in 1.4, where it
is argued that Wittgenstein's picture theory supplies the means by which statements match the world,
40 Badiou (1994) pp52-53.
41 Badiou (1994) p53, and pp54-55 and 63-69.
42 Badiou (1994) p54.
43 Badiou (1994) pp58-61.
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theory of convention, derived from his work in possible
pragmatist (Darwinian, cf. 1.1), theory ofmeaning.
XVI
3. Convention, Intention and Repetition
Derrida studies the concept of the transmittable, unique meaning or content described in and
presupposed by the word 'communication". There is, he thinks, a presumption in asking after it, for if
it were found to possess several meanings, irreducible to one another, there could be no a priori
definition, and this is implied by its application across the fields of semantics, semiotics and linguistics,
for communication also denotes non-semantic, gestural, or 'real' communication, and how might one
account for this?2 Communication may have no connection to meaning whatsoever (Derrida suggests
passage between places, and the transmission of earth tremors), yet the force of the analogy should not
be overstated, because in acknowledging it, the '...value of the notion of literal meaning appears more
problematical than ever...', and because metaphorical displacement to non-semantic cases ('transport')
is, '...precisely constitutive of the concept of metaphor with which one claims to comprehend the
semantic displacement that is brought about from communication as a non-semio-linguistic
phenomenon to communication as a semio-linguistic phenomenon'3. This abundance of meaning, this
polysemy, exceeds even dissemination4. A candidate for limiting the field is determinate context,
1 Derrida, J., 'Signature Event Context', Glyph. Vol. I, ppl72-197, 1977.
2 Both Strawson and Norris note the presumption. (Strawson, P.F.; 'Meaning and Truth', ppl70-189 in Logico-Linguistic Papers
(London, Methuen & Co.) 1971, pl71 and Norris, C.; The Contest of Faculties: Philosophy and Theory after Deconstruction
(London, Methuen) 1985, pl95). It is a virtue of Grice's (and Gricean) theory ofmeaning intentions that it theorises intentions in
communication without reference to the fact ofwhether they are verbal or non-verbal. Plainly, this is a distinction which Derrida
would not allow can be overridden, but it is the case that Grice's voice is inexplicably missing from the Derrida/Searle exchange.
3 Both this and the previous quotation are from Derrida (1977) pl73. ('Transport' also guides the movement between e and a in
Derrida (1982) p5. Derrida's arguments against Saussure are a further source of arguments against the thesis of conventions of
language. Cf. especially p7 and pplOff). Language is thus, for Derrida, 'constructivist' in the sense described by Ortony, A.;
'Metaphor: A Multidimensional Problem', ppl-16 in Ortony, A. (ed.); Metaphor and Thought (Cambridge University Press)
1979.
For DoleZel (1998) p21 readers access fictional worlds in acts of communication between author and reader, pending 'semiotic
mediation' and 'information processing'. Both author and reader construct worlds; the book serves as an 'instruction manual' for
the process. A reader, pace Nussbaum, integrates fictional worlds into his experience as readily as reality. Cf. Schultz, R.A.;
'Analogues of Argument in Fictional Narrative', Poetics, vol. VIII, nos. 1 and 2, pp231-244, 1979. Currie, G.; 'Desire in
Imagination', pp201-221 in Gendler, T.S. and Hawthorne, J. (eds.); Conceivability and Possibility (Oxford, Clarendon) 2002
examines the roles of imagination in conceiving alternative possibilities, making use of Nussbaum's argument that engagement
with literature assists in the creation ofjudicious judges, fulfilling the condition required in Lewis and Rawls (and, Currie says, in
Adam Smith) (p204). His prime concern is with how the postulation and assessment of alternative moralities (worlds) can make
one a better person. Cf. Castaneda, FI-N.; 'Fiction and Reality: Their Fundamental Connections: An Essay on the Ontology of
Total Experience', Poetics, vol. VIII, nos. 1 and 2, pp31-62, 1979. Miller, J.H.; Speech Acts in Literature (Stanford University
Press) 2001, pi 12 says of the consequences for ethics of Derrida's 'reversal' of speech act theory that '...the performative
utterance creates the conventions it needs in order to be efficacious, rather than depending on their prior existence for its felicity'.
They transform contexts, not presuppose them; they change history'. Cf. also Derrick, J.; Positions (University of Chicago) 1981,
pp29-32.
Ronen (1994) pp9-ll says that fictional status is bestowed in the nexus of'...literary, cultural and institutional considerations'.
Cf. Routley, R.; 'The Semantical Structure of Fictional Discourse', Poetics, vol. VIII, nos. 1 and 2, pp3-30, 1979. Routley
emphasises the way in which modal logic has application to a theory of fiction. See also Ihwe, J.F. and Rieser, H.; 'Normative
and Descriptive Theory of Fiction: Some Contemporary Issues', Poetics, vol. VIII, nos. 1 and 2, pp63-84, 1979. For an
application to metaphor, cf. Bergmann, M.; 'Metaphor and Formal Semantic Theory', Poetics, vol. VIII, nos. 1 and 2, pp213-230,
1979, and see Derrida (1980), pp48-49 on the absence of contemporaneity between author and production, and both from a
governing context ('episteme').
4 And because it postulates transport between meanings. The abundance is accounted for, it is argued below, by a principle of
charity. Derrida (1977b) ppl78-179 asks ofhimself: what is he doing in the essays on Austin? Is the intention merely to provoke,
or, perhaps more honourably, to offer, in writing, a text, signed and authorised, again in writing, in which a performance is
presented and in which at all times the oppositions between concepts and values are questioned; this, as the conclusion to (1977a)
shows, is a consistent motivation. Such rigorous oppositions are, Derrida maintains, upheld by speech act theory, and should be
grist for Austin's desire to play Old Harry. Derrida offers rather,
described in a linguistic convention, and, '...produced by a kind of consensus that is implicit but
structurally vague...,'; Derrida suggests communications, '...to engage or to pursue dialogues within
the horizon of an intelligibility and truth that is meaningful, such that ultimately general agreement
...the performance of a text which by raising and passing the question of truth (beyond Austin's intermittent
impulses in this direction) does not simply succumb to its jurisdiction and remains, at this point, qua textual
performance, irreducible to "verdictive" (as Austin might say) sentences of the type: this is true, this is false,
"completely mistaken" or "obviously false".
Derrida (pi 82) notes that it is in the 'name ofanalogy', that Searle justifies the idealising distinction of serious and non-serious
in elucidating the nature of illocutionary acts. Speech act theory is limited from the beginning, however, by its being restricted to
analysing speech acts said to be ordinary in languages said to be actual, and '[t]he language of theory always leaves a residue that
is neither formalisable nor idealisable in terms of that theory of language'. (These points emerge in II. 1). Derrida adds that all
theoretical utterances are themselves speech acts, and that this can only ruin the '... analogical value (in the strict sense) between
speech act. theory and other theories'. The statements of theory in speech act theory are just as prone to incommensurability,
indeterminacy and vagueness, and the illegitimacy of an analogy between heterogeneous theories is joined by the analogical
status of the utterance suggesting that the analogy refers ultimately to an analogical utterance. (A Lewis convention responds to
this point). This, Derrida argues, can hardly be thought to underpin the theory, purporting as it does to 'found the entire
methodology (abstraction, idealisation, systematisation, etc.) of the theory of speech acts'. Derrida writes that the essential
iterability of all marks renders unworkable all of the philosophical oppositions governing the Searlean idealisation, and are, on
these terms, the condition of the positive values for which Searle makes the case.
Derrida (ppl83-186) moots in opposition to himself the idea that in the light of the irreducibility and generality of iterability it
may itself be susceptible to idealisation and purification, or, systematisation. Derrida replies that this is not the case, for the status
of iterability as comprising identity and difference, repetition and alteration, renders idealisation possible without ever lending
itself to any one idealisable conceptualisation. As before, there can be no idealisation without iterability, and yet iterability
cannot be idealised, for any such process imposes a limit preventing the term idealisation from itself being subsumed within the
idealisation, '...just as it excludes the reappropriation of that whose iteration it nonetheless broaches and breaches'. In this way is
a limit imposed upon all theorising that seeks fully to account for its object of study, for the object incorporates the hierarchy of
oppositional values which iterability is to unpick, and poses and reposes the values. The opposition of serious and non-serious
cannot 'become the object of an analysis in the classical sense of the term: strict, rigorous, "serious", without one of the two
terms, the serious or the literal, or even the strict, proceeding to determine the value of the theoretical discourse itself. To avoid
such presupposition speech act theory must make account of the non-serious, the metaphorical, the ironic and the cited; doing
this deprives idealising speech act theory of a monopoly on the correct understanding of serious and literal speech acts.
On these matters Searle (1977) p204ff is unequivocal in his assessment ofDerrida: his depiction of Austin is 'unrecognisable'.
The exclusion of parasitic forms is not nearly as grave as Derrida says: as Austin indicates, he wishes to study standard cases to
bring to light essential characteristics. There could not be promises made by actors if there were not the possibility of promises in
standard communication. (This matter returns with fascinating consequences for the assessment ofDerrick's work in III.5). There
is, Searle says, a logical dependency ofparasite on parasited: Austin merely excludes them for the 'present'. In developed speech
act theory the problem of parasitism is of the least importance, and the very questioning of the status of parasitic discourse
presupposes a 'general' theory of speech acts. Austin never wrote that parasitic discourse is not part of ordinary discourse,
merely that the circumstances in which it is produced differ. Furthermore, the possibility of citation is not the same as the
phenomenon of parasitic discourse. A writer is not in general quoting anyone, and an actor repeats lines without quoting them.
Such cases are not instances of a general iterability essential for successful performatives. Most instances of parasitic discourse
are not citations, but cases in which the relevant expressions are used and not mentioned, and Austin works with a vastly
different notion of iterability than that ascribed to him by Derrida: parasitic utterances are instances of iterability, not '...in any
way a modification of iterability or citationality'. Austin's setting aside of the cases of fictional discourse to deal with non-
fictional performatives is an 'investigative strategy': both parasitic and non-parasitic are instances of iterability, but Austin draws
no larger conclusion from his study of the former case.
Derrida (1977b) pp237ff rejoins that (1977a) was not primarily meant as a criticism of Austin but was to show that the 'general
theory' which neither Austin nor Searle can state could only ever be given after '... a re-elaboration of the axiomatics or of the
premises...', of any such theory. In saying this, Derrida emphasises that he has not misunderstood the strategic intentions of
Austin, and ho notes a duty to responsibility, to '... responsible intentionality...He rejects Searle's accusation that he states that
Austin excludes the possibility that performative utterances can be quoted on the premise that Austin excludes fictional
discourse. Derrida writes that both he and Austin would reject the charge. The question turns upon the analysis Austin gives of
the possibility. Derrida tarns again to the distinction he has marked between possibility and eventuality, a distinction
inadequately marked by Austin in his deliberate exclusion of the possibility, and he cites again the second lecture (pp229-230).
What Austin rules out by the temporary exclusion of the parasitical is the very fact that changes parasitism as possibility into an
eventuality, and Derrida regards Searle's arguments for the logical dependency of non-parasitic, or literal, upon parasitic, as
instrumental in allowing him to distinguish the temporary, methodological exclusion from a metaphysical exclusion. Derrida
replies that the determination of positive values (serious, literal) is dogma, for all speech acts depend upon the structure of
iterability; furthermore, he notes in Austin an intimation of the idea that one cannot have a methodological exclusion which is not
also a metaphysical exclusion. His distinctions: normal/abnormal, literal/non-literal, are not simply value oppositions around an
'unfindable' centre, but imply a malicious, unthinking subordination, and his repeated returns to origins or structures of priority
to elucidate the derivation and determination of specific speech acts, is 'the metaphysical exigency'. An exclusion such as Austin
postulates could not be temporary, and Derrida remarks, justifiably, upon the absence of the general theory from Searle, J.R.;
Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge University Press) 1969, and with incredulity upon Searle's
claim that once in possession of the general theory one can analyse the status of parasitical discourse. Derrida allows that Austin
had the kernel of the general theory, but that it would not, even by extension on the terms in which it is stated, allow the
integration of that which it begins by excluding. In this is Derrida's major contribution to speech act theory. Derrida (p238) notes
the developed philosophical tradition that would have rejected the Searlean analysis.
may, in principle, be attained'5. Each act of consensus would direct a particular use of the word
'communication', 'qua signification', yet it could never be reached, for there is a, 'theoretical
inadequacy', a 'non-saturation', in the constitution of determinate contexts, invalidating all attempts at
definition and distinction, and confirming the status of writing as irredeemably metaphorical, as
'inscribed and supplementary', leashed to its source in oral and gestural communication6. For Derrida
this demands the 'extension' (mooted above), of the 'field' of plausible means of communication, and
shows limits to the reach of oral and gestural eollocution, breached only by the accretion of writing7.
Derrida moves on to consider how this field is constituted, and how it may define a limit, given that it,
'...remains fundamentally continuous and self-identical, a homogeneous element through which the
unity and wholeness of meaning would not be affected in its essence'8, and the analogy is pursued in
5
Though Derrida rejects this, it is argued in this dissertation that a theory of meaning intentions in communication can be
founded upon a theory of convention. Furthermore, the theory provides for a notion of analyticity in language, indeed, what
Derrida rejects is precisely a coordination problem, as solved by Lewis. In III doubts about such a theory's structural constitution
are entertained, owing to the inconsistencies found in Searle's theory. The relativisation that Searle fears to 'each' use of a word
is obviated in Lewis' conventions (cf. IV).
6 The notion of consensus directing uses of language approximates Searle's theory of background conditions, or conventions, in
speech acts, and Habermas, J.; The Philosophical Discourse ofModernity: Twelve Lectures (Cambridge, Polity) 1987, pl97 says
of these conditions that they can, ifneeded, be brought out in a 'rationally motivated agreement': (cf. Ill and Searle and Strawson
on the essential avowability of speech acts). In Habermas' response to Derrida a principle passably similar to Searle's theory of
the background is used, yet Habermas' response is founded more on those remarks of Derrida emphasising that the nod to
convention in Austin justifies that the latter reproduces '... in a discourse said to be theoretical the founding categories of all
ethical-political statements'. Derrida goes on (1977b) p240:
I am convinced that speech act theory is fundamentally and in its most fecund, most rigorous, and most
interesting aspects...a theory of right or law, of convention, of political ethics or of politics as ethics. It
describes (in the best Kantian tradition, as Austin acknowledges at one point) the pure conditions of an ethical-
political discourse insofar as this discourse involves the relation of intentionality to conventionality or to rules.
Cf. Derrida, J.; 'Afterword: Toward an Ethic ofDiscussion', ppl 11-160 in LimitedInc (Northwestern University Press) 1988.
Although the point is not taken up in detail below, it is the conviction of the present author that Derrida's arguments for the
immanent relativisation to contexts can be challenged by the development of a theory of quantification into oblique, indirect or
prepositional contexts. It is hoped that enough of an idea is provided in the discussion of demonstrative or indexical sentences (in
1.2 and 1.3). The 'underdetermination' ofwhich Quine speaks in assessing the claims of founding conventions and contexts in the
philosophy of language are of similar motivation to Derrida's arguing for the impossibility of a means of reigning in iterability,
and it is shown below (in TV. 1), that Lewis' possible worlds theory of intentionality is given explicitly as a response to Quine.
7 Because it seems to allow for iterability and repetition. The Gricean theory offered in this dissertation makes no use of a
dichotomy between oral and gestural communication and that codified in writing; as seen in II, Grice's theory accounts for all
acts made with intention to communicate.
8 Derrida (1977b) pl79 says that this picture, this representation, of interpretation characterises the nature of philosophy: there is
not '...a single counter-example...'. However, Grice, as Searle and Derrida, argues that there is no intentionality without
language, and, it is added to his analysis, that the notion of convention needed to supplement it, makes no appeal to essences of
either conventions or language. (See 1.2) (It might be added that Derrida's method in the essay following the establishing of his
premises is a model of methodical philosophising). Derrida's is a subtle questioning of truth, which by its formulation in a
performance ('at this point') is an example of the impossibility of classifying a performative with a simple verdictive sentence.
Searle's response, making such accusations, is so far from clear that his reply to Derrida is indeed a 'misreading', but rather of
Searle's own intention.
How is it possible to miss the point that Sec, from the one end to the other, is concerned with the question of
truth, with the system of rules associated with it, repeating and altering that system, dividing and displacing it
in accordance with the logical force of the iter, which ties repetition to alterity.
By ignoring many of the aspects of the essay Searle is able to articulate his criticisms, for his target is '...after all, nothing but
[his] own autistic representation'. Derrida (pl81) can find humour in the ignorance: Searle misses only three things, namely
signature, event and context. He claims that Searle's adherence to a narrow definition of writing (one can substitute 'all
communication'), as the representation of speech, is only a further example of his faith in unworkable theories. In a connected
point Derrida writes that the first premise of (1977a), the questioning of communication, applies to Searle's arguments, for he
works with a definition of language as communication, and with a definition of 'text' as the contents of an utterance, be they
present or transcribed. Derrida's first reply is to argue that that the role of context can never be separated from the analysis of a
text; a context is always '...transformative-transferrable, exportative-exportable...'. With this in mind Derrida returns to the
accusation of Searle that he traduces the use/mention distinction. The passage in (1977a) which Searle targets is cut at an
auspicious point, making his argument unworkable. The omitted word 'encore' in its 'signifte encore' does indeed signify that
another, supplementary meaning can be grafted onto the first, 'even onto a non-meaning', but it also signifies that a
supplementary graft has been added to another mark which itself did not originally signify an 'example of agrammaticality', but
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Condillac. Men write, Derrida argues, to communicate thoughts or ideas, and because they are disposed
to communicate in progressively more adventitious ways, ways in which thoughts may be inscribed, or
represented, for purposes of repetition and of instilling authority. Writing is a form of representation,
analogous to gestures and sounds, which may undergo transformation into other systems ofwriting, but
which never severs its connection to the first act of communication, '...the relation idea/sign...".
Writing to communicate with an absent receiver ('The absence of the sender, of the receiver...'), leaves
in its wake effects, '...independently of his [the writer's] presence and of the present actuality of his
intentions...'; this absence marks the structure of all language, yet is dismissed by Condillac10.
Condillac argues that the analogy of the signs is 'chosen', in an order that one has 'instituted' among
one's ideas. One retraces objects according to one's 'present needs', and finds the appropriate device.
Condillac's contribution, Derrida argues, is the inclusion of an 'ideology' of presence, and a theory of
which in turn cannot constitute the original, authentic state of the mark existing before the graft. There is a circle of reference but
no meaning. Derrida (1977b) p222 notes a precaution he might have taken to avoid misunderstanding, derived from an example
in Searle (1969). He could have mentioned 'the green is either' signifies nothing '...to the extent, at least, to which signification
or meaning is bound to discursive grammaticality...', and added that a citation of a mentioning phrase '..."the green is
either"...as a 'citational reference' signifies in addition "this is an example of agrammaticality", and the example """the green
is either""", by dint of its functioning, that a graft is always possible, '...just as every phrase endowed with grammaticality that is
cited in a certain context, for example in a grammar book, can also signify (encore): I am an example of grammar'. Derrida
(p223) moves to consideration of the distinction marked by Searle between normal and not-normal, and the claim that what does
not have normal use, that is cases of citation and objects of discourse, are described by 'perfectly adequate' use/mention
conventions.
0
Kripke (1980) makes a study of dubbing, or original naming. However, he argues that the relativisation to contexts (described
by Derrida), in fact instantiate relativisation to possible worlds. Cf. Manley, L.; Convention: 1500-1750 (Harvard University
Press) 1980. It is Manley's ambition to study and remedy the breakdown in the view of'...readers, nature and precedents' which
constituted classical linguistic theory. He sets as the main issue for study the opposition between nature and convention as a
'basis for collective order', and that between convention and a Romantic ideal of the individual (Cf. Eldridge, R.; Leading a
Human Life: Wittgenstein, Intentionality and Romanticism (University ofChicago) 1997). For the former Manley looks to Levi-
Strauss' work on conventions and natural order, and its denial of the '...primacy of individual consciousness and intentionality',
(p6). Conventions, in line with the classic structuralist definition of Saussure (see Course in General Linguistics (London,
Duckworth) 1972, Chapter II, especially pp71-74), are to be understood intersubjectively. As an intersubjective phenomenon,
structuring ways of thinking, conventions have a unity not evident at the 'empirical level' (p7). In this convention and nature are
not distinct, the former is not an interpretation of the latter; indeed, conventions 'determine and express' nature. Thus, on Levi-
Strauss' terms, convention is pervasive and should be fundamental to philosophy, for any attempt to describe man in his
intentionality, his self-consciousness and his intersubjectivity, must tangle with convention, and not, 'disguise it metaphysically'.
As Manley says, this raises Derrida's concerns: see Derrida, J.; 'Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human
Sciences', pp278-293 in (1978c).
Society is not preceded by a state of nature, in that there is no congress such as that envisaged by Quine for the settling of
language (see IV). Levi-Strauss' work is thus wholly congruent with Lewis': as Manley and Levi-Strauss have it, '[wjhoever
says "Man" says "Language", and whoever says "Language" says "Society"'. Intersubjective consciousness is thus a symptom of
conventions, and so Levi-Strauss can make fundamental objections to Cartesianism. As Manley implies, there are radical
implications for temporality, for the present is always constructed out ofpast regularities and future expectations.
A full survey of the theory offered in this work would show that Saussure is beholden to the theory of convention rejected by
Davidson, Lewis, Grice and Strawson: one acquiesced in, on Conant's terms, by Derrida. As Dole2el (1998) p5, says, Saussure's
is a theory of language without reference: its appeal to Derrida is obvious. Further on the temptations in philosophy of language
can be found in Derrida (1995a). See also (1998). The motivations behind post-structuralist assessments of Saussure are
diagnosed in Merleau-Ponty (1974). A more significant essay for writing a theory of intentionality could not be found: it is
especially good on the primacy of gestures. Equally good is Gillan, G.; 'In the Folds of the Flesh: Philosophy and Language',
ppl-60 in Gillan, G. (ed.); The Horizons of the Flesh: Critical Perspectives on the Thought ofMerleau-Ponty (Southern Illinois
University Press) 1973. A discussion of the prospects for theories of intentionality and corporeality with impressively broad
reference is Wider, K.V.; The Bodily Nature Of Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind (Cornell
University Press) 1997.
10 See Condillac (Bonnot, E.); Philosophical Writings ofEtienne Bonnot, Abbi de Condillac (New Jersey, Lawrence Erlbaum)
1982. Derrida (1977a) pl77 writes that in the Essai absence is the '...continuous modification and progressive extenuation of
presence'. The supplementation of ideography is, as with the relation of idea/sign, related always to the influence of oral and
gestural communication. With regard to Condillac's notion of tracing and retracing one's thoughts, Derrida again takes up the
idea/sign relation. Derrida writes, again parsing Condillac, that the sign "... comes into being at the same time as imagination and
memory, the moment it is necessitated by the absence of the object from present perception', and in memory operates a process
of analogy. Derrida's emphasis is on the passage of the analogy between referents.
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signs as representative of ideas, and in turn, of objects perceived; such a theory views a representation
as,'...ideal content (meaning)...
Derrida raises two problems. Firstly, the absence within writing would have to be of a more 'original'
type than Condillac countenances if it were to be privileged, and secondly, if the absence were found to
be applicable to all communication, writing would become merely a species of communication, and
both concepts would fail12. For a written communication to remain readable it must do so in cases of
delayed presence, and indeed the absence of any receiver. It must, that is, be iterable. The only survival
of a private language of two persons in the absence of one or both would be the result of iterability13,
and the effect of this in writing renders it a 'rupture' in presence: a writer's marks remain for future
reception, yet are linked to,'... non-presence in general...', to,'... the non-presence ofmy [the writer's]
11 Derrida (1980) pp82-83, commenting on Condillac, considers 'analogy' as a means of propagating and disseminating
convention. Cf. Lewis, D.K.; Convention: A Philosophical Study (Harvard University Press) 1969, pp36-42. Condillac takes
algebra, and mathematics generally as the most well-formed languages: it is argued that they should serve as models. Cf. Derrida
(1980) pi 10-111. The process of analogy in language pertains to a 'mastery' of the language in question, when signs become
'instituted', and Condillac views this as a teleology, revealed post facto. Later, Derrida writes that the proliferation of frivolities,
words not governed by conventions, manifests a fear of 'legitimacy' (pl35). (Also Derrida (1980) ppl22-123). Truth definitions
of precisely Tarskian type are called 'frivolous' by Condillac; they are speaking without end, identities ofwords but not ideas.
(Derrida (1980) pp95-96). For Condillac, signs are the governing principle in perception and understanding: they are not posited.
They are fundamentally linked to mutual practical knowledge, '... the language of action precedes and grounds all language... so
practical knowledge precedes theoretical knowledge'. (Derrida (1980) plOO). Condillac says that this sedimentation allows the
return to the presemiotic rigour of all scientific languages, and to 'the value of things'. (This is, incidentally, one source of
Derrida's critique of commerce).
Searle (1977) pi99 ascribes to Derrida the intention of marking the distinction between speech and writing, or indeed of
opposing them, and Derrida says that the rejection of the two hypotheses he sets up in his reply he takes as a refutation of the
essay itself. The hypotheses, Derrida (1977b) pl82 replies, are not to be found. Derrida allows that Searle has got him broadly
correct in that (1977a) generalises predicates of writing and applies them to speech. However, Searle objects that from the
perspective of iterability there is no difference to be discerned. Derrida replies, 'precisely the thesis of Stec, if there is one!' Searle
asks again: can the distinction between speech and writing be ascribed to the potential of linguistic elements to repeatability. He
replies again that the distinction cannot be made for all linguistic elements, be they written or spoken, indeed, 'any rule-governed
element in any system of representation' (pl99), can and must be repeatable. This, Derrida replies again, is rather a lever of
(1977a) which operates in an area in which the distinction between speech and writing is rendered irrelevant, and in which all
marks, all utterances one might add, are graphematic. (Searle (ppl99-200) tries a different tack, and asks whether writing and
speech may be distinguished according to their tolerance of the absence of the receiver. A spoken utterance, or token, cannot be
repeated, but the use of writing makes it possible for communication to be effected with an absent receiver. There is, writes
Searle, no necessity in the condition of absence). Derrida (1977b) pl85 examines Searle's imputation to him of the illusion that
illocutionary intentions, if they 'mattered', would lie behind utterances, animating them. Searle (1977) p202 refers to the case of
'serious literal speech', in which there is no such dichotomy, in which the sentences are 'fungible intentions'. Derrida replies by
making reference to the criticism made of representation, communication and expression, and the requirement in any statement
of conditions on their obtaining of appeal to a notion of intention as intrinsic and giving animation to the expression, and to the
criticism of the concept of a sign and the opposition of the signifier and the signified. Arguing that in serious literal speech the
sentences are immanent realisations of the corresponding intentions betrays a faith in a presupposition in which the distinctions
between 'intention', 'realisation' and 'expression' are all intact. Derrida sees the differences between the terms as motivating
both the oppositions of 'the ideal case' (serious literal speech), and the 'real' oppositions of the other cases.
Searle claims Derrida has misunderstood Austin (and it is argued in II.4-5 that he has), but it is equally the case that Searle has
missed the import of Derrida's essay, and, moreover, articulates a theory of speech acts sharing common weaknesses with
Austin's. Merleau-Ponty is equally a target of Derrida's criticism: cf. Merleau-Ponty (1974a) pp92-93, and the role for
sedimentation. The theory offered in this dissertation says that author's intentions and the conventions they instantiate always
remain present; the abandoning of 'writing' for 'the mark' holds no difficulties for Gricean theory. (Cf. 1.2-3 and III.5).
12 Searle (1977) pp]99ffasks how written and spoken language are to be distinguished. It is not, he answers, by iterability ('...the
repeatability of the linguistic elements...'). All rule-governed elements in any system of representation must be repeatable, or
there is no application of the rules. Nor is it the absence of the receiver, for the banal reason that written communication can
occur in the presence of the receiver, as in cases of self-instruction. Searle writes that, quite plausibly, copies of texts can be
proliferated and disseminated, allowing the, perhaps deceased, author communication with further receivers, and that this is the
core of Derrida's notion of iterability. (One should add that, were this Derrida's argument, it would be astonishingly weak, and
that this triumphantmissing of the point is the source of Searle's troubles with Derrida).
13 Derrida (1977b) pl94. There could be traces of iterability with secrecy, and writing exists in the absence of all receivers.
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intention of saying something meaningful..."4. The rupture affects both context and intention ('...the
wanting-to-say-what-he-means'), and allows the detachment of a written sign from the sentence in
which it appears and its 'grafting' into others. The possibility of detachment intimates also the ever-
present separation ofwritten signs from all forms of present reference to past or future15. The effects of
rupture go for all language, and ultimately all 'experience', deriving as it does from the, 'field of the
mark', the network of effacement and of difference ensuring that the units of iterability constituting it
are rendered never identical to themselves16. The status of each erleb is that of a grapheme, constituted
14 Derrida (1977b) pf 95. It shall be noted here for later reference that it is in this that Derrida makes first use of the phrase
'vouloir-dire', from which one approach to his arguments can be made. In an example he describes the functioning of a mark
which, in the author's absence, will continue 'in principle', to undergo rereading and rewriting, and this, in extremis, in '...the
non-presence of [the author's] intention of saying something meaningful [non vouloir-dire, non intention, de-signification] of
[his] wish to communicate, from the emission or production of the mark', a mark underwritten by the '...plenitude of his desire
to say what he means, in order to sustain what seems to be written "in his name'". This, for Derrida, is a drift both allowing and
rendering impossible the repeated reception of writing, and the necessary absence of both responsibility for one's utterances and
of a guiding consciousness: '... the break with the horizon of communication as communication of consciousness or of presences
and as linguistical or semantic transport of the desire to mean what one says [vouloir-dire}...'. Derrida emphasises that these
points are generalisable for all systems of signs and of communication (gestures and so forth).
In Yourgrau, P.; 'The Path Back to Frege', pp97-132 in Yourgrau, P. (ed.); Demonstratives (Oxford University Press) 1990,
and in presenting his first thesis of reference (that the task of semantics is to describe the ways in which a subject is able to refer
to his world), the author notes the difficulty of translating 'Bedeutung' and the intimacy between a theory of reference and one's
epistemology and philosophy of mind. (Cf. Bennington, G.; 'For the Sake of Argument (Up to a Point)', pp332-354 in
Glendinning, S. (ed.); 'Arguing with Derrida', Ratio, vol. XIII, no. 4, 2000, and Evans, G.; 'The Causal Theory ofNames', ppl-
24 in Collected Papers (Oxford, Clarendon) 1985. Yourgrau's essay is a model of the broad-based work done in the 'analytical'
tradition). Without the connection one's theory of reference issues in a notion, unfaithful to Brentano's statement of the
conditions on the intentional object of thought, tolerating what Yourgrau calls the '... "noumenalisation" of reference' (that is, the
intentional objects become as elusive as Kant's noumena). In this are raised further matters for any work endeavouring to make
the connection between semantical and phenomenological philosophy in contemporary responses to Kant, and Yourgrau (ppl09-
112) gives reasons for thinking that Kripke's Cartesianism is the purest response to intentionality. (Cf. McGinn, C.; 'Anomalous
Monism and Kripke's Cartesian Intuitions', Analysis, vol. XXXVII, no. 2, pp78-80, 1977. Yourgrau's revised Fregeanism is
seen to share problems with Kripke's theory, especially time-sensitive (tensed) sentences: cf. ppl28-132). Yourgrau says that
semantics faces equally the problem faced by transcendental arguments, namely, the statement of the conditions on the
possibility of reference to the world. Cf. Taylor, C.; 'The Opening Arguments of the Phenomenology', ppl51-187 in Maclntyre,
A. (ed.); Plegel: A Collection of Critical Essays (New York, Archer) 1972. See Hacker, P.M.S.; 'Philosophy', pp322-347 in
Glock, H-J. (ed.); Wittgenstein: A Critical Reader (Oxford, Blackwell) 2001, for the Kantian influence on Wittgenstein. As
Yourgrau says, the shift in emphasis requires of future anti-Cartesian arguments that they work at the level of belief, thought and
knowledge. What is the argument for the accessibility to oneself of one's thoughts?
Salmon, N.; Frege's Puzzle (Harvard University Press) 1986, p distinguishes Fregean sense from what a speaker's words are
about (their semantic referents). Kant's argument is that reference to one's world is possible if it reports an identical yet
numerically different twin. Yourgrau asks whether this is congruent with Kant's arguing for non-conceptualised, or non-
mediated, reference to objects (or whether it is distinctly conceptual, and indeed, whether the action of reference to possible
worlds problematises the whole notion of reference to reality, and so raises the matter of whether Fregean sense is itself made in
intuition (non-conceptually)). Salmon responds that Frege's semantics advocates a conceptual accessibility, and besides, that
possible worlds semantics can allow reference to one's world (and that the Fregean theory of intentionality is superior to the
Kantian). However, none of this, Yourgrau argues, rules out that in giving a Fregean sense one secures semantic reference.
Yourgrau gives a hearing to the competing ways in which identicals may be indiscernible (the ways Salmon denies to Frege in
saying that, for Frege, all accessibility is conceptual), namely the denial that identicals are indiscernible by any means, and the
view that indiscernibility depends upon the epistemology one advocates. In response to Salmon and Kripke, Yourgrau argues for
the latter: that Fregean sense is semantic reference. This raises again the problems with Cartesian cognitive access, and is grist
for Evans' argument (described in 1.2).
15
Precisely what is replaced in the (possible worlds) theory offered in this dissertation. Searle (1977) pp200-201 writes,
paraphrasing Derrida, that the permanence of the text makes possible the separation of the text from its origin, and the distinction
of the written and spoken words. Derrida, however, Searle continues, conflates the two by a simple metonymy: tire possibility of
spacing and rupture is essential to the estrangement of the origin from its source of the utterance, and adds that this distance
renders every mark ',,,a grapheme in general', The possibility of repeating an utterance through citation or quotation, Searle
replies, is merely that of being able to use it outwith its rdle in a context of representation, and this is a feature of any system of
representation. (Cf. 1.2 on Davidson on quotation and quantification and his use, in his work on creative use of language, of the
Gricean analysis ofmeaning intentions (1.5)).
16 Hence Deirida says that there can be no perception. In 1.3 Hintikka's arguments for possible worlds semantics as the kernel of
a theory of perception are considered. With reference to the Saussurean notion of convention: that spoken elements of language
find their places in relation to a code, Derrida writes that one must be able to identify signifying forms, an identity which carries
with it the necessity of division. The very constitution of identity contains division. Derrida attacks Austin for the same reason,
although as Strawson shows, Derrida's understanding ofAustin is significantly wrong. Cf. Derrida (1981a).
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by the possibility of its being repeated in the absence of a referent, of the 'determinate signified', and
the intentions of signification and communication.
Derrida examines examples from Husserl". An utterance referring to a possible object can be made
with the referent present to speaker or hearer. This, for Derrida, is the possibility of iterability in
general, the possibility of utterance, and the generative possibility of marks18. The possibility of the
absence of the signified Husserl deems an 'inferior' meaning, one which is, indeed, (in part)
responsible for the crisis in the European sciences. Husserl lists three forms of absence. Firstly, signs
may function by being manipulated without animation, with merely the intention of signifying19.
Secondly, utterances can have meaning without, 'objective signification', for example, in an utterance
such as 'the square circle'. It can be judged false or contradictory, yet the division
signifier/signified/referent cannot, for Derrida, fit Husserl's analysis, for there is in the example the
absence of a referent and a signified, but not of a meaning, and the absence of the intention of actual
signification, and of the referent, still constitute the possibility of writing, for it exhibits the internal
structure of spoken language in the form of an outside20.
In the third category are cases of agrammaticality ('the green is either'). There is here '...no
cognitive language such as Husserl construes in a teleological manner, no language accorded the
possibility of the intuition of objects given in person and signified in truth'21. Husserl's focus is on the
rules of a logical grammar as a set of conditions of possibility for significations in relation to possible
objects, '...not with a pure grammar in general,...'22. In this notion of intention, in this 'oriented
contextual field', 'the green is either' is unacceptable. However, Derrida writes, it signifies in other
contexts, and he offers the example of translation (German into French), or, more provocatively, (and
Searle is provoked), it signifies '...an example of agrammaticality'. This encapsulates the sense of
possibility Derrida advocates, which is,
...the possibility of disengagement and citational graft which belongs to the structure of
every mark, spoken or written, and which constitutes every mark in writing before and
outside of every horizon of semio-linguistic communication; in writing, which is to say
17 From Husserl, E.; Logical Investigations (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul) 1970, p293. This is followed up in 1.3.
18 Halion, K.; 'Parasitic Speech Acts: Austin, Searle, Derrida', Philosophy Today. ppl61-172, 1992, pl63 adds that iterability in
Derrida accounts for type-token distinctions.
19 Cf. the discussion ofFregean semantics in 1.2.
20
Responses to these points are adumbrated in 1.3 and responded to by the arguments offered in 1.2.
21 Derrida (1977a) ppl84-185 notes that Husserl's theory gives a putative differentiation of instances of communication from
signs as signifying, and as seeking to say something.
in the possibility of its functioning being cut off, at a certain point, from its 'original'
desire-to-say-what-one-means [vouloir-dire\ and from its participation in a saturable and
constraining context23.
Every sign can be cited, and in so doing engender a proliferation of 'illimitable' contexts. There are
only contexts without centres, and this condition of iterability is, in a prelude to any discussion of
Austin, that without which a mark could not be thought to have a 'normal' function24. Austin's theories
ofperlocution and illocution emphasise the roles of speech acts as acts of communication, replacing the
performative-constative distinction, and showing the use of the performative as produced in the
'...total situation in which the interlocutors find themselves'. Illocution and perlocution, Derrida
writes, '...do not designate the transference or passage of a thought-content, but, in some way, the
communication of an original movement...'25. A performative communication is a communication of
'...a force through the impetus...of a mark'. The performative does not have a referent; it describes
22 Derrida (1977a) pl85. Smith, D.W. and Mclntyre, R.; Husserl and lntentionality: A Study ofMind, Meaning and Language
(Dordrecht, Reidel) 1982, pp289-300 detail the debt of Husserl to a possible worlds semantics and a metaphysics of possible
worlds.
25 Derrida (1977b) ppl84-185. Derrida says that he only appeals to this possibility, and makes no claim for the necessity of this
condition: absence pertains, and Derrida quotes himself 'qua possibility', to the structure of each mark as such and to its
possibility for iteration. The possibility of writing being able to convey communication in the absence of the speaker, receiver
and all context, is the only necessary element, being permanently inscribed in the structure of a mark and defining its function:
'To object by citing cases where absence appears in fact not to be observable is like objecting that a mark is not essentially
iterable because here and there it has not in fact been repeated'. The complexity of the structure of this possibility and the role of
the presence of speaker and receiver is greatly increased by the necessity for inscription of this possible functioning. This is the
of logic for which (1977a) endeavours to account, for, contra Searle's claims for Austin's procedure, and indeed Austin's own
justification ofhis method, when once one recognises the importance of this structure it cannot be treated as expendable, '...even
temporarily, on allegedly methodological grounds', for it is always working its effects, 'marking all the facts'.
24 Cf. Derrida (1977a) ppl85 and 196. In cases of agrammaticality Husserl theorises the absence of language granting the grasp
of objects '...given in person and signified in truth'. Derrida notes with enthusiasm that his primary intention is upon Husserl's
detaching communication from its '...context or its teleological andmetaphysical horizon...'. In this is the distinction affected of
communication from the analysis of the sign or expression '...as signifying sign, the seeking to say something'. In the
accompanying footnote Derrida cites Husserl to the end that expressions in communicative situations function as indexes. There
is, in addition, a role for expressions '... in the life of the soul...as they function outwith such situations: the change of function
changes nothing pertinent to what makes them expressions. 'They have, as before, their Bedeutungen and the same Bedeutungen
as in collocution'.
Iterability, which Derrida makes clear, is never confused with iteration, can be seen in a mark which seems to have occunred
only once, for the mark is always already divided by the structure of repeatability, and always undercuts, and allows the
contamination of, the oppositions of fact and principle, the factual and the possible, and the necessary and the possible. Searle's
two putative counter-examples, the shopping list written for oneself and the scribbled note passed to a companion during the
course of a concert, cannot traduce this law. The shopping list is, indeed, neither utilisable nor producible, for it would not be
what it is were it not for the structure of possibility allowing it to function from the very beginning in the absence of the sender
and the receiver. The drawing up of the list for oneself is done in the light of the fact that it is only a list if it implies one's
absence (if one is able to utilise its function upon one's arrival at the shop). Even the most fleeting of absences, the simple
'absence ofmemory' for instance, is always already marked by absence. These conclusions move Derrida to argue that the writer
(or, in other examples, the sender), of the list is palpably not the same as the shopper (the sender at a later time), and if the
presence of the sender to the receiver is always assured, there would be no need for the writing itself. The sender and the receiver
always inevitably are related to a mark or marks they experience as always able to operate in their absence, and this is
experienced not as a limiting condition but as a positive, indeed the sole condition, of the possibility of communication. Derrida
remarks, but does not pursue the thought, that this requires analyses of the value of presence to oneself and to others, and of
difference and differance,
Derrida (ppl88-189) calls Searle's analysis 'facile', wedded to the presence at the moment of sending the shopping list of the
receiver. If the list is to circulate, to perform its function, both the sender and the receiver, who cannot on Searle's own terms be
the same, cannot be present at the moment of writing. In addition, Searle has no sensitivity to the difference of between being
present and being 'present-to-oneself. Derrida applies the same response to the example of communicating with short written
messages.
25 Derrida here fails to heed the conditions Strawson puts on the distinction between illocutions and perlocutions and their
production in a saturated context according to a specific intention. These conditions (presented in II and picked up in III), have
implications for a distinction between performative and constative utterances.
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nothing '.. .that exists outside of language and prior to it'; rather it transfers a situation. Derrida argues
that even if a constative utterance may achieve the same, this does not impair its function, as, he
maintains, it does in the case ofthe performative26.
Derrida enjoys Austin's liberation of the performative from conditions of true and false, and the shift
of focus to study of their force. He writes that the performative is a communication which does not
consist in the transport of 'semantic content', constituted by fidelity to truth, but that Austin encounters
difficulties, each with a 'common root'27. Austin does not account for the repetition immanent in the
structure of locution, and which introduces that obscured by the accretion ofwriting (the 'graphematic
in general'); recognition of this would destroy the distinctions between illocutionary forces that Austin
so patiently establishes28. Derrida gives as an example Austin's postulation of the 'exhaustively
20 There is again a difference between illocutionary and perlocutionary force, although cf. following the discussion of II, the
argument presented in III. 5.
27 Searle (1977) p203 notes Derrida's application of his conclusions to a discussion of Austin. Searle refers to the common root
Derrida discerns as the source ofAustin's problems, namely that:
Austin [does] not [take] account of what—in the structure of locution (this before any illocutory or perlocutory
determination)—already entails that system of predicates I call graphematic in general and consequently
blurs...all the oppositions which follow, oppositions whose pertinence, purity and rigour Austin has
unsuccessfully attempted to establish.
Derrida remarks upon Austin's distinction of felicitous and infelicitous speech acts, but Searle adds, '...does not sufficiently
ponder the consequences arising from the fact that the possibility of failure of the speech act is a necessary possibility', on the
face of it, one might add, an astonishing criticism. More depressing for Searle is Derrida's charge that Austin excludes the
possibility of quotation of utterances, made by the fact that Austin excludes fictional discourse and other parasitic forms. These
forms are, for Derrida, in their emphasising of durability, the condition of possibility without which there could be no successful
performative utterances. For Derrida a performative can succeed only '...if its formulation reports a coded or iterable utterance,
only if it is identifiable in some way as a citation'. With a reckoning of the forms of iteration one shall see that intention is
essentially absent from an utterance (p204).
28A defence ofAustin on this point could surely be mounted to the end that he is operating not at the level of locutions but at that
of illocutions. Important cross-references are Cohen, L.J.; 'Do Illocutionary Forces Exist?', The Philosophical Quarterly, vol.
XIV, no. 55, ppl 18-137, 1964, and Skinner, Q.; 'Conventions and the Understanding of Speech Acts', The Philosophical
Quarterly, vol. XX, no. 79, ppl 18-138, 1970. Searle (1977) pp200-201 also attributes to Derrida (1977a) the argument that what
distinguishes writing and speech is the 'permanence' of the text, and that the subsequent arguments confuse iterability and
permanence: '...the type-token distinction is logically independent of the fact of the permanence of certain tokens...'. Derrida
(1977b) ppl87-188 says that (1977a) speaks rather of a 'non-present remainder', which cannot be assimilated to '...the
substantial presence implied by the temporality of permanence...'. Derrida notes carefully Searle's analysis of his words, and
cites,
He [Derrida] writes, "This structural possibility of being weaned from the referent or from the signified (hence
from communication and its context) seems to me to make every mark, including those which are oral, a
grapheme in general; which is to say, as we have seen, the non-present remainder of a differential mark cut off
from its putative 'production' or 'origin'".
Derrida responds that it is imperative to avoid the incorrect translation of restance (the remains of the grapheme), into a ' standard
and trivial' idiom, for it is categorically not to be allied with the permanence of written language; it includes oral marks, and
indeed all graphemes. The remainder has nothing to do with the function of language, but is the condition of iterability of all
marks, allowing the self same mark to be repeatable and identifiable after repetition. (1977a) articulates the work of the
permanent non-present remainder of all marks estranged from their origins. The estrangement occurs not with the absence of the
hearer from the speaker, but at once and always. Derrida is correct to say that Searle considers the theory of the objects described
in speech act theory to be a psychology, describing an 'interior domain of psychic life', but his denunciation of the arguments for
restance is a further example of Seaxle's arguing against his own autistic representation of Derrida's argument. With regard to
the distinction of serious and non-serious speech and the claim that in the first case there is no distinction between the
illocutionary extension and its expression, there is no more significant target for (1977a), for no such idealisation can be made.
Derrida (1977b) pp206-207 turns to Searle (1969), and to Searle's recognition that idealisation is required for two reasons: to
define the structure of illocutionary acts, and indeed for the justification of the whole enterprise of philosophical analysis.
Derrida replies that neither point is satisfactorily made. In Searle's rush to force the distinction Derrida finds confirmation of the
fact that criteria of intention are required for the definition and distinction of serious and non-serious discourse and of the fact
that the intention must (on Searle's own arguments) be the motivation of the utterance. Derrida has three main objections, which
he does not take up in detail: such an idealisation poses insuperable factual difficulties, opens up the of 'labyrinths of empiricity',
and leads, inevitably, to an 'interminability' of the required analysis. (In II it is shown how a theory ofmeaning intentions can be
derived from an analysis of speech acts making no such unacceptable exclusions, and in IV how such intentions can correspond
to conventions without fear of 'interminability'). Derrida says himself that empirical difficulties do not preclude the possibility of
a process such as Searle's leading to an essential definition, and that one need not appeal to cases of real promising for the
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determined' context in which a performative occurs, and in particular the place in it given to
consciousness, or '...the conscious presence of the intention of the speaking subject in the totality of
his speech act'. Austin conceives of performative communication as the communication of intentional
meaning, '... even if that meaning has no referent in the form of a thing or of a prior or exterior state of
things'. He allows no surplus in convention, in context, in grammatical form, or in the semantics of the
constituent words, '...that is, no "dissemination" escaping the horizon of the unity of meaning'®.
Austin's six conditions for the success of a performative, by dint of the values of convention and
completeness, emphasise the conditions of context, consciousness and of meaningful speech,
'...[vouloir-dire]...\ as '... master of itself: the teleological jurisdiction of an active field whose
organising centre remains intention'30. Derrida writes that Austin's procedure,
analysis of the conditions necessary for a promise. He does, however, that such unacceptable distinctions are precisely of the type
that speech act theory is peculiarly suited to question and to overturn.
Although Searle affects a lack of interest, owing to exasperation, in the exchange, he returns to the matter in Searle, J.R.; 'The
Word Turned Upside Down', The New York Review of Books, vol. XXX, no. 16, pp74-79, 1983. Searle refers to an unnamed
but esteemed friend who claims that Derrida gives bullshit a bad name. Although Searle's caricatures are gross (primarily
because he takes a review of Culler, J.; On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism (London, Routledge and
Kegan Paul) 1982 as a review ofDerrida), there are, as Rorty, R.; 'Deconstruction and Circumvention', Critical Inquiry, vol. XI,
no. 1, ppl-23, 1984, says, real difficulties. Searle argues that Derrida sacrifices his arguments to the relentless pursuit of the tenor
of an idea. Part of the negative response to Sokal and Bricmont would have been avoided had this been seen by the authors of the
replies. (Mackey picks up many of these points. Mackey, L.H. and Searle, J.R.; 'An Exchange on Deconstruction', The New
York Review of Books, vol. XXXI, no. 1, pp47-48, 1984. Searle's reply contains the beautiful irony of a pre-eminent speech act
theorist debating a correspondent as to whether another (Culler) has or has not made an assertion). Perhaps despite himself,
Searle raises the very idea that should have, from the start, motivated the adoption of Derrida by philosophers. (It might also be
speculated that this might have dissuaded the frivolous deconstructors). On p76 Searle writes, with disdain, that the conclusions
Derrida discovers for writing are applied with abandon 'all over', to experience, perception, personal identity, authority,
responsibility and so forth, that is, to central questions of philosophy. One should use this kernel, found by Derrida in Husserl,
(and by Follesdal and others in Frege), to follow him through all ofhis analyses, and to make the criticisms one has in the light of
careful reading. Cf. Lawlor, L. (ed.); 'Derrida's Interpretation of Husserl', The Southern Journal of Philosophy, vol. XXXII,
Supplement, 1994. One might take Searle's remark that Derrida shares conditions with 'classical' metaphysics support for a view
that the philosophers whose work is considered here is more radical, and that foundations for language and communication can
be provided. (On bullshitting as an intentional state see Cohen, G.A.; 'Why One Kind of Bullshit Flourishes in France',
(typescript, Oxford) 2002b, and 'Deeper into Bullshit', pp in Buss, S. and Overton, L. (eds.); Contours ofAgency: Essays on
Themes from Harry Franlfturt (MIT) 2002a. Cohen responds to what appears to be the seminal essay in the field, Frankfurt,
H.G.; 'On Bullshit', ppl 17-133 in The Importance ofWhat we Care About: Philosophical Essays (Cambridge University Press)
1988). Scholes (1988) writes that, for American literary theorists, Derrida offers 'escape' from rules and responsibilities. Part of
his success is his style. This is, in its commentary on the Derrida-Searle exchange, a rich and suggestive essay. Another study
argues that Derrida's success is due precisely to processes of 'legitimation', from a congruence between his work and 'highly
structured cultural and institutional systems', even a capitalisation on the intellectual fashions of an educated cultural public and
not an academic elite. (Of course, the keep and dissemination of his work is now a preserve of the elite). The dissemination of his
work by a small number of critics in a few institutions secured both its appearance as a 'status symbol', and Derrida's unique
place in the intellectual 'market'. See Lamont, M.; 'How to Become a Dominant French Philosopher: The Case of Jacques
Derrida', American Journal of Sociology, vol. XCIII, no. 3, pp 584-622, 1987. Cohen (2002b) argues that one of the causes of
bullshit in France is the absence of a system of truly critical peer review. He credits Sokal and Bricmont.
29 Such conventions are K-II acts in the vocabulary of Strawson andMillikan (cf. II.4-5).
30 Derrida (1977b) pl95. Derrick (pl98) moves next to the matter of context, and to Searle's lack of attention. Fie writes that his
exclusion of the matter is similarly motivated to Austin's and able to be criticised on the same terms. Indeed, Derrida calls
Searle's remarks trivial and dubious. In speech, Searle writes, one can invoke features of context which could not be used in
writing without those features appearing in or being repeated in the text, or '[i]n conversation a great deal can be communicated
without being made explicit in the sentence uttered' (Searle (1977) p203), Derrida is surprised that a theorist of speech acts can
regard context as deferrable. He replies that context is either determinate, jn that it determines the structure of an utterance from
within, in which case it cannot be 'bracketed', or it applies to different separate contexts, ones which can always be separated
from the context in which they are encountered and imported or grafted into another. Derrida writes that the new logic required
to theorise iterability is not available on the terms given by Austin and Searle, and that contexts are never created from nothing:
'...no mark can create or engender a context on its own, much less dominate it. This limit, this fmitude is the condition under
which contextual transformation remains an always open possibility' (p203). Again, Derrida's arguments would benefit from
consideration of the wider work on speech act theory, that is, in some cases, other work of Searle (cf. Ill), but more importantly,
the work ofGrice and Strawson, McDowell and Schiffer, and the work of Lewis on convention.
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sidelight, for it is the mutual accusations of relativism that are here attended to, and which provol
their disagreements.
Rorty argues that Putnam, Cavell and Conant remain 'too kind', to modern philosophy3. Whil
Conant may caution against the allure of fruitless philosophical explanations (of mind, intentionalitj
free will, and so forth), reckoning the ways in which their acceptance entails complicity in the subtl
form of imperialism which it is the mark of Rorty's pragmatism to dispel, and Putnam declare thai
'...the illusions that philosophy spins are illusions that belong to "the nature of human life itself"
there remains a simple problem, giving Rorty pause at the statement 'the nature of human life''1. Th
problem affects Cavell's claim for the inevitability of tarrying with scepticism, (in Derrida, th
hymeneal), for these, and Putnam's and Conant's, are tired themes, best given 'the slip'5. Arguing agaii
against representationalist theories, Rorty recalls his early physicalism. The five-point plan o
3
Rorty (1993) p449, and one should try to set aside the 'shards' of the dichotomies between subject and object, scheme ant
content and appearance and reality. One's relation to the universe is 'causal' not 'representationalist', and Rorty argues that it it
this purely causal picture which Putnam finds unpalatable.
4
Rorty (1993) p449. See Conant, J.; 'Critical Response II: On Bruns and Cavell', Critical Inquiry, vol. XVII, no. 3, pp616-634
1991, and the exchange with Cavell in 'An Interview with Stanley Cavell', pp21-72 in Fleming, R. and Payne, M. (eds.); Tht
Senses ofStanley Cavell (Lewisburg, Bucknell University Press) 1989. See also Dews, P.; 'Communicative Paradigms and thf
Question of Subjectivity: Habermas, Mead and Lacan', pp87-117 in Dews, P. (ed.); Habermas: A Critical Reader (Oxford
Blackwell) 1999, especially pp87-88. Dews considers the need for a shift from philosophies of consciousness (allowing, foi
Rorty, the victimisation ofwhich Conant writes), to philosophies of communication. It is contended that this is precisely what is
offered in this dissertation, and that Derrida's objections to Husserl's phenomenology (discussed in 1.3) may be circumvented,
precisely by showing a possible way in which a theory of intentionality, and of convention, in communication may be given a
practice, or pragmatic, element. See also Dunne, J.; 'Beyond Sovereignty and Deconstruction: The Storied Self, ppl37-157 in
Kearney, R. (ed.); Paul Ricoeur: The Hermeneutics ofAction (London, Sage) 1996, and Putnam (1990) p38-40 for an appeal tc
intuition in epistemology and metaphysics.
5 Cavell, S:,In Quest ofthe Ordinary: Lines ofSkepticism andRomanticism (University of Chicago) 1988, especially ppl62-168.
Cavell describes in exquisite detail the attractiveness of philosophy, with particular reference to the beginnings ofWittgenstein's
Philosophical Investigations, a text that repeatedly occupies Cavell. Cf. McDonald, C.V. (ed.); The Ear of the Other: Texts and
Discussions with Jacques Derrida: Otobiography, Transference, Translation (New York, Schocken) 1985, pl25, and 'Whom to
Give to: Knowing not to Know', ppl51-174 in R6e, J. and Chamberlain, J. (eds.); Kierkegaard: A Critical Reader (Oxford,
Blackwell) 1995, pp242 and 257-259; on surplus, or supererogation, Derrida, J.; Positions (University of Chicago) 1981, pp5-6.
The whole of Derrida (1998) is a discussion of problems of paternity, maternity and responsibility. For the prospect of
fascinating developments of these points, cf. Heyd, D.; Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory (Cambridge University
Press) 1982; Frederic Jameson's foreword to Lyotard, J-F.; The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (University of
Minnesota) 1984, ppxiii and xvii on 'junkspace'; and the excellent Gray, R.T.; 'Economic Romanticism: Monetary Nationalism
in Johann Gottlieb Fichte and AdamMtiller, Eighteenth-Century Studies, vol. XXXVI, no. 4, pp535-557, 2003.
Conant (1991) p622, considers the temptations of philosophy as diagnosed by Cavell. This excellent essay regards Cavell's
essays on Shakespeare as continuing a tradition, from the later Wittgenstein and from Austin, of challenging sceptical arguments.
Scepticism, for Cavell, characterises, '...any view which takes the existence of the world to be a problem of knowledge', and the
best source for his arguments is Cavell, S.; The Claim ofReason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality and Tragedy (Oxford,
Clarendon) 1979, and especially Part One, Chapter Two. The problems of scepticism are, Cavell says, shared by both sceptic and
realist, and Wittgenstein, better than anyone, plays the role of mediator, as what Rorty calls a therapeutic philosopher. Conant
places his discussion in the context of the institutional division and prejudice toward both 'Continental' and 'Anglo-Saxon'
philosophy, for Wittgensteinian philosophy advocates, depending upon one's interpretation, either a return to the ancient
motivations for reflection or the abdication of what many, in 'analytical' traditions, see as the due methods in the search for
answers. (The hegemony of analytical philosophy, and its significance for the teaching and dissemination of philosophy in the
'humanistic discourses' is taken up in Derrida, J.; Ethics, Institutions and the Right to Philosophy (Oxford, Rowman and
Littlefield) 2002. One should see in particular pp28-32. In the roundtable discussion, Cavell is presented as an 'outlaw' from the
camp of analytical philosophy (p30). The debate is presented in the context of a discussion of cross-cultural influences. Again,
Searle gets a rough ride (p32)).
Cavell's position on the borderline of the two traditions is far more compelling and fecund than that of Derrida. The signatories
of the letter to The Times would do well to understand the difficulty of their subject by reading Cavell on Austin and
Wittgenstein, and indeed, Conant on Cavell (e.g. p623). They might consider, for instance, what Cavell does with the 'madness',
evinced by Descartes (and by Othello). Conant also notes the discussions of scepticism, ofmutual reading and of interpretation,
of deception and of therapy, in Cavell and Gadamer (p630). The deception which scepticism can practice is, as Wittgenstein
before him, a running up against self-imposed boundaries. Wittgenstein claimed to understand how Heidegger felt the frustration
of this continual collision. Cf. Waismann, F.; Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle (Oxford, Blackwell) 1979, pp68-69.
quotation are 'abnormal, parasitic', or 'non-serious' uses of language, and he ignores them: '[a]nd
[Derrida writes] the concept of the "ordinary", thus of "ordinary language" to which he [Austin] has
recourse is clearly marked by this exclusion'34, an exclusion, Derrida argues, that carries with it the last
hope of the general theory, which, had it successfully been stated, '...would no longer be governed by
those oppositions'. Derrida refines his earlier question: does parasitism threaten speech, and place
around it unbreachable boundaries, limitations which speech can only exceed by 'remaining "at home",
by and in itself, in the shelter of its essence or telos...or does this risk the very possibility of speech?
What, Derrida asks, can be meant by ordinary language that excludes this law? What Austin describes
as 'ordinary language' in truth constitutes an 'ethical and teleological determination' of the utterance as
an ideal, carrying '...the presence to self of a total context, the transparency of intentions and the
presence of meaning [vouloir-dire\ to the absolutely singular uniqueness of a speech act...'35. Derrida
responds that the non-serious, anomalous performative is the exemplar of the condition of iterability,
and the condition, or the limiting case, of successful performatives36.
for the role of 'I' leaves it no less open to iteration and replacement; it offers no prospect of an adequation between saying and
meaning, for '[a] thousand possibilities will always remain open...'. Derrida lists as possibilities all the canonical examples of
parasitic utterance; again, however, iterability '...prohibits apriori (and in principle) the full and rigorous attainment of the ideal
plenitude such exclusions purport to isolate' (p201).
4 Derrida (1977a) pl90. However, Strawson (in H.4-5) shows how these uses can be accounted for in an Austinian theory. Cf.
Spivak, G.C.; 'Revolutions that as Yet Have No Model: Derrida's "Limited Inc'", in Landry, D. and MacLean, G. (eds.); The
Spivak Reader: Selected Works ofGayatri Chakravorty Spivak (London, Routledge) 1996, p77.36 Derrida (1977a) pl91. Habermas (1985) ppl94-195 is clear that the view of Austin as stating the view of convention and
repetition to which Derrida objects is accepted without demur by literary critics. Habermas' response rejects the connection
between iterability, quotation, repeatability and the status of the quoted as fictional. Why should the fact that a literal promise can
be repeated, conventionally, in a fictional context have the consequence that the status of literal utterance is harmed? Only the
performative utterance itself carries the force of, say, a promise, and that, '...mentioned or repeated in a quote depends
grammatically upon this'. Habermas is very close to Searle here. Stage promises depend equally on a basis of consequences for
action, understood background practices and actions: off stage, promises. (This is surely, as the arguments of II and III show, a
better interpretation of Austin). Why does Derrida not analyse this equally 'ordinary' mode of speech? Habermas extends the
argument to the proliferation of readings or interpretations of texts. Cf. Miller (1987) pp499ff, and indeed all of Chapter 10 in
which Miller defends realism. The argument for the continuity between Davidson and Gadamer, one good for forming part of a
response to Taylor, says that the proliferation (repetition) of readings (interpretations according to conventions) remains good if
all are focussed on achieving a, '...mutual understanding in which the same utterances are assigned the same meaning' (pi98).
All interpretations must be directed to achieving a consensus (cf. Lewis (1969) p21). As Habermas notes, one is here nearing the
notions of language games and criteria. Scholes (1988) pp279-283 writes that there is no coherent approach to texts evident in
Derrida's works, and that the response to Searle is an example. Scholes argues that Derrida helps himself to notions which
deconstruction categorically denies to others. Rorty writes ofDerrida that he often likes to have it both ways: Rorty, R.; 'Critical
Response IV: The Higher Nominalism in a Nutshell, A Reply to Henry Staten', Critical Inquiry, vol. XII, no. 2, pp462-466,
1986. Cf. also Halion (1993) pl63. Scholes' examples are not always convincing (cf. pp281-282) for he does not give to law and
convention the role for which Derrida, though cf. p294.
There are further instances of coerciveness in deconstruction, indicating that it may be as prone to the tendency to coerciveness
in philosophy diagnosed in Nozick (1997a), and other essays therein. The discussion in Philosophical Explanations (Oxford,
Clarendon) 1981 is broad and entertaining. That deconstruction is more coercive than negative dialectics is mooted by Habermas
(1985) ppl85-189.
36 Johnson utilises the taxonomy of illocutionary verbs given by Austin at the close of How to do Things with Words for the
analysis of performatives in poetry, the paradigm case of non-serious utterance. Cf. Johnson, B.; The Critical Difference: Essays
in the Contemporary Rhetoric ofReading (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins) 1980. It should be noted that Derrida makes no detailed
study of the taxonomy, and that this shall be seen to be a significant omission. The nested intentions in Mallarmd's poem are
'legion' (p52), and Johnson raises as most pertinent that of the difference between the presentation of the beautiful lady and the
pained but always inadequate description. There is a congruence between the acts of naming and that of exhibiting (p53): the
poet gestures and struggles to describe, and both names and descriptions come together in a collocution, with all of its
indeterminacy: namely, in an 'act of speech' (p53). Johnson lists the by criterion, the necessity of acting according to
conventional procedures with expected conventional effects, and the eventual rejection of the performative-constative distinction
for that of locutions, illocutions and perlocutions. See Pratt, M.L.; Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse
(Bloomington, Indiana) 1977, pxvi. Both Valery and Mallarm6 make the distinction between poetic and practical language (and
poetic and practical experience).
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Of successful performatives, the paradigm of events in speech act theory, Derrida questions the very
status of event as it entails conditions of repetition in structure57. He asks whether a performative could
succeed in the case that it does not conform to a context (for, say, launching a ship or laying a bet), by
being an instance of citation38. This is not, for Derrida, simply the citation present in contexts of
recitation, but is a condition opposed to Austin's claim of a 'relative purity' of performatives, that
which is offered not in opposition to the iterability in contexts of recitation, '...but in opposition to
other kinds of iteration within a general iterability which constitutes a violation of the allegedly
rigorous purity of every event of discourse or every speech act'. In Derrida's notion of citation the
'category of intention [does] not disappear', but is no longer thought of as the basis of a theory of
meaning and communicative acts39. Rather, the dichotomy between utterances conceived of as citations
and their corresponding 'event utterances' is exchanged for another, namely that between marks and
their constitution in sentences. The intention animating an utterance should never be thought
'.. .through and through present to itself and its content'40, and the non-serious, or parasitical, cannot be
excluded from ordinary language41.
37 Searle (1977) pp207-208 writes that the argument that iterability threatens the idea that intention is the fundament of meaning
and communication cannot be accepted; the reverse is the case. Speech acts are indeed singular events, yet they have properties
Derrida does not notice. There is no limit on new speech acts, no limit on what can be communicated by them: 1... hearers are
able to understand this infinite number of possible communications simply by recognising the intentions of the speakers in the
performances of the speech acts', and both speaker and hearer are masters of the recursive rules of language. Iterability of types
and of rules of syntax are required for intentionality.
38 Austin perhaps forgot that Brunei conceived, designed and built his great ship as the Great Eastern, but after disagreements, it
was, without Brunei's consent, christened the Leviathan: a bottle was broken and so forth. Cf. Brunei, I.; The Life oflsambard
Kingdom Brunei: Civil Engineer (London, Longmans Greens and Co) 1870, p363. After the difficulties surrounding its launch (it
was so heavy that it would not slip down the gangway), and when it was finally floated, the ship was unofficially and without
ceremony named the Great Eastern. The name was in common use, and stuck.
39 Discourse is not language, it is, Argyros maintains, fundamentally Kantian, the condition of possibility for language. Argyros,
A.; "The Warp of the World: Deconstruction and Hermeneutics', Diacritics, vol. XVI, no. 3, pp47-55, 1986. Hesse (1985) pp62
and 65 reminds one that Rorty rejects the notions ofmutual knowledge and convention in descriptive, or hermeneutical, theories
of intentionality.
40 Derrida (1977b) p202 turns to what he considers Searle's second approach to his example of the reading of the statement of a
dead author: that one think of it simply as a sentence of English '...weaned from all production or origin, putative or
otherwise...', and yet still exhibiting intentionality '...because a meaningful sentence is just a standing possibility of the
corresponding (intentional) speech act'. One who made the utterance would be performing the speech act '...determined by the
rules of the languages that give the sentence its meaning in the first place'. Firstly, Derrida replies, the consideration of utterances
as having specific authors in particular situations is not as clearly rejected by his analysis, as Searle seems to think. In one of its
main arguments (1977a) considers the break between author intentions and marks, and Derrida says that 'up to a certain point',
this break retains its possibility without preventing the mark from functioning. He says that this implies that in the ideal cases
postulated by Searle there is always an element of '...play, a certain remove, a certain degree of independence...', in the origin,
production and intention of the mark. The very idea of postulating a break from speaker utterance is dependent upon this element
ofplay and remove, and if the break occurs it, of necessity, leaves its imprint on the mark. Derrida did not, in (1977a), argue that
intentionality is absent, pure and simple, from the functioning of the mark, but instead that there can be no '... fulfilled and
actualised intentionality, adequate to itself and to its contents' (p203). Derrida expounds and takes the point into important new
territory; he works on the 'problematical' relationship between understanding a mark in its 'meeLniagfulness' and the minimum
required for the attainment of such understanding. (1977a) focuses on the constitution of this bare minimum ofmaking sense, and
argues that'.,, its conformity to the code, grammaticality, etc. is incommensurate with the adequate understanding of intended
meaning', What is more, the incommensurability is irreducible, it 'inheres' in intention itself and it js riven [crease] with
iterability'. The debate joined with Searle on this matter, as Derrida says, is that of the relation between iterability and
conventionality and the latter's possibility. Derrida notes with reference to (1977a) the 'perhaps paradoxical' nature of his
appealing to convention for the writing of an argument for the necessary failure of convention, yet he returns to his arguments for
the necessary contamination of iterability, saying that both convention and iterability can only be what they are '...in the
impurity of [their] self identity (repetition altering and alteration identifying)'.
As far as the internal semiotic context is concerned, the force of the rupture is no less important: by virtue of its
essential iterability, a written syntagma can always be detached from the chain in which it is inserted or given
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Difference ('...the irreducible absence of intention or attendance to the performative utterance...'),
posits the graphematic structure of all communication, and ventures that the effects of speech acts, as
reports of presence, and as performatives, do not'... exclude what is generally opposed to them...but
presuppose it as '...the general space of their possibility', a space disruptive of presence, or, of
writing42. All of the difficulties Derrida discerns in Austin are attributable to the examples in which
without causing it lose all possibility of functioning; if not all possibility of "communicating" precisely. One
can perhaps come to recognise other possibilities in it by inscribing it or grafting it onto other chains. No
context can entirely enclose it. Nor any code, the code here being both the possibility and impossibility of
writing, of its essential iterability (repetition/alterity) (pp203-204).
The permitted iterability allows the sign to break with all contexts, allowing an illimitable number of new contexts. 'This does
not imply that the mark is valid outside of a context, but on the contrary that there are only contexts without any centre or
absolute anchoring [ancrage]' (p204).
41 Derrida (1977a) pi 92 again ascribes to Austin arguments which are only dubiously his, firstly, the want of a general theory,
one which, should it hold out successfully against citationality and iterability, would become a shelter for '... the teleological lure
of consciousness...'. Secondly, the absence of intention in the utterance disallows the prospect of a complete, determinable
context, '...in the sense required by Austin', and renders it useless as a 'determining centre' of context. Derrida concludes that
the concept of context is as wedded as that of the ordinary to a basis ofpresuppositions in favour of a determinate consciousness.
The rejection of Searle's accusation that the argument of 'Signature Event Context' requires a notion, implicit or explicit, of
inner processes ('intentions') behind utterances does not, Derrida (1977b) p218 writes, constitute an endorsement of the thesis
that there is a simple adequation of the utterance to itself, or indeed between the intention and the expression in an ideal utterance
which is the full realisation of the intention. Iterability, Derrida writes, works it effects in both intention and its expression.
(1977a) argues that not all intentions are conscious, and that no intention can ever be fully conscious or present to itself; it makes
the case (it would be incorrect to suggest that it does more), for a 'structural unconscious', the structure of parasitism in the ideal
model of speech act theory. Additionally, and importantly, Derrida (p214) makes the case for the unconscious as subverting the
concept of parasitism introduced strategically by Austin and Searle; this, he says, questions radically the nature of the bond
between intention and consciousness, the bond neither Austin nor Searle questions. For qualification Derrida turns to Searle
(1969), and to the conditions placed upon strict and literal speech acts (cf. Ill), namely, that in their analysis one considers an
ideal speech situation (not a parasite), and that both speaker and hearer are taken to be conscious of what they are doing. (These
points arise in Searle (1977) at the very points at which Searle nods to the unconscious, a recognition that Derrida (p214) derides
as '...only a potential, limited consciousness that has not yet become thematically self-conscious...'). He notes also Searle's
claim that few intentions are ever 'brought to consciousness', and that speaking and writing are conscious intentional activities
with this not implying that the intentions behind illocutions imply 'a separate set of conscious states apart from simply writing
and speaking', and says (p215) that an illustrative example is found in Searle (1969), one in which promises are parsed as threats
or warnings. Searle writes that in such cases there is a distinction to be marked, seen in the fact that a promise is a promise to do
something for the hearer, while a threat is a threat to do something to the hearer. A promise is defective if one promises to do
something the hearer does not want done, and also if the promiser does not believe the hearer wants it done. He quotes Searle:
'The promisee wishes (needs, desires, etc.) that something be done, and the promiser is aware of this wish (need, desire, etc.)'.
Derrida neglects to refer to the sources of which Searle's work is a development and criticism, primarily the work of Grice, and
especially in his remarking that Searle concludes that if a promise is to be non-defective, then that which is promised must be
something the hearer wants done, considers in his interest, or prefers, and that the speaker must believe that these conditions
obtain. Derrida responds that this description excludes all but the "... distant, determining and determinable consciousness of the
intentions, desires, or needs involved'. He moots (mischievously), the extension of his earlier example, and questions whether in
promising to be critical of Searle's theses and thereby providing Searle's unconscious with all of its desires would muddy the
ascription to Derrida's utterance of the status of promise, threat or warning: 'Searle might respond that it would constitute a
threat to Searle's consciousness, and a promise for the unconscious. There would thus be two speech acts in a single utterance.
Flow is this possible?' (p215).
Derrida (p217) considers what he thinks would be a plausible Searlean response. None of this, Searle might write, contradicts
the arguments; all that Derrida has done is to note certain interesting corruptions of promising. Searle would say that if a promise
is to be made it must involve a 'speaker who is conscious with regard to a hearer who is equally conscious and desirous of what
is promised to him', and for Derrida this is to conclude that the process of idealisation concerns speakers and hearers only as they
are 'conscious egos;, and within the limited scope of the phenomena that this can describe the application and plausibility of this
thesis is unquestionable. However, the phenomena never appear in this straightforward fashion, and the conscious ego can never
be given a unitary identity precisely because of the effects of iterability. The second argument Searle gives, namely that both
spoken and written discourse may become corrupt in identical ways is indeed '...the nerve of the demonstration in Sec...'
(p218), though in a more radical (more Davidsonian) fashion. The inadequation between meaning and saying, and the potential
for corruption of a text, when raised to the status of a necessary possibility make up part of the structural ambivalence theorised
by (1977a). This is the most significant parasite of them all, one which neither Austin nor Searle manage (or try) to incorporate
into their discussions of corruption, infelicity and parasitism.
What must be included in the description, i.e. in what is described, but also in the practical discourse, in the
writing that describes, is not merely the factual reality of corruption and of alteration [de l'ecart], but
corrupta6/7/(y (to which it would be better henceforth not to give this name, which implies generally a
pathological disfunction, a degeneration or an ethical-political defect) and dissociability, traits tied to iterability,
which Sec proposes to account for. That can only be done if the "-bility" (and not the lability) is recognised
from the inception on [des l'entame] as broached and breached [entamee] in its "origin" by iterability (pp218-
219).
42 Cf. Conant, J.; 'Critical Response II: On Bruns, on Cavell', Critical Inquiry, vol. XVII, no. 3, pp616-634, 1991.
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speech and writing are thoughtlessly elided, and he turns for qualification to Austin's treatment of
signatures. The context of the argument from Austin is a difficulty in the search for a criterion by
which to distinguish performatives and constatives, and Austin justifies his preference for first person,
present indicative active forms for performatives, owing to their proximity to the source or origin of the
utterance and its statement. In cases of the absence of an indexical, or a name, the utterer is 'referred
to', in one of two ways: verbally, by being the utterer, and, in writing, by the appending of a signature.
As before, the connection to source is made in the singularity of an event and its 'pure' repetition'13.
Again, however, the condition of possibility for the effect of the signature, the sine qua non of its
function, is the impossibility of its carrying present intention, and Derrida writes that his analysis of
non-verbal signatures applies equally to those 'oral' signatures constituted in spoken utterances"4. The
implication of non-presence in the signature is potentially over-ridden by the retention of a 'having-
43 Derrida (1982a) pl7 gives a suggestion for the consideration of Nietzsche and Freud as central in arguments in a work on
intentionality. The notion of the eternal recurrence is paramount. Derrida makes it himself with his claim that differcmce is best
considered a displacing movement between apparently opposed terms; indeed, that each term is always the diffirance of the
other. Additionally, this would be include a '... reinterpretation ofmimesis in its alleged opposition to physis', and would indicate
the "... sameness of diffirance and repetition in the eternal return'. Derrida (1980) p71 considers the consequences for repetition
of a gap between native genius and the dissemination of language, and the view of history as bound by 'gaps' and irredeemible
novelty. A complete response to Derrida on the import of psychoanalysis in indirect, non-literal utterances would demand
consideration of Sainsbury, R.M.; 'Saying and Conveying', Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. VII, no. 4, pp415-432, 1984, see
esp. p423. Sainsbury develops a theory of speaker roles: speaking ironically, elliptically, sincerely and so forth.
44 The confusions Derrida has identified obtain, he writes (Derrida (1977b) ppl92ff), in Searle's discussion of intentionality.
Searle writes that intentionality plays the same role in written and spoken language, taking this as an argument against Derrida;
Derrida, however, agrees. He, however, disagrees vehemently with the imputation to (1977a) of the argument that intentionality
is absent from all writing (all graphemes).
What the text questions is not intention or intentionality but their telos, which orients and organises the
movement and the possibility of fulfilment, realisation, and actualization in a plenitude that would be present
to and identical with itself (pi 93).
For a writing to be a writing it must continue to "act" and be readable even when what is called the author of
the writing no longer answers for what he has written, for what he seems to have signed, be it because of a
temporary absence, because he is dead, or, more generally, because he has not employed his absolutely actual
and present intention or attention, the plenitude of his desire to say what he means, in order to sustain what
seems to be written "in his name" (ppl93-194).
The value of a law (any law) is not in its illustrative and particular examples but in its instantiation of a general condition, again
defined by durability, which says that intentionality applies only to things iterable. Intention will never 'achieve the goal' of
being present to the object and to itself, for the status of iterability is not an eventuality, present here and there, but unavoidable:
'[ijntention is a priori (at once) differante: differing and deferring, in its inception' (pl94). (Austin accepts only that the source
of an utterance in the present indicative active is present to the utterance and its statement, and that the authenticity of the
relationship is assured by (a case of non-verbal utterance) a signature. Derrida notes in addition Austin's attention to the legal
performative 'hereby'. Cf. Austin, J.L.; 'Performative-Constative', ppl3-22, in Searle, J.R. (ed.); The Philosophy of Language
(Oxford University Press) 1971. Performative utterances are the, '...operative clauses of a legal instrument' (ppl4 and 18)).
Blackburn, S.; Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy ofLanguage (Oxford, Clarendon) 1984, ppl24-125 makes a
distinction between an assertion as reported in the first person present indicative active and the congeries of other intentions with
which the assertion may be uttered, and writes that, in virtue of this, there can be no thought of there being a 'central case' in
which the author's intentions are made fully available for inspection and instantiate the conventions for each speech act.
Blackburn says that Derrida's work, and indeed its responses (especially Searle), has nothing essential to do with media of
communication and the transitoriness of speech (Searle does not appreciate that this is a one-line version ofDerrida), but that the
debate concerns the authority, or responsibility, of an author over and for the signs he issues in a public and conventional nexus
of communication. (The present author cannot help concurring with Searle that Derrida's arguments are occasionally very poor;
in Rorty (1984) p, they are described as 'awful'). Blackburn argues that Derrida's work is thought by Derrideans to be the 'end of
the road' for a theory of convention in meaning, and it is to obviate this scepticism, or, at the very least to indicate alternatives,
each radical in its own way, that this dissertation is written. It is the conviction of the present author that these alternatives, all it
must be said, deriving from analytical work, illustrate a fact of great importance about this tradition, namely, that there are means
by which to progress beyond poststructuralist meaning scepticism, and that far from being the end for theories of meaning and
intentionality, enquiry in the analytical mode can meet Derrida's work on the same ground. It might be ventured, in a work of
greater scope than this, that by returning to the problems Derrida correctly puts at the heart of discussions ofmeaning, those once
shared by the analytical and the continental traditions, the dialogue between the two shall be fruitful. Cf. Scholes (1988):
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been-present' in a 'past now', which remains a 'future now' in 'the transcendental form of
presentness'45, but again, for a relation to source to remain there obtains an 'absolute singularity of a
signature-event and a signature-form: the pure reproducibility of a pure event', only with the
simultaneous possibility and impossibility of the rigorous purity of a signature46.
It is to be argued that the guiding presence of speaker intention, in Austin's paradigmatic and
Derrida's parasitical cases, can be accounted for without fears that the two types cannot clearly be
discriminated, for they can, and the 'I' appearing in literal and fictional contexts registered in its status
as literal or fictional. In 1.2 the first element in the response to these arguments is presented in the
context of Frege's discussion of statements containing demonstratives or other indexical expressions,
and, more particularly, Evans' arguments establishing that they are comprehensible in a Fregean theory
as the senses of statements mediated by reference. In 1.3 it is suggested that, owing to the congruence
between the notion of mediation in Fregean Sinn and Husserlian noema, one might appeal to Evans in
defence of Husserl against Derrida's criticism, and, furthermore, that the best theory of the mediation
of senses by reference is of a piece with Hintikka's response to theories of intentionality as
Blackburn's suggested response to Derridean scepticism is identical to Scholes', and nota bene that Blackburn raises the matter
of the priority of intentionality over language (ppl26-127 and ppl34-140).
45
My theory that Derrida's concerns are answered by a consideration of demonstratives and indexicals (as presented in 1.2 and 3)
seems preempted in Scholes (1988) p289.
46 Derrida (1977b) pl92 stresses his annoyance that Searle ignores the section of (1977a) dealing with signatures, and yet '...the
section on signatures concerns the putative "origin" of oral orwritten utterances, and thus, the content and indispensable recourse
of all speech-act theory'; a signature is equally affected by the conditions of iterability outlined. The important matter ofwhether
the features Derrida identifies as peculiar to writing render by extension the notion of intended meaning in all communication
otiose is treated separately by Searle (1977) pp200-201. The communication of intended meaning is not imperilled by Derrida's
arguments, for intentionality plays the very same role in written and spoken communication: '...a meaningful sentence is just a
standing possibility of the corresponding (intentional) speech act' (p202). Understanding requires only that one know that one
who said it '...and meant it...', would be performing the speech act given its meaning by the rules of the language in which the
sentence is given meaning, and Searle continues that the very idea of illocutionary intentions is prone to doubt; in response to
Derrida he adds that if they existed or mattered they would subsist 'behind' the utterance, and guide it. However, in '...serious
literal speech...', the sentences are the realisations of the intentions; they are 'fungible intentions'. A second point is that
intentions need not be conscious. Both speaking and writing may be conscious, intentional activities, but the intentionality of
illocutionary acts does not require the postulation of conscious states underlying forms of communication. With regard to
intentionality, the understanding of the utterance requires the recognition of S's illocutionary intentions, and this, in turn, requires
the knowledge ofwhat linguistic act S performs.
Derrida (1977b) pp213ff claims that he debates the status of'structuralpossibilities', for onoe it is found to be possible for an
utterance or mark to function in the absence of a guiding intention, there is raised the possibility of non-presence pertaining
necessarily in this function. Firstly, one may consider cases of the functioning of a mark in cases in which S's intention is not
present (that is, in which a present intention may be dispensed with), and secondly, the defined notion of 'possibility qua
necessity'. There is cross-contamination between the two, both tending to the conclusion that by virtue of the iterability which
forms the structure ofall marks, and which cleaves intention, that the mark may never be 'fully present to itself in the actuality of
its aim, or of its meaning (i.e. what it means to say [vouloir-dire])' This limiting yet positive condition applies equally to
intention as to the object aimed at in the intention, and to this end Derrida finds broad agreement with Searle on the fact that
'there is no getting away from intentionality', 'a meaningful sentence' being a 'standing possiblity of the corresponding
(intentional) speech act'. Derrida relates to this his doubts concerning the fullness of meaning and the presentness of the
corresponding speech act. (1977a) questions precisely the presumption of the plenitude of intentional meaning (again, vouloir-
dire), and of consciousness and presence organising communicative situations, By arguing that all marks imply the possibility of
functioning without the full presence of intention, Derrida does not, however, efface intentionality, for instance, the 'differential-
deferring' structure of intentionality 'alone' can enable one to account for the difference between the locutionary, the
illocutionary and the perlocutionary aspects of the self-same utterances. Writing has proliferated and continues to proliferate,
leaving as its effects the play of logocentrism: 'the system of speech, consciousness, meaning, presence, truth...' (Derrida
(1977a) pl92). Derrida retains ('provisionally', and for strategic reasons), the name of writing; by placing metaphysical concepts
in opposition one begins the process of undue subordination, and the therapy of deconstruction ('double writing') removes such
oppositions for the purpose of formulating a means by which they may be overcome; it is not a metaphilosophy but a proto-
philosophy.
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directedness. The point to be made is that one need not entertain meaning scepticism after reading
Derrida, for the criticisms he makes of intentionality need not be accepted. The relativism concerning
meanings that such theories may engender is examined in 1.1.
In II begins the main response to the problems Derrida discerns in Austin. A voice omitted from the
Derrida-Searle debate, that of Grice, is heard. With specific relation to speech act analysis he, again,
argues that speaker intentions, as it were, remain in the spoken utterance without losing its sense, and,
one can add, that this is the case on both interpretations of his thesis (defined in II). Grrice's thesis
requires a workable notion of convention, and for this one must look to Lewis (in IV).
11INTENTIONALITY AND CONVENTION
1. The Principle of Charity and Intentionalitv
Rorty considers where his agreements and disagreements with Putnam lie1. There are (at least) five
areas of agreement. Firstly, language, and mind, saturate 'reality', rendering any attempt independently
to read it fatuous and its results irrelevant. Secondly, a description of the way the world is reflects
beliefs and values, and some descriptions are better than others. Thirdly, and following this, the
indeterminacy of translation is rather the 'interest relativity' of translation, and a correct translation
may be provided, '...given the interests which are relevant in the context'. Fourthly, one's relevant
interests, or one's conceptual scheme, make no claim upon, or reference to, 'the way things are'.
Fifthly, the idea that concepts and conceptual schemes can be bounded is 'incoherent', for they are
given life only in a (Quinean) holistic web of belief, and are subject to review and continual change2.
Some details of Putnam's response are considered below, and it is to pre-empt discussion to add that
Rorty finds cause to accuse Putnam of straying from the pragmatist path. This, however, must remain a
1
Rorty, R.; 'Putnam and the Relativist Menace', The Journal ofPhilosophy. Vol. XC, No. 9, pp 443-461, 1993.
2 Putnam details his objections and misgivings. Putnam, H.; Realism with a Human Face (Harvard University Press) 1990, pp20-
21. Rorty finds the criticism of his scornful, Carnapian tone (particularly evident, he admits, in Philosophy and the Mirror of
Nature) well-founded, and ignores Putnam's quip that this belies Rorty's 'analytic past'. Rorty makes no apology in 'Non-
Reductive Physicalism', ppl 13-125 in Objectivity, Relativism and Truth: Philosophical Papers, Volume I (Cambridge University
Press) 1991, but, in the form of this physicalism, his shady background still works its influence, cf. 1.1, but even in those dark
days there were signs of the work to come. In Rorty, R.; 'Mind-Body Identity, Privacy and Categories', The Review of
Metaphysics, vol. XIX, no. 1, pp24-54, 1965, disagreements between proponents and critics of the identity theory are a 'case
study' ofmethods of 'linguistic philosophy'. Proponents argue that empirical enquiry reveals that sensations are brain processes,
and that objections merely demonstrate conceptual confusions. Classifications of expressions as conceptual and as empirical are
profitless, for they can only embody the present stage, and state, of enquiry, which, when described, shows that the mind-body
identity theory is correct, and that ways of speaking must be changed. Classifications are always otiose. "There is simply no such
thing as a method of classifying linguistic expressions that has results guaranteed to remain intact despite the results of future
empirical enquiry. Thus in this area (and perhaps in all areas) there is no method which will have the sort ofmagisterial neutrality
of which linguistic philosophers fondly dream'. (p25). Rorty defends his case in 'In Defence of Eliminative Materialism', The
Review of Metaphysics, vol. XXIV, no. 1, ppl 12-121, 1970. In Elder, C.; Appropriating Hegel (Aberdeen University Press)
1980 it is argued that Hegel has convincing arguments against eliminative materialism.
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sidelight, for it is the mutual accusations of relativism that are here attended to, and which provoke
their disagreements.
Rorty argues that Putnam, Cavell and Conant remain 'too kind', to modern philosophy3. While
Conant may caution against the allure of fruitless philosophical explanations (of mind, intentionality,
free will, and so forth), reckoning the ways in which their acceptance entails complicity in the subtle
form of imperialism which it is the mark of Rorty's pragmatism to dispel, and Putnam declare that,
'...the illusions that philosophy spins are illusions that belong to "the nature of human life itself",
there remains a simple problem, giving Rorty pause at the statement 'the nature of human life'4. The
problem affects Cavell's claim for the inevitability of tarrying with scepticism, (in Derrida, the
hymeneal), for these, and Putnam's and Conant's, are tired themes, best given 'the slip'5. Arguing again
against representationalist theories, Rorty recalls his early physicalism. The five-point plan of
3
Rorty (1993) p449, and one should try to set aside the 'shards' of the dichotomies between subject and object, scheme and
content and appearance and reality. One's relation to the universe is 'causal' not 'representationalist', and Rorty argues that it is
this purely causal picture which Putnam finds unpalatable.
4
Rorty (1993) p449. See Conant, J.; 'Critical Response II: On Bruns and Cavell', Critical Inquiry, vol. XVII, no. 3, pp616-634,
1991, and the exchange with Cavell in 'An Interview with Stanley Cavell', pp21-72 in Fleming, R. and Payne, M. (eds.); The
Senses ofStanley Cavell (Lewisburg, Bucknell University Press) 1989. See also Dews, P.; 'Communicative Paradigms and the
Question of Subjectivity: Habermas, Mead and Lacan', pp87-117 in Dews, P. (ed.); Habermas: A Critical Reader (Oxford,
Blackwell) 1999, especially pp87-88. Dews considers the need for a shift from philosophies of consciousness (allowing, for
Rorty, the victimisation of which Conant writes), to philosophies of communication. It is contended that this is precisely what is
offered in this dissertation, and that Denida's objections to Husserl's phenomenology (discussed in 1.3) may be circumvented,
precisely by showing a possible way in which a theory of intentionality, and of convention, in communication may be given a
practice, or pragmatic, element. See also Dunne, J.; 'Beyond Sovereignty and Deconstruction: The Storied Self, ppl37-157 in
Kearney, R. (ed.); Paul Ricoeur: The Hermeneutics ofAction (London, Sage) 1996, and Putnam (1990) p38-40 for an appeal to
intuition in epistemology and metaphysics.
5 Cavell, S.; In Quest ofthe Ordinary: Lines ofSkepticism andRomanticism (University of Chicago) 1988, especially ppl62-168.
Cavell describes in exquisite detail the attractiveness of philosophy, with particular reference to the beginnings ofWittgenstein's
Philosophical Investigations, a text that repeatedly occupies Cavell. Cf. McDonald, C.V. (ed.); The Ear of the Other: Texts and
Discussions with Jacques Derrida: Otobiography, Transference, Translation (New York, Schocken) 1985, pl25, and 'Whom to
Give to: Knowing not to Know', ppl 51-174 in Ree, J. and Chamberlain, J. (eds.); Kierkegaard: A Critical Reader (Oxford,
Blackwell) 1995, pp242 and 257-259; on surplus, or supererogation, Derrida, J.; Positions (University ofChicago) 1981, pp5-6.
The whole of Derrida (1998) is a discussion of problems of paternity, maternity and responsibility. For the prospect of
fascinating developments of these points, cf. Heyd, D.; Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory (Cambridge University
Press) 1982; Frederic Jameson's foreword to Lyotard, J-F.; The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (University of
Minnesota) 1984, ppxiii and xvii on 'junkspace'; and the excellent Gray, R.T.; 'Economic Romanticism: Monetary Nationalism
in Johann Gottlieb Fichte and AdamMtlller, Eighteenth-Century Studies, vol. XXXVI, no. 4, pp535-557, 2003.
Conant (1991) p622, considers the temptations of philosophy as diagnosed by Cavell. This excellent essay regards Cavell's
essays on Shakespeare as continuing a tradition, from the later Wittgenstein and from Austin, of challenging sceptical arguments.
Scepticism, for Cavell, characterises, '...any view which takes the existence of the world to be a problem of knowledge', and the
best source for his arguments is Cavell, S.; The Claim ofReason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality and Tragedy (Oxford,
Clarendon) 1979, and especially Part One, Chapter Two. The problems of scepticism are, Cavell says, shared by both sceptic and
realist, and Wittgenstein, better than anyone, plays the role of mediator, as what Rorty calls a therapeutic philosopher. Conant
places his discussion in the context of the institutional division and prejudice toward both 'Continental' and 'Anglo-Saxon'
philosophy, for Wittgensteinian philosophy advocates, depending upon one's interpretation, either a return to the ancient
motivations for reflection or the abdication of what many, in 'analytical' traditions, see as the due methods in the search for
answers. (The hegemony of analytical philosophy, and its significance for the teaching and dissemination of philosophy in the
'humanistic discourses' is taken up in Derrida, J.; Ethics, Institutions and the Right to Philosophy (Oxford, Rowman and
Littlefield) 2002. One should see in particular pp28-32. In the roundtable discussion, Cavell is presented as an 'outlaw' from the
camp of analytical philosophy (p30). The debate is presented in the context of a discussion of cross-cultural influences. Again,
Searle gets a rough ride (p32)).
Cavell's position on the borderline of the two traditions is far more compelling and fecund than that of Derrida. The signatories
of the letter to The Times would do well to understand the difficulty of their subject by reading Cavell on Austin and
Wittgenstein, and indeed, Conant on Cavell (e.g. p623). They might consider, for instance, what Cavell does with the 'madness',
evinced by Descartes (and by Othello). Conant also notes the discussions of scepticism, of mutual reading and of interpretation,
of deception and of therapy, in Cavell and Gadamer (p630). The deception which scepticism can practice is, as Wittgenstein
before him, a running up against self-imposed boundaries. Wittgenstein claimed to understand how Heidegger felt the frustration
of this continual collision. Cf. Waismann, F.; Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle (Oxford, Blackwell) 1979, pp68-69.
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pragmatism articulates a vision of the way in which human constitution guides the development of
social institutions, its moral concisely expressed in Dewey's fable of the anteater and the bower-bird,
one heeded, Rorty avers, by Davidson, but not Putnam6. Human evolutionary features (digits,
opposable thumbs, brains, and fraternity, solidarity and cooperation), allowed the growth of social
institutions, for such features define humans in their wants and in their abilities to satisfy them, yet they
compel the ascription of no 'representational' relationships, merely facilitating, '...batting increasingly
complex noises back and forth'. The reluctance of philosophers to take the pragmatist turn, Rorty adds,
should not blind one to the utility of the Darwinian vision in dissipating philosophical problems, and
setting aside fruitless distinctions7. One can see the world aright, not, following Wittgenstein, by
6 Under Sericulus Melinus, Chlamydodera Maculata, Amblyomis Sublaris and Ptilonorhynchus Violaceus, Sharpe gives fine
descriptions of bowers. Sharpe, R.B.; Monograph of the Paradiseidce, or Birds ofParadise, and Ptilonorhyncidce, or Bower-
Birds (London, Henry Sotheran & Co.) 1891-1898. A representative passage is Dewey, J.; Reconstruction in Philosophy (New
York, Henry Holt and Company) 1920, pp75-76. 'It was said that it has now become extremely difficult to recover the view of
the world which universally obtained in Europe till the seventeenth century. Yet after all we need only to recur to the science of
plants and animals as it was before Darwin and to the ideas which even now are dominant in moral and political matters to find
the elder order of conceptions in full possession of the popular mind. Until the dogma of fixed unchangeable types and species,
of arrangement in classes of higher and lower, of subordination of the transitory individual to the universal or kind had been
shaken in its hold upon the science of life, it was impossible that the new ideas and method should be made at home in social and
moral life. Does it not seem to be the intellectual task of the twentieth century to take this last step? When this step is taken the
circle of scientific development will be rounded out and the reconstruction of philosophy be made an accomplished fact'. On
Dewey on life as a natural event, see Sathaye, S.G.; Instrumentalism: A Methodological Exposition of the Philosophy ofJohn
Dewey (Bombay, Popular Prakashan) 1972, pplllff. See also Murphy, A.E.; 'Dewey's Theory of the Nature and Function of
Philosophy', pp33-55 in Ratner, S. (ed.); The Philosopher of the Common Man: Essays in Honour ofJohn Dewey to Celebrate
his Eightieth Birthday (New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons) 1940, and pp43ff on the contextual definition ofmeaning.
The response to Rorty's arguments against 'representationalist' theories suggested in Introduction is, it seems, shared by
Dewey, as may be seen in Dewey, J.; Leibniz's New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding: A Critical Exposition
(Chicago, S.C. Griggs and Company) 1888. He is concerned to disabuse the reader of the view (notoriously held by Russell,
B.A.W.; A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy ofLeibniz with an Appendix ofLeading Passages (London, George Allen &
Unwin) 1937), that Leibniz's theory of monads is a useful theological fairy tale, one for which he prostituted his intellect in the
service of his patrons. Dewey accepts all of the theory of monads, see especially pp291-298, and on p293 presents the theory of
monads as 'windowless mirrors of the world'. Dewey's service is all the greater in that he finds the sources of the theory in
Aristotle and Aquinas, and he writes: '[t]he monad is individual, for it represents reality in its own way, from its own point of
view. It is universal, for its whole content is the order of the universe'. Cf. Deleuze (1993) plO. It is the 'many in the one', and
the source of both perpetual change and of continuity, and is thus the '...answer to the inquiry [sic] of Greek philosophy'. It is
khbra. Cf. Anscombe and Geach (1973) p and Dewey (1888) pp346ff. The details of the atomists' theories of the formation and
constitution of possible worlds and khora, see Guthrie, W.K.C.; A History of Greek Philosophy, Volume II: The Presocratic
Tradition from Parmenides to Democritus (Cambridge University Press) 1965, pp404-413. Dewey (1888) p295 says that each
monad expresses 'precisely law', and pre-established (meaning, following Russell, 'existent'), harmony. The consequences for a
theory of repetition are noted, and Kierkegaard's credit to Leibniz is again invoked: [a]U things have an end because they from
parts of one system; everything that occurs looks forward to something else and prepares the way for it, and yet it is itself
mechanically conditioned by its antecedents' (p296). In only man and God do monads, to different degrees, become self-
reflective (cf. pp318 and 347-348).
Following Wolff, with whom, for Dewey, misreadings of Leibniz begin, an Epicurean tenor was read into Leibniz's theory.
'The monad was...considered to be in space, or at least conditioned by space relations, as is a mathematical point, although not
itself spatial in the sense of being extended'. However, Leibniz is more radical: monads are incorporeal and insensible: they have
neither extension in space nor place in time. They are constituted by receptivity to changes, caused (mirrored, represented),
internally by changes in relationships between other monads. Mates (1976) p335 argues that the Leibnizean theory of necessity
as truth in all possible worlds is distinct enough from contemporary theories to justify the broaching of '... a more strictly
Leibnizean approach...'. Deleuze (1993) pp3-13 describes this difficult relationship, and in a description of the fold as the
intersection ofmany (infinitely many) monads (p26), he finds cause to question Heidegger's theory of being-in-the-world.
7 Those trotted out to 'con' freshmen into taking an interest in the problems of philosophy. On Rorty on Darwin cf. Fromm, H.;
'The New Darwinism in the Humanities: Part II, Back to Nature Again', The Hudson Review, vol. LVI, no. 2, pp315-327, 2003.
In Kaufmann, F.; 'Cassirer's Theory of Scientific Knowledge', ppl83-213 in Schilpp, P.A. (ed.); The Philosophy of Ernst
Cassirer (Northwestern University Press) 1949, pp210-211 Kaufmann writes that Dewey's '...naturalism is heavens apart from
those crude types of naturalism which would "reduce" human activity to behaviour of inanimate bodies', and gives an
interpretation of Cassirer congenial to Rorty's drafting ofDewey for his cause. Rorty (1993) p448 is mortified to think his work
could be mistaken for crude physicalism. An excellent survey of Dewey's theory is in Tiles, J.E.; Dewey (London, Routledge)
1988, pp78-86. Explicitly in response to 'analytical' philosophy of mind (Tiles cites Grice and Bennett) Dewey's naturalism is
neither nominalist, in Bennett's sense, nor individualist, in that it makes appeal to social, mutually-known practices. It is
interesting to note that neither Dewey's nor Rorty's pragmatism would find favour with Peirce, and that Rorty, in 'Pragmatism,
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working through prior 'representationalist' theories with a view to dismissing them, but simply by
looking in the right direction.
Rorty defends himself, and Foucault and Derrida, Dewey and James, against Putnam's charge of
relativism. There is indeed a justification, a 'sociological' justification, to which statements are prone,
any other is strictly inconsistent with the five points of pragmatism8, but this counts nothing for the
charge that the consequences that he, Foucault and Derrida read in the failures of (in Rorty's catch-all
term), foundationalism, constitute an incoherent, self-defeating, even repellent, relativism. The failures
compel, Putnam says, the revision ofways of speaking, dictating '...whether and when we are allowed
to use words like 'know', 'objective', 'fact' and 'reason', and leaves philosophy, once intellectual
culture's 'pedestal', unfit to bear a statue that has, besides (and by Rorty's mentors), been toppled9.
Rorty replies that Putnam, as a pragmatist, should know that there needs be distinctions between useful
and confused use of terms, and that, if philosophy, fully a century after Frege, is still talking to itself,
Davidson and Truth', ppl26-150 in (1991) ppl29-132 is not troubled. Against Davidson's animadversions (Davidson (2000)
pxviii), Rorty finds many continuities between his work and that of James, cf. ppl28-129 and ppl32ff.
Interestingly, regarding Rorty's drafting of Quine for the pragmatist cause, Martin, E. and Smith, D.W.; 'On the Nature and
Relevance of Indeterminacy', Foundations of Language, vol. XII, no. 1, pp49-71, 1974 consider three theses of Quine regarding
translation: that when all evidence is in, no translation scheme is more likely than any other; that all translations are relative to a
theory, and that there are no relations from language to language (meanings) making a translation correct or incorrect. The first is
an epistemological thesis: indeterminacy affects all inference in theory construction; the second repeats Quine's lesson that truth
and ontology are relative to conceptual schemes. The third, regarding the example of posits in physics and linguistics (cf. I. 5)
says that there are no relations for translation to establish. Martin and Smith venture that Quine is wrong to argue that the
positing of meanings in linguistics is more objectionable than that of entities in physics, for their failure is due not to
indeterminacy but to explanatory irrelevance. They do no work, for the evidence for translations is too weak, and allows no
identification of sameness ofmeaning, but, Martin and Smith argue, the problem is not in language, or the theory ofmeaning, but
in Quine's epistemology, and that Peircean pragmatism includes what is missing in Quine. Their solution (p71) to defend
linguistic theory against the indeterminacy of translation is to,'... marshall behavioural evidence for one set of mental structures
over others'. It might be investigated whether Quine's acquiescence in anomalous monism (Quine, W.V.O.; Pursuit of Truth
(Harvard University Press) 1990) offers a means to do this without abandoning key elements of his theory.
Peirce argues that repeated observation and revision of beliefs leads theory to converge on the 'one True conclusion', and that
the only restrictions on this must be procedural, dictating reluctance, or conservatism, with regard to altering entrenched beliefs.
By following the correct procedure one will arrive at an explanation of reality, indeed, at the truth. (Martin and Smith suggest
that the very idea of alternative conceptual schemes, and of their indeterminacy, holds inherent difficulties, for how may
empirically distinct conceptual schemes, offering equally good explanations of all evidence, be individuated?) See Hartshome, C
and Weiss, P. (eds.); The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce: Volume V, Pragmatism and Pragmaticism (Harvard
University Press) 1934, §5.407. Also Volume I, Principles ofPhilosophy (1931) §1.120, at which one leams that '[a] hypothesis
is something which looks as if it might be true and were true, and which is capable of verification or refutation by comparison
with facts'. (The issue of surplus and economy, or supererogation, is also raised, §1.122). Cf. also Volume IV, The Simplest
Mathematics (1933) §4.1. The importance of the essays, 'How to Make Our Ideas Clear', and the later 'What Pragmatism Is' (V
§5.411-5.437) is that they state and re-state the differences of Peircean pragmatism from that of James and Dewey. Cf. Weiss, P.;
'Biography of Charles Sanders Peirce', ppl-12 in Bernstein, R.J. (ed.); Perspectives on Peirce: Critical Essays on Charles
Sanders Peirce (Yale University Press) 1965, pp6-7. Bernstein's own essay, 'Action, Conduct and Self-Control', pp61-91
articulates a notion of praxis useful for elucidating the (Weiss says) opaque description of how Peirce says one achieves clarity,
viz., 'Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have.
Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object (V, §5.402). Success in achieving this will
plainly call upon capacities for intention and for action, and cf. Davidson, D.; 'Intending', pp41-60 in Yovel, Y. (ed.); Philosophy
ofHistory andAction (Dordrecht, Reidel) 1978, and Hampshire's reply.
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Rorty (1993) pp459-450 suggests as an example that one can make assertions unwarranted and unjustified by the practices
obtaining in one's language community, those the justification for which is, say, yet to be determined. Cf. Norris, C.; The Contest
ofFaculties: Philosophy and Theory after Deconstruction (London, Methuen) 1985, pl96 for an example of Norris recognising
the problem in Putnam that he discusses in relation to Rorty and Foucault, that of applying relativist arguments so far as to
remove all ground for one's objections to relativism. See also Norris, C.; 'Doubting Castle or the Slough ofDespond: Davidson
and Schiffer on the Limits ofAnalysis', The Review ofMetaphysics, vol. L, no. 2, pp351-382, 1996, pp355-356 on Putnam not
following Rorty's pragmatism. See Rorty (1993) pp449ff, and Howells, C.; Derrida: Deconstruction from Phenomenology to
Ethics (Cambridge, Polity) 1999, ppl 18-119.
9 Putnam (1990) p41. Putnam writes: 'Under the pretence that philosophy is no longer "serious" there lies hidden a gigantic
seriousness'. This is the 'covert ideological bias' ofwhich Norris (1985) writes.
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and can still make nothing of Darwin, Freud, even Wittgenstein, then it must be gestured in a new
direction10. The desired reformation of thinking, which Putnam abjures, need be no more elusive than
(Putnam's ambition), secure foundations for 'truth as idealised rational acceptability', for what is this
but acceptability to '...us as we should like to be', the very notion Rorty advocates in identifying
pragmatism and 'ethnocentrism'11. For Putnam it follows from Rorty's remarks that consensus to a
systematic view of morals, interpretation, pragmatic liberalism, or translation remains always relative
to the conventions of the interpreter's or translator's language, and that this conceals what Norris dubs
a 'subtle form of cultural imperialism'. Rorty replies that this, again, is to give too significant a role to
the notion of critical analysis in philosophy; he prefers a mutual respect rather than a consensus, and
says only this for the cultural role of philosophy, that 'in the long run' the abandonment of the view
from nowhere may forge 'some practical differences' for the lives of non-philosophers12. There is only
a relationship of'rational persuasion' between one, one's forebears, and one's followers, a relationship
upheld in a network of mutually-enhancing, continually shifting, values and beliefs. As a better belief
emerges the network is altered and significations shifted13. In this the deference to Quine's theories of
language and epistemology is clear, yet Quine has doubts concerning his drafting for the pragmatist
cause, and his doubts point one toward the utility of Davidson's anomalous monism as part of a
response to Roify14.
Quine writes that the claim that there is no first philosophy is not a naturalistic (Darwinian?), but a
holistic claim15. Moreover, there is justification in attributions of meaning to utterances and beliefs to
people: '[h]ow words and sentences are used, in what circumstances and in what relationships to one
another, is very much a matter of fact, and moreover I cheerfully call its study a study of meaning"6.
Importantly, his arguments apply elsewhere: to the ascription of meaning to sentences and so to their
translations. The factuality of beliefs is for decision in individual cases, and, '[sjome beliefs can even
be measured, in human subjects, by laying bets and offering odds'. 'X believes that p' is always
grammatical and can be assessed for factuality, but for the ascription of terms for the description of the
10 Although, Rorty (1991) says, his view of the, '...cultural importance of philosophy', is not that of Heidegger or Derrida, for
whom the failures of theories of intentionality and reference and so forth, are cause for reflection on their failure and the salvage
of guides for conduct.
11 Cf. Norris (1985) pl96.
12
Rorty (1993) p445.
13 Rorty (1993) pp452ff applies his arguments to study of truth as the '... reification of an approbative and indefinable adjective'.
14 Cf. Quine, W.V.O.; 'Let Me Accentuate the Positive', pp 117-119 in Malachowski, A. (ed.); Reading Rorty (Oxford,
Blackwell) 1990. Quine (pi 17) writes that Rorty's account of his work is 'mistaken'.
15 Quine (1990) pi 18.
16 Quine (1990) pi 17. The means by which the ascription ofbeliefs to people is made is described in the discussion of Davidson
in this section.
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believer's mental states, intentions and so forth, '...there is [and Rorty would agree] nothing factual
about holding the belief: nothing but pious lip-service"7. In such cases, the idiom is not acceptable in a
scientific, extensional language, yet for Quine this means that science must find more acceptable
idioms for descriptions of mentality, not that there need be no descriptions offered. Quine adds that the
indeterminacy of translation is not simply a result of the under-determination of science by observation,
and denies a charge (brought by Putnam and Margolis), that he covertly imparts guidelines
(conventions or analytical hypotheses), into his conditions for choosing between theories or conceptual
schemes vital for interpretation which he denies to methods for choosing between translation manuals18,
and he restates the kernel of the thesis of language as stimulus and response: that two complete
manuals of translation may conflict without conflicting with any speaker's behaviour or dispositions to
behaviour.
Quine allows that terms describing mental entities might be postulated on the model of posits in
physical science, for such theoretical terms have utility in framing useful theory in hard sciences and
might be found to do so in describing mentality. The aim of knowledge, rather than being the coping
with sensory input (unconceptualised sense data), in the field of force, is more properly the
'...satisfaction of intellectual curiosity', by establishing schemes for the prediction of sense-data.
(Significant problems with this are discussed in 1.5). However, as intimated, Quine states that the
description of the world in truth-functional language may be accompanied, in part, by a description in
intentional language, a point recognised (as discussed below), by Davidson and Strawson in arguing
that at least part of a description of meaning must be given over to a communication, or use, theory,
and it is anomalous monism that supplies the means of writing such a description by its containing a
role for both semantical and syntactical theories. What is absent from Quine's theory is a notion of how
conceptual schemes, or conventions for referring, meaning and intending, can come to be established or
assessed as pragmatically more useful than any other. It is argued in 1.5 that he must, for his argument
for holism to work, allow into the web analytic truths, or (in TV.l), truths established by conventions.
While Quine emphasises his apostasy from Rorty's pragmatism, and argues that the notions of the web
of belief, of indeterminacy and of meaning as stimulus and response do not imply a meaning
17 Both quotations are from Quine (1990) pi 17.
18 Quine (1990) pi 18. The charge is made in 1.5 and IV. 1. Cf. Norris (1985) pi 96, and Derrida (1977a) ppl77ff. Are not Quine's
arguments against conceptual schemes similar to Heidegger's? (Cf. Wheeler, S.C.; 'The Extension of Deconstruction', The
Monist. vol. LXIX, no. 1, pp3-20, 1986 and Cerbone, D.R.; 'Proofs and Presuppositions: Heidegger, Searle and the "Reality" of
the "External" World', pp259-278 in Wrathall, M.A. and Malpas, J. (eds.); Heidegger, Authenticity and Modernity: Essays in
Honour ofHubert L. Dreyfus: Volume I (MIT) 2000). This should be considered with Taylor's reminder that Quine remains an
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relativism", there is a broader point to be made, namely, that notwithstanding Norris' argument that
Quine's work entails a rejection of all ca priori structures of mind', his tolerance of descriptions in
intentional language and his late acquiescence in Davidson's anomalous monism, both a compelling
response to dualism, or 'representationalism', and itself a rich theory of intentionality, that Quine (as
argued in 1.5 and IV. 1), must appeal to some, admittedly nebulous, such structures. The rest of this
section describes how anomalous monism is such a good response to Rorty.
Davidson lists the states, described as mental, constituting Feigl's nomological surplus20. They have a
causal, law-like role in the physical world, yet are not subject to scientific laws as are physical states
and events21. (He says that reconciling freedom with causal determinism is a 'special case' of the
problem on the presumption that determinism entails capture in, and freedom escape from, the
nomological net. Davidson argues that causal dependency and the anomalousness of the mental are
undeniable and yet reconcilable)22. Some mental states interact causally with physical events
(perceptions are made and action taken consequently), and 'perhaps', Davidson suggests, reasons can
be given to say that all mental events causally interact with physical events23. One calls those verbs
empiricist, made in Taylor, C.; 'Interpretation and the Sciences ofMan', The Review of Metaphysics, vol. XXV, no. 1, pp3-51,
1971. Heidegger's is an ontological commitment: see Wheeler (1986) pl8.
19
Although they imply a great deal more than Quine countenances, as argued in 1.5 and IV. 1.
20 Davidson, D.; 'Mental Events', pp207-227 m. Essays onAction andEvents (Oxford, Clarendon) 1980, p207.
21 Davidson accounts for this seeming anomaly, which arises, he argues, in the mutual tension obtaining between three principles
(p208). Firstly, that at least some (Davidson ventures, ultimately all), mental events interact causally with physical events (the act
of sinking the Bismarck (firing torpedoes and so forth), was caused by prior mental events). Secondly, such causal relations
instantiate laws, yet, thirdly, these laws can be neither predicted nor explained, for the mental is anomalous. Davidson holds all
three principles, and so explains away the apparent contradiction. Scruton, R.; Sexual Desire: A Philosophical Investigation
(London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson) 1986, remarks upon the use of Davidson's theory of intentionality in overcoming the
difficulties bequeathed by Brentano, and cf. 1.3.
Adams, F.; 'Intention and Intentional Action: The Simple View', Mind and Language, vol. I, no. 4, pp281-301, 1986. Views
such as those implicit in Derrida's analogy, that meaning, or communication, is a broad class with instantiations in different
categories, is the target in Adams' essay on the explanation of cognitive behaviour (intelligent, intentional and goal-directed) in
the cognitive sciences. At issue in all cases is the gathering and processing of information for the making of subsequent actions.
Adams rejects the distinction between systems, '...instantiating mental states in full dress...' (those in possession of meaning),
and those seen as possessing merely goal-directed behaviour (missile systems): he maintains that intentional behaviour is a
'species' of goal-directed behaviour, not its 'genus'. Adams offers an analysis of part of his earlier stated theory, namely, that an
intention to do A is a necessary condition of intentionally doing A. To this end he concurs with Davidson's claim that bodily
movements are not actions unless motivated at some stage by an intention: one may intentionally do A by carrying out B and
intending B. Adams considers objections to his view stemming from this motivation, the most compelling of which allows that
the content of an intention and the description of the corresponding action need not match. In Clark, A.; 'A Biological
Metaphor', Mind and Language, vol. I, No. 1, pp45-63, 1986, the principle of charity is offered as the foundation for the
ascription of intentional states for propositional attitudes to systems in non-static strong AI. Clark confronts the computational
model of the mind with the biological as a model for progress. Cf. Oatley, K.; 'Freud's Cognitive Psychology of Intention: the
Case ofDora', Mind and Language, vol. V, no. 1, pp 69-86, 1990. Oatley argues that Freud's work ensures the understanding of
'bases of intention' in intentional mental states. He presents Freud, as in the case of Dora, as trying to read her actions not as
mere outpourings of mental mechanisms, but as in their extent as 'conscious' mental states, and argues that the description of
intentionality renders the language of psychology inappropriate. What is required is 'narrative' in the cognitive sciences (and
Oatley sees other continuities), and a tolerance, allowing content to emerge. Oatley also argues that Freud's work on intention is
immune to the substantive criticism ofpsychoanalysis.
22 Hence Davidson (1980) p207 says that reconciling the dependency of the physical upon the mental with the anomalism of the
mental is a special case ofKant's problem of accounting for the fact that human freedom and free will cannot be explained away.
One must at least, Kant says, show that there is no contradiction, even if one cannot offer a theory of the freedom of the will.
This raises the fascinating prospect of a Davidsonian theory of intentionality, in response to Rorty and Derrida, drawing on
explicitly Kantian, 'representationalist', arguments, and this might be regarded as of a piece with the contemporary revival of
Kantian themes in philosophy ofmind.
23 And so prove that causal relationships instantiate lawlike statements. Davidson's examples may be taken from his work on
Hempel, 'Actions, Reasons and Causes', pp3-19 in (1980), and, best of all 'Causal Relations', ppl49-162 in (1980). These essays
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mental which express propositional attitudes, verbs which may sometimes appear as predicates in
sentences with persons as subjects, and which are completed by embedded sentences in which rules of
substitution do not apply owing to the problems of quantification24. This criteria requires clarification,
for Davidson wishes to exclude verbs expressing propositional attitudes when they appear in fully
extensional contexts (because, due to the inherent quantification, definite reference cannot be
achieved), and to include them even when they are not in embedded sentences25.
Mental verbs can also be used as psychological verbs in the creation of non-extensional contexts, yet
a description of the form 'the event that is M', or an open sentence of the form 'the event X is M' is a
'mental description' or a mental open sentence iff the expression that replaces M contains at least one
mental verb essentially. In such a way can cases be excluded in which the description or open sentence
is logically equivalent to one containing or not containing mental vocabulary. An event is mental iff it
has a mental description, or if there is a mental open sentence true of that event alone; and physical
events are identified by descriptions or open sentences that contain only physical vocabulary
essentially. However, it is of secondary importance to characterise physical vocabulary, because when
compared to the mental it is 'recessive' in determining whether an event is mental or physical, because
by anomalous monism the distinguishing feature of the mental is not that it is private, subjective,
immaterial or any of the properties philosophers suggest distinguish it from the mental (the only ones
Rorty considers), but that it exhibits intentionality26. Davidson asks whether his analysis accounts for
traditionally peripheral, less clear-cut cases of mental states. He gives the example of Smart: the seeing
of an after-image, and, that of Wittgenstein, the feeling of pain. Sentences reporting after-images and
pains '... seem free from taint of non-extensionality...and the same holds for reports of raw feels and
other sensations27.
contain important developments of the notion of events as contained in 'Mental Events'. Emphasising the nomological nature of
causation need bring no commitment to arguing that there are strict deterministic laws for the prediction and explanation of
mental events, owing to the anomalism of the mental. Anomalous monism accounts for the dependency of the physical upon the
mental and for the anomalousness of the mental. The three, apparently contradictory, principles are shown to be consistent,
indeed, they are entailed by Davidson's identity theory of mental and physical events. In turn, this shows that events, by
anomalous monism, are unrepeatable, individuated, 'dated' individuals (and Davidson emphasises the case of historical
utterances). And on the use of Davidson's anomalous monism in clarifying the detail of the debate between Hirsch (and
Schleirmacher) and Gadamer, see Warnke G.; Gadamer: Hermeneutics: Tradition andReason (Cambridge, Polity) 1987, pp42ff.
The prospect is raised of an aesthetics taking the best from theories of authorial intention and from hermeneutics.
24 Welton, D.; 'Soft, Smooth Hands: Husserl's Phenomenology of the Lived Body', pp38-56 in Welton, D. (ed.); The Body:
Classic and Contemporary Readings (Oxford, Blackwell) 1999, considers interaction problems in Husserl's philosophy of
consciousness.
25 Davidson (1980) p210. This perfectly in keeping with Fregean semantics (cf. 1.2).
26 Davidson (1980) p211 specifically references Brentano. All of the references for this paragraph are to this page.
27 Davidson (1980) p212.
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Anomalous monism countenances no necessary laws connecting mental and physical events, and its
import only waxes in comparison to other theories28. The latter tolerate an ambiguity in the phrase 'a
given mental event', saying that events cannot be dated or particularised, and that, without appeal to
regularity or convention, it makes no sense to speak of a single (mental) event as invariably
accompanied by another (physical) event, a position held to by Taylor29. Davidson writes that if events
are of a given kind, as the identity theory maintains, then the theory presupposes causal laws. Smart's
identity theory is an '... honest ontology of individual events...but one written without cognisance of
the way in which mental events might be individuated without identity implying a correlative law30.
The respective positions of these and other authors may be tabulated. Nomological monism (the
position of, for instance, Smart and Kim), holds that there exist correlating laws, and that the events
correlated are one; nomological dualism (Cornman, Putnam), covers parallelism, interactionism, and
varieties of epiphenomenalism; anomalous dualism combines dualism in ontology with no allowance
for correlations of the mental and the physical (Descartes); and Davidson's position, anomalous
monism, the materialist thesis of the supervenience of the mental on the physical, with the rejection of
the argument that the mental is 'explained' in terms of the physical31. It allows, as Davidson has it, that
not all events are mental, and insists that all are physical; and in its 'ontological bias', allowing for the
best case to be made for the intentional32.
Theories advocating the reduction, by law or definition, of the mental upon the physical (tacitly)
accept, Davidson argues, the reduction of moral properties to descriptive properties, and this, he adds,
there is good reason to 'believe' cannot be done; the example applies for another case, the reduction of
truth in a formal system to syntactical properties, '...and this [Davidson says] we know cannot in
28 Davidson (1980) pp212-215.
29 Taylor replies that Davidson is too beholden to the view of the self as the home of representations, and that, in rejecting a third-
person perspective, he rejects intersubjectivity. Taylor follows Bourdieu in arguing that one is constituted as a self by becoming
inured to a community and its practices. Cf. Taylor, C.; 'To Follow a Rule', pp in Hjort, M. (ed.); Rules and Conventions:
Literature, Philosophy, Social Theory (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University) 1992. See also Tully, J. (ed.); Philosophy in an Age
ofPluralism: The Philosophy ofCharles Taylor in Question (Cambridge University Press) 1994, especially James, S.; 'Internal
and External in the Work of Descartes', pp7-19, and Hjort, M.; 'Literature: Romantic Expression or Strategic Interaction?',
ppl21-135.
30 Davidson (1980) p213.
31 Cf. Smith, D.W.; 'Mind and Body', pp323-393, in Smith, B. and Smith, D.W. (eds.); The Cambridge Companion to Husserl
(Cambridge University Press) 1995. Smith argues that Husserl's monism is an 'ontologically more developed' form of
anomalous monism (p362), and that Davidson's concession to materialism is one Husserl would reject. For Husserl events are
neither mental nor physical, and yet they can be described in a theory of physical phenomena. A materialist theory is not enough
to account for all of the relevant phenomena, most obviously, intentionahty. Cf. esp. pp363-364. Smith also considers causality
in Husserl (pp365-367). See also Follesdal, D.; 'Absorbed Coping, Husserl and Heidegger', pp251-257 in Wrathall and Malpas
(2000a), p252. Kim, J.; 'Causation, Nomic Subsumption and the Concept of Event', The Journal of Philosophy, vol. LXX, no. 8,
pp217-236, 1973. Kim argues that the components of a classic Humean causation are not joined in relations: he questions in
particular the temporal and spatial contiguity of events: what, he asks, are the entities, and the categories of events, related in
Humean causation conditions? The conditions are 'jointly incongruous ontologically', and so the causal relation itself
'ontologically incoherent'.
32 Davidson (1980) pp213-214.
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general be done'. His identity thesis describes a 'lawless monism'. If one thinks of the vocabulary of
physical events (L) as possessing resources enough to express both an amount of mathematics and its
own syntax, the addition of L' ((L) augmented with the mental predicate 'true-in-L'), allows the
individuation, with a definite description or an open sentence, of each sentence in extension of the truth
predicate, and if L is consistent there is no predicate of the syntax of L that applies to all of the true
sentences of L. Consequently, there can be no psychophysical law instantiating an identity between a
sentence true-in-L and a physical predicate of L33. Davidson argues rather that mental events are
individuated by physical vocabulary alone, but that physical and mental predicates have different
extensions. It is, as the example shows, a 'matter of law' that no purely physical predicate could have
the same extension as a mental predicate34.
33 Davidson (1980) pp214-215. This is, of course, Tarski's truth definition (and see below). In Tarski, A.; 'The Concept of Truth
in Formalised Languages', ppl52-278, in Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923 to 1938 (Oxford, Clarendon)
1956, Tarski endeavours to define truth, or better, to give a, '...materially adequate and formally correct definition of the term
"true sentence'". As Austin might say, this is a 'classical' problem of philosophy; Tarski's project proceeds in, as it were, the
opposite direction, for though 'true sentence' seems clear in colloquial language, this is not the case in definitions with
pretensions to precision. It is worth recalling that Tarski's considers the claims of both colloquial and formalised languages to
give his semantic definition of truth. Tarski (1956a) especially pl66. A fascinating examination of Derrida would be to append
this to his analysis, for he tells Searle that the graft applies to both. Cf. on signs ppl66-167.
Tarski's truth definition is the core of Davidson's theory of semantics, and is used throughout this section. Tarski allows 'no
doubt' in the terms making up the definition (ppl52-153). Cf. Sieroka, N.; 'Phenomenology Meets Logical Semantics: What
Husserl's and Tarski's Theories of Truth Do Have in Common', Journal for the British Society for Phenomenology, vol.
XXXIV, no. 2, ppl 16-131, 2003. Sieroka surveys the influence of Brentano on a number of the great Polish logicians. Tarski's
notion of 'satisfaction' is compared to Husserl's 'fulfilment' (they also share a use for 'states of affairs'), and an attempt made to
examine the shift, in thinking about truth, from metaphysical theories to formal scientific systems. Sieroka flags ideas that are
key to a real dialogue of the analytical and the phenomenological traditions in intentionality (pi27). One of the most fascinating
connections is Tarski's knowledge of the work of the Gottingen school, and specifically Hilbert (Cf. 1956a, pl99). See also
p215, and the relation to 'type' in PrincipiaMathematica, and p219. Rorty (1991b) pl37 remarks upon the pragmatist nature of
Tarski's, and Davidson's, notion of satisfaction. He also embraces anomalous monism (cf. ppl 14 and 121).
34 In Davidson, D.; 'In Defence of Convention T', pp65-75 in (2001e), Davidson writes that the Ramsified truth-sentences
presented in Lewis, D.K.; 'Mad Pain and Martian Pain', pp216-222 in Block, N. (ed); Readings in the Philosophy of
Psychology, Volume I (Harvard University Press) 1980, do not account for truth in oblique or opaque contexts, say, for
equivalents of 'Every sentence Aristotle spoke was false', and 'What you said last Tuesday was true' (p65). They do not show
the indispensability of a truth predicate, but demonstrate '...what it would be like to have one'. There are T-sentences for each
truth sentence of the language under analysis, and thus the corpus of T-sentences show the application (the extension) of the
predicate '...is true', but how, Davidson asks, may a sentence fulfil the criteria defined by the T-sentence? A central point about
Convention T and T-sentences, frequently missed by philosophers, is that they provide the 'sole link' between intuitive truths
about truth and formal semantics; Convention T can guide one in negotiating use-mention distinctions, and the 'quotation-lifting
feature' of single-place truth predicate T-sentences governs the essential condition of recursion on truth or satisfaction. Most
importantly, Convention T allows the framing of correct questions: in asking what it is for a sentence to be true, one need not
require of an answer that it make a connection between the sentence and states of affairs, for semantic notions appearing in both
subject and predicate in a Tarski definition are fully defined in syntactic terms. In determining that the meaning of a sentence
depends upon the meaning of its parts, Convention T makes none of the mistakes of other semantic theories, namely of opposing
meaning to reference, or of assuming that meanings are entities. Such theories analyse truth and inference in sentence structure;
Tarskian truth theories, on the other hand, show that certain sentences are true according to the properties of their logical
constants. Davidson (2001e) p71 writes: '[t]he logical constants may be identified as those iterative features of the language that
require a recursive clause in the characterisation of truth or satisfaction. Logical form, in this account, will of course be relative
to the choice of a metalanguage (with its logic) and a theory of truth'. On the proviso that one may limit the description of
'natural language' to 'systems of signs that are or have been in actual use', both interpreted and uninterpreted systems are
outgrowths of natural languages, and Davidson notes Tarski's recognition of the difficulties of deriving a theory of natural
language in a natural language; for instance, there arise a raft of problems concerning the presence ofwords for which it cannot
provide a translation; the universality of language requires also the admission into language of names of sentences and
expressions, of sentences containing these names and of truth predicates. When considered in the light of Convention T, these
problems are avoided, for one may describe the truth predicate using 'no conceptual resources' outwith the language in which the
predicate appears. Only the truth predicate must be in the metalanguage, and all that is required for using it to elucidate the object
language is a 'theory of truth'(p72). Both object and metalanguage retain the same ontology, with increase in 'ideology' limited
to semantical concepts.
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Anomalous monism synthesises the best of the competing positions detailed. It holds that causality
and identity are relations between individual events, regardless of the way in which they are described;
the laws it postulates are linguistic, and so the events instantiate laws only as they are described; the
causal interaction it allows for describes events in extension alone, and thus it is 'blind' to the mental-
physical dichotomy. The nomological nature of the causal law, it must be emphasised, says that when
events are related as cause and effect, their descriptions instantiate a law: it does not say that every true
singular statement of a causal relation instantiates a law35.
Davidson insists that the analogy between the place of the mental and the physical and the place of
the semantical and the syntactical is to be explained via Tarski's truth definition, the canonical version
of which is applied to the calculus of classes, and shows that the metalanguage both names the
sentences of the object language and provides each with a translation ('...a sentence having the same
meaning')36. Ascribing truth to a sentence of the object language utilises the same recursive method as
35
Translatability between languages 'idealises' the resources of a natural language, and this is justified with a transcendental
argument (Davidson says, offered in 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', ppl83-198 in (200lj)), and this raises issues of
how one may come to understand a metalanguage for the elucidation of an object language (200lj) pp72-73. An extensional
metalanguage to illuminate the semantic features of an intensional object language assumes that the object language shows up
typical features of a natural language: the metalanguage, as it were, '...exceeds the expressive power of the object language'.
'For each "intensional" sentence of the object language there is a corresponding extensional sentence (about possible worlds,
counterparts, etc.) with the same truth conditions in the metalanguage; but there must be metalinguistic sentences with intuitively
the same subject matter that have no corresponding sentences in the object language. Intensionality is treated by such theories as
a lack of expressive power—a lack we are taught how to make up for by the theory itself. But if we understand our
metalanguage, we are using a system of concepts and a language which is the one for which we really want a theory, for it is this
richer system that is our natural one. And fortunately the richer system does not raise any difficulties for a truth theory satisfying
Convention T, for it is extensional'. A theory of natural language, by Convention T, is, Davidson argues, open to empirical test,
for the inhering of the object language in the metalanguage does not render empirical content absent, '...rather this fact can
qualify as the fact to be verified'. Davidson adds that one cannot use a criterion of translation without 'begging the question' of
empirical application. The question, mooted earlier, of how T-sentences are taken as true can be answered, and the answer has
wide ramifications (pp73-74). (As before, T-sentences give the extension of the predicate '...is true'). 'Ifwe consider any one T-
sentence, this proposal requires only that if a true sentence is described as true, then its truth conditions are given by some true
sentence. But when we consider the constraining need to match truth with truth throughout the language, we realise that any
theory acceptable by this standard may yield, in effect, a usable translation manual running from object language to
metalanguage... If we treat T-sentences as verifiable, then a theory of truth shows how we can go from truth to something like
meaning—enough like meaning so that if someone had a theory for a language verified in the way I propose, he would be able to
use that language in communication'.
Problems arise in making a truth theory a theory of interpretation for relativisation to speaker and time; namely, problems of
indexicals and demonstratives (discussed in 1.2). A solution to these problems shows more accurately the ways in which the
sentences of a natural language are interpreted by speakers. The condition on the object language and the metalanguage, that they
relate the sentence used and the sentence described, is challenged by cases of such relativised utterances, for a sentence giving
the truth conditions of a sentence containing a demonstrative includes variables appearing in the statement of truth-conditions: as
Davidson says, 'absolute truth...goes relative when applied to a natural language'. All the same, and vitally important, the
verification of instances of T-sentences is still empirical, calling upon a notion of demonstration among 'speakers, times and
objects', appealing to no notions of meaning or synonymy, and offering a theory of radical interpretation. Loar, B.; 'Two
Theories of Meaning', ppl38-161 in Evans, G. and McDowell, J. (eds.); Truth and Meaning: Essays in Semantics (Oxford,
Clarendon) 1976, pl39 sees that Davidson adds to Tarski consideration of indexicals. Sowa, J.F.; 'Laws, Facts and Contexts:
Foundations for Multimodal Reasoning', pp, in Hendricks, V.F., Jorgensen, K.F. and Pedersen, S.A. (eds.); Knowledge
Contributors (Dordrecht, Reidel) 2003. Sowa argues that Kripke's possible worlds semantics can be simplified for application to
some contexts of intentionality. Tarski's application ofhis work to a theory of linguistic intentionality is given at (1956a) p252.
36 Davidson (1980) p. Tarski (1956a) pi87 gives an example, '...corresponding to the sentence "Tlx. Fix,. AIx.xJx..x." is the
name "G1 Q2 (fl,2+f2,l)"and the sentence "for any classes a and b we have a<b or b<a'". On the introduction of the
metalanguage and the metatheory for the investigation of the language of a deductive science, see Tarski (1956a) pl67. Segal
gives a version of the Tarski truth definition for names. He writes, 'It is part of our semantic competence to know, in general,
what it is for something to bear a name. And we know (partly consciously, partly unconsciously) how names can get attached to
individuals by baptisms, cultural conventions and so on. We also know how they stick to individuals over time'. Segal, G.; 'Two
Theories ofNames', Mind and Language, vol. XVI, no. 5, pp547-563, 2001, especially pp549-550.
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was used above: in the sentence schema 'x is a true sentence if and only if p', 'x' is replaced with the
name of the sentence, and 'p' with its translation. When applied to Tarski's sample sentence there
follows a proof that there are no physical open sentences true of all and only all the events having the
same mental property. This is an explanation, '...in a precise way, in accordance with linguistic
usage...of truth-ascriptions to sentences, and the definition is formalised as Convention T37.
Davidson writes that in examining the irreducibility of the mental, 'irreducibility' must carefully be
defined. He argues not only that mental events are picked out with physical vocabulary, but that in
cases in which the number of events that fall under each mental predicate are finite, that there may exist
a physical open sentence coextensive with each mental predicate38. However, even if fmitude cannot be
reached, there is no reason to rule out the possibility that there could be coextensive predicates, mental
and physical, for none of this that the mental is nomologically irreducible. There may be true general
statements relating mental and physical, but they are not laws, though they may have the logical form
of laws39. They are Tawlike', and following the earlier analogy, Davidson writes that the existence of
lawlike statements in physical science depends upon the existence of constitutive synthetic a priori
laws within the same conceptual domain.
Just as one cannot intelligibly assign a length to any object unless a comprehensive
theory holds of objects of that sort, one cannot intelligibly attribute any prepositional
attitude to an agent except within the framework of a viable theory of his beliefs, desires,
intentions, and decisions40.
The content of a prepositional attitude derives only from its place in this framework, and there can be
no ascription of beliefs to agents on the basis of verbal behaviour alone, for one makes sense of beliefs
only as they cohere with others, with preferences, and with intentions, and because they approximate,
to a greater or lesser degree, one's own. Each case tests a theory and depends upon it, and the content
of a prepositional attitude derives from its place in this theory, and its relationships to others. There is
Tarski (1956a) pi55 says the task of a semantical definition is to make precise the statement of a relation between a true
sentence and the state of affairs it reports. Tarski (1956a) pp209-210 on the importance of 'calligraphy' in writing the symbols
(constants, variables, notation) of a logical language.
37 Davidson (1980) p215. Cf. Tarski (1956a) ppl87ff. 'Not much more in principle is to be demanded of a general definition of
hue sentence than that it should satisfy the usual conditions ofmethodological correctness and include all partial definitions of
this type as special cases: that it should be, so to speak, their logical product. At most we can also require that only sentences are
to belong to the extension of the defined concept, so that, on the basis of the definition constructed, all sentences of the type 'x is
not a true sentence', in which in the place of 'x' we have the name of an arbitrary expression (or of any other object) which is not
a sentence, can be proved'. Tarski argues that the 'establishing of semantics as a scientific basis', as given in Convention T,
fulfils Godel's conditions for making decidable propositions previously thought undecidable. Tarski, A.; 'The Establishment of
Scientific Semantics', pp401-408 in (1956). Cf. (1956a) ppl85-186, 247, 262ff, and especially pp274-277. Considerations of the
correctness ofConvention T are found in Tarski (1956a) ppl95ff, p236 and pp246-247.
38 Tarski confronts the difficulties of quantification in his theory (1956a) ppl75ff, ppl92-193 and p223.
39 Davidson (1980) p219.
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no possibility of decoding or translating a man's speech if one cannot access the attitudes guiding his
sentences. Given access, one can begin working out a 'passing' theory of meaning, one containing only
'heteronomic', lawlike statements linking mental and physical, indicating the role of (radical)
translation in the description of the propositional attitudes, and so Davidson's response to Quine41.
Davidson allows no strict psychophysical laws between mental and physical, because they
perennially fulfil 'disparate commitments'42. The irreducibility of the mental derives neither from the
property of intentionality, for this interdependence is compatible with there being a correct way to
interpret a speaker's words without relativisation to conflicting translation manuals, nor from the
possibility of there being many equally plausible manuals, for this is compatible with the arbitrary
choice of a scheme; it is due rather to the utility in use of concepts of belief, desire and intention,
showing that one must be prepared to adjust one's theory 'in the light of recalcitrant experience', for
reasons of overall cogency43. The nomological slack (not surplus), between mental and physical defines
the property of intentionality, and allows one to conceive of man as rational. Arbitrary choice of
translation manuals precludes this shifting of position, and ignores the fact that choice is to be made on
the basis of all available evidence. The difficulties (and 'oddness') arising from cases of privacy and
first-person reports of propositional attitudes dissipate with the investigation of the grounds for
accepting a translation manual, for they are all investigated to further the principle of charity, not as
private, first-person, literal, non-literal or parasitical, but as reporting the presence, in context, of a
network of intentions, purposes and beliefs44. It is the very lawlessness of the mental which establishes
40 Davidson (1980) p221.
41 Davidson (1980) p222.
42 Davidson (1980) p222.
43 Davidson (1980) p223. The process is controlled by an ideal of rationality. Pradhan, S.; 'Minimalist Semantics: Davidson and
Derrida on Meaning, Use and Convention', Diacritics, vol. XVI, no. 1, pp66-77, 1986. In an excellent survey, Pradhan (p76)
reminds one that Davidson's notion of truth is categorically not the metaphysical notion to which Derrida objects. In D'oro, G.;
'Re-enactment and Radical Interpretation', History and Theory, vol. XLIII, no. 2, ppl98-208, 2004 it is argued that both
Davidson and Collingwood proceed transcendentally in describing how understanding is possible. There are differences
concerning the presumption of rationality, and Collingwood makes no conflation of truth and meaning. Leslie, A.M.; 'Review of
Relevance by Sperber and Wilson', Mind and Language, vol. IV, nos. 1 and 2, ppl47-150, 1989, pl49 raises the matter of how
judgements of relevance are made in Sperber and Wilson's relevance theory; on this cf. Davidson (200 lj). However, Walker
makes the (Davidsonian) point that relevance is not simply a cognitive notion. Walker, R.C.S.; 'Review ofRelevance by Sperber
and Wilson', Mind and Language, vol. IV, nos. 1 and 2, ppl51-159, 1989.
44 Davidson (1980) p223. Cf. Okrent, M.; 'Intending the Intender (Or, Why Heidegger Isn't Davidson)', pp279-301 in Wrathall
and Malpas (2000a). Okrent considers similarities and differences between Heidegger and Davidson concerning first- and third-
person directed intentions, showing that a significant difference between their respective traditions lies in the fact that Heidegger
argues that all intentions are, at least partly, self-directed, or reflexive. Okrent also raises fascinating comparisons between
Davidson's and Heidegger's responses to Descartes. The essay is an excellent study of Heidegger on intentionality, and is itself
exemplary. Davidson admits to bemusement at his connections with Heidegger, Derrida, and post- and after- trends, wondering
whether he misses something in his own work. Davidson, D.; 'The Third Man', Critical Inquiry, vol. XIX, no. 4, pp607-616,
1993. The essay contains Davidson's reflections on objects linguistic and artistic, and their intentional creation.
Mohanty's theory of intentionality is close to Davidson's concerning the application of charity, and tolerates a notion of
repetition, glossed as 'reflexivity', in Mohanty, J.N.; The Concept of Intentionality (St Louis, Warren H. Green Inc.) 1972,
especially pl74ff. Cf. van Peursen, C.A.; 'The Concept of the Body in Transcendental Phenomenology and in Modem Biology',
pp133-151 in Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.); Analecta Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research, Volume I
(Dordrecht, Reidel) 1971, especially ppl36ff. Chisholm (1985) pl07 says Davidson is a philosopher of recurrence.
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the due identity of the mental and the physical, and the explanation of a man's free actions with
reference to his decisions, habits, knowledge and perceptions offers an account of intentional
behaviour, 'in a conceptual framework removed from the direct reach of physical law by describing
both cause and effect, reason and action, as aspects of a portrait of a human agent'45.
Having rejected the idea of conventions linking mental and physical, Davidson asks whether the
conventions applicable in language approximate more those of games or of etiquette; that is, are
conventions of language necessary to communication, describing rules, or do they guide
appropriateness and finesse46? It shall be seen that the debates assessed in the chapters to follow raise
repeated concerns as to the ambiguity of 'convention' (indeed, it compels Strawson's distinction), but
Davidson's view is clear; the matter, '...concerns not the truth of the claim that speech is convention-
bound, but the importance and role of convention in speech'47. A full and compelling theory of meaning
needs more than the ascription of meaning to well-formed utterances and their parts. Clarification of
what utterances mean demands reference to notions of intention and purpose48.
Davidson considers Dummett's focuses on the form of conventions in declarative sentences,
obtaining, '...except in special contexts...' (perhaps, fictional); assertions are theorised as having been
uttered with the intention of producing a true sentence, in analogy to securing a victory49. Davidson
45 Davidson (1980) p225.
46 Davidson, D.; 'Communication and Convention', pp265-280 in (2001k).
47 Can there be, he asks, (2001k) p265, communication without convention? Lewis, D.K.; 'Languages and Language', pp3-35 in
Gunderson, K. (ed); Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy ofScience: Volume VII, Language, Mind and Knowledge (University
ofMinnesota) 1975, says that it is a platitude that there are conventions of language, and Davidson replies that while no-one
could deny that conventions involve speech, this is not the convention upon which the existence of language depends. 'No doubt
what Lewis has in mind is the idea that the connection between words and what they mean is conventional. And perhaps only a
philosopher would deny this; but if so, the reason may be that only a philosopher would say it in the first place. What is obvious
enough to be a platitude is that the use of a particular sound to refer to, or mean, what it does is arbitrary. But while what is
conventional is in some sense arbitrary, what is arbitrary is not necessarily conventional'. (These points arise again in the
discussions ofMillikan (H.5) and Lewis (IV)).
48 Davidson (2001k) p266. That is, convention must supply the means of connecting linguistic meaning and human attitudes, and
acts caused by dispositions.
49 Davidson (2001k) pp266-267. The view is adumbrated in Dummett, M.; 'Truth', ppl-24 in Truth and Other Enigmas (London,
Duckworth) 1978. Kenyon questions three theses fundamental to Dummett's programme: that utterances of sentences occur in
accordance with conventions (Kenyon says that 'non-elliptical words and phrases, a species of indirecr speech, may do the
same); that word meaning depends on sentence meaning, and that, significantly, in the light of the discussion of Derrida, Searle
and Grice, that language precedes thought. Kenyon, T.; 'Non-Sentential Assertions and the Dependence Thesis of Word
Meaning', Mind and Language, vol. XIV, no. 4, pp424-440, 1999. The latter notion would, in a longer work, need treatment in a
comparison of Grice, Derrida and Searle (and Husserl) in the light of Dummett's programme: cf. p438. Cf. Cappelen, H. and
Lepore, E.; 'On an Alleged Connection Between Indirect Speech and the Theory ofMeaning', Mind and Language, vol. XII, nos.
3 and 4, pp278-296, 1997, especially p279 and pp287-291. Kenyon argues that the thesis, fundamental to Dummett's philosophy,
that the unit of meaning is the sentence, and that this obtains conventionally, is no support for the last two theses. The theses
stand but not for the reason Dummett gives. Indeed, the first thesis is incorrect, and Kenyon's alternative appears on pp432ff.
Wright, C.; 'How Can the Theory of Meaning be a Philosophical Project?', Mind and Language, vol. I, no. 1, pp31-44, 1986.
Wright discusses the prospects of theories of meaning of the Davidsonian/Dummettian kind, and their splicing of semantical and
syntactical considerations. The appeal to recursivity, apparent in Davidson's application of Tarski's Convention T, raises
questions which such a theory must answer: namely, how is it possible for the speakers of a natural language to understand an
infinity of sentences, to leam said language, and to understand previously unheard sentences? Wright considers arguments, and
an opposing view, from Evans for a dispositional account of meaning, stressing its connection (in terms of 'psychological bonds'
between speakers and 'axioms' of knowledge-based reasoning), to notions of intention and convention.
Wright opposes Dummett's theory of implicit knowledge, and Evans' theory of dispositions to form beliefs about meanings; he
suggests that this has implications for 'armchair' philosophy as vital to an approach taking cross-currents from neurophysiology
and cognitive science.
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asks whether attaining truth is a form of victory. A definition (in paradigmatically Wittgensteinian
terms), of victory cannot be derived from definitions of instances of victory in particular games;
likewise (again in Wittgensteinian terms), encountering a speaker of a foreign language, and given a
truth definition, can one establish that the definition applies? If Dummett's convention were to suffice,
understanding truth in language as like winning a game would, '...make the crucial connection
between meaning as described in a theory of truth and the use of language in contexts of
communication', but how would one recognise the speaker as aiming at truth50? Playing a game
demands, at the very least, Dummett says, that one represents oneself as wanting to win. (This is not
necessarily dissembling). It requires that one play by the rules, and that winning be an end in itself, but
Davidson baulks at this. Dummett writes that to know a language is to be able to employ it, and thus
that an account of the knowledge of a language is simply an account of how the language works. He
adds that an account of the knowledge of a language (of all of its expressions), will solve all problems
ofmeaning;'... once we are clear about what it is to know the meaning of an expression, then questions
about whether, in such-and-such a case, the meaning of a word has been changed can be resolved by
asking whether someone who understood the word previously has to acquire new knowledge in order
to understand it now'. This is a notion of purely linguistic convention, defined as a commitment of
speakers to make true (with appeal to specific conventions for each declarative sentence), one which
Davidson rejects, but to which, it is argued, Derrida cleaves in interpretation of Austin, contrary to
Austin's own, far subtler theory. Strawson's distinction brings out this subtlety (II.4-5). Davidson
writes that speakers often do not want to speak true, declarative sentences; there is no requirement that
speaker's represent themselves as wanting to do so, nor that they do so intentionally. Speaking true
sentences is, '...never an end in itself.' One might, Davidson argues, substitute the search for a
definition of speaker truth in declaratives with one emphasising the mutual exchange typical of
assertion (in collocution), turning upon notions of coordination and rationality51. Assertions are made,
in sincere cases, in the hope that they are taken as true (S wants H to recognise his intention in
speaking). Assertions can be made without reference to agreed rules or conventions of language; but,
Davidson adds, if there are to be connections between H's recognition of S's intention and a claim to
50 Davidson (2001k) p267. Dummett asks what can be said for a theory of truth conditions as the basis for a theory ofmeaning, in
Dummett, M.; 'What is a Theory ofMeaning? (II)', pp67-137 in Evans and McDowell (1976). He suggests as an alternative an
intuitionistic theory with verification and falsification in place of truth and falsity. (Of. Martin and Smith (1974) p53 on
verification in Quine and Peirce). Dummett is critical of the Tarski truth theory, and writes of knowledge of how to use a
language as practical, or propositional, knowledge, and represented as '...mastery of a procedure, of a conventional practice'.
Though a theory of meaning for language must ascribe such 'implicit' procedures (it cannot demand that a speaker formulate in
words his knowledge of language), it must also account for its manifestation.
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truth, there must be conventions obtaining for situations in which assertions are made, justifying the
attribution of truth conditions to illocutions, and this Davidson rejects52. If a convention is to link
intentions (Davidson's 'ulterior purposes', explicitly compared to Austin's perlocutionary effects), with
meanings they must identify, for S and H, cases in which the intention yields the literal meaning,
distinguishing them from those that do not. (This requiring understanding of the words spoken, and of
their illocutionary force). Even if intentions may conventionally be related to illocutionary force, there
can be no guarantee that S is sincere. Deciding an utterance's literal meaning tells one nothing of
whether S achieves his ulterior purpose, for his intentions remain hidden53. Strawson's 'avowability
conditions' offer only a 'partial' analysis, neglecting the importance of, '...publicly recognised tests,
criteria, or practices', the matter of communication and convention in speech54.
The analysis of linguistic conventions, as conceived by Dummett, says nothing for the importance
and role of the notion of, and mutual awareness of, regularity or repetition in usage55. Regularity (and
Davidson stresses that this must be over time, and not of the moment), demands the repeated
interpretation of sound patterns, and, '...unless they coincide in advance, the concepts of regularity and
convention have no definite purchase'. Rather, interpretation occurs without agreed prior theories, for
again, one applies charity, and radically interprets a congeries of general information that cannot be
reduced to rules, '...much less conventions or practices', guiding the assimilation of new information.
While knowledge of broad tendencies in linguistic behaviour is a 'crutch' to interpretation, though
utilised in practice, under 'optimum conditions' for communication, it is abandoned, offering nothing
for theory56. The details ofDavidson's arguments against conventions of language are surveyed in 1.5.
51 This is a more sophisticated candidate for comparison to Strawson's notion of convention in speech acts, see II.4.
52 Cf. Davidson (2001k) pp269-273. Cf. Sainsbury, R.M.; 'Evidence for Meaning', Mind and Language, vol. I, no. 1, pp64-82,
1986. Sainsbury argues that notions of assent and dissent can form no part of the evidence for a theory of meaning. In a
translation situation, assent and dissent are not signs of truth and falsehood respectively. A Quinean theory is undermined by
precisely those ideas Grice discerned as vital for a theory ofmeaning in 'Logic and Conversation', pp22-40 in Studies in the Way
ofWords (Harvard University Press) 1989. Sainsbury gives suggestions for the rescue of discussion of indexicals from a theory
ofpragmatics (pp80-81).
Cf. Gruber, J.S.; 'Performative-Constative Transition in Child Language Development', Foundations of Language, vol. XII, no.
4, pp513-527, 1975. Gruber gives evidence for the fundamental role of the performative in a child's linguistic development, and
speculates on the performative as the, 'sine qua non of human language'. It is a 'representation of the power of reflection' (and
the reference to Chardin is made) upon oneself and one's thoughts. Gruber writes that Jakobson makes the contrast (in an
unnamed lecture) between predication and attribution, and ventures that the performative can be thought an 'essential part of
predication'; cf. Searle (1969).
53 But cf. the argument of Evans, G.; 'Understanding Demonstratives', pp71-96 in Yourgrau, P. (ed.); Demonstratives (Oxford
University Press) 1990. This is presented in 1.2.
54 Davidson (2001k) p274. Kaplan remarks the similarity of 'structure' of his and Strawson's theory. Kaplan (1988) p70.
55 Davidson (2001k) pp276-277.
56 Davidson (2001k) p279. Stanley Fish adds another perspective, that of one who 'redefines', or interprets, events on a level at
odds with that on which all (or most) others do. Fish gives an example of one who attributes his fortunes to 'providential design';
one for whom the 'everyday' interpretation is conventional and no more essential than his own: the latter is as good an
alternative. Fish, S.E.; 'Normal Circumstances, Literal Language, Direct Speech Acts, the Ordinary, the Everyday, the Obvious,
What Goes Without Saying, and Other Special Cases', Critical Inquiry, vol. IV, no. 4, pp 625-644, 1978. This makes a
compelling question of the status of the 'ordinary', and a change in patterns of interpretation as drastic and as vivid as this is seen
in Augustine's conversion, and again cf. Cavell (1988) pl32. (See also Cavell's interpretation of Philosophical Investigations,
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Like Quine, Davidson rejects all arguments to the end that a corpus of truths analytic for a language
can found for it workable conventions, and, returning to earlier points, while Norris may write that
radical empiricism rejects any distinction between matters of fact (syntheticity) and matters of apriori
logical truth (analyticity), because truths in the holistic web cannot be distinguished on these terms, the
arguments of 1.5 and IV. 1 show that the case is far more complex. Accordingly, the interpretation of
Quine and of pragmatist objections to the analytic/synthetic distinction goes on, the explanation of
meaning and knowledge proceeds without appeal to 'a priori structures' of the mind, but neither of
these claims is wholly correct, for Quine's distinction between the relative status of beliefs in the web
is not pellucid as Norris argues, and, moreover, Quine had cause to 'acquiesce' in a theory of
intentionality, namely, anomalous monism. Consensus on the interpretation of the rest ofQuine's work
is invariably achieved. Translation is indeterminate, and radical translation impossible, because an
interpreter cannot know enough about the conventions of a native speaker even to start interpretation.
Speaker and translator are ontologically relative, and the infinite, and most vicious regress, which
Quine detects in theories of language conventions begins, owing to the incommensurability of
conceptual schemes57. However, it is the case that the regress may be avoided, and by a theory
and the work of those arguing for Descartes' Meditations as of a piece with Jesuit traditions of confession). Cf. Derrida (1998)
pp233-234 and 237.
Fish goes on to develop a thesis of the text as 'stable', as being as real as the 'ordinary world', yet subject to varying
interpretations, the congeries of which bolsters its stability. The notion of 'evidence' for an interpretation is central, and Fish's
case is made with reference to legal case histories. The Davidsonian ring to Fish's reflections is compelling, for example: 'How
is it that a text... demonstrably unstable can be stabilised to such a degree that a large number of people know immediately what
it means?' (p 630). In Fish's theory of 'literal' meaning sentences are always under an interpretation: they all already have an
illocutionary force. (As Searle makes abundantly clear (cf. Ill), the same statement may have different illocutionary forces). Fish
argues that his take on the direct/indirect speech act distinction approximates that given by Searle. Again, this is described in Part
III, and (other) reasons given, in III.5, for thinking Fish is right to see the connection. It is also the case that Fish's conclusions
are overturned by Lewis' theory of convention, which as shall be seen, offers the deliverance Fish, and Derrida, seek; cf. Fish
(1980) p239. In (1989) p53 Fish notes the regress of interpretations in Derrida's analysis of contextual conditions. In a Lewisian
convention there need be no contextual conditions. Lewis does not take a language and define its conventions, but define
conventions that can be used in the used in the analysis of all language. It should be recalled that Fish compares his theory to
Wittgenstein's language games (p241). See Warnke (1987) ppllO-111. Wamke adds Habermas' voice, and argues for the
superiority of a Gadamerian/Davidsonian epistemology to a Wittgensteinian. Of course, as Wamke continues, Habermas raises
concerns on the influence of ideology in the achievement of consensus. Cf. Habermas, J.; 'Reconciliation through the Public Use
of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls' Political Liberalism', The Journal of Philosophy, vol. XCII, no. 3, ppl09-131 1995, on
Rawls' original position.
57
Quine regards the simplicity of competing theories as a criterion for preference. Quine, W.V.O.; 'On Simple Theories of a
Complex World', pp242-245 in The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays (New York, Random House) 1966. They combine
beauty and convenience, and carry a degree of probability. The latter is the 'maxim of the simplicity of nature', a mark ascribing
in equal measure uniformity to nature. Simplicity is '...relative to the texture of a conceptual scheme'; if one conceptual scheme
is derivable from another, then one might conclude that the first is more elementary. However, if both contain propositions
concerning the other, then neither can be deemed simpler, and simplicity has no intimate relation with truth. (The same applies
for ascriptions of uniformity. Recall that Putnam suggests other dogmas of empiricism). The bias toward simplicity is, on
experiment, found to preclude all possibility of disconfirming the belief in simplicity: it becomes self-fulfilling (pp243-244). It is
akin to belief in the uniformity of nature, and this Quine ascribes to 'wishful thinking' and the tendency of perceptual capacities
to filter out the complex. It works also for theory formation. If one devises a test of an agent's stimulus-response criteria, one's
results need repetition in other agents before they can be forwarded as part of a workable theory. The theory describes the criteria
of all whose conditioning and responses are described by it. Quine remarks: '...we cannot, by this method, get evidence of pre-
experimental quality spaces unlike for the two [agents]'. Cf. White (1952) p. Quine writes that complex hypotheses are as simple
an option, and as open to confirmation or rejection by experimental data (pp244-245). As Quine goes on to argue, one's
conclusions turn upon the procedural conventions one adopts.
Quine considers the notion of sensations as immediate experiences, with particular reference to the 'process of language'.
Quine, W.V.O.; 'On Mental Entities', pp208-214 in (1966). He rejects as 'unrealistic' the positivist thesis that says language has
'hidden' definitions, tracing terms back to their stimulus conditions. Quine returns to his theory of linguistic behaviour as a
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predicated on the notion of a nascent, 'pre-individuative', (for McDowell 'primitive'), phase in the
formation of conceptual schemes, at which the fundament, the principle of charity, is present but at
which the vocabulary, experience and sensitivity remain as yet underdeveloped58. Davidson goes
further than Quine (and Derrida), and rejects the idea that truth is relative to the conventions of
language. In their place Davidson offers, via the principle of charity, the basic attitude of holding true
(described by Convention T), for ascriptions of truth to S's sentences. This allows interpretation
(Hacking, it shall be seen, remarks on the equivocation between 'interpretation' and 'translation'), and
the 'movement' between conceptual schemes, it shall be argued (in IV.3), allows the understanding of
utterances issued in Derrida's parasitical contexts59.
The conclusion of Davidson's theory is that conventions, if one wishes to call them that, proceed
from language use, but that they are functionally irrelevant: they do no work, and, correlatively, that
meaning relativism is undercut, for the meanings of statements do not determine their truth60. In the
chapters that follow it shall be argued that the case against relativism may be made significantly
stronger. The attitude, described in the principle of charity, of aiming to maximise rationality and
coherence in familiar contexts shall be compared to a situation instantiating a coordination problem in
Lewis' theory of convention. By exploiting premises analogous to those placed upon the principle of
charity, Lewis describes the ways in which parties may, in his first examples, converge upon a course
of action, and in his substantive examples, how such mutual, social, or institutional, conventions may,
by identical means, apply to conventions of language. The work shows that conceiving of conventions
species of stimulus and response: language is an 'infinite totality' of sayable phrases and sense experience guided by a 'process
of psychological association or conditioned response', and 'keyed in' to the totality at various places. The Duhem-Quine
hypothesis is again referenced, and the rejection of theories of language conventions clear (pp208-209). The theory of stimulus
and response describes the learning of words from one's elders in a formal learning situation. Phrases are associated with
experiences, and contextual knowledge develops. Neurath's metaphor is again the model. The pressing question is how decisions
are made as to acceptance and rejection. Quine suggests the presumption of simplicity, and a 'pragmatic guess'. One posits, say,
electrons (of which one has direct experience) because they contribute to the richness and continuation of scientific theory;
wavicles have, as yet, been seen to have no evident purpose (pp210-214). One's conceptual scheme is a 'function of present
purposes and past conceptualisations'. The contribution of reason is not merely to conceptualise a 'presented pageant' of
experience and to posit objects behind it, for it always to respond, with selection and emphasis, to the pageant itself, which is
always 'polluted' with the remnants of competing, past and fringe conceptualisations.
58 Davidson (1980) p223 and cf. Norris (1985) p207.
59 Cf. Davidson, D.; 'Radical Interpretation', ppl25-139 in (2001h). Norris (1985) pp202-203 writes that Frege's semantics is
undercut at its foundations by Quine's arguments, for the distinction between analytic and contingent statements cannot be made.
Quine, as Davidson (and Derrida), goes on to reject the idea of conventions of language. Norris' discussion of Davidson on
Convention T, a foil he says to deconstructive 'rigour' and relativism, is weakened by incomplete consideration of its formal
semantics aspect. Davidson insists that, as a basis for a meaning theory, this must always be supplemented by a Gricean
communication-intention theory, and the relevant points are described in 1.5 and II.
60 Norris (1985) p207 notes a move characteristic ofDerrida's remarks on convention, namely, that of applying across the board
arguments for a number of notions of incommensurablility, and of generalising problems. The principle of charity makes the very
opposite beginning, for one brings charity to all instances of communication.
Regarding Convention T, Norris (pp213-214) has doubts similar to Strawson's concerning its acceptance, and in his querying
of Davidson's argument that the application of Convention T dissipates all problems of translation, Norris intimates the
discussion of Hacking. He also echoes Searle's points on the incomplete reading of Saussure by Derrida and other meaning-
relativists: they have focussed only the r61e of semantics in the construction of a language, and Davidson emphasises, in contrast,
the role of syntax.
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as relative to language, and of this resulting in a most vicious regress in which no conventions can be
established, owing to the logical impossibility of settling a first meaning without an already developed,
and considerably rich, language, is no cause for scepticism about meanings. One need not hold such a
theory. Conventions for language may be founded in a theory having at its core the attitude described
in the principle of charity, and Lewis argues that this allows even a theory of analyticity for language.
Davidson's appeal to Grice is well-founded (he says that all formal semantics must be supplemented
by a Gricean communication-intention theory), and Lewis' work shows the way in which the appeal to
convention made by Grice in his theory of meaning intentions may be set upon a firm basis.
Reciprocally, Lewis' theory of convention shows the way in which a theory of meaning intentions can
be founded without the sceptical doubts expressed by Derrida. A Gricean theory of meaning intentions
is essentially correct, allowing an argument to the conclusion that speakers' motivating intentions in
speaking remain present, even (after consideration of Lewis' further arguments, and Schiffer's), in the
indirect, parasitical contexts for which, Derrida argues, theories of meaning intentions cannot account.
A start is made in the following section with an argument for the meanings of statements containing
demonstratives and indexicals, cases broached by Derrida in his presentation ofHusserl and Austin, as
not subject to the relativisation to literal and parasitical contexts. They can be assessed using identical
criteria of sense and reference. A theory of communication makes this much appeal to rule-governed
repetition as it is conceived: it is a presupposition that speakers will go on as before, yet this counts
nothing for the necessity of an account of convention in a theory of language. Derrida's rejection of
convention is unworkable because no one need hold the theory he rejects. (It is debatable whether
anyone could). The 'trade-offs' between attributed beliefs and the interpretations given to a speaker's
words constitute no concession to the disowned theory of convention, although they are needed in the
move from artificial to natural languages. The conclusion is approached indirectly, by assessing the
role of demonstratives in Frege's semantics; this, as argued in 1.3, the logical analogue of Husserlian
phenomenology.
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2. Demonstratives and Reference
Frege asks whether identity relations ascribe identity to objects or to their names (signs)1. In the
'Begriffschrift' he argues that it concerns signs of objects: a=a and a=b are respectively an analytic
statement and a synthetic statement (a posteriori), giving 'valuable extensions' of knowledge, yet, if
the equality relation is seen to hold between the objects identified by the names ('a' and 'b'), then on
the condition that a=b is true, statements 'a=a' and 'a=b' would not differ2. The names 'a' and 'b'
would stand in a relation of identity, designating the same thing, the relation 'mediated' by the
connection of the signs with the objects designated. However, '...this is arbitrary. Nobody can be
forbidden to use any arbitrarily producible event or object as a sign for something', and in such cases
no proper knowledge is expressed by a=b, only a 'mode of designation', or, a thought. In cases in
which 'a' is distinguished from 'b' as an object and not as a sign (as designating something), the
cognitive value of a=a and a=b is identical3. Designated objects differ if they receive a different mode
of presentation, and Perry notes that Dummett argues that Fregean sense is linked to understanding and
truth, yet Perry counsels that knowing an ideal procedure for determining reference is not necessarily to
be able to carry it out, and in this section resolution is reached on this matter1.
Frege defines the notions of'designation' and 'mode of presentation'.
It is natural.. .to think of there being connected with a sign (name, combination ofwords,
written mark) besides that which the sign designates, which may be called the meaning
of the sign, also what I should like to call the sense of the sign, wherein the mode of
presentation is contained... The meaning of "evening star" would be the same as that of
"morning star", but not the sense5.
This is the theory of sense and reference. (Concepts and relations are argued for elsewhere)6. The
notion of a sign as a designation means that it does the work of a proper name. A sign has a sense, and
a meaning (or reference), yet again, '[t]he same sense has different expressions in different languages
1
Frege, G.; 'On Sense and Meaning', pp56-78 in Geach, P. and Black, M. (eds.); Translations from the Philosophical Writings
ofGottlob Frege (Oxford, Blackwell) 1952, p56. Cf. also Quine, W.V.O.; Methods of Logic (London, Routledge and Kegan
Paul) 1952, and Davidson, D.; 'Truth and Meaning', ppl7-36 in (2001b). Davidson begins his theory of meaning by noting the
priority of the meanings of sentences upon the meanings of words. This compels the conclusion that one can leam a human
language (and, as will be seen, Frege brings to the fore problems of translation), from a finite vocabulary and a set of rules (pl9).




Frege (1952c) p57 suggests an example. Lines connecting the vertices of a triangle with the midpoints of the opposite sides
share a point of intersection, which may be given two different descriptions: modes of designation and an identity statement, if
given, impart knowledge. Cf. Mill, J.S.; A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, Being a Connected View of the
Principles ofEvidence and the Methods ofScientific Investigation (London, Longmans, Green & Company) 1886.
4
Perry, J.; 'Frege on Demonstratives', The Philosophical Review, vol. LXXXVI, no. 4, pp474-497, 1977, especially p475.
5
Frege (1952c) p57. 'In [the example of lines meeting at a point of intersection], accordingly, the meaning of the expressions
"the point of intersection of a and b" and "the point of intersection ofb and c" would be the same, but not their sense'.
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or even in the same language'7. In an idiolect there should correspond to each expression a definite
sense, '...but natural languages often do not satisfy this condition, and one must be content if the same
word has the same sense in the same context'. This will come to raise the problems for Frege's theory
of sentences with demonstratives. Additionally, there may correspond to a proper name with sense no
thing meant8. Intricate cases arise when one uses words in other than the 'ordinary way', when one
talks about words or their senses, or,'... when the words of another are quoted". One's words designate
those of another; they are signs of signs, requiring quotation marks. 'Accordingly, a word standing
between quotation marks must not be taken as having its ordinary meaning.' In quotational contexts
one talks about the sense of another's words; the quoted words do not have 'customary' meaning, and
report their sense: that is, they have 'indirect' meaning. Given the ubiquity of such and correlative
cases, '[t]he indirect meaning of a word is accordingly its customary sense'10.
Thus the core of Frege's semantic theory is a theory of reference for meaningful expressions
(reported in sentences), assigned to their parts11. Understanding language requires knowledge of the
reference of expressions, and a theory assigning to each meaningful expression a reference or 'semantic
value'. Evans says that such a theory discerns structure in compound expressions (sentences), and gives
them references according to the references of their parts12. Frege argues that the reference, or semantic
values, of sentences and singular terms are truth values and objects respectively, but as seen below, and
as Evans argues, this interpretation is unduly complex, requiring only that understanding of language
all told requires knowledge of semantic values13. Evans writes:
In the case of sentences this knowledge can be regarded as more or less explicit, but for
sub-sentential expressions, knowledge of their semantic values will simply be a logical
construction out of the knowledge of the semantic values of the sentences in which they
6
Frege, G.; 'On Concept and Object', pp42-55 in (1952b).
7
Frege (1952c) p58.
8 One thinks of Russell's example of 'the centre of mass of the solar system.' Davidson (2001b) ppl8ff gives an alternative




Frege (1952c) p59. Such cases are imperative for the correct understanding of the relation of sign, sense and meaning. The
sense, meaning and thought of a proper name gives access to a three-tier difference between expressions, words and sentences,
inhering first at the level of the idea, secondly at the sense, and thirdly at the meaning. The stray and loose connection between
thoughts and words may mean a difference holds for one person and for no others. 'The difference between a translation and the
original text should properly not overstep the first level' (p61). Such difference may be accounted for as the 'colouring and
shading' given by an author to his work to communicate his sense. These rhetorical elements are not 'objective', and need to be
evoked each individually in the thoughts of each reader according to the author's hints. All art requires this 'affinity', for, '...it
can never be exactly determined how far the intentions of the poet are realised.' In speaking of objects of disputed meaning or
existence one 'presupposejs] a meaning', guided in this by the author's intentions in speaking or thinking. Mistakes in
presupposition occur, but it is done all the same.
11 Evans (1990) pp72-73.
12 Evans (1990) p73.
13 In a footnote (Evans (1990) p73) wonders why he finds himself in disagreement with Dummett. The quotation to follow is
from the same page.
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occur.
Frege writes that whole sentences contain thoughts as objective, mutually knowable contents, and the
problems raised above reoccur. Frege gives an example, of a sentence with meaning. Replacing one
word with another bearing the same meaning but a different sense bears no effect on the sentence's
meaning. However, the thought is changed, and therefore cannot be what is meant by the sentence, but
rather constitutes its sense. Additionally, Frege asks (and the points again arise below), whether it is
conceivable that a sentence has sense but no meaning: some, for instance, contain proper names (and in
subject-predicate form), those perhaps of mythical beings, that have no reference. Further problems
arise with the ascription of truth or falsity to such a sentence. One regarding the sentence as true or
false ascribes the contained proper name a meaning, for it is ofwhat the name means that the sentence
predicates something. One not allowing that the name has a meaning could not, in a non-fictional
context, apply a predicate, and Frege concludes from this and the previous example, that,
[i]f it were a question only of the sense of the sentence, the thought, it would be needless
to bother with what is meant by a part of the sentence; only the sense, not the meaning,
of the part is relevant to the sense of the whole sentence14.
The thought remains the same whether the name, in a subject-predicate sentence, means something or
not, and it loses its claim to truth value upon recognition that it fails of reference. The question arises
again: in what is contained the meaning of a sentence? Frege consider the suggestion that it is the
appeal to a truth value15.
Frege moots the idea that the relation of thought to truth approximates not that between sense and
reference, but that between subject and predicate15. In each sentence, the truth claim arises from the
14
Frege (1952c) pp62-63. With predication, Davidson (2001) pl7 writes, a problem arises concerning the ways in which the
meaning of the sentence is dependent upon, or generated from, the meanings of the constituent parts. As shall be seen, to avoid
these difficulties Frege assigns predicates to incomplete, 'unsaturated' entities, and names to saturated entities. The problems of
predicating and quantifying into oblique, indirect contexts still arise. Cf. on Frege and Husserl, Smith, B. (ed.); Parts and
Moments: Studies m Logic andFormal Ontology (Miinchen, Philosophia Verlag) 1982.
Kaplan, D.; 'Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology ofDemonstratives and Other
Indexicals', pp481-563 in Almog, J., Perry, J. and Wettstein, H.K. (eds.); Themes from Kaplan (New York, Oxford University
Press) 1989. Kaplan conceives of his theory as, firstly, about quantification into oblique contexts, and secondly about direct
reference, and thus about the reference of singular terms, '...without the mediation of a Fregean Sinn as meaning' (p483 and
p489). He faces problems identical to those faced by Frege, those concerned with the troubling notion of mediation, those in
which,'... the proposition expressed by a sentence containing such a term would involve, 'individuals directly rather than by way
of the "individual concepts" or "means of presentation"...' (p483). Such 'singular propositions' are 'directly referential' (Cf.
p484), and this solution is provided by Evans in the context of an assessment ofFrege's work.
15
Frege (1952c) p63 again makes the contrast to non-literal, or parasitical cases. In hearing a poem, for example, one is
concerned with euphony and the images and feelings aroused (with thoughts); the question of truth arises in a different kind of
investigation altogether, and by it one is led to the assessment of that which is meant. 'We are therefore driven into accepting the
truth-value of a sentence as constituting what it means.' On these terms every assertoric sentence concerned with what its words
mean is called a proper name, and it has either of the only two truth values, true or false. Cf. again Frege (1952c) 'It would be
desirable to have a special term for signs having only sense. Ifwe name them, say, representations, the words of the actors on the
stage would be representations; indeed, the actor himselfwould be a representation'.
16 All quotations in the paragraph are from Frege (1952c) pp64-65.
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form of the assertoric sentence relating subject and predicate, and, in those instances in which the
assertion '...lacks its usual force...' (when spoken by an actor), the sentence contains only a thought,
reporting a sense. From this Frege concludes that the relation of the thought to truth is not comparable
to that of a subject to a predicate, for subject and predicate are elements of thought and may come apart
in parasitical cases. On the supposition that the meaning of a sentence is its truth-value the sentence
must bear the substitution of a part (word or expression), with another bearing the same extension, and
if the meaning of a sentence is its truth-value, then true and false sentences will retain the same truth
value and meaning, showing again that: '...in the meaning of the sentence all that is specific is
obliterated'.
Frege writes that by judgement one may distinguish parts within truth-values, and this by attending to
contained thoughts: every sense attaching to a truth-value contains a thought and has its own method of
analysis17. With this Frege indicates the importance in the analysis of a sentence's meaning of the
relation of part to whole, arguing that the meaning of a word is part of the meaning of the sentence, if
the word is truly a singular term, elucidating the point with appeal to a case in which the expressions
substituted in sentences (as the constituents of meaning; the parts of the sentence), are themselves
sentences. The truth-value of the sentence remains the same in cases in which the replacement sentence
has identical truth-value to that replaced. Exceptions arise in cases in which the whole sentence or the
replacement part is, '... direct or indirect quotation...', for in such cases the sentences designate another
sentence and thought. Frege considers whether such subordinate clauses can have meaning according
to an ascribed truth-value, for, '[o]f indirect speech we already know the opposite'18. Frege ignores the
grammarian's categories of distinction in his analysis of subordinate clauses (see footnote 18), and
begins with consideration of cases not conveying a full, independent thought, those introduced with
'that' clauses. Such cases include those of indirect quotation, in which words have indirect meaning,
deriving their sense and reference by being analogues or paraphrases of another's words, the latter
derived from thoughts and not truth-values, and their senses not from thoughts but the sense of the
words, or, the phrases embedding the noun clause". Frege gives as examples constructions with
11
Frege (1952c) pp65-66 for all quotations in this paragraph.
18
Frege (1952c) p66. Frege wonders whether subordinate sentences should be compared to meanings, and so share the same kind
ofmeaning as nouns, adjectives or adverbs (that is, as parts of thoughts).
19 Davidson says that he has the key to an analysis of indirect (oblique), discourse, and thus to an analysis of sentences containing
propositional attitudes. Davidson, D.; 'On Saying That', pp93-108 in (2001g). The change of context that occurs in the
replacement of synonyms for singular terms changes the truth of the sentence. Davidson argues that the invalidity of this is only
'apparent', for the notion of replacement exploited is simply a part of the idea of a singular term. The problem affects the
reference of quantifications into propositional attitude contexts and the truth or falsity of predications made of entities and their
references. Hand, M.; 'On Saying That Again', Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. XIV, no. 4, pp349-365, 1991, brings out well the
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'conclude', 'be convinced', 'be of the opinion', and notes the difficulties raised by words such as
'perceive', 'know', 'fancy' and so forth. It is of no moment to the truth of the whole sentence whether
the embedded, subordinate clause is true or false, because the meanings of subordinate clauses are the
thoughts contained20. Frege gives two examples: 'Copernicus believed that the planetary orbits are
circles', and 'Copernicus believed that the apparent motion of the sun is produced by the real motion of
the Earth', adding that the subordinate clauses can be substituted for each other without impairing the
truth-value of the whole sentence. Both main and subordinate clauses, to repeat, have as their senses
separate thoughts, and the truth of the whole sentence does not turn on that of the subordinate sentence.
As Frege has it, expressions in the subordinate clause may only be replaced by others with the same
indirect meaning (as Frege calls it, 'customary sense'), and not those with the same customary
meaning. In considering the idea that the belief reports state a relation between Copernicus and the
reference of the clause, Perry writes that, on their own, the clauses refer to the False and the True
respectively (stating respectively a false and a true statement), but that embedded in sentences they do
not acquire, 'ordinary', customary reference; were they to, the replacement of a false sentence would
preserve the truth of the full sentence21. Perry's definition is apt; on this: '[t]he notion of the indirect
reference... is just whatever it is, that this sentence has as reference here', and Frege concludes that the
meaning of a sentence is not always its truth-value, for, say, 'morning star' does not always refer to the
planet Venus, and paradigmatically so when the expression has indirect meaning, and when any
relationship between demonstratives and demonstration. Hand criticises the extension of Davidson's account from the analysis of
indirect speech to reports ofpropositional attitudes, carried out in Lepore, E. and Loewer, B.;' You Can Say That Again', pp338-
356 in French, P.A., Uehling, T.E. and Wettstein, H.K. (eds.); Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Volume XIV: Contemporary
Perspectives in the Philosophy ofLanguage (University ofNotre Dame) 1989.
Segal and Speas reject Davidson's claims. Segal, G. and Speas, M.; 'On Saying 5et', Mind and Language, vol. I, no. 2, ppl24-
132, 1986. "That' is not a demonstrative pronoun, and the structure of 'says that' postulated by Davidson is correspondingly
weak. Segal and Speas give two uses of 'that', as a demonstrative pronoun and as a 'complementiser': respectively 'That's him!'
and 'She was so tired that she slept right through the third act' (pl25). Davidson's examples, they argue, are all of
complementisers, and Davidson's paradigm sentences may not divide into main and subordinate clauses and that 'that' in indirect
discourse is not a demonstrative pronoun (pl25). Segal and Speas adduce syntactical evidence against Davidson's claims and
apply them to the arguments for opacity (ppl26ff). The most interesting in the present context is that regarding Davidson's
account of the structure of indirect discourse, in the course of rejecting a quotational approach, rendering a translation between
languages impossible even though the indirect sentences in both are structurally similar. Segal and Speas' question is whether
translation is a test for 'that' in indirect discourse, and, as que and ga are found in different grammatical categories, that 'that' of
'says that' is different from a demonstrative 'that'. This ramifies in the consequences for opacity, for Davidson's account must
extend to qualitatively similar languages in their indirect discourse. Different semantic structure and values for other languages
would work equally for English. Segal and Speas give reasons for doubting that que is a semantic demonstrative; though its
status as a syntactical demonstrative, Davidson might argue, is uncontroversial, this cannot give its role in semantics.
McDowell, J.; 'Quotation and Saying That', pp206-237, in Platts, M. (ed.); Reference, Truth and Reality: Essays on the
Philosophy ofLanguage (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul) 1980. McDowell considers alternatives to Davidson's quotational
theory of indirect discourse. Cappelen, H. and Lepore, E.; 'Varieties ofQuotation', Mind, vol. XCVI, no. 106, pp429-450, 1997,
offer a 'unified' theory of quotation, dealing particularly with the difficult cases of 'mixed' quotation. They suggest 'Alice said
that life is "difficult to understand'". On p439 they use Davidson's theory of quotations as definite descriptions containing
demonstratives. It is for future enquiry to develop Davidson's work in its significance for 'concrete particulars', and not subject
to the problems of indirect (oblique) contexts.
20 This constitutes the kernel of an unequivocal response to Derrida: it matters not in assessment of the truth and meaning of a




contained subordinate clauses have thoughts as their meanings22.
Frege considers sentences with subordinate clauses in which words have customary meanings, but no
thought as sense or truth-value as meaning. He offers: '[wjhoever discovered the elliptic form of the
planetary orbits died in misery'23. If the subordinate clause expressed a thought it would be possible to
express it in a separate sentence, and this is plainly not the case, for it describes Kepler and does not
instantiate a truth-value. An objection says that the sense of the whole sentence contains a thought as
part, yet Frege replies that this approximates only gives only the meaning of the dependent clause. He
continues that it is wrong to presuppose that, in assertions, proper names have meanings, for (as
described above), it does not follow that the sense of'Kepler died in misery' presupposes that the name
'Kepler' designates something. It merely reports a 'fault' of natural languages that they contain
expressions which do not designate objects, because the truth of a sentence must be assessed in its
context, and this cannot tell one whether the subject of a sentence denotes objects, or '... only seems to
do so...'. That is, a parsing of the sentence may not denote an object (as seen in the discussion of the
means of establishing the truth of subordinate clauses). As Derrida notes, this imperfection affects even
the symbolic languages of logical analysis, and Frege writes that therefore, '[a] logically perfect
language (Begriffsschrift) should satisfy the conditions, that every expression grammatically well
constructed as a proper name from signs already introduced shall in fact designate an object, and that
no new sign shall be introduced as a proper name without being secured a meaning'. It must never
depend upon the truth of a thought whether a proper name has meaning24. Evans says that it need not,
22
Frege (1952c) p67. Concluding that the meaning of a sentence is not its truth-value might be taken to mean that'... in that case
it could always be replaced by another sentence of the same truth-value. But this proves too much; one might just as well claim
that the meaning of "morning star" is not Venus, since one may not always say "Venus" in place of "morning star"'. The relation
to thoughts is again emphasised; in cases in which one says, 'It seems that...one means, 'It seems to me that...', and the same
goes for 'to be pleased', 'to hope' and so forth. Such beliefs or convictions can 'in addition', be the basis for inference. In
inferences the meanings of the known and the inferred parts are two separate thoughts. All that is material to the truth of the
sentence is that the individual is convinced of both thoughts and uses the first as a basis for drawing the second. Main clauses
which do not exclusively pick out the object referred to in the subsidiary clause introduce further indirect meanings (cf. p68).
23 All quotations in this paragraph are from Frege (1952c) pp68-70.
24
Frege (1952c) p71. Expressions for concepts can be constructed such that marks of a concept are given by adjective clauses.
Such a clause cannot have a thought as a sense or a truth-value as a meaning; its sense is only part of a thought. As with noun
clauses, there is no independent subject, and no possibility of reproducing the sense of the subordinate clause in an independent
sentence. Similar considerations apply for places, instants, and so forth, taken as objects: '...the linguistic designation of a
definite place, a definite instant, or a stretch of time is to be regarded as a proper name'. Expressions for concepts that apply to
places can be constructed, yet again, the sense of the subordinate clauses cannot be reproduced in an independent sentence, for
the determination of place or time is only indicated by a relative pronoun or a conjunction. Perry (1977) pp477-478 writes that
not all sentences have complete sense. The subordinate clauses in Frege's examples refer to a time (or place) and are thus
incomplete. The sense of the clause is thus not a thought, and only sentences, 'complete in every respect', express thoughts. Perry
raises a vital point, one which can be lost sight of in Frege's presentation. The clause could be used, alone, to express on that
occasion the sense of a thought. It might, for example, express the sense in response to a question. A distinction must, therefore,
be made between the sense a sentence has on 'each occasion of use', and that which it 'expresses on various occasions of use'.
For timeless sentences ('complete in every respect') the two will coincide, but for incomplete sentences, the occasion sense is
given by completing the sense. (These points are raised in the context of Perry's response to Frege below). The thought is
identified with the sense expressed in these latter sentences. Davidson (2001b) pl8 gives a characterisation of one of Frege's
complex singular terms, and the way in which they raise the problems of the meanings of whole and part. His example indicates
the overcoming of a variety of use/mention distinction. He asks how the meaning of the terms depends upon the meaning of the
parts. The response Davidson gives goes equally as well for Frege's example of sentences in which two thoughts are expressed.
25
but that Fregean sense can mediate references in literal and parasitical cases alike. Evans argues that
the sense of a singular term in Frege's semantics is, not as the above arguments have shown,
'existence-independent', or restricted to a literal or non-literal reference to a single referent (Evans
shows that this may be elucidated through comparison with Russell's definite descriptions), but is
categorically 'existence-dependent'25. More simply, Evans shows that Frege is more willing than most
commentators allow to ascribe sense to empty (non-denoting, fictional, parasitical), singular terms, and
that the arguments that subordinate clauses contained in sentences have as their senses not fully-formed
thoughts, but parts of thoughts, reporting neither truth-value nor meaning (and because the words in the
clause have indirect meaning, or because the presence of an indefinite indicator renders it incomplete,
and able to express a fully-formed thought only when combined with a main clause), may be
challenged26. Frege says that subordinate clauses cannot be replaced by others of equal truth-value
without harm to the truth of the whole sentence structure, precisely because they do not have truth
values as their meanings, because they express only parts of thoughts. However, Evans shows that it is
wrong to regard the senses of expressions on a Fregean theory as, in some way 'intermediary' between
sense and referent, making all reference, as it were, indirect, because guided by a contained thought,
and thus allowing the difficulties of parasitical, indirect or oblique reference to arise27. There are, Evans
says, no such problems, for sense never gets in the way, or renders 'indirect what might be direct'28.
Frege continues that in cases in which the subordinate clause is such that it would express a truth-value
if a whole sentence, the sense is still incomplete and the meaning indirect. Other cases arise when the
subordinate clause does have such a value but is not restricted merely to doing so, for the reason that its
sense includes one thought and part of another as a subsidiary clause, and when a part of the sentence is
25 Evans (1990) p80.
26
Frege (1952c) pp74-75. The subordinate clause may be a complete thought, and in such cases, it can be replaced by another
clause of the same truth-value without harming the truth of the whole, '...provided there are no grammatical obstacles'. Some
subordinate clauses do not fit into these categories, and because they have no 'simple sense'. One's main thoughts have
connected with them subsidiary, unexpressed, thoughts: they are associated by H with one's words, '...in accordance with
psychological laws...'. These thoughts may be expressed if necessary, and come to enrich the sense of the sentence, and '...it
may well happen that we have more simple thoughts than clauses'. Some sentences require this elucidation, others may leave
doubt as to whether the subsidiary thought belongs to the sense or only accompanies it. (Frege remarks that this will be vital in
deciding whether an assertion is a He, an oath, or perjury.) There is plainly here the notion of unconscious, implicit, unexpressed
thoughts, and in such cases one may doubt, '...whether this thought is just slightly suggested or really expressed'. The
replacement of sentences with the same truth-value would ramify through all of one's thoughts, and change their truth-value. For
this reason, clauses of equal truth-value cannot always be substituted for one another in such cases, and so '[t]he clause expresses
more through its connection with another than it does in isolation'. In some cases this regularly happens, and one might, for
example, again consider a sentence in which two thoughts are expressed, neither by means of antecedent and consequent clauses.
In the expression of the first thought the words of the subordinate clause have indirect meaning, and in the expression of the
second thought their customary meaning. Thus, the subordinate clause in the original sentence has different meanings, once for a
thought and once for a truth-value. The truth-value is not the total meaning of the subordinate clause, and another of equal truth-
value cannot replace it. (See also pp76-77).
27 Evans (1990) p80.
28 Evans (1990) p80. What is more, for Evans,'...we can appreciate how baseless it is to maintain that an extension of a Fregean
theory to demonstrative singular terms must involve assigning to them the sense of, or anything like the sense of, some definite
description'.
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only an, '... indefinite indicator instead of a proper name'. Furthermore, the subsidiary clause may be a
complement of another thought, which, taken with the thought 'directly expressed' by the subordinate
clause, makes up the sense of the whole sentence29. More truculent cases arise with sentences
containing demonstrative or indexical expressions, and it is to their importance that Perry and Evans
turn.
Perry writes of the 'severe' difficulties raised by demonstratives in Frege's semantics, that they
introduce notions of private and incommunicable senses wholly at odds with the theory of sense and
reference. Evans replies that the interpretation of Frege's notions of sense and reference upon which
consideration of these difficulties turns is incomplete, and that a Fregean approach to demonstratives is,
'essentially correct'30. Consideration of their respective arguments occupies the rest of this section31.
Evans writes that although a theory of meaning ascribing sense and references must give the senses of
expressions, a theory of sense is not independent of the theory of reference, and his alternative is
avowedly Russellian in inspiration. A Fregean semantics of sense and reference has, as Evans argues, a
consequence that one cannot give the sense of an expression without also giving its reference. Evans is
admirably clear:
29 Quotations from Frege (1952c) p77. From this Frege concludes that cases of subordinate clauses not being replaceable by
another of the same value cannot form counter-examples to the argument that a truth-value is the meaning of a sentence that has
as its sense a thought. Perry (1977) pp475-477 emphasises that 'sense', 'thought' and 'indirect reference' are not synonyms in
Frege: their references are the same but their senses differ. In 'The Thought: A Logical Inquiry', Mind, vol. LXV, no. 259,
pp289-311, 1956, Frege remarks upon the use of syntax (and the 'structure of language'), as an aid to H's understanding. In
(1952c) the structure of language is a, '...guide to the structure of senses and objects', and the notion of sense completion is, for
Perry, fundamental. As Perry writes, Frege sees the sense of, 'two plus two equals four' as being determined by the sense of
'two' and of '( ) plus two equals four'. The blank could be filled by either an object or a concept, (say, 'two' and 'something'
respectively).
Frege (1956) p289 writes that discovering truths is the task of all intellectual pursuits, but that logic must discern the laws of
truth. 'Laws of nature are the generalisation of natural occurrences with which the occurrences are always in accordance. It is
rather in this sense that I speak of laws of truth'. From laws of truth follow rules for thinking, judging, inferring and so forth, and
this may lead to the postulation of laws of thought, and Frege adds '[pjerhaps the expression "laws of thought" is interpreted by
analogy with "law of nature" and the generalisation of thinking as a mental occurrence is meant by it'. A law of thought in this
sense is a psychological law, and in this way one might come to believe that logic deals with mental processes and psychological
laws, but this would be to misunderstand the notion of truth, for the assertion of what is false and what is true takes place in
accordance with psychological laws, and a derivation and an explication of a mental process would never replace a proof ofwhat
is asserted. Frege argues that truth is not genuineness or verisimilitude, but nor is it a function giving a word its '... proper,
unadulterated sense...'. As an adjective, 'true' covers the affirmation of pictures, ideas, statements and thoughts, and Frege
remarks that it is '...striking that visible and audible things occur here alongside things which cannot be perceived with the
senses' (p290). He detects that this, '...hints that shifts of meaning have taken place'. Are pictures true and, say, leaves not;
pictures must be animated by an intention, as must all ideas.
Frege considers truth as a correspondence between a representation and what it represents: 'true', however, carries no relation
of correspondence between two items, and in a correspondence theory of truth it is essential that reality be distinct from the idea.
However, in this there could be no complete correspondence, no complete truth. Frege abandons the attempt at a definition, for in
a definition, '...certain characteristics would have to be stated. And in application to any particular case the question would
always arise whether it were true that the characteristics were present' (p291). The truth of pictures and ideas is reduced to the
truth of sentences, and Frege says that one calls a sentence true when its sense (or corresponding thought) is true; it is here that
the question of truth arises. Frege calls a thought something for which the question of truth arises, and continues that the thought
is the sense of a sentence (with the proviso that not every sense of every sentence is a thought). A sentence comes to express a
thought, and for the clarifying of the notion of thought Frege distinguishes various kinds of sentences: though one could not
conceivably deny sense to an imperative sentence, the question of truth could not arise for it. Frege rules out desires and requests
for the same reason. 'Only those sentences in which we communicate or state something come into the question'. Interrogatives
raise a difficulty: word questions are incomplete sentences obtaining 'true' sense through completion. Frege ignores word
questions, and this is an early sign of the difficulties posed for his theory by demonstratives and incomplete sentences.
30 Evans (1990) p71. Glock (1989) pp646-649 notes Frege's admission of the difficulties caused for this theory by
demonstratives, and the consequent development of his 'context principle' (p648).
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[r]ather than look for a theory quite independent of the theory of reference, we must take
one formulation of the theory of reference—the formulation of the theory which
identifies the references of expressions in the way in which one must identify them in
order to understand the language—and make it serve as a theory of sense.
By way of example, Evans writes that the two clauses, one stating Leibniz's law:
The reference of 'Hesperus' = Hesperus
The reference of 'Hesperus' = Phosphorus
are equivalents, but that only the second can serve for a theory of reference, owing to the way in which
it identifies, 'shows', or 'displays' a sense in identifying the reference of the name.
Perry emphasises that 'thought' is not, for Frege, a synonym for 'sense of a sentence', thought
characterising the attitude of the one apprehending the sentence32. The derivation of Frege's notion of
thought from the study of 'judgement' shows that 'thought' is typically, '.. .that for which the question
of truth arises'33. (This is also a 'criterion of difference for thoughts'). The assertive force of a sentence
lies not in the scope, application or presence of the word 'true' but by the sentence appearing in
indicative form; the word cannot replace lost assertive force, and such a loss occurs (recalling Derrida),
'...when we do not speak seriously'.
As stage thunder is only apparent thunder and a stage fight only an apparent fight, so
stage assertion is only apparent assertion. It is only acting, only fancy. In his part the
actor asserts nothing, nor does he lie, even if he says something ofwhose falsehood he is
convinced. In poetry we have the case of thoughts being expressed without being
actually put forward as true in spite of the form of the indicative sentence, although it
may be suggested to the hearer to make an assenting judgement himself. Therefore it
must still always be asked, about what is presented in the form of an indicative sentence,
whether it really contains an assertion. And this question must be answered in the
negative if the requisite seriousness is lacking. It is irrelevant whether the word 'true' is
31 The following references are from Evans (1990) p74. For Evans' debt to Dummett cf. pp72-76.
32
Perry (1977) p476.
33 More importantly, in response to a sentence-question one expects the response 'yes' or 'no'. The former 'means the same as'
an indicative sentence, for in it the thought contained in the interrogative sentence is proffered as hue. (Such a sentence-question
can be formed from every indicative sentence). Wiggins (1971a) ppl6-17 and Searle (1969) pp31f. Frege distinguishes two
elements in an indicative: content and assertion, the former containing the thought. In this way is it, '... possible to express the
thought without laying it down as true'. Both elements may be conjoined in an indicative, but they are separable, and,
consequently, there may be distinguished assertion, judgement (a suggestion of connection between content and assertion), and
thinking. Thinking, or the apprehension of a thought, occurs when one forms a sentence-question (Frege (1956) p294. Frege
comments that this is the stage at which scientific advance may occur (cf. p307)); when the thought is recognised to be true one
may declare this with an alternative, indicative sentence (which need not contain the word 'true').
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used here. This explains why it is that nothing seems to be added to a thought by
attributing to it the property of truth34.
Frege adds that an indicative contains a third component for which assertions categorically cannot
account: they might be called rhetorical elements. They are ubiquitous in poetry, but less so in the
'exact sciences', for the latter are directed at, '...truth and only the truth', and, Frege argues, demand
less of rhetoric35. He ventures more: '[those] constituents of sentences to which the assertive force does
not reach do not belong to scientific exposition, but they are sometimes hard to avoid, even for one
who sees the danger connected with them'. Their undoubted utility lies in the fact that they allow the
understanding of what cannot simply be grasped in judgement or apprehension, and by way of
example, Frege writes that the more scientific '... an exposition is the less will the nationality of its
author be discernible and the easier it will be to translate'. Rhetorical devices make difficult the
translation ofpoetry ('.. .even make a complete translation almost always impossible...'), for languages
differ mostly in those elements in which assertive force is inapplicable, those superadded and
extraneous to unadulterated thought.
Evans writes that on the theory that the referent of a singular term (say, the demonstrative 'today'), is
its semantic value, or a way of thinking about a particular object, the value could not obtain and the
way not exist if the object did not exist36. The fundament of Fregean theory, that sense presents
reference, shows one that one shall not receive specifications of sense without specifications of
reference, but this, Evans adds, should not obscure the fact of Frege's equation of the reference of
singular terms with their associated objects (their referents), an analysis of singular terms, Evans says,
more in the atomistic tradition of Russell or, more tentatively, Wittgenstein, and this is the point of
decession for Evans' theory. These cases show up singular results. He suggests that the semantic
difference between names in a description theory can be retained in a Fregean semantics of sense and
reference. References of'a' and 'b' can be stated:
The reference of 'a' = a
The reference of'b' = b,




Frege (1956) p295. The work of Davidson on the problems of translation, the application of a principle of charity and the
arguments for idiomatic uses as the growing points of a language are all relevant here.
36 Evans (1990) p75.
37 Evans (1990) pp78-79. Evans writes that all he tries to do is to show that there is a plausible interpretation of Frege that says
that he recognised in his semantics only Russellian singular terms: "... terms whose customary sense depends upon their having a
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With regard to this, Evans wishes to remind the reader that, as before, empty singular terms, for Frege,
have sense, and add that thus sentences containing them may have sense (constructed from the
constituent parts), without reference38. How can a Fregean theory, in which sense presents, or mediates,
reference, possibly account for such cases? Evans continues that Frege's notion of empty singular
terms with sense is still acceptable in his semantics, for, with application to his work on
demonstratives, it is seen that Frege's rejection of empty singular terms as indefeasibly 'defective',
'fictional' or parasitical, is not the unequivocal rejection of their claim to reference as has been thought.
Atomic sentences in Frege's semantics carry expressions of two kinds (as given above), those to
signify objects and those signifying functions mapping objects to truth values, and,
[i]f any expression in an atomic sentence failed to refer to an entity of an appropriate
kind, the possibility would be open that no further truth value would be determined for
the sentence, and it is clear that Frege regarded this as a defect in a sentence of a quite
fundamental kind—as he was quite right to do39.
However, again, the postulated expression remains the bearer of a thought, and it should be said that
Frege entertains no notion that vague concept-expressions have sense of a kind, or that vague sentences
(and so without truth value), express thoughts of a kind. The same goes for empty singular terms40.
Sentences with empty singular terms can have sense (they need not be nonsense), but it is not the sense
of atomic sentences, because it only appears to function properly (in say, a fiction), and because the
sense depends upon an associated thought referring to or communicating a fiction41.
referent'. This may be controversial, and Evans emphasises that all he claims is that there is '...nothing to prevent Frege
recognising Russellian singular terms: i.e. that there is no difficulty in ascribing to such terms a Fregean sense'.
38 Evans (1990) pp75-76. Evans asks, rhetorically, how one can conceivably ascribe to Frege the view that sense is a mode of
presentation of reference; this is plainly at odds with his semantics as it is traditionally understood. Evans argues that a very
different interpretation emerges from a careful study ofwhat Frege says about empty singular terms.
39 Evans (1990) p76.
40 Evans (1990) pp76-78. Evans expresses some of the confusion of Frege's theory: he regards empty singular terms as fictional
or mythical: '[i]nstead of simply saying: "Proper names must have a reference", he says: "Myth and fiction aside, proper names
must have a reference'". The serious use of a empty singular term is of a kind with the use of language in fiction or story-telling.
Evans gives reference to Frege (1956) p300: 'but if [in speaking] my intention is not realised, if I only think I see without really
seeing, if on that account the designation "that lime tree" is empty, then I have gone astray into the sphere of fiction without
knowing it or wanting to', and Evans notes, as any reading of Frege's canonical works shows, that all of Frege's remarks on
empty singular terms exploit the notion of fiction. He finds the same to be true in Frege's posthumous work: empty singular
terms and sentences containing them have sense (for they need not be nonsense), but they do not have the sense of ordinary
atomic sentences: they only appear to function properly. However, Evans writes, 'Frege's use of the notion of fiction wrongly
directs our attention to just one case in which it is as if & singular terms refers to something, namely when we are engaged in a
pretence that it does, but there are others, and ifwe think of them we will perhaps speak of apparent, rather than mock or pretend,
thoughts, and turns upon an unjustified move from 'mock assertions' to 'mock thoughts'.
41 Evans (1990) pp78-79. Evans adds that the idea of mock or apparent thoughts shows a way in which Russell's work on
singular terms must be extended if it is to be plausible.
Evans (pp76-77) shows that Frege thought of the serious use of empty (non-referring) singular terms, say, in drama, as fictional
or mythical. In such instances, Frege writes, a speaker lapses into fiction. Evans notes Frege (1956) p300: 'But ifmy intention is
not realised, if I only think I see without really seeing, if on that account the designation "that lime-tree" is empty, then I have
gone astray into the sphere of fiction without knowing it or wanting to'. Evans is explicit: for a full understanding of Frege's
account of empty singular terms one must refer to his account of fictional usage of language, which is found in a posthumous
work on logic. Some representative passages are quoted: '[n]ames that fail to fulfil the usual role of a proper name, which is to
name something, may be called mock proper names. Although the tale ofWilliam Tell is a legend and not history and the name
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The problems of demonstratives, as Frege realises, are limiting cases of these problems. The contents
of a sentence may, in fictional or deceptive cases, exceed the thoughts it expresses. The opposite may
also happen, and cases arise in which the, '...wording, which can be grasped by writing or the
gramophone does not suffice for the expression of the thought'. The exemplar in which instances can
be described is the present tense, with which one may date one's expressions, and indeed eliminate any
temporal restriction, '...where timelessness or eternity is part of the thought'42. If a time indication is
indicated by the present tense one must know when the sentence was uttered correctly to grasp the
communicated thought, and in such cases, '...the time of utterance is part of the expression of the
thought'; (for instance, one must replace 'today' with 'yesterday' when the thought is expressed on the
second of two consecutive days). The thought is the same, yet its verbal utterance must be changed,
adjusting its sense. (As Frege notes, the same is the case for 'here' and 'there'). In all such cases the
wording, as '...given in writing...', is not the complete expression of the thought, the assessment of
which requires 'knowledge' of'... conditions ofutterance...'The same utterance containing the word
"I" will express different thoughts in the mouths of different men, of which some may be true, others
false'. (One may, Frege adds, assess gestures and glances by the same criteria). Perry gives two
examples, both of which appear to bear out Frege's theory, but which upon closer examination, are
found to raise difficulties for the notion of the 'sense completion' of demonstrative expressions43. A
clause containing the sense completer 'today', will express a truth on the day of utterance and a
falsehood on the following day, yet will have the same sense on both occasions, as will, indeed, the
clause itself. Owing to the fact that the truth-value of the clause can change, its sense is incomplete: it
is not a 'timeless' truth. In explicating what one knows when one understands the use and application
of 'today', Perry utilises notions of 'rules' and 'contexts': rules to take one from an occasion of
utterance to an object ('today' to the day, 'I' to the speaker and so forth, and for Perry these become
crystallised as the roles of the utterances), and contexts constituting a '...set of features of an actual
utterance...', in which utterances defined by respective roles are singularly appropriate. (Perry has the
"William Tell" is a mock proper name, we cannot deny it a sense. But the sense of the sentence "William Tell shot an apple off
his son's head" is no more true than is that of that of the sentence "William Tell did not shoot an apple off his son's head". I do
not say that this sense is false either, but I characterise it as fictitious... Assertions in fiction are not to be taken seriously: they are
only mock assertions. Even the thoughts are not to be taken seriously as in the sciences: they are only mock thoughts. If
Schiller's Don Carlos were to be regarded as a piece of history, then to a large extent the drama would be false. But a work of
fiction is not meant to be taken seriously in this way at all: it is all play.
The logician does not have to bother with mock thoughts, just as a physicist, who sets out to investigate thunder, will not pay
any attention to stage thunder. When we speak of thoughts in what follows we mean thoughts proper, thoughts that are either true
or false'.
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same difficulty as Frege in describing the notion, although he returns to the matter). The object one is
taken to by the demonstrative in a context is its 'value', but the machinery of sense and reference give
no means of getting from an incomplete sense expressed in a sentence containing a demonstrative, and
appearing in an (as yet unclear), context, to a thought44.
Evans considers this case. The demonstrative 'today' is uttered on a particular day (in, say, the
expression, 'Today is fine')45. The concept expression '(£) is fine', has a sense, the expression of a
thought, on the occasion of utterance. However, if the sentence is to have sense on the occasion of
utterance (the definition ofFregean sense), the demonstrative must have a sense and a referent, namely,
the day itself, for one can refer neither to fictions nor to the day in the utterance, for it can be spoken on
different days. The notion of an inviolable, timeless meaning for demonstratives, that which Perry dubs
their 'role', and Kaplan their 'character', as Perry argues, does not supply a sense completer (or a
convention for use of demonstratives), and neither can the referent46. When used to refer to different
days, the sense of a demonstrative expression ('Today is fine'), takes different references, and a
Fregean theory faces the problem of demonstrative expressions having differing references in different
contexts. Perry's argument that the completing sense requires a unique description, '...of the value of
the demonstrative in the context of utterance', is rejected by Evans, for there is no thought about the
44
Perry (1977) pp479-480. Perry argues that the role of demonstratives is not explicable in a Fregean semantics: in demonstrative
sentences '[sjenses do not carry us from context to references, but directly to references, the same on each occasion of use'. One
might, he writes, suppose that 'yesterday' can have the sense of 'the day before', but gives two examples (i) 'Russia and Canada
quarrelled the day before', and (ii) 'Russia and Canada quarrelled yesterday'. The question 'Did Russia and Canada quarrel on
August 2nd?' asked on August 5th, under (i) implies that they quarrelled on the Is1, and under (ii) that they quarrelled on 4th. 'If (i)
were uttered when no day had already been mentioned, it would not express anything complete, but simply give rise to the
question "before what?" An utterance of (ii) would still be fully in order'. Perry sees that Frege is sensitive to the roles of
demonstratives, or the fact that the context of utterance is vital to their understanding. 'He does not talk about the sense of
"today" or "I" so he also seems to have recognised that the role of a demonstrative is not a sense, as he has explained senses.
But Frege clearly thinks that, given knowledge of the accompanying conditions of utterance of a sentence like... (ii) to a
thought. He must have thought, then, that the demonstrative provides us not simply with an object—its value on the occasion of
utterance—but with a completing sense. This is puzzling. Neither the unchanging role of "today" or its changing value, provides
us with a completing sense. A day is not a sense, but a reference corresponding to indefinitely many sense. There is no route back
from reference to sense. So how do we get from the incomplete sense of "Russia and Canada quarrelled", the demonstrative
"today", and the context to a thought? This is the problem demonstratives pose for Frege' (p480).
45 Evans (1990) pp71-72.
46 Cf. Kaplan, D.; 'On the Logic of Demonstratives', Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. VIII, no. 1, pp81-98, 1978. Kaplan
writes that the 'context' of a demonstrative cannot be compared to a possible world in modal logic, or to an instant in tense logic.
To ease the difficulty Kaplan introduces notions of 'content' and 'character' (p68); this constitutes, in the main, a reduction of
Burks' notion of an index. (Cf. Burks, A.W.; 'Icon, Index and Symbol', Philosophy and Phenomenoloaical Research, vol. IX, no.
3, pp673-698, 1949). There is in Kaplan's revised theory a cleavage made between analyticity and necessity (pp69-70) and cf.
Peirce (1932) §§2.274-2.308.
Predelli, S.; 'Utterance, Interpretation and the Logic of Indexicals', Mind and Language, vol. XIII, no. 3, pp400-414, 1998.
Predeili argues that some indexicals require a distinction between analysis in a context of utterance and in a context of
interpretation (or between the context of utterance and the context intended by the speaker). Relevant contexts are recorded
messages, and Predelli suggests a case in which the message 'today is the 15th March', is recorded for audition on the following
day. (A different view is in Sidelle, A.; 'The Answering Machine Paradox', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. XXI, no. 4,
pp525-539, 1991). Predelli's response occurs in a discussion of a possible worlds interpretation of intentional contexts, building
on Kaplan, pp410-413: Predelli, S.; 'Truth about Fiction', Erkenntnis. vol. XLVI, no. 1, pp69-77, 1997. Predelli also comments
upon the discrepancy between a sentence true in a film, yet false in conversation. (His example is 'Salieri commissioned
Requiem', true in Forman's Amadeus yet false in any reliable commentary on the history of music). He adds that there must be
improvement in the Lewisian possible worlds account of talk and truth in fiction (Lewis, D.K.; 'Truth in Fiction', American
Philosophical Quarterly, vol. XV, no. 1, pp37-46, 1978). Gabriel, G.; 'Fiction—A Semantic Approach', Poetics, vol. VIII, nos. 1
and 2, pp245-255, 1979, develops an account of fiction making consideration ofboth Fregean and possible worlds semantics.
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day, expressible by a definite description true of the day, that may express the thought contained in the
demonstrative47. (As Perry says, different speakers (on different occasions), will have differing
cognitive attitudes)48. In response to these points (and correlatively, to those (above) concerning the
reference of a sentence being its truth value), Evans notes Frege's allowance for the fact that the
references of an expression ('Snow is white'), can be identified and described in different ways, say, as
approaching the True, and as instantiating the value of the thought, say, that snow is white49; he is,
however, clear that understanding an expression requires understanding reference 'in a particular way',
namely, via its sense, and Evans writes, replying to Perry, that:
[n]o substantial, or positive theory of the notion of a way of thinking of something is
presupposed by this conception of sense. If the intuitive notion needs to be
supplemented, one can appeal to the general idea of an accord of what makes it the case
that a thought is about the object which it is about; two people will then be thinking of an
object in the same way if and only if the account ofwhat makes the one person's thought
about that object is the same as the account of what makes the other person's thought
about the object50.
47
Perry (1977) p482, and because of the difficulties of quantification into prepositional attitude contexts. Cf. Kaplan, D.;
'Quantifying In', pp206-242 in Davidson, D. and Hintikka, J. (eds.); Words and Objections: Essays on the Work of W. V. Quine
(Dordrecht, Reidel) 1969. Kaplan argues that, by Quine's theory, contexts of quotation and prepositional attitudes are to be
assessed as merely 'orthographic' occurrences, and this explicitly in response to Frege's theory. A similar ambiguity is discussed
in 'Opacity', pp229-289 in Hahn, L.E. and Schilpp, P.A. (eds.); The Philosophy ofW. V. Quine (La Salle, Open Court) 1986.
48 Evans (1990) p72 rejects Perry's idea that the sense of a singular term must be the sense of a fully-worked out definite
description, or 'intimately related'. Cf. 1.4 for a response in addition to that given by Evans.
49 Evans (1990) p73 gives also the example '(Q is bald' as the function yielding truth given as inputs all, say, bald men, or as that
which yields truth given any object iff that object is bald. On p74 he remarks upon the similarity of a Fregean to a Davidsonian
theory.
50 The account that will be appealed to in this work is Wittgenstein's, and this arises in 1.4. Frege (1956) p297 gives as an
example of the thought in two utterances ofan identical sentence not being the same the case ofGustav Lauben, who says 'I have
been wounded', followed days later by Leo Peter, who says 'Gustav Lauben has been wounded'. Rudolph Lingens hears what
Peter says, and was present at Lauben's utterance. Frege says that if the same thought is uttered by Lauben and Peter, then
Lingens, '...who is fully master of the language...must know at once from Leo Peter's report that the same thing is under
discussion'. Lingens acts as a translator of the language. However, '...knowledge of the language is a separate thing when it is a
matter of proper names', for if Peter and Lingens proffer identical descriptions of what 'Gustav Lauben' means, then they would
understand a sentence in the same way. In the case that Lingens does not know that Lauben is the man who said 'I have been
wounded', he cannot know that the same thought is expressed on both occasions. Conflicting means of understanding lead to
opposed thoughts:
Then as far as the proper name "Gustav Lauben" is concerned, [two speakers] do not speak the same language,
since, although they do in fact refer to the same man with this name, they do not know that they do so.
The same thoughts are not associated with one sentence. With proper names it depends upon how whatever it refers to is
presented: every way corresponds with a sense of a sentence containing the proper name. The different resulting thoughts all
correspond in their truth-value: if one is true then all are, and if one is false then all are; this notwithstanding, each is distinct, and
account for this must be made. See also p298.
Glock (1989) pp646-647 writes that the arguments against psychologism in Frege and Husserl, and the tendency of both, at
stages of their career, to Platonism, were laid to rest only by the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and an understanding of
thoughts as 'embodied in' the common practice of speaking a language. Evans (1990) pp75-76 supplies matter for thinking the
Husserlian theory of demonstratives fuller than the Fregean. Perry's interpretation of Frege on demonstratives is incorrect, and
precisely because of its dealing with empty singular terms. A broader consideration of a theory of demonstratives derived from
Frege might be begun with Leder, D.; 'A Tale of Two Bodies: the Cartesian Corpse and the Lived Body', ppll7-129 in Welton,
D. (ed.); Body and Flesh: A Philosophical Reader (Oxford, Blackwell) 1998. Leder traces and contrasts some consequences of
Descartes' and Husserl's theories of body, and fascinating extensions are in Gallagher, S. and Cole, J.; 'Body Image and Body
Schema', ppl31-147 in Welton (1998), Casey, E.; 'The Ghost of Embodiment: on Bodily Habitudes and Schemata', pp207-225
in Welton (1998) and Welton, D; 'Soft, Smooth Hands: Husserl's Phenomenology of the Lived Body', pp38-56 in Welton, D.
(ed.); The Body: Classic and Contemporary Readings (Oxford, Blackwell) 1999. Cf. further extensions are in Heintz, J.;
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Evans goes on to argue that the senses carried by both subjects, in literal and parasitical instances,
mediate references51.
Perry gives an example of a sentence S(d) containing a demonstrative. Without the demonstrative one
has S(), an incomplete sense. (As Frege's examples make clear, S() may still be a sentence). Perry
suggests a schema for all such sentences S(), postulating a means of describing the movement from
context to truth value. He gives a rule for the role of S(d): 'S(d) is true when uttered in context c, if and
only if the value of d in c falls under the concept referred to by S( )'. For sentences, the object picked
out by the role is a truth value. Perry states the situation succinctly, and notes a useful analogy: the role
of a sentence with a demonstrative is said to share characteristics with sentences without
demonstratives: '[tjhe role is a procedure for determining truth value, just as is the sense. The
difference is that the role is a procedure which starts from a context'. There is no need to find a
completing sense, for there is no utterance of a complete sense in a demonstrative. This elucidation of
the thought gives one a basis for arguing that the sentence, and its role, could not be found fully
'Reference and Inference in Fiction', Poetics, vol. VIII, nos. 1 and 2, pp85-99, 1979, and Gabriel (1979). For a means of deriving
intensions for fictions from an extensional semantics, cf. Dolezel, L.; 'Extensional and Intensional Narratives', Poetics, vol. VIII,
nos. 1 and 2, pp 193-211, 1979.
51
Frege writes that each and everyone is presented to himself in a 'particular' and 'primitive' way, and wishing to communicate
thoughts with others necessitates a procedure: one, '...must use the "I" in a sense which can be grasped by others, perhaps in the
sense of "he who is speaking to you at this moment", by doing which one makes the associated conditions of one's utterance
serve for the expression of one's thought'. Frege (1956) pp299-301 considers further examples of thoughts as private and unique;
he writes that each person stands within his own world of ideas. See Perry (1977) p480 for the following example.
Kaplan (1989) p483 says that the problems of singular propositions that he diagnoses become acute in possible worlds
semantics. 'It was not that... any sentences of the languages being studied were themselves taken to express singular propositions,
it was just that singular propositions seemed to be needed in the analysis of the non-singular propositions expressed by these
sentences'. Kaplan argues that demonstratives, like proper names, are directly referential, and he distinguishes them from
Kripke's rigid designators. A study ofKaplan's theory shows precisely how conventions apply in semantical theory, for they are
the conventions found in direct reference theories. Kripke, S.A.; Naming and Necessity (Oxford, Blackwell) 1980, pp24-26
quickly establishes the connection of the problems he describes with those of Russell. He asks whether the problem of supplying
the referent of a name is best solved by definite descriptions or by Mill's 'denotations'. If a name does not have descriptive
content, then, Kripke asks, how do names refer to things? One cannot fall back on ostension, for there are innumerable things to
which one cannot refer in ostension: in such cases, '...our reference here seems to be determined by our knowledge of them'
(p28). He goes on to show that definite descriptions give the correct analysis of the way in which Hesperus comes to be identified
with Phosphorus, and makes the point at issue here and in 1.4: how does a description apply; how does one know that the
properties ascribed do pertain of the subject in question? (In footnote 5, p29 Kripke says that Quine's proposed 'canonical
notation' shares none of the problems of definite descriptions, for it is not a theory of reference for names). Other holders of a
description theory invoke the notion of a cluster concept, saying that each object identifiable by a proper name can be described
by any of a number of 'definite' descriptions. Kripke (p31) regards Searle as the progenitor of the theory, though it is intimated
in Frege and is plainly a mainstay of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Which descriptions are acceptable? In the example, if
'Aristotle' means, say, 'the man who taught Alexander', then this surely cannot express the sense of the name, for it is plainly not
a necessary proposition. Kripke (p32) writes that there is another way to understand the description theory. The description does
not give the meaning of the name, but 'determines' the reference of the name: that is, the name and the description are not
synonyms. In this, as Kripke says, there is a certain room for 'ostension and baptism'. Kripke (pp33-34) details problems with
this alternative.
Of utmost importance to the meta-philosophical approach being encouraged in this dissertation is Kripke's utilisation of
Kantian terminology, in particular the distinction between 'a priori' and 'analytic'. Kripke is adamant that 'a priori' and
'necessary' are not interchangeable. He introduces to Kantian philosophy a notion that may not be entirely at odds with Kant, cf.
Hanna (2001). It is the notion of possibility in epistemology, and the concern of Kripke is to bring one to realise that it is
indefeasibly a modality in the writing of a priori conditions. Kripke (p34) writes that a prioricity is an epistemological notion,
but that the role of possibility introduces the further condition that '... it is supposed to be something which can be known
independently of any experience'. This must be accounted for before the notion of the a priori can 'get off the ground'. 'That
means that in some sense it's possible (whether we do or do not in fact know it independently of any experience) to know this
independently of any experience. And possible for whom? For God? For the Martians? Or just for people with minds like ours?'
As Rripke asks, what sort of possibility is here in question? Given the problems outlined Kripke looks to locutions for study of
the question ofwhether a particular person knows or believes something a priori. On the consequences ofKripke's work for the
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congruent with the thought, in that a sentence could express the same role (carry the same sense), on
different occasions while having different truth values, and seems to account for Frege's contention
that a thought is expressed in a sentence with a demonstrative52. The only analogy that can be discerned
between an incomplete sense and an object is their common sharing in an 'equivalence class of
thoughts', each being constituted together by its 'informational' equivalence. If this information
identifies the class, '.. .without identifying any one of its members...', there will follow an explanation
of how one may get from the incomplete sense and the object to a thought without utilising a
completing sense. Perry offers a new definition:
...an utterance of S(d) in context c, and S'(d') in context c', will express the same
thought if the (incomplete) senses of S() and S'() are the same, and if the value of d in c
is the same as the value of d' in c'.
This, as Perry writes with the authority ofDummett, is a mainstay of Frege's theory, and a version of
Leibniz's law. Sentences expressing the same thought with different clauses ('today', 'yesterday'), do
so if their incomplete senses are the same. However, there are difficulties in the case of singular terms,
and, again, they appear as tensions in Frege's own theory. The thought of Lauben in saying 'I am
wounded' to Peter cannot be identified with that expressed in a non-demonstrative completion of the
incomplete sense in which the singular term refers to Lauben, for there is no thought that they both
express. That is, there is no correspondence between Lauben and '( )' for in 'different possible
circumstances' they correspond to different equivalence classes of Fregean thoughts. Frege's account
will not permit such utterances expressing thoughts to be expressible in eternal sentences, and these
conventions for demonstratives cannot be discerned or established53.
mind-brain identity theory, see Feldman, F.; 'Kripke on the Identity Theory', The Journal of Philosophy, vol. LXXXI, no. 18,
1974, pp665-676, and a reply, Lycan, W.G.; 'Kripke and the Materialists', pp677-689.
52
Perry (1977) p481. On Frege's criterion of difference for thoughts, roles cannot be thoughts: they are not the senses expressed
by sentences.
53 This, Perry (1977) p483 remarks, makes the value of a demonstrative part of the thought, and Frege says that only senses can
be parts of senses. Perry's next example offers an instance, one Derrida might enjoy, of the supplementation, for the greater
clarity of a statement, of utterances by gestures. (On the first occasion of utterance S says of an item (x) the name of which is
carried on its side and clearly visible to himself and to H, that it is x, and the identification is easily accepted; on the second
occasion, on which the name is obscured, the identification, complete with gesture, is repeated but acceptance is not
forthcoming). For Frege, a different sense is expressed on both occasions, but on Perry's criterion of identity for thoughts, the
same thought is expressed, for the incomplete sense is the same in both cases and the value of the demonstrative is, in both cases,
x. 'To adopt this notion of a thought, Frege would have to give up the identification of sense expressed and thought expressed'.
Following on from Evans' recognition of Frege's treatment of the notion of fiction (Perry (1977) pp484-485), refers to the
example of Peter and Lingens expressing different thoughts with the utterance 'Gustav Lauben has been wounded'. Both know
the reference of the sentence by different means, and thus do not know that they both refer to the same individual. Frege (1956)
pp297-298 sees that the different thoughts are 'systematically equivalent' (they correspond in truth-value), but insists that they
are distinct, owing to counter-examples of a type in which one may take the sense of the sentence 'Dr Lauben has been wounded'
as true while taking 'Gustav Lauben has been wounded' (not knowing the identity of the Doctor to be that of the gentleman,
Gustav, known to one), to be false. Regarding his notion of informational equivalence, Perry writes that '[sjenses, considered to
be roles, cannot be thoughts. Thoughts, considered as information, cannot be senses. If Frege is to keep his identification of sense
expressed by a sentence, with thought expressed by a sentence, he must find, somewhere, a completing sense'.
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Frege considers the difficulty one might experience (as Perry does), in singling out an idea to go as
bearer of the object called 'I'54. To influence others through the communication of one's thoughts, one
induces others to apprehend one's thought and to take it to be true and sincerely held. The process of
communicating a thought is qualitatively different from that of handing over an object, which, in such a
process, undergoes changes in, say (clumsily), the orientation of its parts in space and so forth; nothing
of this occurs with the thought, which, '... does not leave the control of the communicator by being
communicated, for after all a person has no control over it'. This, however, counts nothing for Perry's
hypothesis that a demonstrative supplies its own completing sense, for the appropriate sense for each
and every demonstrative in each and every expression in which it can appear would be related to the
sense of a definite description with the value of the demonstrative in the appropriate context. When two
different descriptions attach, say, to the one proper name, Frege writes that one tests the identification
by examining the beliefs of those giving the description, one, that is, imparting a sense, or determining,
'...as reference the value the demonstrative has on that occasion'. Flowever, while proper names can
carry the same sense, once for all, demonstratives take different values on different occasions, and thus
report different senses. They cannot abbreviate settled descriptions (conventions), for there will always
be instances of expressions for which the description must account55. (The sense associated with a use
of a demonstrative does not determine the thought expressed by a sentence containing it)56.
Additionally, there are difficulties in that a sentence with a demonstrative ('... for which the question of
truth arises...'), can express a thought whether or not the speaker associates a sense or a definite
description with the demonstrative. One may be marking no identification; one may, indeed, be
referring to nothing57. Evans means of dealing with the references of sense reported in indexical,
demonstrative or fictional utterances in a developed Fregean theory requires no undue notion of sense
completion, indeed, he writes, 'I want to stress that the idea of sense as a mode of presentation of




Perry (1977) p486. Perry adds that one can still say that for each person, the sense of 'today' for a person on a specific day is
the sense of one of the descriptions (or combination thereof). An objection says that this seems to explain the senses of sentences
containing demonstratives in terms of beliefs the natural expressions ofwhich contain demonstratives
56
Perry (1977) p486. 'Suppose I believe that today is the fourteenth of October 1976. From that it does not follow that when I
utter
Today is sunny and bright
I express the thought
The fourteenth ofOctober is sunny and bright.
For suppose today is really the fifteenth, cloudy and dull. Then what I have said is wrong, whatever the weather was like on the
fourteenth'.
57
Perry (1977) pp486-487. One can express a thought with an utterance 'Today is sunny and bright', and it may be assessed for
truth or falsity independently ofwhether associates a correct sense with 'today'. One may have no idea what the day is, and be
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terms'58.
Frege's canonical use of sense in ascription to singular terms is, as before, the source of problems
with identity and the indiscernibility of identicals. The argument that two sentences referring to the
same thing differ in cognitive value is the argument that one can hold different epistemic attitudes to
them individually (one as true and the other as false, or as not simply instantiating a truth value). On
the traditional understanding of Frege's semantics, the ascription of sense to a singular term is to say
that there is a particular thought associated with the referent, a way in which it must be thought of if it
is to be understood, and this, the interpretation goes, cannot arise via a reference for demonstrative
expressions. Evans, for contrast, notes Russell's description theory, saying that if two singular terms
referring to the same thing have different senses, then one must hold different ways of thinking of the
referent. Evans is as yet cautious:
We [Evans, and Perry in his search for the sense completer] have linked the idea of a
way of thinking of something to an account that may be offered of what makes a
unable '...without recourse to "today" or other demonstratives...to say anything about today that may not equally be true of
other days. (See also Perry's further example on p437).
58 Evans (1990) p78. Frege (1956) pp298ff makes the case that various persons might associate various senses with one proper
name if, following from the example, the person were presented in various ways. From this Frege makes the case for the
incommunicability of self-directed 'I' thoughts. In communication 'I' thoughts can be expressed, owing to the replacement of the
T with other demonstratives in other contexts. These thoughts determine one as reference, yet are incommunicable. Frege
continues that there seems to be no strict sense in which one could maintain that one is presented to oneself in a unique and
primitive manner, but on the supposition that such a sense exists, it could not be the result of progressively more primitive
senses; it must itself be primitive. Fregean sense is a model of the presentation of reference, and this taken as a unique method of
presentation to oneself, shall still not suffice, for there is nothing to say that any such senses are definitional of oneself.
Perry (1977) p492 turns to what he calls 'self-locating' beliefs as alternatives to Fregean thoughts; they are not simply the
understanding of thoughts, but the '...grasping of them via the sense of certain sentences containing demonstratives'. The
emphasis must be on the particularity of senses in particular contexts. Perry speaks instead of 'entertaining' sense and
'apprehending' thought. Different thoughts can be apprehended in different contexts by entertaining the same sense, and the
same thought by different senses. These senses are not Fregean incomplete senses. The sense of a sentence with a demonstrative
can be thought a role (not a complete sense), and thoughts reveal the type defined ('...individuated by object and incomplete
sense...'). Senses and thoughts are not here identified, though they harmonise to a fault.
To have a thought we need an object and an incomplete sense. The demonstrative in context gives us the one,
the rest of the sentence the other. The role of the entire sentence will lead us to Truth by leading us to a true
thought, that is just in case the object falls under the concept determined as reference by the incomplete sense
(p493).
Senses are used to characterise psychological states '...in explaining and predicting action...', and it is the sense entertained and
not the thought apprehended that makes the connection with human action.
Perry (1977) p495 applies the lessons of this to the revision of the notion of indirect reference, concentrating upon whether or
not the reference of a sentence containing a demonstrative falls within the scope of a cognitive verb, a sense or a thought; this he
does through an example of a sentence with a propositional attitude (' S believes that...'). Knowing the sense entertained, and
having been given the believer's context, it might be taken that the thought can be deciphered, but this is not the case. It is the
thought apprehended that is the indirect reference of a sentence with a demonstrative and a propositional attitude. Moving from
the sentence embedded in the utterance to the thought apprehended one takes '...the value of the demonstrative in the context of
the belief reporter, not in the context of the believer'.
It has been suggested that we try to use the sense entertained by the believer in reporting his belief, wherever
possible. What we have just said does not conflict with this. The point is simply that the function of thought
identification dominates the function of sense identification, and when we use demonstratives, there is almost
always a conflict.
There will be no conflict, when one is dealing with eternal sentences, or when one is reporting one's own
current beliefs. The need for distinguishing sense from thought will not be forced to our attention, so long as we
concentrate on such cases (p495).
Frege's morning star/evening star example can be considered with reference to a notion of the context of utterance. If one
announces a belief in the identity of Venus as the morning star in the morning, but rejects the belief in the evening, there is false
beliefbut not belief in a contradiction. No 'thoughtful' person accepts a sense and its negation in the same context; one must not
think of senses as thoughts; one may come to reject a thought once believed, yet this is not coming to reject a sense once
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subject's thought about its object, and certainly no argument can be based upon this idea
alone to the conclusion that senses can be grasped in the absence of a referent®.
Therefore, how do the senses of different co-referring singular terms become established with differing
cognitive values of complex, compound sentences? For this to occur the assignment of senses to
singular terms t and t' in the sentences A (t) and A (f) must display their differing cognitive values, that
is, it must'.. .be possible for anyone who understands the sentences to take different epistemic attitudes
towards them'. For Evans this will be possible on the following principle:
If the account of what makes a subject's thought Tj (about x to the effect that it is F)
about x is different from the account ofwhat makes his thought T2 (about x to the effect
that it is F) about x, it is possible for the subject coherently to take, at one and the same
time, different epistemic attitudes towards the thoughts he entertains in T! and T2.
Furthermore, it does not behove to Frege to supply a theory describing the forms of the accounts, or to
'...suppose that ways of thinking of objects can always be given by giving some definite description
uniquely true of the object, or to make any other supposition which would lead to "existence-
independent" senses'. This is not required because it is wrong to suggest that an account ofwhat makes
a subject's thought about an object capable of making the principle true is one containing a condition
saying that the subject provide or know a definite description of the object. With the strengthening of
the 'if of the principle to 'if and only if, Frege's equation of the sense of a sentence containing
singular terms and a thought may be made as the obtaining of a prepositional attitude. This equation is
not made if it is possible for one who understands two singular sentences with identical sense to take
different attitudes to them, for this would require a difference in the ways the subject thought of the
object to which reference is made, for this would not report an identity of sense.
Evans concludes his discussion of Frege's notion of sense. The sense of singular terms is not
restricted to the sense of definite descriptions, and thus of 'existence-independent' senses. Evans
argues, with textual support from the canonical sources, that there are existence dependent Fregean
senses, and what is more, that there is no justification for holding Frege to the view that singular terms
must have existence-independent sense. Evans concludes that it is wrong to think Fregean sense
intermediary between subject and referent, '...as something which must, from a certain point of view,
get in the way, or anyway render indirect what might be direct'. Fregean senses simply do not play this
accepted. (p496) The negation of a thought consisting of an object and an incomplete sense is taken to be the thought consisting
of the same object and the negation of the incomplete sense.
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role and do not require that senses can only be understood in the context of a sentence with reference,
fictional or otherwise. A way of thinking of an object (as appearing in fictional or non-fictional
contexts), cannot obstruct the thinking of an object, or make such thinking indirect or make parasitical
the thoughts contained in fictional contexts; singular terms, in a Fregean theory, can immanently carry
their sense.
59 Evans (1990) p79.
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3. Intentionalitv and Possible Worlds
Husserl marks his own distinction between sense and reference1. As Frege before him, he distinguishes
'expression' and 'sign': all signs may go as signs for something, but only some are endowed with sense
and reference, elicited by conventions of language or speech2. The simple relationship of 'standing for'
does not convey a meaning3, for expressions must both signify and indicate4. Meaning in
communication instantiates the conveyance of intended meaning, and, for Flusserl, expressions used
remain meaningful in 'isolated mental life'5. It is the continuities between Husserl's and Frege's
theories, and this lest one forget Evans' case for Fregean semantics, that constitute the core of the
discussion in this section. (Noema and Sinn should be taken as synonyms).
Follesdal's, and more satisfactorily Hintikka's, theory of intentionality as intensionality relates all of
the difficulties of intentional directedness upon objects found in Husserl to consideration of the
mediation of reference by sense; indeed, Follesdal's 'main thesis' is that noema is a, '...generalisation
of [Frege's] notion of meaning...'6. In response to Brentano's theory of directedness (that mental
1 Husserl, E.; Logical Investigations (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul) 1970. His distinction bears comparison with Grice's
distinction between natural and conventional meaning (and cf. II). Further points making the comparison are contained in this
section. The affinity between Grice and some theorists of formal semantics has been described in 1.1. Cf. Wiggins (1971a) pl7,
and Strawson (1971c) pi72, at which Strawson regards the tussle between pragmatic and formal theories as a 'Homeric struggle.
Loar, B.; 'Two Theories ofMeaning', ppl38-161 in Evans and McDowell (1976) considers this, maintaining, contra Quine and
Davidson, that semantics can be done with only intensions and propositional attitudes. It is interesting to note that his argument
turns on the difficulties of translation into quantificational contexts, cf. especially ppl44ff. On ppl46-147 Loar finds Frege's, and
so Davidson's, intensional semantics superior to Catnap's. In Mind andMeaning (Cambridge University Press) 1981, p3 Loar
writes that his theory revives 'classical' ideas of truth as correspondence between thought (state of affairs represented), and world
in response to Quine's scepticism. What is more, a theory of meaning containing propositional attitudes provides a necessary
alternative to reference theories. On Quine on stimulus and response, cf. p4. (The points raised in these essays are considered in
II). Smith, D.W. and Mclntyre, R.; Husserl and Intentionality: A Study ofMind, Meaning and Language (Dordrecht, Reidel)
1982, pp267ff stress the relationship of Husserl's semantics to pragmatic verificationism. On demonstratives, cf. pp213-222. On
p319 Woodruff Smith and Mclntyre clearly bring out the major difference between Fregean and possible worlds semantics: in
the latter, expressions in intensional contexts refer to entities in different possible worlds (and so, it is argued, avoid the
problems, seen in 1.2, of reference in demonstrative expressions and to fictional or non-existent entities). Derrida should not have
considered the approach to intentions and intentionality taken by Husserl and Austin to typify all theories, for the possible worlds
semantics approach is an alternative providing a strong argument for a theory of intentionality without the scepticism engendered
by the difficulties Derrida (correctly) discerns in Husserl, Austin, Condillac and so forth. A possible worlds semantics response
to Derrida is given in IV.3).
2 Apel, K-O.; 'Is Intentionality more Basic than Linguistic Meaning?', pp31-55 in Lepore, E. and van Gulick, B. (eds.); John
Searle and his Critics (Oxford, Blackwell) 1991, p32 compares the reductionism of Grice's approach with that of Husserl's, yet
sees a difference. Grice's reductionism is not of the 'total spectrum of the intentionality ofmind', but of 'action-intentions' (of
speech acts). Thus intended meaning is reduced to the production of effects in the consciousness of hearers. Apel writes: 'If one
conceives these intended effects with Austin as "perlocutionary effects", then this approach can best be compared with Max
Weber's conception of social actions as reciprocal purposively rational actions; this means that it should here be possible to
reduce linguistic communication to strategic interaction. More or less in the way that it is analysed in economic game theory'.
(This is excellent for setting up further examination of the conclusions derived from Lewis' analysis of coordination problems in
IV). References are Apel, K-O.; 'Intentions, Conventions and Reference to Things: Dimensions of Understanding Meaning in
Hermeneutics and in Analytic Philosophy of Language', pp79-lll in Parret, H. and Bouveresse, J. (eds.); Meaning and
Understanding (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter) 1981, and 'Linguistic Meaning and Intentionality: The Compatibility of the
"Linguistic Turn" and the "Pragmatic Turn" ofMeaning Theory within the Framework of a Transcendental Semiotics', pp2-52 in
Silverman, H. and Welton, D. (eds.); Critical and Dialectical Phenomenology (State University ofNew York) 1987. On pp35ff
Apel places Searle in the pragmatic tradition of Peirce, and on Searle's theory of illocutionary force, cf. p47.
3 Cf. Derrida (1977a) pp183-186, and Apel (1991) p31.
4 In the sense ofpick out uniquely.
5 Husserl (1970) p269. As Derrida (1977b) pl93 says, there are frequent affinities between Husserl and Searle. One might
speculate that a detailed study of Searle's notion of 'states of affairs' (cf. Ill), would suggest further connections. Apel (1991)
p33 says that Searle's theory is positively 'pre-"linguistic'".
Follesdal, D.; 'Husserl's Notion ofNoema', The Journal of Philosophy, vol. LXVI, no. 20, pp680-687, 1969, p681. See also
Hintikka, J.; 'The Intentions of Intentionality', ppl92-222 in The Intentions of Intentionality and Other New Models for
Modalities (Dordrecht, Reidel) 1975. See also Woodruff Smith and Mclntyre (1982) p267, on Frege and Husserl sharing the
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inexistence accompanies reference to a content, to which the intentional act is directed), Husserl replies
that one might suffer hallucinations, or contemplate non-existent objects. If, say, one's intentional
object is contained in one's thought, the content of the act could be real or unreal with no change in the
act itself; more familiarly, one might think demonstrative thoughts, or reflect upon thought7. For
Husserl, each act has an accompanying noema to which it is directed, obviating the Brentanian appeal
to intentional content, a theory which, Hintikka shows (see below), suffers inconsistencies, and
compels the postulation of a possible worlds theory of intentionality.
Hintikka asks how 'abstract' noema determines objects8. This abstractness is the subject of later
discussion, and Mohanty adds that if the noema does not mediate sense and reference, what does a
possible worlds interpretation give9? Their disagreement aptly expresses the interpretative problem in
possible worlds semantics, and an answer to the first question is given in 1.2 (a noema need not
notion ofmeaning or Sinn as an abstract, intensional entity. For their thesis Follesdal and Hintikka can claim, a point ignored in
most interpretations, the authority of Husserl, noting Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (London, George
Allen and Unwin) 1931, p89. Most importantly, Follesdal cam claim that although Bedeutung was originally '...related only to
the linguistic sphere, that of expressing', it is of the first importance to relate the meanings of words, so that they are
'...applicable to the whole noetic-noematic sphere: that is to all acts, whether these are intertwined with expressing acts or not'.
Follesdal gives other illustrative references to Husserl (1931). Cf. Derrida, J.; 'Form and Meaning: A Note on the
Phenomenology of Language', ppl55-174 inMargins ofPhilosophy (University ofChicago) 1982 on the extension to other areas
of the conclusions drawn from a theory of meaning. An incomparable study of the relations between Frege and Husserl is
Mclntyre, R.; 'Intending and Referring', pp215-231 in Dreyfus, H. and Hall, H. (eds.); Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive
Science (MIT) 1982
7
Glock, H-J.; 'Ursprilnge der Analytischen Philosophic by Michael Dummett', Mind, vol. XCVIII, no. 4, pp646-649, 1989,
raises issues concerning the primacy of language or thought in analytical philosophy, and shows that the linguistic turn, for
Dummett, entails the notion that thoughts, for the logician, cannot be studied in psychology: an approach Frege shares with
Husserl. (Appositely, Hintikka (1975a) p63 quips nicely that there is often, '...more logic than phenomena to phenomenology',
and goes on to show how one may link Grice's work in perception and in meaning). Glock gives a summary of the reasons why
Frege's work suggested a linguistic turn and Husserl's did not, and is unambiguous concerning Dummett's view of Frege's
superiority, p647. He assays some responses.
Mohanty, J.N.; 'Husserl and Frege: A New Look at their Relationship', pp43-52 in Dreyfus and Hall (1982), defiantly swims
against the tide regarding Frege's influence on Husserl. Mohanty argues that Husserl made all of the distinctions: sense and
reference, object and representation and so forth, independently of Frege. Following Mohanty's essay is a response: Follesdal,
D.; 'Husserl's Conversion from Psychologism and the Vorstellung-Meaning-Reference Distinction', pp52-56. If Mohanty is
correct, the importance of that early convergence of the semantical and the phenomenological traditions in disabusing Husserl of
his psychologism, namely Frege's review of Husserl's Philosophy of Arithmetic, has been over stated. (Cf. Grayling, A.C.;
'Russell's Transcendental Argument in An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry', pp245-267 in Monk, R. and Palmer, A.
(eds.); BertrandRussell and the Origins ofAnalytical Philosophy (Bristol, Thoemmes) 1996, p253).
Concerning the tradition of thinking about intentionality started by Husserl, Follesdal writes that Husserl comes out very badly
in Dreyfus' presentation of Heidegger: Follesdal, D.; 'Absorbed Coping, Husserl and Heidegger', pp251-257, in Wrathall and
Malpas (2000a). This is not merely a problem of exegesis, for the skewed interpretation gives Heidegger undue significance,
particularly in the way of perspectival thinking. Husserl, Follesdal claims (with textual evidence) was equally aware that one
operates with tools with meaning (pp255-256). Intentionality is, after all, as has been seen, unmediated by structures of mind.
Searle, J.R.; 'The Limits of Phenomenology', pp71-92, in Wrathall, M. and Malpas, J. (eds.); Heidegger, Coping and Cognitive
Science: Essays in Honour ofHubert L. Dreyfus, Volume II (MIT) 2000, categorically rejects Dreyfus' dismissal of his work in
Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I (MIT) 1991, and in 'Heidegger's Critique of the
Husserl/Searle Account of Intentionality', Social Research, vol. LX, no. 1, ppl7-38, 1993. Searle reassures the reader that he is,
'...sure he [Dreyfus] has read my work...', and makes the case for his own work as 'logical analysis', to be contrasted with
phenomenology (p71, cf. pp75-76). The strident tone of the reply to Derrida is present, and many of Searle's strategies reappear
(p72), but cf. Okrent in Wrathall and Malpas (2000a).
On Brentano's difficulties, cf. Follesdal, D.; 'Brentano and Husserl on Intentional Objects and Perception', pp31-41 in Dreyfus
and Hall (1982) (one might also recall Husserl's debt to Hume). Cf. also Dahlstrom, D.O.; Heidegger's Concept of Truth
(Cambridge University Press) 2001, pp54ff. Heidegger's notion of repetition is considered on pp59ff and cf. ppl38-148.
8 Hintikka, J.; 'Phenomenology vs Possible Worlds Semantics: Apparent and Real Differences', pp251-255 in Dreyfus and Hall
(1982), pp252ff. Like Searle, J.; Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy ofMind (Cambridge University Press) 1983, p4,
Hintikka rejects the metaphor of directedness in intentionality. Scruton, R.; 'Intensional and Intentional Objects', Proceedings of
the Aristotelian Society, vol. XCII, ppl87-207, 1971, is the best study of the means by which one may fully dispose of the
difficulties of intentionality as directedness. (In this it should be placed alongside Merleau-Ponty (1974b)). It raises the potential
for a far richer study of intentionality than that offered by Derrida, not least because Scruton, as Evans, remains close to the word
of Frege's analysis.
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describe an object with a referent); an answer to the second shall be seen to turn on the answer to the
first, and one must note that Hintikka's theory of reference as providing arguments from a Sinn to a
world or sub-set ofworlds, with objects in possible worlds as values of the arguments, is avowedly a
response to a theory of Sinn as abstract and complete10. The argument to be made in this section says
that if a function relates noema from a set of possible worlds to specific worlds (or objects in them),
then a theory of intentionality, of sense determining reference, is given, and, deploying Evans'
arguments, without the difficulties of intentionality as directedness. Mohanty responds that one cannot
know the constitution ofpossible worlds before one computes the functions to senses and so to objects,
and thus one cannot argue that the functions express relationships from possible worlds to objects. For
Mohanty a description of what is intended in thought or perception must be a precise identification, a
locating, of the object in compatible possible worlds, and he fears that this cannot be done11. It is argued
9
Mohanty, J.N.; 'Intentionality and Possible Worlds: Husserl and Hintikka', pp233-251 in Dreyfus and Hall (1982) p235.
10 As Evans argues (1.2) one need not regard Sinn, and by extension noema, as abstract and complete; one can discern the
reference of expressions in contexts.
11
Mohanty (1982) pp239-240 considers a weaker interpretation. When S perceives p he, rather than perceiving that p in many
possible worlds, or that there are many possible states of affairs compatible with p, there is a logical explication of what S
perceives which locates p as a member of compatible possible worlds. Mohanty asks why such an explication (of what S
perceives to be the case or of S's perceiving what he takes to be the case), is necessary, and argues that it might be thought so
only if the possible states of affairs are possible descriptions compatible with p and under which p can be perceived. '(This
restriction is necessary, for the possible states of affairs compatible with p may be anything whatsoever, so that if reference to
such irrelevant states of affairs be required for semantical explication of what S perceives, the consequence would certainly be
counterintuitive, if not absurd)'. This debate presages that in possible worlds semantics regarding whether the theory commits
one to a belief in worlds (states of affairs) as qualitatively distinct from the actual world, or whether they are merely possible
states of affairs obtaining in the actual world. The question can be more simply stated: is one committed to realism about possible
worlds? Lewis, D.K.; Counter/actuals (Oxford, Blackwell) 1973, thinks so, and unashamedly so. He writes that there are
possible worlds other than the one he, you and I inhabit: 'If an argument is wanted, it is this': realism about possible worlds is
like a belief in chairs and tables. Lewis allows that he is modally opinionated: some groups of possible worlds are classified
according to his opinions ('... there are worlds where physics is different from the physics of our world, but none where logic and
arithmetic are different from the logic and arithmetic of our world'), but adds that he makes place for these opinions when doing
metaphysics. For arguments against abstract possible worlds, cf. Menzel, C.; 'On an Unsound Proof of the Existence of Possible
Worlds', Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol. XXX, no. 4, pp598-603, 1989. Regardless of the interpretation one prefers,
the tenor ofHintikka's work is that an intentional relationship is a relationship to possible worlds, and Mohanty accepts only this.
The intentional act, and its noema, include a, '... horizon of pre-delineated potentialities for further determinations', yet the
question is, are possible worlds potential noemata or possible acts of perceiving? The role of meaning is played by Sinn, the
meaning relationship creating identity between noema. Mohanty asks how possible worlds fit the role of matching acts (noemata)
to noema, and argues that acts of perception cannot fill this role: a description of the way in which an object is perceived is a
further Sinn, a further function. On a related point, Mohanty writes that different acts of perception, noemata or Sinne may refer
to one object, and, '...ifwe construe two different Sinne as two different possible worlds, the meaning function would be one
which yields the same value for two or many different arguments', and this, without good reason, abandons the core of Frege's
semantics, that sense determines reference. The beginning of a possible-worlds theory of perception is contained on Mohanty
(1982) p240 where he also considers the difficulties of making connections between semantical and phenomenological
treatments of intentionality, and concludes that such a theory cannot truly be phenomenological, but a semanticist's dream.
The best sources for a study of the respective metaphysical and metaphilosophical positions with regard to possible worlds can
be detailed. Stalnaker, R.; Inquiry (MIT) 1984, pp44ff examines Lewis' realism about possible worlds. He argues that 'possible
world' is not synonymous with 'a way things might have been', but that one may countenance 'moderate' realism about possible
worlds. The questions Stalnaker asks are taken up in Adams, R.M.; 'Theories of Actuality', ppl90-209 in Loux, M. (ed.); The
Possible and the Actual: Readings in the Metaphysics ofModality (Cornell University Press) 1979. Adams asks what it is that
God confers in making a world actual. Adams assumes possible worlds are 'determinate', and that for every world and every pair
of contrary propositions, one of the pair is true and the other false in each possible world; every possible world is a 'complete
world history', and not a mere stage. Adams discusses the 'actuality' of the best of all possible worlds, and of things in possible
worlds, noting some affinities with existential phenomenology, and regarding thematter of repetition.
Plantinga, A.; 'Transworld Identity or Worldbound Individuals?', ppl46-165 in Loux (1979), questions the sense of 'could
have', in the assessment of possible states of affairs: are they existent, or conjurable, worlds, or states of affairs in this actual
world? Plantinga distinguishes natural possibility (the sense in which one speaks of one's swimming the Atlantic as not
impossible), and possibility in first-order logic. Necessary propositions include logical and mathematical truths, and a (probable)
infinity of other propositions.
The notion of an infinity of possible states of affairs raises issues which may help the elucidation of Lewis' metaphysics.
Plantinga describes senses of necessity and possibility which compel some conclusions: if S and S' are states of affairs related
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in this section that the ramifications of Hintikka's argument, that Shine determine possible worlds for
compossibility, allows specification of references in specific worlds by the argument given by Evans
(in the previous section). Evans' argument also shows that the fears of Hintikka regarding the
abstractness and completeness ofSinne are unfounded.
Husserl gives examples of natural and conventional meanings: brands for slaves, and flags for
nations; Martian canals for signs of intelligent life, and fossils for signs of prediluvian species12. There
is in the latter cases, dubbed 'indications', a 'common element', allowing 'transport', or the capacity
for certain states of affairs to indicate the 'reality' of others, a verity, Husserl says again, good for cases
of collocution and for solitary utterance13. There is '"motivational" unity' in such acts of judgement,
matching them with corresponding states of affairs14, and Husserl writes, '[pjlainly such a state of
such that they cannot both obtain (S precludes S1), and if S requires S' to obtain, S includes S'. Further there is the case that S
either includes or precludes S', in which case S is 'maximal'. Plantinga argues that a possible world is a maximal set of possible
states of affairs, and continues, the world (W) contains a set of propositions of which p is one if W is actual. The set of W
contains as subsets either p or not-p. All that is in the world is included, and all that is not is explicitly excluded. The network of
propositions making up a possible world instantiates the same individual (x) in many different states of affairs ('x is an athlete',
'x is a...'); as the world excludes non-obtaining possible states of affairs the descriptions will not obtain. Lewis (1973) p gives, in
justifying his belief about possible worlds, a fascinating alternative to Rorty's claims for the status of method in analytical
philosophy. 'One comes to philosophy already endowed with a stock of opinions. It is not the business of philosophy either to
undermine or to justify these pre-existing opinions, to any great extent, but only to try to discover ways of expanding them into
an orderly system. A metaphysician's analysis ofmind is an attempt at systematising our opinions about mind. It succeeds to the
extent that (I) it is systematic, and (2) it respects those of our pre-philosophical opinions to which we are firmly attached. Insofar
as it does both better than any alternative we have thought of, we give it credence. There is some give-and-take, but not too
much: some of us sometimes change our minds on some points of common opinion, if they conflict irreducibly with a doctrine
that commands our beliefby its systematic beauty and its agreementwithmore important common opinions'.
As shall be seen in 1.4, Black, M.; A Companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus (Cambridge University Press) 1964, writes that
Wittgenstein thinks of atomic propositions or situations as like coordinates in logical space, and complex propositions as a
'volume' in logical space. It might be added that the view of this as merely a metaphor depends upon which interpretation of
possible worlds one holds. Black writes that, '[a]n important implication is the inseparability of a proposition from the "logical
space" in which it is located. The proposition's logical relations partially determine its sense and are not something superadded
when the proposition combine with other propositions in truth-functions'.
12 Precisely those in Grice, H.P.; 'Meaning', pp213-223 in Studies in the Way of Words (Harvard University Press) 1989, for
distinguishing natural and non-natural meaning. See especially p214. The theory is explained in II.1. The distinction as Husserl
states it is plainly unsatisfactory. The Gricean (and Schifferian) tenor is continued in Husserl's ascription of conditions of
indication. Indications may, of course, be brought about deliberately or artificially (signs may be called into use), and the
relationship of standing for instantiated.
The matter presented in Note may be returned to. The notion ofmeaning with which Grice works shows him to be more radical
than Husserl in a most significant way, and with consequences for any full assessment of Derrida's work on Husserl. While both
Grice and plusserl make a distinction between indicative and meaningful signs, bestowing only upon the latter the property of
'expression' ('utterance' in Grice), and maintain that a speech act is an expression whether or not it is vocalised, Husserl,
contrary to Grice and to the later speech act tradition, excludes gestures (both as endowed with communicative intent, as in hand
signals, and as inhering in (Austinian) contexts of utterance), as not 'one with the experiences' in which they are elicited. They
are not intended as is speech and therefore have no meaning, though an interlocutor may, peradventure, interpret them as
indicating something. As said, Grice makes no such distinctions and exclusions. Grice and Husserl are agreed that semantic
theory must clarify these distinctions. Another Gricean distinction arises below between signs (written marks, sounds), and
associated acts giving them meaning; this distinction is, as is argued, vital to establishing conventional meanings.
13 Husserl (1970) p270. Cassirer studies the objectification of knowledge through the production of linguistic signs, and the ways
in which this constructs a reality, instantiating the harmony and opposition of, '...subject and object, ego and world...'.
Kaufinann (1949) pp208-209 considers some consequences for ontology.
14 Or their 'objective correlates', a notion Husserl shares with Bradley. Husserl (1970) p270, and Wollheim, R.; F.H. Bradley
(London, Pelican) 1959, ppl33ff. This raises the prospect of a role in any theory of intentionality for literary studies for the
avowed connections between Bradley and Eliot. Ackroyd, P.; Notes for a New Culture: An Essay on Modernism (London,
Vision) 1976, responds to Eliot, T.S.; Notes towards the Definition ofCulture (London, Faber and Faber) 1948, making the case
for Husserl's continued relevance. In an excellent study of intentionality in lyric poetry, Bruns writes that intention is
'indispensable' to a theory of interpretation, yet it invariably evades hermeneutical enquiry, firstly because it is historically
contingent, and secondly, because it is intentionality that history does not (can not?) record. Bruns says that Romanticism offers
deliverance, and of Browning that he was 'obsessed' with intentionality. Bruns, G.L.; 'Intention, Authority and Meaning',
Critical Inquiry, vol. VII, no. 2, pp 297-309, 1980, and Johnson (1980). Bruns adds that the matter of 'authority' in texts, literary
and scriptural, is here emphasised, and that literary study is the worse for not reflecting on the topic of meaning, which is,
'almost exclusively a theme of analytical philosophy,...' (p309). On Romanticism and intentionality, cf. Eldridge, R.; Leading a
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affairs amounts to just this: that certain things may or must exist, since other things have been given"5.
States of affairs constitute the given in intentional acts, and are the core of a response to theories of
intentionality as directedness, eluding the difficulties Derrida diagnoses. Reference, on a possible
worlds theory of intentionality, is the mediation, carried in a Sinn, of a sense from a set of states of
affairs to a reference in a single or sub-set of specific possible worlds. There is no unthinking metaphor
of directedness against which Derrida justly argues: intentional acts are not directed but
'informational', they report on states of affairs16.
Husserl demarcates cases of 'demonstration' and indication. Indications (brands for slaves, and so
forth), as conventional established meanings, require no 'insight'; however, an inference from fossils to
their having been left by ancient species may turn out 'false', and only, '...a relation of
consequence...be seen to hold"7. That is, there are 'objective relationships' between states of affairs,
inadequately approached in subjective judgements. However, with growing familiarity, judgements
reveal a common property mediating communication (this brand means X is a slave); following
repetition a rule becomes established, through reflection on judgements and contexts of inference and
proof. For Husserl, indications exclude such knowledge of connections between contents of
judgements. To say that a state of affairs indicates another implies no necessary correlation, for they
are conventions, and are thus mutable18. They presuppose cases of demonstration or explicit dubbings
('this brand, which I now apply, means X is my slave); they are the conventions upon which all
indications are based19. An indication compels no necessary connection between mark, or statement,
and meaning; belief in the indicated state of affairs can only approach the definitiveness of
demonstrations. There is, Derrida is correct, a 'jurisdiction' allowing that the inferences may be called
'justified' or 'unjustified', 'valid' or 'invalid'20.
Human Life: Wittgenstein, Intentionality and Romanticism (University of Chicago) 1997, and on the very idea of authority in
scripture, Goldingay, I.,Models for Interpretation ofScripture (Michigan, Paternoster) 1995.
Pratt begins from a Derridean position. Wishing to overcome the distinction between literary and other uses of language, those
discussed in the sources which are the targets of Derrida: 'Russian Formalism through Prague School poetics and Anglo-
American structuralism to present-day French literary semiotics', (ppxi and xv) she rejects a distinction between poetic and non-
poetic uses. Pratt, M.L.; Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse (Bloomington, Indiana) 1977. Pratt discerns the
origin of the distinction in Romanticism. Both Searle and Grice are marshalled for the case that literary use can be described by a
theory accounting for non-literary discourse; see esp. Chapter Five. Husserl is classed as a structuralist in Derrida, J.; "'Genesis
and Structure" and Phenomenology', ppl54-168, in Writing and Difference (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul) 1978. See also
Habermas (1987) pp201-203.
15 Husserl (1970) p270.
16 This builds upon well-trodden objections to object theories of intentionality, cf. Woodruff Smith and Mclntyre (1982) p262.
"Husserl (1970)p271.
18 Husserl (1970) p272. 'The contents of one's judgements are not here related as premises are to a conclusion'. The latter state of
affairs is parasitic upon the former.
19 This is what Derrida calls a parasitism, and as Husserl (1970) p274 writes, the associations made in indications are as much
creative as they are generic.
20 The distinctions Derrida (1977b) pl68 finds in Austin and Searle are thus found in Husserl. Husserl (1970) p277 says that all
expressions in communicative speech function as indications. There is never an assured relation to probability conditions, and the
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Sounds or marks allow communication when S intends a sharing of knowledge21. Husserl's affinities
to Davidson have been intimated, and in describing the conditions necessary for mutual understanding,
Husserl states that a principle of charity is applied. S matches his sounds with 'sense-giving' acts,
revealed to H in communicative acts. Communication becomes the mutual correlation of thoughts, or,
for Hintikka, the sharing of information. In speaking S intimates a sense (say, that he makes a wish),
and in interpreting, H, following recognition, ascribes to S beliefs, desires, rationality and good faith,
yet without ever accessing the private, incommunicable, unique (Fregean) thoughts, and so
interpretations remain approximations in judgement22. (Husserl again remarks that the meanings of
expressions remain the same in uncommunicated, solitary utterance)23. As Frege before him, so
Husserl: meaning does not reside in the mere intimation of senses. Additionally, one cannot, in
soliloquy, use expressions as intimations to oneself, for in such cases one's expression is given two
aspects, (one means, and one intends the recognition of one's meaning by oneself), that is, the sense in
both the meaning and the intending act is that 'aimed at' in the one sign; and this logical
embarrassment returns Husserl to his earlier point that mere signs do not give expressions meaning2,1.
In intentionality as directedness a sentence good for use as an indication must describe 'an existent',
and Husserl is as stubborn as Austin, rejecting out of hand the difficulties of non-existence or
quantification into fictional contexts. Follesdal examines this thesis25. Noema contain two components,
congruent with Fregean notions of sense and thought. The sense of one's intentional act can be
common to all acts with the same content, be they perceptions, imaginings, or hallucinations, or
jurisdiction is faced with appropriately 'modest surmises'. Husserl distinguishes (as Schiffer does in response to Grice) the
means of expression from the meaning of an expression, the latter notion, with its reference to 'what these words ordinarily
mean', only comparable to Gricean natural meaning. It shall emerge (and in greater detail in II), that Grice himself makes no
such presupposition about what words ordinarily mean; he makes no claim for meaning as predicated on a capacity for
communication. Grice takes his lead from non-natural meaning, and the ways in which meanings arise in conventional contexts
of communication (with 'convention' to be defined in the coming three chapters, and in a way in which Derrida's doubts are
neutralised). Grice makes no exclusion of parasitic cases, and as shall be seen his theory allows their assessment without the
scepticism Derrida entertains.
Husserl himself sees that the distinction between the means of expression and the meaning of an expression is crude, and for
clarification looks to paradigmatic cases (of names), and the (again Fregean) distinction between what the name means and what
'mental state' (Fregean 'thought') it engenders.
21 Husserl has the language of Grice but none of the subtlety in his theory, for he also argues that sharing (communication) takes
place when H recognises S's intention in speaking.
22 The link to the theory of speech acts is clear. Husserl (1970) pp277-278. S intimates a sense with his speech act, and H's
judging it turns upon no 'conceptual knowledge'; H perceives S to be saying 'this or that'. H perceives S as a speaker, as
recounting, demonstrating, doubting, wishing and so forth. He perceives the intimation as he perceives S, even though, in
eminently Fregean language, '... the mental phenomena which make him a person cannot fall, for what they are, in the intuitive
grasp of another'. The Davidsonian tone is continued when Husserl continues: 'Common speech credits us with percepts even of
other people's inner experiences; we "see" their anger, their pain...', and these are equally as much percepts as are those of
'outward bodily things'. Again continuing the Fregean heritage, H can never have an 'inner' percept of S's experience
('thought'), but only ever an 'outer' percept, and this is the '...big difference between the real grasp of what is in adequate
intuition, and the putative grasp ofwhat is on a basis of inadequate, thought intuitive presentation'.
23 Husserl (1970) p278. 'A word only ceases to be a word when our interest stops at its sensory contour, when it becomes a mere
sound-pattern'. It is here in Husserl that the problem of demonstratives is seen to arise.
24 Husserl (1970) p279.
25 Fellesdal (1969) pp681£T.
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different according to their role as perceptions, imaginings or hallucinations, yet the thought contained
in each act is unique26. Against Husserl Follesdal argues that it is noematic Sinn that allows
consciousness to reach out to objects, for sense to mediate reference27. A noema has only one object,
while one object may be that of several noemata, or (to continue the connection), of several Fregean
thoughts28. As Fallesdal puts it: '[t]he object being identically the same is not sufficient to guarantee
sameness ofSinn...'29. Noemata may have many corresponding acts, each qualitatively distinct; indeed
they are paradigm Fregean, non-spatial, thoughts30. Husserl argues that knowledge of how noemata
reach out to reality is found in reflection, this the, '...basis of the phenomenological judgement', and
which is learning meanings. It is categorically not the coming greater to understand thoughts or
judgements themselves31. The condition allowing the iteration of phenomenological reflection (with a
Sinn becoming the object of judgements), does not permit, Husserl writes, that intentional acts are
directed to meanings, or to thoughts of objects. Intentional acts remain ('normally' says Follesdal),
directed at intentional objects32. In the description of phenomenological reflection de Mulder sees a neat
statement of the problem of mediated reference to real and to imaginary objects owing to an analogy
Husserl draws between perception and reference33. Before the analogy is explored, Husserl's distinction
between meaning-conferring and meaning-fulfilling acts (and incidentally, matter and quality), must be
presented34. It shall be seen that the distinction is that Follesdal marks between senses and thoughts. A
'sound-complex' (an utterance), is given meaning by meaning-conferring acts, and the sound-complex
comes to refer (conventionally as Grice says); de Mulder adds, the sounds come always to evoke the
20 Husserl (1970) p682. Husserl writes: '[i]f perception never constitutes the full meaning of a statement grounded on perception,
it seems nonetheless to make a contribution to this meaning...and suggests that in a perception instead of speaking, say, of 'a'
blackbird, one speaks of 'this' blackbird: an occasional expression for an occasion of perception. He adds that the grammatical
form contains a relation to time and to circumstances of utterance. The perceived object, described in perception, is what the
word 'this' signifies. 'The present tense in the grammatical form of a verb likewise expresses a relation to what is actually
present, and so again to perception. Plainly the same holds of our original example: to say 'There flies a blackbird' is not to say
that some blackbird in general is flying by, but that a blackbird is flying by here and now'. Cf. de Mulder, W.; Demonstratives
and Inlentionality: Searle andHusserl onMeaning andPerception (Antwerp Papers in Linguistics, no. 79) 1994, pp50ff.
27 That is, an act's noema is not the object to which the act is directed (again, contra Brentano).
28 Follesdal (1969) p683 says that each act has only one noema.
29 Follesdal (1969) p683. The object must be imaged as the same.
30 Husserl (1970) p684 even uses the same analogy as Frege. He speaks of the 'thisness' of an identification under different
specification, and as Follesdal (1969) p684 says, although Husserl here speaks of noematic Sinn, since the other parts of noema
are also parts oiSinn, the same conditions apply to the whole noema.
31 Cf. Follesdal (1969) p685, and Husserl (1970) p686-687. Follesdal notes the similarity on this point between Frege and
Husserl.
32
Frege's conditions on the cases of oblique, prepositional attitude contexts introduce (as seen in 1.2), a distinction between
reference in normal and in indirect contexts, in which terms refer to objects and to meanings respectively.
33 de Mulder (1994) p41. Husserl argues, says de Mulder, that perceptual acts are as much representations as are thoughts or
senses; '...they aim at contents that are not given in consciousness through contents that are...'. The given in perception is the
sensation, the ltyle\ they are not themselves perceived but are 'transformed' in acts of perception. Husserl (1970) pp597ff. Cf.
Smith andMclntyre (1982) p246.
34 Hintikka (1975c) p205 calls the matter-quality distinction 'ubiquitous' in Husserl.
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act of dubbing and thus can give meaning and fulfil reference in later instances35. (Deliverance
concerning the way in which a 'sound-complex' establishes a convention awaits the discussion of
Grice in II and of Lewis in IV). Perception seems not to face the difficulties of mediation, for object
and intentional content are related due to the immediacy of the sensation causing the intention. As
before, sensations (reel1) are contained in acts and not objects, but a problem arises for the mediation of
intentional acts to objects: the sensations in the act are themselves, as Follesdal says, imperceptible,
they have no meaning; it is part of a debt to Brentano that sensations representing real objects are not
the objects of intentional acts, and thus do not account for directedness36.
I see a thing, e.g. this box, but I do not see my sensations. I always see one and the same
box, however it may be turned and tilted. I have always the same "content of
consciousness"—if I come to call the perceived object a content of consciousness. But
each turn yields a new "content of consciousness", if I call experienced contents
"contents of consciousness", in a much more appropriate use ofwords37.
One 'lives through' one's sensations, but they are not objects. They 'show themselves' in acts of
perception, and accordingly limit the contents of intentional acts, as Follesdal says, and how does
Husserl account for the directedness of intentional acts to their objects38? Intentionality as directedness
assays a solution in the distinction between matter and quality39. The matter of an act relates it to
'something objective', and gives its manner of relation. Describing how one identifies an object reveals
one's sensations, the latter being, again, not contained in perceived objects, and endowed with
(Fregean) sense. The quotation continues:
Very different contents are therefore experienced, though the same object is perceived.
The experienced content, generally speaking, is not the perceived object. We must note,
further, that the object's real being or non-being is irrelevant to the true essence of the
perceptual experience, and to its essence as a perceiving of an object as thus and thus
appearing, and as thus and thus thought of0.
35 de Mulder (1994) p46 marks some differences between meaning and perception, referring to Husserl (1970) p455ff. A 'sound
complex' and the meaning it is given in an intentional act bear no internal link; in perception there remains a link because of the
perception bearing, for Husserl, an immediacy to the sensation itself.
36 Follesdal (1969) pp686-687.
37 Husserl (1970) p565.
38 de Mulder (1994) pp48-49 considers similarities and differences between Husserl's and Searle's theories of causation in
perception. Searle's causal theory is broached in Part III, though it should be noted that Husserl and Searle share a belief in the
way intentional acts are directed to perceived objects: the causation is internal to the acts. Husserl does not speak of causation, de
Mulder writes, because it might imply that the sensation and the act in a perception are separate, something he would not want to
say. Cf. Searle (1983) pp454 and 49.
39 Husserl (1970) pp586ff.
40 Husserl (1970) p565.
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Husserl continues that the experience of the difference in content is itself a further sensation; their
collation in judgement and reflection giving the 'being of the object forms'. The 'objective correlative'
ofthe act is found in the relationship to which it appeals in fulfilling its reference41.
An act's quality determines its status as an intentional act, represented in a speech act, of, say,
asserting, questioning, and so forth42. Matter conceived as sensation allows that sensation is a part
('moment'), of the accompanying act, but as with different instances of particular speech acts, different
acts, in time and in possessor, can share the same content. Content is a 'species', given a form in
matter, and the relationship is one of tokens to types. Meanings are constituted by meaning-intentions,
conceived in sensations or thoughts, and reported in acts which give meanings and so references to
objects. Meanings are not immutably related to the signs that express them but come to apply by usage
and convention43.
Soliloquy tolerates the existence of imagined indications, yet it is imperative that this is not elided
with a corresponding belief in imagined objects. The imaginary mark or speech act does not exist, yet
the words used do form an expression. Only in vocal utterance is intimation linked with meaning and
the communication of Fregean thoughts44. Expressions and their meanings break down into two
categories: the 'physical phenomenon' of the expression, and the corresponding 'acts' giving them
meaning (or their, '...intuitive fulness, in which [an act's] relation to an expressed object is
41 Husserl (1970) p566.
42 See again Fnllesdal (1969) pp685-686. There are other conceivable links to Austin (cf. de Mulder (1994) p52), with Husserl
considering the ways in which an act's 'liveliness' or 'intensity' may affect its 'essence'. See also Searle (1969) p52.
43 A further analogy between Husserl and Grice, and cf. de Mulder (1994) pp54-55ff. Cf. Ricoeur (1970) pp383-385. Ricoeur
adds that this is a theory of repetition. Howells (1999) pi 10 writes, [t]he repetition compulsion does not seem to produce
pleasure, on the contrary it tends to involve the relieving of displeasure, and Freud describes such compulsive and neurotic
repetition as "devilish"'. Cf. also pl20 and Bowie, M.; Lacan (London, Fontana) 1991, ppl7ff and especially pp29-36. In 'Frerud
and the Scene ofWriting', ppl96-231 in Writing and Difference (University of Chicago) 1978, Derrida considers the matter of
representation in repression and repetition. The writing interior to speech, '...has been contained outside speech' (pi97). A
difference exists in that logocentrism retains the means of observing how repression occurs in fact and in history, and Derrida
notes the caution with which Freud 'manipulates conventions and conceptual hypotheses' (pl98). Cf. Merleau-Ponty (1974a)
p82. On pp87ff Merleau-Ponty unequivocally states that intention and convention must always be discussed together, and offers
a Lewisian/Gadamerian/Davidsonian cooperative principle. Difficulties with Husserl's theory of repetition are considered in
Minkowski, E.; Lived Time: Phenomenological and Psychopathological Studies (Northwestern University Press) 1972. Husserl's
theory, displaying its scholastic bent, distinguishes a first, stimulus intentionality, and a second, unifying intentionality, reporting
a dichotomy between subject and object, one which Minkowski rejects in favour of immediate experience of the natural world
(pp44-78). In his philosophy of consciousness Husserl also, writes Welton (1999) p39, a phenomenology of the body and
reflections on embodiment, all to a comparison with classical Cartesian conceptions of the body. There are shared problems of
interaction and of consciousness, and also concerning the nature of access to nature, or experience. Nature for Husserl, displaying
both the influence of Leibniz and the reason his work is so amenable to Hintikka's possible worlds theory of intentionality, is a
'sphere ofmere things', of objects for perception, carried out by an engaged agent (an ego-subject), and not a Cartesian 'corpse'
(Welton (1999) pp39-41). Nature is always endowed with values. It is monadic in that it has no pure constitution or
consciousness, no description free of values, but is rather always interested and characterised as 'the correlate of a particular
interest brought to it by the subject'. This acutely raises the problems found in Husserl's theory by Hintikka, and does not resolve
them.
Incomparable studies of the relationship of the modal concepts and of time are Hintikka, J.; Time and Necessity: Studies in
Aristotle's Theory ofModality (Oxford, Clarendon) 1973, and Waterlow, S.; Passage and Possibility: A Study ofAristotle's
Modal Concepts (Oxford, Clarendon) 1982.
44 Husserl (1970) pp279-280. One speaks in soliloquy, but '...in the genuine sense of communication...', there is no speech, and
one tells oneself nothing. 'In a monologue words can perform no function of indicating the existence ofmental acts, since each
indication would there be quite purposeless. For the acts in question are themselves experienced by us at that very moment'.
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constituted')'15. By the grant of meaning, and pending articulation, the expression relates to the
'objective', which may be present in intuition or in mental imagery; in this way, '...a relation to an
object is realised'. Where the expression merely functions significantly, without meaning, there is no
'intuition' linking acts and objects, and the expression is merely a 'meaning-intention'. This clarifies
the distinction between 'meaning-conferring' and 'meaning-fulfilling' acts, the former being speech
acts, or expressions of sense, and the latter 'fulfilling' the relation to corresponding objects, revealing
how the expression 'reaches right out'®. 'The sounded word is first made one with the meaning-
intention, and this in its turn is made one (as intentions in general are made one with their fulfilments),
with its corresponding meaning-fulfilment'. One should not say that an expression, '...expresses its
meaning (its intention)...', but that the act of meaning-fulfilment completes the act accompanying the
expression (a wish becomes a wish, a perception a perception and so forth)47.
Husserl asks how expressions relate intentions to objects, writing that,'[t]he function of a word (.. .an
intuitive word-presentation), is to awaken a sense-conferring act in ourselves...', and repeats that the
correlation of signs to signifieds does not make one the expression of the other, for again, the same
signs may carry different thoughts; he adds that expressions are viable descriptions of such correlations
only as experienced48. Husserl clarifies the cleavage between a sign and the intention making it an
expression by arguing that signs are external experience open to the vagaries of perceptions (as
described above), and in this one sees the vital notion, rarely seen for all its significance in Husserl, of
intentionality as the coming greater to understand the logical relations of experienced correlations or
states of affairs, and not, as a superficial reading of Husserlian intentionality as directedness would
suggest, in the nature of the objects or states of affairs to which a subject relates49. An utterance, made
with an intention to communicate, is modified when it constitutes an expression (as defined). Acts of
meaning-fulfilment have objects coincident with the objects named or meant in the meaning. In the two
aspects of an act of intentional meaning, conferring and fulfilling, there inhere expressions, senses and
their objective correlates (their corresponding objects or states of affairs), and it is in this that the
exclusion arises to which Derrida should have directed his attention, namely the condition requiring
45 Husserl (1970) p280. The same reference goes for the next two quotations.
46 Husserl (1970) p281. 'The briefer expression "meaning-fulfilment" can only be used in cases where there is no risk of the
ready confusion with the whole experience in which a meaning-intention finds fulfilment in its correlated intuition'.
47 Husserl (1970) p281. In such a relation the expression (with sense) 'becomes one' with the act of meaning-fulfilment. The
form of the expression (its utterance or inscription), and its meaning-intention or fulfilment are yet connected. Both are intrinsic
to human experience, yet the provision of the expression does not contribute to the constitution of the life-world, but to the
enactment of the sense and the corresponding intention.
48 Husserl (1970) p282. One might here ponder a Wittgensteinian connection.
49 Smith and Mclntyre (1982) p276 argue that possible-worlds semantics is presaged in Husserl.
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that meaning expressions are, as a matter of course, issued with sincerity50. H's response assumes that S
speaks sincerely: his understanding S's assertion compels the notion that the latter judges the content of
the assertion to be a reliable record of the state of affairs described. This leads Husserl to moot a
question fundamental in assessments of Gricean analysis, namely whether the analysans in theories of
communicated intention be S meaning or H understanding, and Husserl rejects the idea that S's
judgement or H's understanding in any way constitute the meaning of S's assertion, for the content of
the assertion remains the same regardless of S's identity and the occasion of its utterance. Utterances
are the 'uniquely adequate' way of expressing meanings, yet they can reveal no individual judgement
(Fregean thought). The state of affairs about which the assertion is made is reported or not regardless of
whether S's assertion is true of it or not, yet in judgement S assumes that it obtains, and thus
judgements or intimations (defined above), bring in notions of inner, private experience; what is
asserted brings in no such notions, and describes a single state of affairs51. Intentions are communicated
'only symbolically' in false assertions; their want of 'fullness' entailing that they communicate no
knowledge about states of affairs52. The belief that a judgement is, '.. .the meaning of "the" declarative
sentence', confuses the intimation of an assertion with assertion itself, and in his categorical rejection
of this beliefHusserl again approaches the opaque doctrine of states of affairs.
If one falsely asserts something, he continues, one makes no assertion, for the state of affairs does not
obtain. However, one says something, something more than a report of one's judgement, and Husserl
gives an example. One might hypothesise a possible state of affairs (say, that the sum of the angles of a
triangle do not equal the sum of two right angles), a hypothesis the content ofwhich can be intended in
many judgements, at different times, by different people and so forth, but still states of affairs invoked
by true judgements are, '...the objectively-ideal treatment characteristic of all thinking'; that is, Husserl
maintains, and as Derrida says, that false cases do not achieve this ideal. The two aspects of intention,
judgement and a mediating relation, can, Husserl writes, be explicated by considering a third sense of
what is (tacitly) expressed by an expression in its invocation of a convention, namely, the reference to
an 'objective correlate'. An expression spoken with intention does not only say something, but refers to
objects, one or many, over and above its meaning. For explication of this Husserl examines expressions
50 It is odd to see this distinction in Husserl, for elsewhere he seems to make no such dogmatic exclusions, but it is the case that
all of the examples from Husserl to follow are predicated on the fact that they are spoken sincerely. The argument from Grice
introduced in II. again, an intimation of conventional non-natural meaning, shows that such speech acts can be assessed for their
status as literal or parasitical.
51 This obtains for false or absurd assertions. Husserl (1970) p285. 'We continue to recognise its identity of intention in evident
acts of reflection: we do not arbitrarily attribute it to our assertions, but discover it in them'.
52 This is Russellian failure to refer: the difference in Husserl of intending and fulfilling meaning.
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with identical meaning but different objects, and those with different meaning but identical objects
(differing extensions and intensions). Names are Husserl's paradigm cases53. Proper names come to
name different things by coming to mean different things, and so Husserl distinguishes names with
many intensions from those with many extensions. A name names (refers) and means, the latter
permitting the former, and the relationship established requires elucidation of the functions of
expressions and guiding intentions. To compel the conclusion that the reference of an expression is
contained in its meaning, Husserl repeats that one judgement can be carried by expressions with
different extensions, adding that expressions and their intentions are not guided by an individual's
intuition alone but by the, '...varying intellectual forms through which intuited objects first become
intelligibly determined, mutually related objects'54.
53 He offers Frege's examples: 'the victor at Jena', 'the vanquished at Waterloo'. Husserl (1970) p287 writes 'Both, of course,
only pertain to an expression in virtue of the mental acts which give it sense. And, ifwe distinguish between "content" and object
in respect of such "presentations", one's distinction means the same as the distinction between what is meant or said, on the one
hand, and what is spoken of, by means of the expression, on the other'. Husserl continues that expressions may have the same
meaning but different objects, or different meanings but the same object. Expressions may agree in meaning and object, as with
translated expressions.
There are problems concerning the objective reference of types of expression, owing to their 'manifoldness'. In 'S is P' the
subject of the statement is the object about which the statement is made; another view says that the whole state of affairs
corresponding to the statement is an analogue of the object a name names, and is thus distinguished from the objects meaning
unequivocally; different expressions ('a is bigger than b', and 'b is smaller than a'), express the same state of affairs.
54 There is, Husserl says, always an area for 'possible fulfilment'. In this, it might be suggested, Husserl draws some of
Hintikka's criticism of intentionality as directedness. Cf. Husserl (1970) pp289-290.
There are, for Husserl, two things found in a realised relation to an object: the object itself and its ideal correlate, (its fulfilling
sense), the latter instantiating the sense expressed by the expression used. In the case of a report of a perception there is a
'content' and an 'object', the former open and mutually available to S and H. Objects require fulfilment through correlation with
an act of meaning, and in such cases the content of the latter coincides with the content of the former, and thus in one's
experience they appear as one. (In the case of perception or of meaning, the notion is clear as to how an object may be the
intended object of a totality of possible worlds or utterances, but fulfilled, perhaps, by one or few). The potential ambiguity that
may arise in the ascription of 'meaning' and 'sense' to both intentions and to their fulfilment (owing to their unity), raises matters
taken up in the studies of both Derrida and Searle. (The use of 'sense' and 'meaning' as coterminous characterises the ambiguity
Husserl finds in Frege). An expression has a meaning (a conventional, non-natural, Gricean meaning) and 'meaningless'
expressions are, by this standard, not expressions: the sound patterns 'Abracadbra' and 'Green is or' are Husserl's examples
(p293). An expression carries a relation to an object, and, some say, '[i]t makes no difference whether the object exists or is
fictitious, or even impossible'. Husserl will not accept this, for the 'genuine' concept of meaning includes the relation of an
expression to an object: expressions denoting non-existent objects are thus meaningless. The meaning cannot be identified with
the objective correlate of an expression, for then objectless expressions would become meaningless. Contradictory objectless
expressions ('a red square') are 'senseless'. The arguments for the fulfilling sense of an expression are given by Husserl in order
to reject such cases, in which, he argues, there is a confusion ofmeaning with fulfilling intention.
Husserl (1970) pp295ff considers Mill's logic, and finds that Mill confuses the distinction between indication and expression.
Husserl says that an arbitrarily chosen mark carrying a meaning is a mere indication and a proper name an expression. In this he
appears to be arguing against a notion fundamental to the assessment of the Gricean theory: the communication of an understood
conventional meaning. Flusserl writes that names have expressiveness above and beyond that of the indication, for in the former
one is not concerned with the mode of presentation but with the object presented, or named. It is the object to which one may
have a propositional attitude: it is the fact of an assertion, and the object of a wish and so forth. The use in assertion is prior, for
only in use as an assertion can the name become available for use in complex expressions (reports of wishes, statements and so
forth). However, the name, for Husserl, is not an index of the subject, for an index serves to 'point to' an object; the object,
'...need not be taken to exist at all'. Mill's association of a name with the idea of the idea named (on the model of the marking of
the house), is incorrect, for Husserl argues that this obscures the fact that one thinks of the object when the sign is encountered,
and one must agree that the analogy is weak. With significance for a study of a Gricean analysis of meaning, Flusserl marks the
distinction between an expression and a noise or sound, in order to consider the notion of the attitude an expression may evoke.
Husserl rejects the notion of attitudes. Understanding, on the view Husserl appears, is the garnering of meaning from the
speaker's speech or actions. The mental contents of understanding given are, '... often said to be the meanings ofwords...', and
the proponents of the view, '...claim to be getting at what ordinary speech means by the "meaning of an expression".' (The
objections Husserl beats will become familiar in II)
. Utterances are often received by a hearer as communicating an intended image, but they are by no means necessary
accompaniments (Husserl (1970) pp300-303). For instance, if one reads and understands an author's assertions: what more is
there available for understanding? What images are conveyed or communicated? Husserl will not allow that a view saying that
meaning is carried in corresponding imagery can appeal to a notion of confirmation of meaning as a private mental act. In this
Husserl would seem to be challenging a tenet of Grice's theory, but as will be argued in II, Grice makes no appeal to private
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The distinction between an act of meaning and achieving unambiguous reference, or conventional
meaning, is threatened by expressions containing demonstratives and indexicals55. In intimations made
on an occasion, the meaning of a demonstrative changes according to context and to sense, and Husserl
sees the threat they pose to his theory: they, '...shake our faith in the ideality and objectivity of
meanings', and for a response he distinguishes 'subjective', demonstrative (or 'occasional')
expressions from 'objective' expressions, adding again that, '...we shall deal only with expressions in
their normal use'56. Objective expressions are understood without attention to the circumstances of the
utterance; and the exemplar of occasional meaning is the personal pronoun. Statements containing 'I',
written by an absent author are not meaningless, but the meaning reports S's designation, and may
instantiate many different extensions57. This notwithstanding, demonstratives and indexicals are not,
Husserl maintains, equivocal, and cannot be identified (as can personal pronouns) with proper names;
Husserl prefers to say that they have two meanings: an 'indicating meaning', to present the things to
which reference is made, and 'singular presentation', giving the meaning of the speech act in which
reference appears. Meaning, full and actual, grows only from indicating meanings: they are necessarily
prior, and they establish enduring meanings58. It might very plausibly be said that Husserl, by making
this Fregean distinction, ignores the problems of demonstratives, and one might, equally plausibly, see
that he has good reason to do so: utterances containing demonstratives seem to carry their meanings in
the corresponding judgements, or senses, used in speech contexts. Accounting for them and all of their
respective contexts would render otiose any argument for the ideality of meanings and for
images in the presentation of the conventional 'transport' of intentional meaning. On the theory to be presented in this
dissertation, conventional meanings require no familiarity for dissemination, communication or meaning, and thus Husserl's
compelling example cannot apply.
55 Husserl also considers cases of sentences in grammatical moods, those relating to past experience and mathematical
relationships. Among the former are included what are elsewhere called propositional attitudes. Cf. the previous footnote.
56 Of the r61e of demonstratives Husserl (1970) p314 writes '[o]bviously we are here dealing with a case of unavoidable rather
than chance ambiguity, one that cannot be removed from our language by an artificial device or convention'. Husserl restricts
himself to expressions with their normal use '... [f]or simplicity's sake...'. Smith, D.W.; 'Husserl on Demonstrative Reference
and Perception', ppl93-213 in Dreyfus and Hall (1982) notes the similarity of insight between Husserl's and Kaplan's theory of
demonstratives, beginning with the understanding of occasional expressions (ppl93-194). Smith identifies ten theses for Husserl
on demonstratives.
57 T indicates to H how he is to understand the meaning of S's utterance, though it does not possess a power to convey this fact,
for, as described, this power resides in the mediating qualities of speech acts. Husserl (1970) pp315-316. 'It is the universal
semantic function of the word "I" to designate whoever is speaking, but the notion through which we express this function is not
the notion immediately constitutive of its meaning'.
58 Husserl (1970) p317 lists other occasional, 'subject-bound' expressions, and again, with say, 'here', the prior 'genuine'
meaning is constituted in the presentation of the place denoted by 'here'. Hintikka (1975c) pi93 compares the study of
intentional concepts to developments in intensional logic. The solutions to the problems of intentionality as directedness given
are as unsatisfactory to Hintikka as they are to Davidson. Hintikka (pl94) writes of his approach: 'Conceived of in the way as
[sic] we have done, there are few questions more important than this problem of characterising the nature of intentionality. For
the question is then: what is characteristic of conscious, conceptualisable human mental life and mental experience? This
question is intimately related to the salient philosophical questions: what is man? And what is thinking? He remarks that views of
intentionality as directedness are typically '...represented by frequent assimilations of intentional, verstehende accounts of
actions to the so-called teleological explanations'. It shall be argued that Hintikka's work, a development of the theory of
possible-worlds semantics, provides the key to a better understanding of intentionality. It is to be argued that Derrida's criticisms
are negated if one does not accept his interpretation ofHusserl. On such an interpretation, intentionality obtains in directedness to
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intentionality as directedness. In response Hintikka dubs his thesis 'intentionality as intensionality',
and, in applying the machinery of possible worlds, gives a description of the theory itself which serves
admirably for present purposes. Intentionality need not be seen in terms of directedness or containment,
but,
...in blunt terms...a concept is intentional if and only if it involves the simultaneous
consideration of several possible states of affairs or courses of events...[possible
worlds].... In other words, possible-worlds semantics is the logic of intentionality, and
intentionality is what calls for possible-worlds semantics59.
That Husserl does not carry out the phenomenological analysis of referring expressions to its logical
extent is recognised by a number of critics (Derrida makes the charge in remarking that
'phonocentrism' is a founding assumption of Husserl's semantics), and is indeed, vital to the possible
worlds interpretation60. Derrida, in explication of his point, describes examples identical to those
objects, and intentional acts, Derrida correctly says, are described by a metaphor of containment: an act has inexisting in it an
object.
59 Hintikka (1975c) pl95. Hintikka wishes to define the senses of the terms he uses, and his remarks are worth quoting at length.
'The word "simultaneous" refers of course to logical parity rather than to contemporaneity in the literal sense of the word. By
"involves" I refer to the semantical explication of a concept, not to the overt features of its use. The "possible worlds"
contemplated here are not grand histories of the world but usually only what a theoretical statistician d la Savage might call
"small worlds", that is to say, alternative courses of events which are rather short in duration and which concern only a miniscule
part of the universe, for instance alternative courses that a single experiment might take. What is crucial is only that several such
alternative courses must needs be considered within the same 'logical specious present'. We shall also find that the word
"possible" in my phrase "possible world" has to be taken with a grain of salt too, and that the possible-worlds semantics in
question has to be of the right kind and even so will exhibit different degrees of intentionality'. His theory of intentionality says
that it is found not in relations obtaining in the world, but in comparisons between several possible worlds.
For Hintikka the consequences of the incorrect interpretation of intentionality is amply demonstrated by approaches taken to
perception, and he remarks the frequency with which Husserl offers, as examples of intentional acts, perceptual acts. Hintikka
says that perception is not obviously intentional and directed: one might prefer to say that in perception one is passive, and
responsive to physical stimuli, and that this obtains even for acts as described by Husserl. However, Hintikka defends the core of
Husserl's theory of perception, noting merely that it appears incorrect because of the faith put in intentionality as directedness,
and Hintikka's work provides the solution, for it is also the intentionality of perception. (He drafts Hazlitt and Kant for
methodological inspiration).
Discussion of the problems of demonstratives as the limiting cases for both Husserl's and Frege's semantic theories are, it
might be ventured, the forums in which Derrick's criticisms ofHusserl must be considered, for as shall be seen at the end of this
section, part of Hintikka's response to intentionality as directedness derives from Evans' arguments for the mediation of
reference by sense. In other work on Husserl, Derrida describes the problems of the permanently absent intention and the non-
saturability of convention, the matters characterising the exchange with Searle, which can perhaps be seen as defining
deconstruction. (Cf. Norris, C.; Derrida (London, Fontana) 1987, pl77). The response of Husserl to the problems of indexicals
and demonstratives acutely raises the main objection of Derrida, that self-consciousness and the prospect of defining contexts for
utterances are both illusory. The presence and adaptation of the sign to context cannot represent that which eludes consciousness.
Further congruence between Grice and Husserl at this point can be noted. Direct meaning ('natural' in Grice), Husserl calls
'expression', and indirect, 'non-natural' meaning he dubs 'indication'. The latter applies, conventionally, to things not open to
awareness or perception, completely or in part, at the time of the utterance (vocal or otherwise). As with a demonstrative, such
expressions, though they refer (and the connectionwith Frege is here strong), are always of indeterminate meaning. They possess
'intrinsic' value. (Mooney, T.; 'Deconstruction and Derrida: Philosophical Roots and Bibliographical History', pp441-473 in
Kearney, R.(ed.); Routledge History of Philosophy, Volume VIII: Twentieth-Century Continental Philosophy (London,
Routledge) 1994, writes, pp455-456 '[t]o be more than an empty bearer or carrier it must be given meaning by a specific
intention, though it may not transmit this in its fullness'). Derrida writes that such indications cannot be given meaning, for the
intention can never be found.
The notion of expression in Husserl postulates a meaning with an immediate relationship with that signified. Meanings are
present, direct, non-metaphorical, non-metonymical, unmediated and so forth. Again as in Grice's theory, expressions may be
given a non-natural, conventional meaning; the signs come to be used for indication; and, for Derrida, the paradigmatic instance
of this is representation in speech acts and writing. Speech and writing launch the expression into the world, exposing it to the
play of intentions and parasitism, and estranging it from its motivating intention. Husserl's notion of the spoken word as vehicle
of intention, one might say, classes him as a speech act theorist: speech reports, unmediated, the content of the speaker's
intention, of his conscious life. (See Mooney (1994) p456).
60 Hintikka (1975c) pl97.
53
(above) from Husserl: the writing desk, perceived as rectangular, wooden, and with, one assumes from
one's perspective, four identical legs at each corner; the tree, or the house, seen again from a single
perspective, as a solitary case of reporting a state of affairs. Husserl argues that the full panoply, the
manifold, is given with the possession of all possibilities, the horizon, of possible perceptions, but
ignores the assumptions underlying the thesis61. Further descriptions are used to fill out incomplete, or
supply absent, states of affairs, and it is precisely here that the problem of demonstratives arises62.
Derrida argues that given the absence of motivating intention, and the proliferation of contexts in
which an author's statement may be uttered, how may the horizon of the utterance be supplied? Signs
for objects in states of affairs may, Husserl writes, operate as effectively in the absence of the complete
manifold for they retain the guidance of intentions and established conventions. Derrida rejects this,
and raises problems of reflexive, or demonstrative, expressions. As described, Husserl argues that a
demonstrative functions if one fills in the motivating intentions operative at the time of utterance, and
Derrida replies that all of its functions can be fulfilled in S's absence, adding that there is no cleavage
between utterance and intention for which account must be made, for the utterance always operates in
the absence of a guiding intention: the motivating 'I' is perennially absent63. This is precisely the matter
to which Hintikka and Evans offer a reply, for (as in 1.2) senses can be discerned outwith the context of
a determining reference. Of retention and protention, the basis of human self-consciousness, Derrida
writes that there is no self-contained, sustaining consciousness in which the reference of expressions is
settled before they are debased by use in indication; there is no unique access one has to one's own
thoughts, expressed in signs motivated by activated knowledge of past meanings and theorised
expectations of consistent, future meanings64. Husserl's arguments that self-consciousness is constituted
by retention and protention show, for Derrida, a further example of phenomenology not following its
arguments to their logical conclusion: self-consciousness is, on these terms, far from pure and self-
61
Regarding the ways in which possible perceptions are derived from intentions and conventions.
62 On the dynamic content of perception in Husserl, and its revival in the work of Gibson and Evans, see Mulligan, K.;
'Perception', ppl68-238, in Smith and Smith (1995) pl65. See also ppl99, 201 and 215. Mulligan adds that Evans (1990) and
Dummett, M.; Origins ofAnalytical Philosophy (London, Duckworth) 1993 both broach the matter of dynamic content, and
credits Evans with reviving Husserl's views after Merleau-Ponty's criticism. The discussion of the function of demonstrative
identification and perception is prefaced on pp209-210, and especially 219. See also pl75, and the references on p238, fn. 117.
The case of indexicals as a limiting case of language in the absence of the speaker is broached in Halion (1992) pl64. Ricoeur
(1970) p385: '...language makes it possible to generalise the perceptual model of the unconscious. The ambiguity of "things"
becomes the model of all ambiguity, of subjectivity in general and of all the forms of intentionality'. Ricoeur argues that this is
vital for seeing the links between phenomenology and psychoanalysis (p386). Cf. Mohanty (1971) pl25.
63
Mooney (1994) p457 writes, in relation to Derrida's mooting of a private language in (1977a) that '[i]f the expressed personal
intuition that my voice breathes into the signature [were] to give it its normal meaning, and if this were to stay with the sign, then
everyone would have to use my own private language'. The argument of 'Signature Event Context', and 'Limited Inc a b c' is
amply attested in Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory ofSigns (Northwestern University Press) 1973:
the meaning of signs is always independent of the intentions with which an utterance may provide them: contexts are never
complete or clear to the speaker, utterances requiring clarification, restatement or redaction to suit.
64 Cf. Mooney (1994) pp258-259.
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contained; it requires developed consciousness of past and future contained in meanings which, for
Derrida, cannot be established65. Derrida argues that the network of relations to further signs in self-
consciousness theorises expressions always by indications, the locus of non-natural, conventional
(context-dependent) meaning, and that if meaning in the present always indicates meanings one may
expect to arise in the future, and which are always anticipated from the past, in what Derrida conceives
as a condition ad infinitum, there is nothing to motivate the sign, or to supply a meaning. There can be
nothing to carry an intention into this regress, giving an enduring conventional meaning, and so
stopping it66. Hintikka argues that these failings in Husserl are of expression and not, as Derrida argues,
of substance; intentionality can be argued for on a possible worlds theory. In presenting his thesis
Hintikka considers the conditions attended to by Derrida, namely, the matter-quality distinction and
that between indicated and indicating meaning. The mediating role given to quality and the notion of
convention required by indications are elucidated, for Hintikka, by reference to Evans' strong case for
the mediation of sense by reference, with particular attention to indexical expressions67.
Hintikka argues for the two notions in Husserl that Derrida rejects: there is a non-intentional, pure
perception (of hyle), and an intentional noesis to mediate this raw material (sense-data)68. Hyle are not
experienced in acts of perception, they are the constituents of all perceptions, and so play a
fundamental role in connecting up stimulation and the senses. They are not, it must be emphasised,
experiences of an object, and are thus not intentional by Husserl's own criteria. The intentional
framework is supplied by the noeses, performing their role by ordering hyle into a set of appearances of
an object®. Hyle occur in acts of perception containing noeses, allowing the repeated collation of the
raw data; that is, sense-impressions become intentional when they are organised by,
...one's expectations, memories, etc...These (and the like) are what the noesis relies on
that makes perception intentional. The objects of our sense are reidentified from moment
to moment largely by means of the continuity of the beliefs we attribute to them70.
65 Cf. Merleau-Ponty, M.; Resumes de cours, College de France 1952-1960 (Paris, Gallimard) 1968, especially pi 15.
66 As is argued in II, Grice supplies this meaning. Cf. Mooney (1994) p460.
67 Hintikka, J.; 'Semantics for Propositional Attitudes', pp87-ll 1 in Models forModalities: Selected Essays (Dordrecht, Reidel)
1969 begins from an identical premise. This essay is important to the development of some of the ideas (philosophical and
metaphilosophical) discussed in this dissertation, and cf. Hintikka, J.; 'Quine on Who's Who', pp209-226 in Hahn, L.E. and
Schilpp, P.A. (eds.); The Philosophy ofW. V. Quine (Illinois, Open Court) 1986.
68 Hintikka (1975c) pi98.
69 This distinguishes Hintikka's work in perception from that of, say, Austin.
70 Hintikka (1975c) pl98. Hintikka writes '[t]hus quite literally only an additional noesis or thought-element... makes the hyletic
data intentional. Thus in a sense, which is problematic but not Pickwickian, raw sensation (unedited perception) is not intentional
according to this reading of Husserl'. A corollary is that one may conclude that when one's beliefs about what one perceives are
correct, one perceives correctly. 'In other words, illusions (incorrect perceptions) are false beliefs induced by the senses'.
However, Hintikka writes that such examples show the insufficiency of phenomenological analysis, for they refer only to the
distinction between correct and incorrect perception and not to that between knowingly having an incorrect perception (and being
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Husserl's phenomenology requires that mediating noesis be conscious, and not implicit or tacit. The
expectations and memories associated with an object cannot, Hintikka suggests, be simply another way
of speaking of the editing and ordering process of the central nervous system, for phenomenology
requires that all noemata are open to the reflection, and therefore that the acts fulfilling the mediating
relationship are available to consciousness; he ventures that Husserl believes that this goes also for
hyletic data. Hintikka rejects the theses that intentionality need be theorised by noeses described in
conventions, and that mediation be understood as instantiating a relationship of directedness71. His
account of intentional perception develops a Davidsonian theme, arguing that consciousness is always
experience 'of certain objects, their properties, their interrelations, etc.' The rawest sense data are
always already structured, and this is the result of past conditioning and expectations learned in
experience. Hintikka is clear: 'On this view, the most primitive layer of sensation we can reflectively
behold is already directed, i.e. organised so as to be of definite objects'. This, Hintikka says, is a 'direct
corollary' of a theory of intentionality as intensionality, adding:
Perception is intentional because it is informational, and all talk of information involves
several different possible states of affairs or courses of events in that it involves a
distinction between states of affairs compatible with this information and those
incompatible with it. Since to specify what one perceives at a given moment in time
is... to specify the information one's senses then convey to one about the object of one's
perception, this specification involves several unrealised states of affairs, i.e. is
intentional in my sense72.
able to correct it in thought), and not having an illusion at all (an important phenomenological problem writes Hintikka), yet, as
Hintikka writes, '[t]o be able to correct a sensory illusion in thought just is not the same thing as to be able to correct it in
perception'... Such distinctions are persuasive proofs that there is a kind of truth and falsity and therefore a kind of intentionality
in a perfectly good sense even in spontaneous, unedited impressions largely independently of what cunrent beliefs (memories,
expectations etc.) we associate with them. They correspond or fail to correspond to facts independently of what we know or
believe these facts to be'. Dummett (1976) ppl26 and 136 notes the affinity of his work with Hintikka's theory of semantics on
the basis that it allows the incorporation '... into our theory of sense an account of the basis on which we judge the truth values of
our sentences, since it does explain meanings in terms of actual human capacities for the recognition of truth'.
71 Hintikka (1975c) pp203-205 does some speculating on the reasons for the ambiguities he finds in Husserl's account of the
relationship ofhyle and noematic sense.
72 The references are from Hintikka (1975c) pp200-202. The view encapsulated in the long quotation is he says compatible with
the results of numerous psychologists of perception who emphasise the object directedness of perception. He argues, perhaps
cheekily, that experiments to prove their point actually prove his, for if'... we could always grasp the hyletic data directly, apart
from their object-presenting function... such special setups [would be] redundant. We could always attend to the sense-data
directly'. Cf. Hintikka, J.; 'On the Logic of Perception', ppl51-183 in Models for Modalities: Selected Essays (Dordrecht,
Reidel) 1969. Hintikka writes that the logic of perception is a modal logic, and that a modal logic of perception both answers
classical problems in the philosophy of perception (sense data, the argument from illusion), and elucidates the semantics of
modal logic. In possible worlds, modal contexts experience no failure of referentiality but rather a referential multiplicity of
possible states of affairs or courses of events. In truly Leibnizean vein, Hintikka writes that, '[a] logician might say that we often
succeed in saying something about the actual world [say, in predictions] only by locating it, as it were, on the map of all the
different possible worlds'.
There is, he continues, an 'intricate' connection between propositional attitudes and possible worlds. He states a case in which
a propositional attitude is 'disclaimed', in which it is said that S believes neither in q nor r; that is to say, '...that there is a
possible world compatible with everything S believes in which q would be false and that there is also a similar possible world in
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(With Hintikka's earlier thesis, derived from Husserl, describing the structure of sense data, the
contents of sensations are specified using the same concepts as apply to intentional objects; the
conclusion is drawn that perception allows a commitment to realism, and that it is irreducibly
intensional, and needs clarification in a possible worlds theory)73. Hintikka continues that the
informational theory of perception elucidates the role of conceptualisation or mediation. Hintikka's
theory presupposes that sense-impressions are received as conveying information, and Husserl's that
sense-impressions are raw material for mediation; as Hintikka says, while the informational theory
demands a degree of conceptualisation by the receiver, this is not something applied over sense-
impressions and mediated by noema as Husserl and Derrida have it, but is immanent in the impressions
themselves, and this is evident in the fact that describing sense impressions is describing states of
affairs compatible with the impressions received. This requires a realist vocabulary, and a speaking of
perceptible objects; a description offered of the state of affairs obtaining is framed in the vocabulary of
the perceiver. It is in this way that concepts enter sense-impressions, and are 'culture-dependent'74.
Mediation raises other issues. Husserl's argument that all noemata are always available to
phenomenological reflection (even the hyletic raw data), contains equivocations and qualifications
enough to lead Hintikka to reject it, for elsewhere Husserl palpably suggests that hyle cannot be
separated from the sense given by a noema, or sense from reference, or indeed, matter from quality. In
elucidating these points Husserl shows some awareness of the difficulties of achieving mediation75:
We cannot place side by side two components in intuition, sense and filling. We can only
obtain the difference by contrasting the empty and the filled sense, that is, through a
synthesis of intuition and empty consciousness. Perhaps we might put it thus: the abstract
identical in several different acts of consciousness which is called sense is an essence
(sense-essence) which particularises in its special way [in demonstrative thoughts],
which r would be false'. However, this is not to say that the worlds are identical, and it can be evident that they are not. Hintikka
gives an example: it is possible that r=not q, and this means that S has neither opinion q nor not-q, and, in this case, the
requirement that the two worlds be identical demands that there be a possible world containing everything S believes in which
both q and not-q are true, this is contradictory. 'Hence we often have to consider more than one possible world compatible with
someone's propositional attitudes. Only in the case of an omniscient S can one restrict one's attention to one world only'.
Hintikka (1969) ppl57-162, proceeds to consider how worlds are related and weighted, and offers a short way of dealing with
Quine's arguments against quantifying into belief contexts.
73 Hintikka (1975c) pp202-203 writes that this is a form of directedness, but that Husserl has the wrong sense. He adds that the
intentional and informational character of perception is connected to the role of conceptualisation in perception, and on a theory
of intentionality as intensionality, the intentionality of perception 'presupposes' that sense impressions are received as conveying
information, and are categorically not merely stimuli for eliciting responses.
74Hintikka (1975c) p203. Hintikka argues that no noeses are required, and that '[a]ll these observations [that Hintikka makes] are
consequences of the analysis of (spontaneous) perception in terms of the class of states of affairs it admits of...'.
75 Hintikka (1975c) p221 says that the remark is found in one of Husserl's unpublished work. He adds that this doubt clearly
shows a threat to all of the distinctions Husserl elsewhere seems so careful to establish (matter/quality, sense/reference and
hyle/sense).
57
indeed, in two basic modes, in the mode of intuition... and in the mode of non-intuition,
the empty mode76.
Husserl here describes the modes of intuition as irrevocably separate, with a meaning inhering in
intuition, and another in non-intuition. Hintikka considers that the passage might be consistent with the
core ofHusserl's arguments: that hyle are always connected with noeses, that sense data are only made
intentional via a noema, and indeed, that Husserl remains consistent on the nature of the mediation
between hyle and sense, but yet identifies, '.. .the limitations of our language and conceptual thought in
speaking of it'. However, Hintikka concludes that Husserl's requiring the mediating contrasts (hyle-
form, matter-quality), leave him unable to accept a theory far more plausible, and closer to Hintikka's
(and indeed to that intimated in the passage), which sees the only necessary distinction as that between
an intuited and a non-intuited mode of consciousness, reported in acts77. The unmediated data, Husserl
argues, are the things that fill noematic acts, and Hintikka suggests that this filling role that Husserl
gives them, '...implies [by Husserl's own theory] their non-intentionality', because to be unmediated
data, they, by definition, are non-intentional. A possible worlds theory tolerates no such distinction.
However, the ambiguities in Husserl's presentation again prevent clear account, for though hyle and the
filling are ever linked, their connection is opaque. Husserl makes, for Hintikka, a prima facie
bewildering distinction in saying that the filling role of noema belongs to objects (or references), and
not unconceptualised hyle, again, this conflicts with the notion that the data appropriate for filling are
the most primitive, atomic givens78. These ambiguities apply equally to the matter-quality distinction. If
76 Hintikka (1975c) p203.
77 Hintikka (1975c) p204 writes, in response to Husserl, that the passage quoted might be thought consistent with Husserl's other
remarks:'... Husserl is only saying that we cannot meaningfully speak of hyletic data in their virgin state, unsullied of any noesis.
If this is what he means, what is involved is merely a consequence of the fact that hyletic data are according to Husserl only
conceptualised (made intentional) through a superimposed noesis. Since language presupposes conceptualisation, we cannot
speak of the hyletic data until they are subjected to the noesis. And even then we cannot really speak of them alone, only of the
intentional experiences to which they belong as components'. This, it might be thought, does not alter the distinction between
hyle and sense, but shows the limitations of language and of conceptual thought. 'He is not saying that there are no unstructured
hyletic data. He is only saying that we can speak of them only insofar as they have already been structured by the noesis (and
even then only at the second remove, that is, only in so far as they are components of our experiences of those objects which are
the only rightful subject matter of conceptualised discourse). So understood, Husserl's second thoughts do not belie [Hintikka's]
criticism ofhim, they merely introduce a cautionary footnote as to how this criticism ought to be formulated'. Kaufinann (1949)
p213 says that there is needed a comparison between Husserl's and Cassirer's arguments on form and matter.
78Mohanty, J.N.; 'Husserl's Concept of Intentionality', pplOO-132 in Tymieniecka (1971) ppl23-125 reveals that-Sartre had the
same fear, that, '... to locate the hyle within consciousness would amount to inserting into the all-transparent consciousness a
"centre of opacity" [and] would be justified only if we assume that consciousness is in fact all-transparent (ppl23-124). As
'discrete sensation', giving an 'impressional matter', Ricoeur says that hyle is vital for a psychological analysis of intentionality;
it is also central in Husserl's analysis of bodies in space, and cf. Lingis, A.; 'Intentionality and Corporeity', pp75-90 in
Tymieniecka (1971) and Dahlstrom (2001) p55.
Ricoeur's theory is presented in Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary (Northwestern University Press)
1966, especially pp371 and 373-409, and in Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation (Yale University Press) 1970,
pp376ff. On Merleau-Ponty's relation to Sartre, cf. Ricoeur (1970) p382. On all of the issues raised, cf. Landgrebe, L.; "The
Problem of the Beginning of Philosophy in Husserl's Phenomenology', pp33-53 in Embree (1972). Merleau-Ponty, M.; 'The
Primacy of Perception and its Philosophical Consequences', ppl96-226 in O'Neill (1974) summarises Merleau-Ponty's
arguments on perception. Intentionality as characterising the situated body, and the life-world, will not bear the form-matter
distinction. Matter always contains and precedes form: the perceived world is the basis of rationality, value and existence: it is a
'nascent logos' (p209).
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the hyle-sense fulfilling relationship is workable, then are the acts filled (ones for which, Husserl says,
one can have conventions and expectations), related more to hyle or to their objects? Are they
'meaning-conferring' or meaning-fulfilling'? Do they describe matter or quality, indicated or indicating
meaning? If Husserl is to maintain the belief in the mediating role of noema, the data allowing
fulfilling must be partly conceptualised, or partly intentional, and this Hintikka offers.
In rejecting the matter-quality distinction, Hintikka writes,
[wjhatever "form" there is in one's perception is present already in the most spontaneous
sensuous "materials" that can surface in one's awareness. Speaking of "matter" and
"form" in perception thus appears not only empty or problematical, but positively
misleading79.
For all this, Hintikka draws no sceptical conclusions retaining a commitment to intentionality and to
realism. He argues that the possible worlds theory of intentionality allows notions of conceptuality and
mediation, and in conclusion, it is argued that Hintikka might appeal to that given by Evans in his
analysis of demonstratives, and this constitutes the final tenet of the response to Derrida's criticism of
Husserl on intentionality80.
The mediating relationships established in a theory of intentionality as directedness are prone to the
objections (as considered in 1.2), to Fregean Sinn. The references, or concepts, of Sinne or noematic
acts are their meanings or objects: they are, on traditional interpretations ofFrege, directed81.
Just as the meaning of a linguistic expression determines which object the expression
refers to, so the noema determines what the object of an act is—if the act has an object;
some acts have a noema for which there is no corresponding object.
Hintikka rejects the metaphor of directedness, and asks, after the rejection of the matter-quality
distinction, how the relationship of sense to reference is instantiated without metaphor, and without
loss of the guiding intention: he echoes Evans82. Neither Frege nor Husserl argue that a Sinn
'functionally determines', by argument, a reference, or object, and this because, '...the two different
79 Hintikka (1975c) p205.
80 la the following section a possible worlds approach is used in formulating a response to Rorty's arguments against
representation in semantics.
81 That is, they are both vehicles of directedness. The quotation is from Follesdal, D.; 'Phenomenology', pp377-386 in Carterette,
E.C. and Friedman, M.P. (eds.); Handbook of Perception: Volume I, Historical and Philosophical Roots of Perception (New
York, Academic Press) 1974, p379.
82 Hintikka (1975c) p206 rejects the notion with a pithy remark: '[a] noema, conceived of as the "vehicle of directedness", far too
easily becomes like a concrete aid to a rifleman's aiming in that it becomes a single entity, however abstract', and provides for
making a response to those, conspicuously Rorty, who believe that Sinne and noemata in Frege and Husserl are easily reified
(and Hintikka reminds one that both regard them as single and complete), and are thus entities about which one may plausibly
evince scepticism. Hintikka shows that the abstractness of noemata is not the pertinent point, for however difficult they are to, as
it were, understand, they are immanent in experience.
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noemata [Sinn and noema] would only rarely be directed to the same object'. Rather, as Evans before
him, Hintikka writes that Sinn is a 'function', itself achieving definite reference to its object, for a Sinn,
besides its reference, contains also, '...the way in which this reference is given'. The notion of a 'way
of being given', is not a metaphor, or a capacity giving only the remnants of always absent intentions,
but is a function, described by Evans, of sense to reference, carrying the reference in literal and
parasitical cases alike. Hintikka asks what are the functions of arguments replacing the 'abstract'
entities in Husserl's analysis, and going for sense and reference in the mediating relationship. His
answer leads directly to the discussion of the following section: '[o]n the general semantical level on
which we are here moving, the only plausible answer is the apparently trivial one: everything'. In
specific, intentional relationships the functions depend upon features of the possible world in which the
reference is made, and, as Hintikka says, they must always depend upon features of this world.
'Concepts, meanings, are therefore functions from possible worlds to references (objects), for the
whole idea of "possible world" is that it comprises everything (at least everything that is relevant to the
particular question we are asking)'. This is, as Hintikka has argues, the response of possible worlds
semantics with regard to the status of concepts and the Fregean notion of the movement of sense to
reference: concepts are functions from possible worlds to extensions; concepts, as possible worlds, are,
again by the above arguments, intrinsically intentional83.
In the following section it is described how hyletic data can, on a possible worlds theory, be
intrinsically intentional, and how utterances, or speech acts, reporting these data (in states of affairs),
can carry intentionality, and thus provide a theory of intentionality for language. The theory to which
appeal shall be made (Wittgenstein's), is avowedly a response to a canonical theory of linguistic
intentionality, namely Russell's theory of descriptions, and it with this that the discussion of the next
section begins.
83 Hintikka (1975c) p207. Meanings of expressions and meanings are functions determining their references or objects.
Regarding Hintikka's and Evan's arguments, this is all that can be said for the logical status of noemata or Sinne. 'No matter how
interested one may...be in the specific recipes for determining the values of such functions or in other aspects of their concrete
realisation, one must not forget their categorical status as functions'.
Regarding the intrinsic intentionality of concepts Hintikka writes that even if all uses of a concept do not have to involve, on
one interpretation of possible worlds semantics, all possible worlds, any nontrivial use of concepts '... implicitly involves more
than one possible world.' He adds, '... a closer analysis of the very idea of intentionality or conceptuality as directedness (to an
object) leads us back to my [Hintikka's] thesis of conceptuality as intentionality in the sense of involving several possible worlds
at one and the same time. Moreover, once we see this, all emphasis is shifted away from directedness as a special relation of an
act to an object in this world. The same function which in our world gives us one object will give us another object in another
one. The relation of this function to its values is no more remarkable in one world than in another. This shows in further detail in
what sense intentionality is an interworldly affair, not an intraworldly one'. One may, says Hintikka, both at the same time
criticise reifications of intensional objects (in the case being considered here, sense data), into entities in the actual world (for
they exist in identifications between worlds), and of intentionality into intraworldly objects rather than relations.
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4. States ofAffairs, Denoting and Intending
Denoting phrases can, for Russell, have any object or subject as their referent; they denote solely in
virtue of their form1. However, there are three caveats to be noted. A denoting phrase might not signify
any living thing or tangible object: Russell's example is 'the present King of France'. It may denote
unambiguously a non-existent thing, say, 'the present King of France' (in 1905); and it may denote
ambiguously over a class, say, 'a man'. An important distinction accompanies this point, showing ways
in which knowledge is acquired. Knowledge by description and by acquaintance are given by complete
description and direct experience respectively2. Russell's example is of the 'centre ofmass of the solar
system'. One can only be informed of this by means of description, for there is no immediate
acquaintance with the centre of the solar system. As Anscombe writes, it is the premise of Russell's
theory that such designating, intentional descriptions require analysis, and that ontological
commitments to non-existent entities can be avoided3.
Russell defines both the universal and the existential quantifiers4:
C (everything) means 'C (x) is always true',
C (something) means 'It is false that "C (x) is false" is always true'.
1 Russell, B.A.W.; 'On Denoting', Mind, vol. XIV, no. 56, pp479-493, 1905. Hunter, G.; 'Russell Making History: 'Hie Leibniz
Book', pp397-4I4 in Irvine, A.D. and Wedeking, G.A. (eds.); Russell and Analytic Philosophy (University of Toronto) 1993.
Hunter remarks that Russell's book was the first token of the type of analytical philosophy. His survey of its influence and its
importance in philosophical historiography is fascinating. On Russell and the modalities cf. Rescher, N.; 'Russell and Modal
Logic', ppl39-149 in Roberts, G.W. (ed.); Bertrand RussellMemorial Volume (London, George Allen and Unwin) 1979. Atlas
(1988) p392 raises, in a footnote, the fact that Russell's arguments in 'On Denoting' substantially derive from Bradley. (Bradley,
F.H.; The Principles ofLogic: Volume I (Oxford University Press) 1883). It is a belief of the present author that the most fruitful
discussion of intentionality will arise from raised in the 'analytical' and 'phenomenological' traditions. It is of great interest to
note that Russell's work, and his with Whitehead in the birth of linguistic analysis, was forged in the crucible of the work of the
idealist and realistmetaphysicians. Russell said that in his early years, in disputes between Hegel and Kant, he always sided with
the latter: The disputes raised between adherents of the two traditions seem so partisan (and unthinking) that an illustration ofjust
how little they differ seems almost too late. By offering a theory of representation on broadly Kantian lines (cf. McDowell
(1998)), one might begin a theory on broadly shared ground, shared at the time and presently, in critical responses. Cf. on
Russell's early influences, White (1956) pl39, and Sathaye, S.G:; Instrumentalism: A Methodological Exposition of the
Philosophy ofJohn Dewey (Bombay, Popular Prakashan) 1972, pp39-44. Sathaye argues that Dewey mediates between a Kantian
and a Russcllian theory of denoting judgements and referring. Cf. White, M.G.; The Origins of Dewey's Instrumentalism
(Columbia University Press) 1943, pp64-95.
2 Russell (1905) p479. The distraction is of the first importance, one found not to work in Anscombe, G.E.M.; An Introduction to
Wittgenstein's Tractatus (London, Hutchinson) 1959, p43 and Derrida, J.; Of Grammatology. Further arguments are made
throughout the footnotes for the conclusion that the distinction does not work. Derrida cuts to the heart of the matter regarding
the insufficiency of denotation as a theory of meaning, and his objections are the same as those made by Wittgenstein. Cf. Monk
(1996) pp4-5. Indeed, responses to Russell must be seen for their use in further muddying distinctions between semantical and
phenomenological traditions in philosophy. There are many interesting questions raised. The most sustained objections are those
of Strawson, P.F.; 'On Referring', ppl-27 in (1971a), and the differences between Russell and Strawson are a microcosm of
those between Cantabridgean and Oxonian philosophy, the former, cmdely, after Russell's example, emphasising semantical
analysis in the pursuit of truth, and the latter, equally cmdely, after Wittgenstein's example, following the analysis of ordinary
language, or of meaning as use. Monk and Derrida suggest Russell's influences were far more phenomenological than has been
realised; indeed, the latter's objections place Russell in the same class as Husserl. Dummell is clearer still on the
phenomenological bases of 'analytical' philosophy. Is Wittgenstein really an analytical philosopher? He is categorically nothing
like Russell. Atlas, J.D., 'What are Negative Existence Statements?', Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. XI, no. 4, pp373-394,
1988, pp381-382 draws attention to an earlier remark in Russell, B.A.W.; The Principles ofMathematics (London, George Allen
and Unwin) 1903. lie wants an analysis of 'A is' which, '...holds of every term (A) without exception. The is here is quite
different from the is in "Socrates is human"; it may be regarded as complex, and as really predicating Being of it' (p49). It is this
which Atlas' work is set to criticise.
3 Anscombe (1959) p43.
4 Russell (1905) p480.
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However, as Russell deals with definite descriptions, he adds, 'C (nothing) means '"C (x) is false" is
always true'5. The first two statements are Frege's; the last is Russell's application to definite
descriptions, and accounts for variables which do not apply to the predicate6. Denoting phrases,
continues Russell, have no meaning in themselves; there is only meaning in the propositions in which
denoting phrases occur7. The constructions of the propositions in logical language are formed so as to
give only a bald denotation with reference (to real or fictional entities). For example, 'C (some men)' is
analysed as 'It is false that "C (x) and X is human" is always false', and so prevents ontological
commitment to abstractions8.
Russell rejects Meinong's claim that a grammatically correct denotative phrase simply stands for the
object denoted, for this permits breaches of the law of non-contradiction by allowing descriptions such
as 'a red square' to refer9. This notwithstanding, the target of the theory of descriptions is Frege, and
his distinction of the two elements of a denotation: sense and reference10. Russell says that the example
of the centre of mass of the solar system is complex in meaning; there are, necessarily, many thoughts
5 Cf. Anscombe (1959) pp41-42.
6 Cf. Anscombe (1959) p44.
7 Cf. Anscombe (1959) p43 and Monk (1996) pp4-5. It is slightly to anticipate later arguments to say that Russell's reasons for
writing the theory of descriptions were to challenge the view that descriptions can have meaning by themselves, or, that they
stand for something (an existent with being), a theory he found in Meinong. Cf. footnote 14.
8 Russell (1905) p481.
9 The descent of Russell's thinking about intentionality from consideration of questions raised by Meinong is well studied in
Monk (1996), see especially pplOff. Parsons considers Meinong's countenancing in his ontology non-existent possible objects
and impossible objects. Parsons, T.; 'A Prolegomenon to Meinongian Semantics', The Journal of Philosophy, vol. LXXI, no. 16,
pp561-580, 1974. Parsons describes well the confusion greeting Meinong's work, diagnosed best by Russell in his essays of
1904. The kernel of Parsons' reply to Russell utilises Meinong's theory of 'incomplete objects', and one is led to a worthy
comparison with Berkeley.
Woodruff Smith argues that Meinong's theory of objects proceeds from the needs of his theory of intentionality. Contrary to
Russell's charge of 'indifference to being', objects in intentionality as directedness, by dint of their serving as objects of thought,
serve also as components in an account of the indiscernibility of identity in intensional contexts. Cf. Burge, T.; 'Reference and
Proper Names', The Journal of Philosophy, vol. LXX, no. 14, pp425-439, 1973, especially pp426-427. The target of Burgc's
work is Quine's predicate theory of proper names. See also the exchanges with Derrida in McDonald, C.V. (ed.); The Ear of the
Other: Texts and Discussions with Jacques Derrida: Otobiography, Transference, Translation (New York, Schocken) 1985,
pp93ff. Meinong's incomplete objects, Woodruff Smith argues, will not bear the r61e. See Smith, D.W.; 'Meinongian Objects',
Grazer Philosophische Studien. vol. I, no. 1, pp43-71, 1975. Elsewhere, Parsons considers the ontology of non-existent and
fictional objects. Parsons, T.; 'A Meinongian Analysis of Fictional Objects', Grazer Philosophische Studien. vol. I, no. 1, pp73-
86, 1975. He criticises 'Anglo-American' philosophy for its desire to analyse away talk of fictional objects (pp77 and 85).
Parsons offers his Meinongian analysis as a modest alternative to possible worlds theories of fictional objects (p86). Cf.
Wolterstorff, N.; 'Characters and their Names', Poetics, vol. VIII, nos. 1 and 2, pplOl-127, 1979. Fictional characters are,
Wolterstorff argues, 'person-kinds', and require no commitment to non-existent entities. Proper names function differently within
and outwith fiction. Also Pavel, T.G.; 'Fiction and the Causal Theory ofNames', Poetics, vol. VIII, nos. 1 and 2, ppl79-191,
1979, and '"Possible Worlds" in T.iterary Semantics', The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. XXXTV, no. 2, ppl65-
176, 1975. Cf. Gabriel (1979), Howell, R.; 'Fictional Objects: How They Are and How They Aren't', Poetics, vol. VIII, nos. 1
and 2, ppl29-177, 1979, and Reseller (1975) pp202-207.
10 As has been seen, Frege's distinction says that proper names and die predicates applied to die objects identified have sense,
and that predicates have reference to an instantiated concept. A sentence with a judgement occuring in 'secondary' occurrence
(cf. below on Wittgenstein's objection to Russell's final example), remains an expression containing a proper name, and if the
name refers, the judgement is either true or false. However, the semantical philosophical tradition since Frege has asked how
senses can be guaranteed references. Russell remarks that the problem is obviated for sentences analysed according to the theory
of descriptions. In an analysed sentence the only words left are those unambiguous and identifying real things. As shown in
footnote 20, meanings go for objects, relations and properties: all things for which the words stand. This, for Russell, is how
language reaches out to reality.
Wittgenstein both retains and rejects parts of both Russell's and Frege's semantics, and the distinction between knowledge by
description and by acquaintance is one part he rejects. All knowledge is knowledge by acquaintance. As seen in the 'difference'
example, Russell remarks that the two judgements carry different relations of the mind to a set of objects and a relationship R
(say aRb); ifR gives the relationship between a and b, then the judgement is true, and if not it is not. Wittgenstein's objections
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required to understand it, yet there is ultimate simplicity in its denotation, for it 'has no constituents at
all"1. This broaches the notion of identity, yet leaves unaddressed a series of problems in Fregean
theory, to which Russell turns. If a denotative phrase is explicitly to deal with identity there must be
clarification offered by examples of the type given in Russell's unit class: 'Ifv is a unit class, then u is
u"2. This proposition ought always to be true, but as 'the if is a denoting phrase, the proposition is
rendered nonsense if 'u' is not a unit class, for, by a Fregean theory, it fails of sense and reference13.
Russell maintains that propositions do not become nonsense simply by virtue of their denotations being
negligible. The second problem derives again from Meinong. Referring to a particular object, and
predicating something of it, entails the difficulties of ontological commitment. For example, the present
King ofFrance is found in neither category when, say, all of the bald things and all of the hirsute things
are enumerated14. A third, related, difficulty with which denoting theories must contend is that of
subsistent ideas or entities. There is an intuitive problem in saying 'A differs from B' in that
'difference' cannot be the subject of a proposition15.
Russell rejects the Fregean theory that argues that a proposition has both a meaning and a denotation.
He states an example which aims to show that the meaning of proposition y, when analysed by the
same method used for the centre of mass example, is, if it is anything, the meaning of the denotation16.
Denotation is given by 'The centre ofmass of the solar system is a point, not a denoting complex', yet
and suggested collections to this constitute the main reply to Russell (see below), and it is precisely the notions of states of
affairs and of logical space (shared with Husserl and Hintikka), that revise this theory of linguistic intentionality.
11 As Anscombe (1959) p41 writes, readily assuming that descriptions hold of objects, and that the sentences in which they
appear describe things true of objects, contains a tacit acceptance of the Fregean theory of descriptions with proper names.
12 For it is identical with itself.
13 Again as Anscombc (1959) p41 says, the core ofRussell's theory is that the way in which descriptions stand for objects must
be different from the way in which proper names do, and that the very idea of definite identity is challenged. She remarks that a
proper name stands for an object because the object is called by that name, but that descriptions pick out objects, because the
object identified satisfies the description: a different relation. Although see Wittgenstein, L.; Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
(London, Routledge & Kegan Paul) 1922, 5.5422. Kaplan quips that the identifying function of Russellian definite descriptions is
to identify a specific individual: 'That's right, John himself, right there, trapped in a proposition'. Kaplan, D.; 'Dthat', ppl 1-33,
in Yourgrau (1990). The quotation is taken from pl3. Cf. Burge (1973) p427. For the following see Russell (1905) pp484-485.
Corazza, E.; 'Kinds of Context: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Proper Names and Indexicals', Philosophical Investigations, vol.
XXVII, no. 2, ppl58-188, argues that proper names and indexicals must be treated separately, and that direct reference must
always be understood on a Wittgensteinian theory of language. See also Beam, G.C.F.; 'Derrida Dry: Iterating Iterability
Analytically', Diacritics, vol. XXV, no. 3, pp3-25, 1995. Beam considers some sound Wittgensteinian objections to Derrida.
14 Atlas (1988) assays the 'extravagant' semantics. He describes the Russell-Strawson debate: Russell's (and Meinong's) positing
of being for denotations for semantic versus Strawson's contextual (conventional) definitions of singular terms (pp382-383).
Taking leads from linguistic theory, primarily that of a topic-designating Noun Phrase, Atlas argues that 'The King ofFrance is
not bald', is not about tire King ofFrance (it not being a topic-designating Noun Phrase). Atlas has great ambitions for his theory:
it constitutes a response to Strawson on the presuppositions of existence statements, and an explanation of the appeal of the
analysis in definite descriptions. Atlas criticises Quine's claim that Russell's mistake is to equate meaning with naming in the
statement of a definite description, because the problem stands without appearing on those terms. The restatement brings up
again the question at the heart of the Russcll-Strawson debate: of the mcaningfulncss of statements as against their truth or falsity
(cf. p376).
15 Russell (1903) states a different view, one to be contrasted with the theory presented in Introduction to Mathematical
Philosophy (London, George Allen and Unwin) 1919. In the former work Russell considers the idea that there are entities meant
by descriptions (cf. especially §51). As Anscombe (1959) p43 says: '...not only definite descriptions, but such phrases as "any
number" in "Any number is either odd or even", had denoting concepts as their "meanings'". However, with reference to the
'difference' example, and to Anscombe's of 'any number', in 'Any number is either odd or even', one must reply that a
proposition with a description is asserted of an entity not of a 'corresponding denoting concept'. Again, this is what the theory of
descriptions is to overcome, and Wittgenstein gets to the heart of this problem.
63
the meaning may be expressed by referring to the subject directly, as in, '"The centre of mass of the
solar system" is a denoting complex, not a point"7. With a complex sentence y, for instance, its
statement reports its sense; that is, to speak about meaning, one's given statement must identify
something which denotes y. This description, Russell says, has among its problems that, in a
proposition, only a denotation occurs, and not a meaning, for meaning is relegated to a sentence with a
different structure, and can only be discerned with study of this sentence18. Russell's suggested
alternative begins from the intuitive objection that the meaning cannot be found only with reference to
an ersatz descriptive statement, but should be given in what y itself means. Furthermore, in giving a
definite description for the proposition 'George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of
Waverley', meaning and denotation cannot be separated in this way, it describing a propositional
attitude and not a factual statement. In providing its analysis, Russell shows if y denotes, then there is
an entity for which it stands19.
The distinction between primary and secondary occurrences is vital to the full analysis of denoting
phrases20. Denoting phrases ('the author of Waverley'), must be stipulated as uniquely identifying a
single person to whom is given a definite description. 'One and only one man wrote Waverley, and
George IV wished to know whether Scott was that man', and not 'George IV wished to know whether
one and only one man wrote Waverley and Scott was that man' is the correct parsing of the phrase
'George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author ofWaverley'. If the property predicated of
the term in question does not belong to the term, or, importantly, belongs to several, then the definite
description has failed, for one is attempting to predicate something to one term, specifically the subject
in y21. The notion of primary and secondary occurrences becomes important when the sense of the
16 Cf. Anscombe (1959) p42.
"Russell (1905)p486 andcf. Anscombe (1959)p43.
18 Anscombe (1959) p42 sees the attraction of Frege's theory. She gives examples of the ways in which the comparison of
definite descriptions with proper names fails. The predicate in a definite description must be uniquely true of something if it is to
stand for anything, and, analogously, a proper name, assigned a bearer, is said without guarantee that the bearer satisfies the
name. In this way one '... can give truth-conditions for statements containing definite descriptions regardless of whether the
descriptions are vacuous or not'. Anscombe adds examples to show that Frege's theory that an occurrence of a vacuous definite
descriptions in a sentence renders the sentence unable to make a true or false statement; she suggests 'Either he has no children
or his first child's name is Hilary'. This shows that the object (he) satisfying the description (there may not be such an object), is
not designated by it in such a way that nothing true or false could be said by a sentence containing the description if the object
did not exist, yet, say, ifWalter Scott had never existed the use of his name to identify the author would never have occurred.
19 Cf. Russell (1905) pp487ff and Anscombe (1959) pp41-42. If a name picks out nothing in the use to which it is put, then no
object is given to which properties may be ascribed, and nothing, true or false, is said. If it does have a use (if it applies to a
bearer), then the accompanying sentence is false if it predicates of the bearer something which does not apply. A subject-
predicate sentence 'Some man is...if false, is so not necessarily because the predication is false of some man. However, if it is
true, it is so because the predicate is true of some man. 'So, ifwe persist in thinking that the sentence would be made true by the
fact that something holds ofwhat the grammatical subject stands for, it turns out that its falsehood would not consist in the same
thing's not holding of what the grammatical subject stands for'.
20 And on this cf. footnote 10.
21 The analysis of sentences with definite descriptions removes them from 'the class of signs that contribute to the meaning of
sentences in which they occur by standing for their bearers'. (Anscombe (1959) p44). Anscombe continues: 'The denoting phrase
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sentence would fundamentally be changed by the parts of the sentence referring differently, and Russell
gives as an example. 'There is an entity which is now King ofFrance and is not bald' fails to refer, and
is, therefore, making a false statement; however, with the negative in the correct place, one can make a
true statement: 'it is false that there is an entity which is now King of France and is now bald'. All
propositions with 'the King ofFrance' in a primary occurrence are found to be false22.
The conclusion of the theory is described in terms of a resolution of the problem of ontological
commitment. If a difference is to be found between two statements (a and b), then saying 'R is the
difference between a and b' is a true statement, constituting a denoting phrase, if there is one and only
one difference, R, to be considered. If the statement is false, then there is no difference, or relation, to
be found between a and b, and there is no commitment to unreal individuals or subsisting entities, and
it is to this example that Wittgenstein objects23. The notion of identity as given in this final example
disappear, and only the predicates (and proper names, if any), used in their construction play a part in the result of the analysis'.
The relationship of intentionality that Wittgenstein offers is achieved by the simplest atomic signs.
Russell writes that for a sign to have a meaning it must stand for something: signs are proper names and also the relations said
to hold between named individuals: both mean the things for which they are signs. Anscombe (1959) pp44-45 notes the
deliverance, clarifying this view, offered by Wittgenstein, L.; Philosophical Investigations (Oxford, Blackwell) 1958, in the
distinction between the proper name as standing for its bearer, and the meaning of a name as its bearer.
22 Russell (1905) p488. Anscombe (1959) pp42-43 comments upon the primary distinction marked in Russell's theory, that
forming part of the heritage from Frege. In a definite description there appears an identifying name and an appended description,
for example 'Scott was the author of Waverley'. Anscombe finds a cleavage between Russell's logic and his theory of
knowledge, that giving rise to the difficulties encountered in Russell's endeavours to avoid ontological commitments. As
Anscombe has it, Russell argues that ordinary proper names are not genuine proper names (which require bearers), but require a
parsing to avoid the intimation that what a genuine proper name stands for must exist. As Anscombe says, not taking this route
leads to the idea that bearers of genuine proper names are not subject to Cartesian doubt (they are akin to raw sense data), or
simply are Wittgenstein's objects. It is Anscombe's view that the ambiguity is never settled, and, again, this shall be pursued
throughout the footnotes and in the discussion ofWittgenstein. Again, Wittgenstein's and Derrida's responses to Russell should
be seen for their close similarity.
Another raft of the argument against Frege, and another to which Derrida attends, is considered here. As seen, Russell argues
that a definite description has no meaning by itself but only in the proposition in which the denotation occurs. Anscombe argues
that by this Russell holds that a definite description does not function like a name, and that this is a further symptom of his
distinction between real proper names and genuine proper names. 'He puts the point in that obscure way because of his idea of
what it is for a word or phrase to "have meaning", namely: a word has meaning if it has a word with which one means an object;
to mean an object one must be acquainted with it; for a word or phrase to have meaning then, it is necessary for what we mean by
it to exist'. It is to satisfy this difficulty that the theory of descriptions is written.
Topic designating noun phrases are described by Atlas (1988) pp376-378. Saying 'The King ofFrance is bald' when there is no
King of France is, for Strawson, a failure to make a true or false statement, for the presupposition is wrong. However, a 'cleft'
sentence, 'It is the King of France who is bald', is a false statement, and thus is made without presupposition of there being a
King of France. The presupposition is of someone as being bald, not of the existence of a King of France. In the latter, 'The King
of France', is not topic-designating. Eliding the distinction between the two confuses the, '...use of a singular term to refer to
something with a statement's presupposing that the singular term is used to refer to something' (p377). Fascinatingly, Atlas'
work leads to discussion of the ways in which words and statements are 'about' the entities named (pp378ff). Atlas says that
Russell was more aware of this fact than his critics allow, giving ample citation from Russell's work prior to 1900. In this way
the understanding of 'aboutness' becomes another of the issues forgotten in the march of linguistic, analytical philosophy (p383
and see p381). Topic designating noun phrases are, according to Atlas, prefaced in Grice, H.P.; 'Presupposition and
Conversational Implicature', pp269-282 in (1989), a fact recognised, according to Atlas, by Hintikka and Donnellan. Atlas
(1988) p388 extends the arguments to Quine's arguments against quantifying into indirect, oblique belief contexts. Quine
theorises the 'aboutness' of statements describing beliefs incorrectly. His argument rests on the assumption that statements
ascribing beliefs to Ortcutt are about Ortcutt (and hence he can establish that belief contexts apparently ascribing beliefs to
Ortcutt cannot be thought to refer to Ortcutt when stated with an 'Ortcutt believes...' formulation). Atlas says this is an
assumption fit for the language of quantified logic, but not for English.
23 Russell (1905) p490. Strawson's reply, rather than suggesting that there is a definite description applying to each and every
name, argues for referring as being something one can do only in a specific case (1971a) p2. A meaning is a function of a
sentence or expression, that is, a sentence or expression must have been assented to before one can give an analysis of its
reference. In the case of the King of France, therefore, one must have assented to the fact that the present King of France exists,
or at least, subsists, for the sentence 'the present King of France', is meaningful. Strawson wants a distinction to be made in
terms of the ways in which a sentence is used in specific circumstance (pp7-8). The use of each utterance of a sentence is
different from the sentence itself. There is both a distinction to be drawn and a similarity to be noted between Strawson's and
Russell's accounts. Strawson's theory would accept that the denoting phrase 'the King of France' is significant, and that a
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reference is made only if there is one and only one King of France answering to the description, but Strawson disagrees that one
of Russell's 'uniquely-referring' phrases has any particular reference, even though it may be used to refer on specific occasions.
The phrase 'The King ofFrance is bald' is truth-valueless, for, he repeats, its use on specific occasions determines its reference.
Strawson takes a more circumspect approach to the matter of ontological commitment. He takes it that a cumulative outcome of
his theory is that saying 'the King of France is bald' need not commit one to a belief in abstract entities. As a reference is
determined by a use on a specific occasion there is no danger posed by ontological commitment, and, thus, one's use need not be
circumscribed by any rules (pi 1). (Strawson also countenances the use of significant expressions to pretend to refer).
There is a fundamental distinction between the use of a sentence and precisely what the reference contained in the sentence
denotes in the Russellian sense. Conventions, combined with the situation in which the utterance is made, secure a unique
reference, 'the use of a proper name, or a pronoun, as what Strawson calls a 'singular logical' subject does, quite simply, make
reference. The subject-predicate analysis of a sentence can be retained, and when an object is not present immediately to the
senses, one can form a description. This description, however, is formed from terms derived from the grammar of a conventional
singular sentence. Strawson dismisses definitional analyses as giving criteria suitable only for ascriptive uses. This, one can
conclude, is due to the descriptions offered presupposing a degree of knowledge on the part of the conceiver (pl2). That is,
Strawson is suggesting that reference will already have been made before a definite description can even be formulated, and this
is a solid criticism ofRussell's theory.
A proper name for Strawson is the purest referring phrase, for it has no 'descriptive meaning'; that is, it has the least
dependence on context of the referring expressions (p20). Within certain bounds, a proper name can be used to refer without
ambiguity in many contexts. This division within referring expressions is signalled further by two classes of statements to which
references can be assigned (p21). The first gives general 'referring-cum-aseriptive' conventions, that is, say, for the use of
indexical pronouns: I, he, and she, respectively in contexts. Hie second gives no conventions, but looks to 'ad hoc' decisions
made for a particular use in a particular case, such as, for example, the use of proper names. Strawson wants to suggest that these
ad hoc decisions are not relative to each individual occasion, but are governed by certain rules for each context in which their use
is taken to be appropriate. One can best analyse the two opposing themes by noting some intuitive difficulties they contain, and,
in some cases, share.
Referring, for Russell, can be achieved by a denoting phrase in three different ways: by referring to a wide class, referring
ambiguously, or to nothing at all. To use Russell's first example, the centre ofmass of the solar system cannot be referred to as
an existent thing; this reference could only be given by a description of something not directly experienced. A number of
problems are entailed. A first response would suggest that descriptions may leave one ontologically committed, for one may have
to have faith in the knowledge one had accrued concerning an event or subject, without a suitable description. Secondly, the
denoting phrase, 'a man', when given a definite description (in itself difficult enough), still seems not to refer. There is an air of
contingency, or relativity, to this phrase; there seems to be needed a context of utterance. A series of sub-descriptions may have
to be offered to achieve specificity. Russell's theory of descriptions does this, as per the Scott example. However, Strawson
shows that there is another sense in which reference may be elucidated. There is a suspicion that Russell's definite descriptions
will have to be made progressively more specific, and, in the process, render any benefit they may have nugatory. One would end
up describing one's situation, or intended reference, in such detail, that one would end up with a theory with similarities to
Slrawson's when its details are filled out.
Avoiding breaches of the law of non-contradiction is central to Russell's intentions, and so the unique identity will single out
one and only one with a description that signals whether or not the item exists. Russell extends this to the centre of mass
example, a reference which can, of course, be made only by description. One can here see the problem of assigning descriptions,
particularly in the light of the discussion of the specificity of Russellian descriptions. If one is forming one of Russell's 'wide
class' descriptions, one is faced with the dilemma of having to form an accurate description of, say, a circle. One could plausibly
describe a circle as, say, a square with equal portions removed at each comer so as to form a shape with two sides of the same
length joined by a right angle, and with a third formed by constructing a line of uniform curvature from the end of one of the
lines to the other. This description, however, is still vague, and the stages it describes could be broken down, and further
described in a number of different ways. This brings the difficulty of requisite knowledge to the fore; one which causes
difficulties for Russell's analysis, and which will be returned to. At the present, one can appreciate that the language Russell
wishes to describe all denoting phrases in is not simple, or atomic, at all, but complex. At this juncture one might look to the
Fregean distinction between meaning (or denotation) and sense, the distinction Russell rejects. Russell rejected it through uniting
the meaning and the denotation in one definite description. The conclusion of the preceding discussion, however, says that as the
definitions which could be offered are of such a broad range, taking just one alone could never get truly at the meaning. A
preliminary further point would suggest that something like Frege's distinction between meaning and denotation may be correct.
The idea of specific references seems confused. If, as has been suggested, meaning is given in many different ways, then the
very idea of definite descriptions is weakened, for, on the Russellian analysis, ifC (a denoting phrase) denotes, then there is an
entity for which it stands. This being so, meaning is given. For C to denote, all of the appropriate evidence concerning a situation
must be taken on and utilised by the conceiver. Leaving aside the difficulties in forming the appropriate definite descriptions,
there is a problem inherent in Russell's analysis, shared with Frege. Offering the appropriate, or any, definite description,
requires, of necessity, that one deals with only attributive knowledge; all definite descriptions could be taken as valid according
to specific criteria. The meaning, it can be argued, is left undefined. Alternatively, it is, of necessity, understood before one can
offer any definite description worthy of the name. What is an appropriate way to describe the subject of the denoting phrase? A
Russellian answer to this question would involve him in the offence for which he criticised Frege, namely, the separation of
meaning and denotation. Knowing that one and only one man wrote Waverley (it was not a collaborative effort) requires, it
seems, biowledge of the fact that one and only one man wrote Waverley. The best that could be claimed for Russell's theory is
that it adds to one's definition; the meaning is already present. Russell's criticisms of Frege's distinction between meaning and
denotation do seem comprehensive, yet there is a sense in which it may be applied. The meaning is achieved by the whole phrase
identifying something: the fact that it does refer. The denotation, conversely, could be taken as the specific item referred to, that
which is denoted.
Russell wants to distinguish knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Owing to tire fact that one cannot be
acquainted directly with many things, Russell laid stress upon descriptions, and, moreover, on full definite descriptions as
avoiding ontological commitment. All descriptions, however, have been seen to offer only attributive knowledge, or knowledge
by description, even for those things with which one is acquainted directly. One could still be committed to the existence ofmany
entities. These points add up to a conclusion which impacts upon Russell's discussion of identity, contained in the example of the
unit class. The conclusion says that one could take u as a unit class without denotation in the Russellian sense because meaning
could plausibly be argued to be prior. The discussion Russell gives of primary and secondary occurrences of denoting phrases
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contains an ambiguity affecting Russell's theory of intentionality, bringing into doubt the idea that
meaning and denotation are carried in a single proposition with a denoting phrase. Wittgenstein argues
that to judge a difference between a and b (a.Rb) one stands in a specific relation to a, R and b, and he
asks how the judging relation must change for, say, a judgement that not-aRb, that is, the converse of
the same proposition. He considers cases for the other logical constants, and introduces notions vital for
his analysis, those of states ofaffairs and of logical space24.
A proposition can determine only one place in logical space: nevertheless the whole of
logical space must already be given by it [in that it must be always sensitive to the
combination of the expression with other logical constants].
(Otherwise negation, logical sum, logical product, etc. would introduce more and more
new elements—in coordination).
only goes to emphasise the preceding criticisms. To form a correct denoting description one must order the elements of the
phrase correctly, thus one must say 'It is false that there is a King of France who is now bald', rather than 'There is a King of
France who is now bald'. Again, one is defining, or elucidating, the already given meaning. This is the problem Strawson takes
on by stating that meaning is decided in each case, that is, is a function of the sentence. The meaning, for Strawson, is not given
by elaborating an exact identifying statement, but is inherent in the use of a denoting phrase in a context. The reference is always
meaningful, for the use of a sentence is in a class apart from the plain statement of it, or its utterance. Strawson's point gives no
problem with definite descriptions, and satisfactorily unites meaning with denotation.
Using a proper name on a particular occasion gives a reference, for, of course, the sentence is meaningful. Therefore, saying
'the King of France is bald' is a referring sentence for it is meaningful. The example of the non-existent entity, however, for
instance Pegasus, points up ambiguities. To predicate things of Pegasus is to use meaningful sentences, but as to referring to
things either true or false, how does Strawson avoid ontological commitments? Strawson might tall back on a translation such as
Quine proposes. This necessitates providing a description, with all of the problems this entails. One need not think of ontological
commitments when criticising Strawson, for one has, on his theory, to define the use of the denoting phrase in question in each
instance of its use, or, at least, to know the terms applicable to the immediate context. One would be giving something like an
ostensive definition, and this would lead, inevitably, to the problem Russell's theory faced: that of giving only attributive, not
referential, uses. The meaning would not be elucidated; it could still plausibly be assigned arbitrarily.
Strawson speaks of rules for his referring expressions, and they are not rules as, say, Wittgenstein has it. Strawson stresses that
meaning cannot arbitrarily be assigned, and so he speaks of general 'referring-cum-ascriptive' conventions for directly referring
expressions, and 'ad hoc' conventions for particular occasions. There is a general set of rules for each type of situation; one does
not decide arbitrarily. For these rules to apply, however, there must be a prior decision as to how terms are to refer: there is a
criterion. Once again, one is only talking of terms with attributive uses; the meaning, one might say, remains undefined.
Both Russell's and Strawson's theories have an absolutely unambiguous description of meaning as their goal. They are both
unable to define meaning, merely relying on descriptions of an already assumed meaning. It was suggested that Strawson's
theory may lack a Quinean descriptive element, as derived from the theory of descriptions. Mates, B.; 'Descriptions and
Reference', Foundations of Language, vol. X, no. 5, pp409-418, 1973. Mates defends the theory of descriptions against the
'followers' of Strawson, and indicates a neglected feature of the theory, one which goes beyond the examination of the given
example. The details are vital, and it is Mates' contention that the theory of descriptions has application not just to a formalised
language, but to everyday speech. It is, the theory of descriptions applies to all propositions m the language of Principia
Malhematica, and to all contexts in which they occur. In response to Quine's extension of the theory, it deals with so-called
'closed' descriptions, and with those 'open' to the binding of their variables outside the description. Thus, the reply of the
followers of Strawson goes, the study of descriptions requires study of both types of cases, and thus that a unique reference for
each description is an impossibility, for a referent, '...is no part of what the speaker asserts in an utterance in which...the
description is used to perform the function of identifying reference; it is rather a presupposition of his asserting what he asserts'.
Cf. Strawson, P.F.; 'Identifying Reference and Truth-Values', pp75-95 in (1971). Mates argues that this is mistaken, and the
notion of presupposition inchoate (cf. p415). Mates' theory proceeds from a notion of asserting, and while it may not achieve
what he claims for it, but as posing the semantics/pragmatics of language in a detailed and fascinating way (cf. p417). It is
important to note that Mates works with a caricature of Strawson's position, making the, '...truth-value of what is said fluctuate
with these differences of situation and purpose is only to lose the difficulties in a haze of confusion'.
24
Wittgenstein (1922) 3.1432 and 3.42; also 4,1252ff. Black (1964) p contains a remark that should be repeated. Black writes
that Wittgenstein thinks of atomic propositions or situations as like coordinates in logical space, and complex propositions as a
'volume' in logical space. It might be added that the view of this as merely a metaphor depends upon which interpretation of
possible worlds one holds. Black writes that, '[a]n important implication is the inseparability of a proposition from the "logical
space" in which it is located. The proposition's logical relations partially determine its sense and are not something superadded
when the proposition combine with other propositions in truth-functions'.
One must also see the applications of Wittgenstein's notion of states of affairs in Notebooks 1914-1916 (Oxford, Blackwell)
1961, especially 19.9.16, 7.10.16, 8.10.16,21.11.16, 11.9.16,5.8.16, 7.8.16, 11.8.16, and 2.9.16.
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Thus it is, Wittgenstein argues, that the states of affairs described in propositions must mirror, or
represent, all other states of affairs, to themselves and to all others, and he raises difficult matters for a
theory of intentionality as directedness, firstly, how a belief is about something, and secondly, how it is
that the content of the thoughts is correctly specified by the statement of the belief ('I believe that p')25.
Can one misdescribe one's intentional states, and if so, what is entailed for relationships to falsehoods
or non-existent entities26? Postulating the independence of the possibility of having the belief that p
from the case that p is no solution, for this avoids the difficulty of how a directed intentional
relationship is established when what one thinks to be the case is independent of, and so not caused by,
the case the p. The question arises: how does the thought reach out to reality? For a response
Wittgenstein introduces as central the idea of representation27. He gives an example of formulating a
wish, and stating it. What makes one's wish the wish that p is a representation made to oneself ofwhat
one wishes to be the case. This, as shall be seen, avoids the difficulties concerning what one believes to
be the case may neither existing nor coming to be, and permits the establishment of a relationship
between the content of a thought and reality28.
Tn Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus the connection between an intentional representation and the
representations of language as reports of states of affairs is intimately made29. The analogy is clear in
Wittgenstein's example: one's thought that p is a proposition that represents its sense iff one's thought
25
Ammereller, E.; Wittgenstein on Intentionality, pp59-93 in Glock, H-J. (ed.); Wittgenstein: A Critical Reader (Oxford,
Blackwell) 2001, p62 notes Wittgenstein (1958) §518, in which Wittgenstein makes a clear application of his concerns to a
theory of intentionality with a quotation from Theatetus, a dialogue which occupies Wittgenstein in the arguments against
ostensive definition. The Theatetus passage (189a) has Socrates asking Theatetus whether, when someone thinks, he thinks
'something', and that when he thinks something it is something 'real'. Theatetus replies in the affirmative on both occasions.
This directedness of intentional states at their content requires elucidation (§95), for the content of the intentional representation
obtains temporally, and (to put it crudely) in die head of one with the representation; it may refer to something one believed not
to have happened, or to something which does not exist. How, to repeat (a question that will arise throughout the rest of this
dissertation), is a picture 'attached' to reality, as Wittgenstein asks in (1922) 2.1511; his own answer is that it reaches 'right out
to it'. See also Wittgenstein, L.; The Blue and Brown Books (Oxford, Blackwell) 1958, §31. For a study of the representing
relationships between words, propositions and things or states of affairs cf. Massumi, B.; 'Deleuze', pp559-573 in Critchley, S.
and Schrocdcr, W.R. (cds.); A Companion to Continental Philosophy (Oxford, Blackwcll) 1998. For the development of these
ideas of. Welchman, A.; 'Into the Abyss: Deleuze', pp615-627 in Glendinning (1999).
Ammereller (2001) pp59-63 considers ideas and problems of intentionality, as prepositional attitudes and as directed at literal
objects. Cf. Davidson (200 lg) especially p96.
26 For it is for future experience to decide whether what one now thinks is attested. Cf. Anscombe (1959) p46.
27 In Wittgenstein, L.; Philosophical Remarks (Oxford, Blackwell) 1975, in which the rejection of early ideas was, it should be
emphasised, outweighed by their modification for the later work. See especially §§20ff. The Philosophical Remarks is
Wittgenstein's response to Russell's later theory of intentionality, given in Russell, B.A.W.; The Analysis ofMind (London,
George Allen & Unwin) 1921.
28 Ammereller (2001) p63, notes Wittgenstein (1975) §26: 'If I wish that p were the case, then of course p is not the case and
there must be a surrogate forp in the state of wishing, just as, of course, in the expression of the wish', and adds that one cannot
say what one wishes to be the case without using some means of representing it: in this case by 'p'. What makes one's wish the
wish that p is 'somehow present in and constitutive of [one's] wish', and by this means can a mental slate of wishing that p be
individuated by what one wishes to be the case, '...given that this has not yet happened and may never happen'. This gives
wishes their content as wishes; they reach up to reality by containing a representation of what one wishes. One takes tire
representation as true, and in cases in which it is, it accurately represents reality. One conceives of the thought one has in the
representation as true. 'Ilence the constitutive problem of what makes a thought the thought that p [how a belief has a specific
content if it is true] is identical with the problem ofwhat makes a representation the representation of what I think to be the case
when I think that p. And the cpistcmic problem [how what one thinks determines the content of the thought] is to explain the




is true, and he argues that what one represents to oneself, what is represented in the noun clause of the
report 'A believes that p', is identical with the fact that p30. Both the intentional representation and the
representations of language are argued for through the picture theory of representation, central to the
Tractatus, and developed and modified in the later work31. The picture theory is instigated to rectify
what Wittgenstein calls the 'misunderstanding' of the logic of language, a confusion engendered by the
use in the same contexts of names and logical constants32.
In the picture theory a proposition or thought is taken as a logical picture of a state of affairs. The
most vital aspect to recall is the analogy (introduced earlier), between the pictorial representations and
propositions. They have in common those features which make any possible representation of the
situation represent truly what it represents33. The sense in both cases, of the proposition and the
representation, is made possible by the existence of atomic, simple objects, those which are a necessary
precondition of representation, and the simple objects in combination, which the picture represents, are
related to one another as represented by the picture34. On a full linguistic analysis every proposition
which can be represented, or can represent by mirroring, is a truth function of only the simple objects,
(the elementary propositions), and Wittgenstein, taking his cue from Russell's definite descriptions
(and from Leibniz), takes elementary propositions as ultimate, necessary metaphysical constituents of
30 Cf. Anscombe (1959) pp46-47 and Hintikka (1975c) p204. One is here, as Hintikka, M.B. and Hintikka, J.; Investigating
Wittgenstein (Oxford, Blackwell) 1986, pp72-73 show, again approaching the bequest of Russell to Wittgenstein, and the
background ofRussell in phenomenology.
31 Cf. Anscombe (1959) pp47-48.
32
Wittgenstein (1922) 3.323 and 4.0621, and cf. Hintikka and Hintikka (1986) pp46-47. Anscombe (1959) pp47-48. Ammereller
(2001) p64 adds that Wittgenstein's theory advocates a close relationship between intentional representation and linguistic
representation, for he argues that a thought is a significant proposition with sense. 'Like its linguistic expression, one's thought
that p is a proposition token which represents its sense, i.e. what is the case, if one's thought is true. Hence, to show what must be
the case for a thought to have content is to show what it is for a proposition to have sense. This...is the crucial point of
Wittgenstein's obscure suggestion that "A thinks that p" is of the form "'p' says p'... viz. that it 'explicitly reduces the question
as to the analysis of judgement... to the question "What is it for a proposition token to have a certain sense?"'. An answer to this
question is, as said, the clarification of the way in which a proposition can have the capacity to be hue or to be false as a measure
of reality, and leads directly to the picture theory of representation. Ammereller gives a brief description of the derivation of the
'main pillars' of the picture theory from Wittgenstein's earliest philosophical work.
33 Wittgenstein (1922) 2.1 and 2.12.
34 Cf. Ammereller (2001) pp65-67. Ammereller writes that, for Wittgenstein, the way a proposition represents its sense is not the
same as the way in which a name stands for an object. 'By the same token, Wittgenstein thought that the natural analysis of the
sentential foirn "A thinks that p" or "A says that p" as that of a dual-relation must be wrong. For on this analysis, A's thinking
(saying) that p consists in a two-term relationship between A and what A thinks (says), i.e. what is designated by the noun clause
"that p". Accordingly, the content ofA's thought is conceived as a kind of object. Furthermore, on this construal, the "object" of
A's thinking or saying is identical with the sense of "p", i.e. with what "p" says or represents'. This seems to require, for true
thought, that what A thinks (what 'p' represents), is identical with the fact that p, entailing the absurd conclusion that false
thought is impossible. Therefore, Wittgenstein, as Ammereller shows, moves to examine what can go in the rfile of object of
thought, and this raises the problems regarding how a thought may come to be endowed with truth, solutions to which are
provided by the picture theory.
A picture and a proposition describing a situation have in common essential features '...in virtue of which any possible
representation of the situation in question represents what it represents' (p66 and cf. Ammereller's description). Importantly,
Ammereller adds, Wittgenstein does not say that pictures or propositions as wholes represent that which must correspond to them
for them to have sense, merely that the elements of a picture, or of the proposition, are the representatives of objects
(Wittgenstein (1922) 4.0312). The sense of a picture or proposition, and the possibility of its bearing truth or falsehood, turns
upon the existence of simple, necessary objects to correspond to its elements, those which can go proxy for the elements of a
picture.
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the world, depending upon nothing for their truth35. Elementary propositions each stand directly for a
simple object, and represent the possibility of a state of affairs obtaining, yet are independent ofwhat is
the case, being its foundation, and are the substance of the world36. The agreement in form of
representation between a picture and what it represents is an agreement in logical form37. While the
world is all that is the case, the case (in itself a fact) is the existence of states of affairs, and a state of
affairs is a combination of simple objects38. The example of the cars in the model of the crash in the
Paris court room is merely one example of a form of representation, for one could choose any such
form for perspicuous presentation. Thoughts, and propositions expressing those thoughts in reports of
intentional states, are, however, logical pictures in a stricter sense than other forms of representation,
for their pictorial form is only logical form. It is essential for the simple objects that they be the
constituents of states of affairs or of atomic facts, and Wittgenstein adds that each object exists only in
logical space39. With this he contends that the matter of how propositions reach out to reality is solved,
for what is given in the picture theory of representation is a definition of what makes a prepositional
sign produce on any occasion of its use the expression of the thought, or, the projection of a possible
state of affairs. Speaker meaning in such cases must then be read off from the projection encapsulated
in the verbal expression. (Wittgenstein postulates a process of interpretation, or translation, for the
35 Cf. Anscombe (1959) p. Bradley, R.; The Nature ofall Being: A Study of Wittgenstein's Modal Atomism (New York, Oxford
University Press) 1992. Bradley studies the mirroring properties of language, and the role played by human convention
(especially ppl64-165). Glock (1989) p649 says that Wittgenstein, in response to Platonist and empiricist theories of logic,
questions the status of logical constants, and, a move known to Husserl, argues that the goal of philosophy is not to describe
reality but to study the ways in which reality is represented. (Cf. on the development from Russell, Grayling (1996)).
36
Henee, Wittgenstein is palpably more Fregean than Russellian. Ammereller (2001) pp67-68 notes some important points in
response, and regarding the way in which these considerations apply to study of propositions. What of problems concerning
propositions containing empty names, or thoughts with non-existent objects? Do not these problems acutely show up the
difficulty confronting any theory of intentionality, of the relation of words or thoughts to the constitution of reality?
Wittgenstein's reply is simple, '...he held [that] every proposition must turn out to be a truth-function of elementary propositions
to which the conditions of the picture theory apply, which entails that the sense of elementary propositions is object-dependent'.
(How great a debt Wittgenstein owes to Russell and the theory of descriptions in this is considered by Ammereller and Hintikka
and Hintikka (1986) pp70ff, roughly, Russell shows that the senses of propositions (say, a predication), can be independent of the
existence of the object (S) ofwhich something is predicated, and that such senses (of ordinary proper names), can be independent
ofthe existence of objects referred to by expressions such as the name of the subject (S).
37
Wittgenstein (1922) 2.15.
38 Anscombe (1959) p.
39
Wittgenstein (1922) 2.011, 2.013 and 2.014. Anscombe (1959) p. Ammereller (2001) pp69-71 shows that for Wittgenstein the
analysis of a proposition terminates in a '...truth function of logically independent elementary propositions which are
concatenations ofnames, each directly standing for a simple object, and representing a possibility of obtaining or not obtaining of
a state of affairs'. These objects are the substance of the world. The identity that, as has been seen, Wittgenstein marks between
the sense of a proposition and what it represents avoids the difficulties of the sense of a proposition depending upon the truth of
another proposition (and thus rendering logic true or false according to contingent fact). On Wittgenstein's view the conditions of
sense are identical with the conditions of possibility of truth or falsity. 'According to Wittgenstein's adaptation of Russell's
theory of definite descriptions, a proposition about a complex can be analysed by a proposition about its constituents and the
propositions which describe the complex completely. Therefore the truth of the former proposition depends on the truth of the
latter' which make its truth conditions clear-. Now if the constituent words of a proposition designated only complexes and not
(ultimately) simples, its sense would depend on the truth of those propositions which analyse it. But these might be false, since
the complexes might be destroyed. In that case, however, they would lack meaning, since nothing would correspond to them.
Therefore, it would have to be true that the complexes exist, which contradicts the condition of the independence of sense'.
A further condition on representation is that it must be possible for the objects for which the elements of the picture go proxy to
stand in the relationship represented by the elements. For Wittgenstein, they must share a logical form, an internal relationship
between a picture and what it depicts, a harmony between a thought or proposition and reality. Logical form (and the
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speaker to go through in order to give sense to the propositional sign; to determine fully and completely
how and what the words signify®. The completely translated proposition expresses the thought in such
a way that the objects referred to correspond to the elements of the proposition and the syntactical
relationships between the objects and the proposition are completely perspicuous. The fully interpreted
sign stands in the projective relation to reality)41.
The analysis of the representing properties of propositions on the model of simple objects in
combination requires clarification, for one must ask what precisely the objects are, and how they may
appear in combination. In answer to the latter, it shall be argued that objects combine in possible states
of affairs, but this must await a full answer to the first question, one which, one might immodestly say,
elucidates Wittgenstein's claim that the sense of a proposition can be shown but not said. For
Wittgenstein, objects are the substance of the world, existing 'independently' of it ('all that is the
case'), irreducible and unalterable, and changed only in relation and configuration to other objects42.
Their ultimate constitution cannot further be determined (they are, to repeat, unanalysable), and all that
can be seen, and so shown, of their make-up is the logical relations they instantiate between type and
type in combination. Wittgenstein writes of this '[s]o we cannot say in logic, "The world has this in it,
and this, but not that'", and so it is, as Hintikka and Hintikka say, that logic is prior to the question of
how logical relations come into being, but not to the question of what it is that they bring into
combination of the forms of different objects), gives the possibilities of certain objects of appearing in certain states of affairs,
and it is in the context of these combinatorial possibilities that objects must be contemplated.
40
Wittgenstein (1922) 3.2, and cf. Anscombe (1959) pp49-50.
41 Wittgenstein (1922) 4.022. It is interesting to note that by the picture theory the expression of a thought is the translation of a
proposition into a public language, and the means by which the relationship is made is studied by Ammereller (2001) pp71-73.
He addresses one of the questions raised by Wittgenstein in his study of intcntionality; what arc the nature of the correlations
between a picture's elements and reality? (Wittgenstein (1922) 2.1515). Wittgenstein writes that it is for psychology to decide
how a speaker's meaning an object by a word can be described via physiological processes, and that discerning the logical
function of a word requires a different (undeniably metaphysical), enquiry. The psychological question is irrelevant to
philosophy. (The thoughts, one might add, would be constituted by the same logical form as the word in a proposition, and in this
is the kernel of Wittgenstein's theory of intentionality). However, as Ammereller notes, Wittgenstein's explanation of what
makes a sign an expression of thought utilises such a psychological conception of a correlation between word and object.
Ammereller quotes Wittgenstein (1922) 3.11 and 3.12 ('We use the perceptible sign of a proposition (spoken or written, etc.) as a
projection of a possible situation. The method of projection is to think of the sense of the proposition.
I call the sign with which we express a thought a propositional sign. And a proposition is a propositional sign in its projective
relation to the world.'), and writes that the expression of a thought, and the thought expressed, are both projections of states of
affairs. Regarding the notion of thinking the sense of a proposition Ammereller writes that '[s]ince what the proposition is a
projection of is the sense of the proposition and since the sense of a proposition is what is said by it, what Wittgenstein refers to
by "thinking the sense of the proposition", presumably, is the speaker's meaning or tire hearer's understanding something by a
propositional sign "p"'. It is this that animates a sign on an occasion of use, for meaning and understanding, for Wittgenstein, are
interpretative processes, giving for each expression a signification for the words used. 'It is only the interpreted propositional
sign which stands in a projective relation to reality; it is only the interpreted propositional sign which shows its sense, i.e. shows
how things are if it is true' (Ammereller (2001) p73). The process of interpretation itself requires knowledge of the logical form
and those combinations of constituents that allow the corresponding thought fully to be expressed in a proposition sharing this
form; indeed, the same processes that the speaker utilises in order to express his thought in a proposition. See for the most
explicit presentation of the argument Wittgenstein (1922) 3.2). Ammereller (2001) p73 concludes that '[i]n the completely
analysed proposition the thought is expressed in a way that the objects of the thought correspond to the elements of the
propositional sign and its logical syntax is completely perspicuous'.
2
Wittgenstein (1922) 2.021, 2.024, 2.027 and 2.0271. Hintikka and Hintikka (1986) pp45-46 consider the plausible questions
that arise in response to Wittgenstein's theory: what are the simple objects, and how are they constituted? They venture that
doubts are best allayed by consideration of the less prominent passages in (1922), and their remarks are considered throughout
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combination43. In reading off the configurations of states of affairs from combinations of simple
objects, Wittgenstein writes, and the Deleuzean tenor should be heard,
.. one cannot say, for example, "There are objects", as one might say, "There are books".
And it is just as impossible to say, "There are 100 objects", or "There are S0 objects".
And it is nonsensical to speak of the total number of objects".
This picks up a thread left by the thesis outlined earlier in this section: that the existence of simple
objects is shown in the use of their names in language. From this it follows, as seen in Wittgenstein's
response to Russell, that the constants of logical language are always 'non-empty'45. Furthermore, the
thesis that simple objects are given, unanalysable, and perspicuous in their configurations has
consequences for the analysis of designating or denoting possible or non-existent entities.
Wittgenstein's ontology of objects avowedly includes possibilia, and he writes that it makes as little
sense to say that a specific object exists or not as it does to maintain that an object could exist, for,
again, one can only seek clarity concerning their instantiated combinations in complex, composite
objects. This shows that'...we have to deal with the objects that actually are as if each of them existed
necessarily and as if collectively they were exhaustive by necessity'46. All states of affairs, actual and
possible, are derived from the same simple objects in combination; their basic, unalterable form
underpins all simple propositions in objects in states of affairs47. Wittgenstein writes;
Ifall objects are given, then at the same time all possible states of affairs are also given.
Objects contain the possibility of all situations.
The possibility of its occurring in states of affairs is the form of an object48.
the rest of this section. They add that the confusion may be exacerbated by Wittgenstein's apparent willingness to countenance
phenomenological entities as simple objects (in this making reference to two early essays).
43
Wittgenstein (1922) 5.61 and 5.552. Elsewhere (3.221) Wittgenstein says 'Objects can only be named. Signs are their
representatives. I can only speak about them: I cannot put them into words. Propositions can only say how things arc, not what
they are', and (5.552) "The "experience" that we need in order to understand logic is not that something or other is the state of
things, but that something is: that, however, is not an experience.
Logic is prior to ever)' experience—that something is so.
It is prior to the question "How?", not prior to the question "What?'".
Cf. Wittgenstein (1958b) §58.
44
Wittgenstein (1922) 4.1272.
45 Hintikka and Hintikka (1986) pp47-48 add that this is not in itself a foreign notion, for it '...reproduces a feature of Frege's
logical notation'. This revisits notions considered by Ammereller, and raises both matters central to the Fregean semantics
considered in 1.2 and to the metaphilosophical ideas adumbrated in Introduction and 1.1 regarding Kant's relevance to the writing
of a theory of intentionality. In Fregean semantics '...one could not express the existence or non-existence of an individual
object. Existence is a higher-level predicate; it is expressed only by the existential quantifier. And this Fregean practice can be
considered, according to several philosophers, merely as a technical realisation of the older [Kantian] idea that existence is not a
predicate'. The shared assumption (one which Wittgenstein pushes much further than Frege) is, write Hintikka and Hintikka, a
dubious notion in Fregean logic and its successors, not least because tire inexpressibility of the existence of an individual
traduces the idea '...that existence is expressed solely by the existential quantifier, for it means that existence assumptions are
imported into one's logical language by each and every individual constant admitted into it'.
46 Cf. Hintikka and Hintikka (1986) p48
47
Wittgenstein (1922) 2.022 and 2.023.
48 The quotations are from Wittgenstein (1922) 2.0124, 2.014 and 2.0141 respectively. Hintikka and Hintikka (1986) p49 write,
following this, that the thesis of the inexpressibility of the existence and constitution of objects is accompanied by the thesis that
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The last remark shows Wittgenstein's thesis to involve more than merely the claim that objects are the
substance of the world: they are also its form, a form reported in propositions describing states of
affairs, and showing that the description contained in the proposition can be given (that is, its logical
form). The basic form of states of affairs and ofpropositions is immanent in simple objects'19.
Hintikka and Hintikka describe the ways in which one may come to know simple objects, and to see
and discern then from other simple objects. They suggest an analogy with Russell's shifting notion of
knowledge by acquaintance. (For Russell, sense-data are the matter of perceptions, yet they are also
objects of perception, the contents ofwhat is perceived). As has been seen, knowledge by acquaintance
describes the direct experience of a state of affairs, and in later work Russell countenances the
development of the theory for application to an account of logical form. Understanding aRb, and its
difference from bRa and not-aRb, necessitates understanding the constitution of the logical form of
each proposition and the relationship of acquaintance requires detailed knowledge of the corresponding
existentially generalised proposition, and of its truth, as revealed in the theory of descriptions50. Such
generalised propositions are necessarily true. As Wittgenstein's objections show, there is a problem in
relating acquaintance with completely general propositions, those Russell used to explicate logic and
meaning in the theory of acquaintance. To what conventions can Russell appeal to claim that the one
state of affairs is to be described in completely generalised propositions for analysis of its logical form?
As Hintikka and Hintikka show, the work done by logical forms in Russell's theory must, for
Wittgenstein, be delegated to simple objects of acquaintance: they must account for (be the building
blocks of), the logical form of complex propositions. Again, simple objects are the substance and form
of the world; complex logical forms are given by the logical forms of atomic propositions, which are,
in turn determined by the forms of objects51. Simple objects are indefinable, '... everything that exists in
such objects constitute the substance ofworlds, actual and possible. The same objects are the ultimately simple constituents of all
worlds.
49 Wittgenstein (1922) 2.022 and 2.025. The thesis of the inexpressibility of objects is, however, confused as Hintikka and
Hintikka (1986) pp49-50, show; it might, they say, go to show that objects are the substance of worlds, but he needs further
arguments to show that they are also their form. It seems that the notion of the sharing of logical form between propositions and
the structure of reality as a potential for the combination of states of affairs with others (presented above), is the source of a
solution to Hintikka and Hintikka's doubts. Simple objects, like monads, have no constituents giving them a palpable form; they
exist only in combination.
50 This goes for Russell, Hintikka and Hintikka (1986) pp52-53 show, for all propositions; all structures of propositions have a
quantitatively separate logical form, which is, like the proposition, an object of acquaintance.5 Hinlikka and Hinlikka (1986) pp53-55 argue that this gives a solution lo the confusion noted in footnote 49: objects are, in
addition to being the substance ofworlds, their forms, that is, they do the work of complex logical forms in Russell. 'To spell this
out somewhat more fully, we can say that Wittgenstein thinks that the complex logical forms are all determined by the logical
forms of elementary (atomic) propositions. Furthermore, the logical forms of atomic propositions are determined by the forms of
objects. It is via this two-stage process that all logical forms can be reduced to the logical forms of simple objects. From them, all
possible logical forms can be constructed. This view is so strange that it has demonstrably misled several competent
commentators'. In coming to grasp this thesis it is well to recall that Wittgenstein rejects complex logical forms as independent
entities: all such entities are constructed, owing to shared logical forms, from simple, necessary objects. 'The very same objects
have to constitute, by being combined with each other, the form of any conceivable fact because logical forms do not exist as
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its own right can only be named, no other determination is possible, neither that it is nor that it is not'.
Complex objects consist of compounded simple objects, and '...the names of the elements become
descriptive language by being compounded together'; simple objects are not experienced as data for the
understanding, as Russell says, but experience is, as it were, immanent in them.
The "experience" that we need in order to understand logic is not that something or other
is the state of things, but that something is; that, however, is not an experience.
Logic is prior to every experience—that something is so.
It is prior to the question "How?", not prior to the question "What?"52
Understanding of logical forms comes not after acquaintance but with acquaintance53. In describing
how acquaintance may arise one may return to two of Wittgenstein's immortal lines, bearing
conflicting interpretations:
The limits ofmy language mean the limits ofmy world.
I am my world. (The microcosm)54.
This is so, Wittgenstein writes, for the limits of one's language defining the limits of one's world mean
that one is one's world; one's faculties and representing abilities are constituted by the relationships of
simple objects55; the degree of sophistication of one's abilities depending upon the way in which the
objects are given, or how one has made their acquaintance. In a transitional work, Wittgenstein writes
that a description of all of one's sense impressions would give, 'primafacie', nothing ofwhat is needed
for a description of them (this being, as above, impossible), but rather '[tjhis would be a biography'.
One's world consists of the objects discerned in one's experience, guiding one's language and thought,
a theory not, as might be thought, suggesting an existentialism or a solipsism, but rather that one, and
one's language and thought, depend upon the objects given in experience (the raw, unmediated sense-
data)56. Given this the detail of the relationship of intentionality is elucidated: simple, atomic objects
show their names to one in experience, performing again the task Russell set for knowledge by
separate entities but have to be built up [from] the logical forms of simple objects. Thus Wittgenstein's simple objects are in a
poignant sense at the same time both the form of the world and its substance (content)'.




53 Hintikka and Hinlikka (1986) p57 add that speaking of 'experience' here may easily be mistaken, for one cannot directly
experience simple objects.
54
Wittgenstein (1922) 5.6 and 5.63.
55 Cf. Wittgenstein (1922) 5.61 and 5.641.
56 Cf. Wittgenstein (1922) 5.621. Ilintikka and Ilintikka (1986) p58 add that, for Wittgenstein, objects not given to one in
experience cannot be spoken about in actual language. 'They are objects of which I could say in my language that they do not
exist or arc not known to exist. But to say this would be to anticipate in my language what the language—the only language that I
understand—would be if it were different. And this would, by Wittgenstein's token, violate the ineffability of semantics'. As
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acquaintance, namely, that of tracing back one's '...understanding of the meanings of phrases to its
source in [one's] experience'. Their names and properties appear immanently in sense experience57.
The ways in which sense-data may come to make up the world turn upon their combination, which,
'...produces [complex] states of affairs'58. Even the constitution of an 'imagined world', Wittgenstein
writes, must have a 'form' in common with the actual one, the unalterable form contained in simple
objects. Their configuration to form the actual world betrays their status as each constituting a single,
simple state of affairs, a possible world in miniature. (Their different configuration gives a different
state of affairs, and so a different possible world). As Hintikka and Hintikka show, the combination of
states of affairs does not include a temporal aspect: configurations and new possible worlds are altered
and changed by the coming to be in description of new simple objects (or states of affairs), themselves
unchanging and tolerating assimilation into new worlds59. (It is in this property that they, it might be
argued, constitute a sound basis for a theory of repetition, for they remain unchanged, and are thus not
themselves subject to repetition, but form the structure of the world and the possibility of discoursing
about its contents). In this way can sense-data be more than merely phenomenal or existential objects,
for simple objects, as seen, do not vary in time, but only in combination with other objects™. They are
unchanging because they are the meanings of the atomic expressions of a language, those which can no
longer be spoken of or described, but only shown61.
seen in IV this is not a difficulty for a developed possible worlds semantics, for in speaking of objects not in one's experience
one simply invokes, or creates, a different possible world. Cf. also 6.431 and 6.4311.
57 Hintikka and Hintikka (1986) p60; pp60-68 considers some details ofWittgenstein's relation to Russell and to phenomenology
on the matters of sense experience, acquaintance and metaphysical realism. For a source of many fascinating connections
between Wittgenstein and Husserl, and Searle and Foucault, see the excellent Mulligan, K.; SpeechAct and Sachverhalt: Reinach
and the Foundations ofRealist Phenomenology (Dordrecht, Reidel) 1987. Following Mulligan the neglect ofReinach's work in
assessments of the development of speech act theory is surely unforgivable.
58 Wittgenstein (1922) 2.0272.
59 Cf. Wittgenstein (1922) 6.3611.
Simple objects stand outside the nexus of repetition, and see Wittgenstein (1922) 6.37.
01 Hintikka and Hintikka (1986) pp70-80 assess the arguments in Wittgenstein for the persistence and ultimate simplicity of
objects (best conceived of, they say, as objects of acquaintance), seeking confirmation in the later works for their thesis that
Wittgenstein was a phenomenologist (and, in some ways, remained one), and again finding parallels with Russell's work. This
nicely leads to the discussion, promised in Introduction, of representation in the later work. This is, it should be emphasised,
merely a summary of some ideas.
One constant theme is the relationship of picturing, or representation. In (1958b) §429 the relationship between thought and
reality remains internal to language, yet is presented as an agreement within language between thought and reality:
The agreement, the harmony, of thought and reality consists in this: if I say falsely that something is red, then,
for all that, it isn't red. And when I want to explain the word "red" to someone, in the sentence "That is not
red", I do it by pointing to something red.
The section also makes reference to the problem at the core of Wittgenstein's first approach to intentionality, that broached in
Wittgenstein (1961), and central in the theories of logical form and logical space in (1922), and yet there are palpable differences.
Firstly, the statement 'This is red' is instantiated not by the existence of a state of affairs which the proposition represents, but by
Ihe existence of the colour red. The propositions 'This is red' and its negation are about the colour red, and the senses of such
elementary propositions are independent of the way things are, but are dependent on the existence of the objects about which the
proposition gives information. Secondly, for an elementary proposition to have sense it must be possible for the object identified
by 'this' to be red. (There is, therefore, an approximation to the early theory of logical form, and what one thinks, says or
believes and so forth in the intentional relation must be something that is possibly the case). Thirdly, for the thought to reach out
to reality its elements (in Fregean vocabulary, its sense and reference), must correlate with objects in the world. These
correlations constitute the relation of representation, and make the representation a picture.
In presenting the doctrine ofmeaning as use, Wittgenstein points to the facts that one explains the meaning of some words by
pointing to the objects identified, and that this generates the idea that what one indicates in an ostensive definition is simply its
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meaning. (Cf. Waismann, F.; Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle (Oxford, Blackwell) 1979, p246). However, Wittgenstein
considers difficulties with this, not least those concerning the supplying of conventions for making connections between
language and reality. The problem is acute for Wittgenstein says that the role played by the meaning of the predicate 'red' in the
sentence "This is red', is not descriptive but normative; that is, in speaking the sentence one is not measuring the object for its
success or failure in reaching a definite standard (of redness), but rather introducing the means ofmeasurement. The object going
for the sample in the ostensive definition is not, for Wittgenstein, something represented, as in a description, but a means, a
vehicle, of representation, or an instrument for setting standards for good representations. ((1958b) §16). This means of
measuring is defined on the analogy with games ((1958b) §82). With the gesture and the demonstrative, the instrument ('red') is
part of a complex making up the ostensive definition. It is a paradigm, or a perspicuous presentation (Wittgenstein's term is
ubersicht, one that he uses consistently throughout his work, early and late), of the thing that is denoted by the name spoken, it
licenses the substitution of the demonstrative, the predicate and the accompanying gesture for the object.
What is the normative status of ostensive definitions? If an ostensive definition of red is an exemplification of the use in
context of the word 'red', then its use as a description of the subject by the predicate carries useful explanatory value. What is
given in an ostensive definition is true or false depending upon whether the object pointed at fulfils the description or not.
Wittgenstein gives a series of examples of the ways in which descriptions given on the model of ostensive definitions may be
observed in practice, and of how their use may inculcate imitation. They are, to all intents and purposes, conceived of as rules.
While it is correct that ostensive definitions can be true or false in a way that definitions of such things as, say, units of
measurement, cannot be, it is the words so defined, red and so forth, that are characterised either correctly or incorrectly, and this
applies equally to words given straightforward lexical definitions. (In an example of a child being instructed by oslensive
definition, the intention behind the teacher's explanation is to give meaning to the word, a meaning which will serve the child in
future descriptions of the world, and in previously unencountered contexts. It becomes, in a way possibly identical to the
definition of the unit ofmeasurement, the status of a rule for continued application; that is, the ostensive definition may achieve
the status of the explanation of an analytic truth).
At ((1958b) §50) it is claimed that what has to be in place prior to the use and understanding of ostensive definitions is a sense
of the grammatically correct use of words. For the canonical illustration of this theory at work one must turn to the opening of
(1958b), and the examples of the shopping lists and the builders (§§1 and 2). The two stories, particularly the first, show up the
fact that just as units ofmeasurement must exist before correct judgements can be made, so must defining samples be among the
tools of language before such judgements can be made. Wittgenstein picks up the point (§58), and says that on the assumption
that a name means, or stands for, an object, it is natural to go on to say that if the colour red did not exist, one could hold no
intentional relationships to red things, and neither say nor think that something is red. This does not require that one posit red as a
necessary existent, for saying that red exists may be merely a way of maintaining that the word 'red' has a meaning.
Alternatively, saying that 'red exists' may be just to say that there are red things in the world. Here, however, in both cases, one
says nothing to the end that the world contains red things as a necessary truth, nor that the meaning of the word 'red' as used in
one's language is given meaning through the reference of an ostensive definition to samples in the world. A reconsideration of
the picture theory may be made here. The possibility of an ostensive definition, and the sense of propositions as presupposing
grammatically correct uses of the word 'red' have, following the postulation of a layer of presuppositions in one's use of
language, uncovered again the question of how language reaches out to reality. As before, this demands analysis of the grammar
of one's language.
In the later work Wittgenstein maintains that the relation between one's thought or proposition and what is the case if tire
thought/proposition is true, is not the sharing of a logical form, but one internal to grammar. It is legitimate to say that the
thought that p is made true by the fact that p; this expresses a rule. The wish that p (to give a different intentional relation), and
the wish fulfilled by the fact that p are two ways of referring to the same act of wishing. (These claims, arguably, ignore the real
problems of intcntionality, primarily, that one's thought that p is categorically distinct from the expression of the thought that p).
There is a second problem, namely, that by the utterance of a sentence one says something that can be verified only with
reference to the intentionality, in thought or expression, of the speaker. Wittgenstein's interlocutor expresses this misgiving
((1958b) §430), in the comparison of a proposition to a ruler against which one may measure reality. (The analogy appears also
in (1922), its precursor (1961) and scattered transitional works. A reasonable response is to question the analogy: a ruler makes
no statements of length by itself, it requires being placed alongside an object. Additionally, the objects themselves say nothing
until they are placed against the measure. The objects do not represent how things are if they are true, for unlike the intentional
properties of a thought the representational properties of the propositional sign are expressions of a thought; they are, one might
say, extrinsic.
How, therefore, is the relation of representation to be revived? For the later Wittgenstein, signs are completely unrhetorical.
There is no shared form between the speaker's meaning and the hearer's understanding. At ((1958b) §433) Wittgenstein presents
a new idea. One's desire to communicate to X determines by its content what it is one desires to communicate, and the signs one
uses to communicate one's desire cannot succeed in expressing an intention. Here one sees the continuity of (1958b): all of
Wittgenstein's arguments are seen to be relevant to this conclusion. The addition of further signs will merely give further
opportunities for misunderstanding. Misunderstandings are derived from the naive belief that an ostensive definition correlates
immediately a word or object and its meaning, a belief that may be challenged by the fact that the object gestured toward could
not give meaning to its definition. Rather, the object gestured toward is, in keeping with the earlier discussion, a sample, and thus
a part of a presupposed symbolism into which speakers and hearers enter.
A worthy response is to question the use of this explanation for an elucidation of intentionality, for how precisely, on this
account, do others come to an understanding of one's propositions, and the regress of signs halted, for as Wittgenstein ((1958b)
§1) says, '[explanations come to an end somewhere'. (Arguments concerning these matters demonstrate again the internal
coherence of (1958b), for they are of a piece with those concerning rule following). For Wittgenstein, the normative use of an
explanation of the meaning of an expression is captured best by a comparison with a rule determining how the expression is used.
For Wittgenstein, to reiterate, misunderstanding regarding this arises because of the assumption that what is meant by a sign is
determined by an interpretation, but the regress of interpretations is halted by the use in actual instances of obeying or
transgressing rules. Saying how a sign was meant is not manifested in explanations of how it should be used, but in applications
of it constituting observances of the sign as a rule. (In a further example of the way in which all of Wittgenstein's arguments are
used for the same conclusion he argues that one cannot obey a rule privately. There is no such thing as a sign which cannot be
interpreted further.
One can take, as one ofmany examples ofprogression from the early work to the late, the tension between the idea that no sign
cannot be interpreted further, and the view that thought and language share logical form. If the constituents of a thought stand in
the relation to reality that words do to reality then the problem of intentionality is obviated, it being a matter of contingency that
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the propositions in thought represent what they represent, 'this, in turn, can be put alongside the early view that the relation
between a thought and its expression is analogous to that between a proposition and its translation by the hearer into a public,
understandable language. There is here, however, in a problem that reoccurs throughout Wittgensteinian exegesis, a lack of
criteria, in this case of correctness and incorrectness. A first suggestion as to how to resolve this difficulty is to say that the
constituents of a language of thought represent intrinsically, and that the subject simply reads off meaning from them. This,
however, makes the constituents of the language of thought have a different relation to objects as do words, as well as a power of
intrinsic representation not shared by public language. The second suggestion, one made by Wittgenstein in transitional works, is
that the constituents of the language of thought are extrinsically intentional, and have intentionality thrust upon them by acts of
will. (In this Wittgenstein recalls his early debt to Schopenhauer). This, however, illustrates a difficulty, in that there is a
presupposition that the acts of will carry with them ways of referring to the objects onto which the language of thought is
projected, and this is possibly the same as arguing that the language of drought is intrinsically representational. Wittgenstein sees
no need to explain this difficulty. To see it as a problem is to have misconstrued the grammar of intentional discourse. The source
of difficulties concerning intentionality is thinking that the function of intentional statements is to articulate, or describe,
associated mental processes.
Of the questions that arise two may be chosen. They reiterate, in different form, the classic questions of intentionality. How, on
this interpretation, is the statement of a belief connected to what the speaker believes to be true, for what is believed may not
itselfbe present to the speaker's mind. Relatedly, how does the speaker know that the noun clause of an intentional statement is a
correct interpretation of his state ofmind. Will not an answer again appeal to internal representations?
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5. Translation, Interpretation and Convention
Left over from Introduction and 1.1 is Rorty's ciaim that the advocation of a Quinean holism is the best
response to theories of intentionality in philosophy of language and mind, those arguing for the
presence of necessary conditions of linguistic and mental representation, and theories of analyticity. It
is argued in this section that holistic theories must, however, appeal to structures of mind placing
conditions upon representation and to analytic propositions for their strictures on language learning to
work. Davidson's holism is offered as a better alternative, and owing to the peculiar role it allows for
conventions, categorically not conventions of language (following Quine), for, as Davidson says, they
are at worst irrelevant, and at best unnecessary, but social, or institutional conventions, or better,
practices. From this, it is argued in IV, a theory of conventions by which language learning can
coherently be described, can emerge. (One might consider in the light of these arguments Quine's
belief that Rorty mistakes his holistic claim that there is no first philosophy for a naturalistic claim). No
discussion of arguments against intentionality will be complete without a consideration of linguistic
behaviour described in terms of stimulus and response. There are raised many issues regarding
normativity in language, and, importantly in relation to other discussions undertaken in TV. 1, the status
of analytic propositions1.
Quine begins his discussion of language and truth by stating the empiricist premise upon which his
verificationism is based: one's subjective sense experiences are derivative, deriving from one's
knowledge of the ways of physical objects2. A foundationalist approach, taking experience as having
'protocol' sentences, is unwarranted, for immediate experience does not, '... cohere as an autonomous
domain'3. Descriptions of sensation in protocol sentences cannot adequately describe experience, for
there is no neutral means of accessing sensation; it is always experienced under the aegis of a
conceptual scheme, and thus cannot be summarised in a general descriptive statement4. A simple
example says that reference to, discussion and analysis of physical objects occurs only in relation to a
theory containing a prior acceptance of the existence of physical objects5, and so man's conceptual
responses to the world are always intimately connected with the acceptance of certain things in the
objective world6. (Other examples are given below in this section).
1 It is vital to note that all ofQuine's work bears on the selective presentationmade here.
2 Quine, W.V.O.; Word andObject (MIT) 1960, p 1.
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However, one may investigate man's conceptual and linguistic responses to the world by subtracting them from the most
appropriate conception of the absolute world, and so find his contribution.
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Use of language is inculcated through education and practice in society; there are, Quine believes,
'prior concomitances' between a stimulus and corresponding appropriate behaviour7. Margolis finds
equivocations between the meanings of several of the central notions making up this thesis, and there
follow consequences for the theory of translation according to stimulus meaning and guided by
analytical hypotheses8. Margolis argues that Quine's central notions are, '...adjustedto what he alleges
to be the problems of radical translation, and to what he is primarily interested in, namely, the analysis
of a language ofwhich the analysts are themselves users...". Quine's equivocations allow the running
together of these two irrevocably separate notions, and an argument to this conclusion is offered in this
section.
Quine's example of one learning uses for the word 'square' takes account of the different
perspectives pupil and teacher may have upon the square10. An objective use may be found, he
ventures, by collating the subjective points of view, and this is learning by induction. (The same
process is carried out for sensations of, for example, 'Red')11. Quine applies his theory to whole single
sentences: they may be described in terms of non-verbal stimuli (drawn from perceptions, surface
irritations and so forth), and there may follow a series of substitutions to describe other sentences by
analogy12. Each sentence, simple or complex, has its corresponding set of inherent stimulus conditions,
and depending upon the simplicity of the experience described in the sentence, some are learned more
easily than others. However, Quine rejects this theory of language learning as giving too limited a role
and too narrow an importance to sense-data13; it allows no access to past sensations other than through
indistinct memories of further unconceptualised stimulations, for how are 'objective' uses dubbed?
What are the conventions? A fully rational conceptualisation of language associates one's presently
conceptualised sentences with those conceptualised in the past, allowing revision and redaction, and
how are sense-data repeatedly identified as the same?14 Quine suggests that such a theory of learning
requires a notion of'observationality', which, Quine argues, is a graded notion with some 'observation
sentences' high in observationality ('Red', 'Rabbit', 'The tide is out', instantiating a simple relation to
'
Quitie (1960) p6.
Margolis, J.; 'Quine on Observationality and Translation', Foundations of Language, vol. TV, no. 2, ppl 28-137, 1968, pi 28.
9
Margolis (1968) pl29. Cf Orianne, A.; 'Intentional Meaning', Foundations of Language, vol. XIV, no. 2, ppl95-209, 1976.
Qrianne (pi95) suggests that stimulations are 'too poor and too remote', from perceptions to allow for full intersubjective












sense-data), and others low15. For such sentences meaning can be explicated as stimulus meaning.
Comparison with sentences low in observationality ('Bachelor') elicits the claim that,
'...observationality is relative to the modulus of stimulation', which, when increased, increases
observationality16. Quine moves to consider the ways in which sense-data have stimulus effects. He
argues that sensations, elicited by a simple stimulus, or a question requesting a description of one's
experience, require a prior language basis to which all experience is compared, and found either to
correspond or to differ, a notion later crystallised in the web of belief7. When an action or sentence is
elicited by a stimulus (Quine allows only for non-verbal stimuli, but his theory must apply also to
verbal stimuli), a network of theory links, in every case, specific stimulus to appropriate response.
Stimuli (in a neural response or in a sentence uttered) are connected in 'logical' and 'causal' ways to
responses. There are, Quine says, 'sensory supports' for this holistic web, combining all of the
sentences that are appropriate for a particular stimulation, and the association of all sentences is, for
Quine, a 'vast verbal structure', linked to all non-verbal stimuli, and so to separate sentences for each
person18. Logic exists in the web to bind all sentences and stimuli together, and these logical
connections describing enduring constants are 'eternal', their path of connections in the web having
acquired 'transitivity'19.
The words a speaker learns first are supplemented by parts taken from other words to form sentences
and propositions, a procedure carried out in different learners via different processes and by using
different analogies. Speakers enter the web at different points, and discover the connections to other
parts through experience, trial and error and so forth; there is no temporal order or linear sequence to
the acquisition of language, and the gradation of observationality (between high and low) relative to the
difficulties of interpretation is fixed (one should add to Margolis, 'at least in part'), relative to '...non¬
verbal stimuli non-verbally discriminated...', allowing the grasp of sentences high in observationality
in a foreign tongue20. ('Gavagai!' is, whatever else it is, an ostension). However, the gradation of
observationality relative to the language used, is, as before, marked in advance, by whatever is taken as
the 'modulus of stimulation'. ('Gavagai!' refers to a rabbit, a rabbit-part, a leg and so forth, and again
as before, all sentences may increase in observationality). How does an interpreter grasp which
15
Margolis (1968) pl29 objects to Quine's definition.
16
Quine (1960) pi 1.
"Quine (1960) pi 1. The quotations in the following paragraph are from ppl 1-12.
18 Recall Plantinga (1979) pl48, and the discussion of competing theories of possible worlds and of the network of propositions
making up a possible world as instantiating the same individual in many different states of affairs; as the world excludes non-
obtaining possible states ofaffairs the descriptions will not obtain.
"
Quine (1960) pl2 gives as an example 'Copper Oxide is green'.
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modulus is in use? A putative objection to Margolis' point, saying that Quine's theory is not so strict,
allowing for invariable paths through the holistic web, and thus for different hypotheses and so
different conventions, may not apply after Quine's remarks on behavioural non-verbal stimuli are
described, and this is a plank of the argument made (below). Whatever the case may be, Margolis'
point is a good one: Quine's equivocation on the modulus of stimulation in radical translation concerns
uses of stimulus-response paths to fix meanings (his point being that interpreter and native are
ontologically relative), and yet in the analysis of a speaker's own language, the modulus is to determine
'conventionally fixed references', determining, in turn, the 'ranges of observationality' and of
'collateral information'. Convergence between interpreter and native is qualitatively the same as that
between speakers of the same language. In the first case the modulus of stimulation is undetermined
relative to the languages of native and interpreter, and in the second case, determines a set of
conventions (of indefinite status) within a shared language21. This equivocation is a case in point of the
problem with Quine's theory to be presented in this section: how to present an holistic theory of
language learning, rich enough to provide for ontological relativity, without appeal to analytical
hypotheses or conventions.
Quine writes that the process of understanding the objective world can be broken down into two
phases. Firstly, understanding what the stimulations or objects presented to one are precisely, and
secondly, understanding what one's prior body of theory, one's conceptual scheme, says about them.
Quine says that there arise difficulties in the cases of objects for which there is no clear scheme or
characteristic stimuli, and the example given is that of the activity of non-existent 'wavicles', opposed
to that of explicable 'molecules'22. For wavicles, one's necessary ignorance (caused by the fact that no
stimuli report their presence), means that coming to understand what wavicles are is, in truth, a process
ofmastering what any putative theory says of them. While words may or may not refer, the distinction
between referring and non-referring terms is made not on grammatical lines, but on the basis of
whether a speaker has come to understand the theory corresponding to the term (that is, the parts of the
web relevant to understanding the term). Quine continues: ways of learning cut across grammatical and
referential boundaries; one learns through description, contextual explanation, or as a response to a one
20 Margolis (1968) pl29.
21 Margolis (1968) pl29. 'In the first, observationality and "the intrusion of collateral information" mark, in principle, exclusive
domains, although particular sentences may exhibit degrees of both observationality and of responsiveness to collateral
information'. As has been seen, Quine thus speaks of conveying stimulus meanings as 'observation sentences', and allows for
degrees of observationality. Margolis continues, the first model allows Quine to argue that there is 'less scope' for collateral
information in deciding whether a seen object is red than there is in deciding whether it is a rabbit, and to apply this argument to
the study of language. How much scope is left for unconditioned variation in conceptual schemes?
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word sentence. 'Centaur' fulfils the first two criteria; 'sake' can only be learned contextually; and 'tile'
can be learnt in each of the three ways. For Quine, words mean only as they are used in sentences
conditioned by explicable sensory stimuli; the psychology of stimulus and response is intimately
connected to the sentences of language. In coming to understand the theory pertaining to a foreign
term, an interpreter works on the assumption that he should, at all times, aspire to attain to the simplest
possible theory for the explanation of phenomena. The question of truth in these theories is passed over
by Quine, for one's immediate experience can only ever provide indeterminate evidence, building into
a potential explanation, in the light of current knowledge, for the nature of reality. A theory of the
activity of molecules is always undetermined by the activity of ordinary things; a posited theory is
necessary, and, while the question of what reality is like is in itself difficult to answer, asking the
question, 'what is real' is, necessarily, logically prior, and demands far more of theory than an answer
to the first. In the assessment of competing theories of the nature of reality, scientific method must be
the arbiter. As a theory persists, and finds success in explaining phenomena in the simplest way, it is
considered successful. Thus it is that the writing and revision of scientific method rests ultimately upon
stimuli, and response to changes in stimuli observed under the aegis of a competing conceptual scheme.
When hardened into theoiy, the scheme offers a body of detailed suggested canons, all without
necessary propositions23.
"Quine (1960) pi 5, and for the quotations in the following paragraph, ppl3-17.
23 Orianne (1976) pl99. As in the case of indeterminate translation of speech, so with the ease of theory change in science:
language and science face the tribunal of experience as a whole, and they are always underdetermined by further empirical
evidence. Translations inevitably carry with them untenable analytical hypotheses. To gamer evidence for the plausibility of a
hypothetical translation, one questions native speakers, using demonstrations and indexicals and framing tests. In all cases,
however, there is only evidence for translations in the light of oilier presupposed translations: the anthropologist asks, while
pointing, 'Is this a gavagai?', and receives assent, assent, that is, to the word 'gavagai' and to the constant 'same as'. Both
together constitute a correct translation, but it is not by any lights the correct translation. Hie native's replies, gestures and other
behaviour are equally plausible under another translation schema; one might change the translation of 'gavagai' to 'undetached
rabbit part', and the translation of 'same as' to 'same as or attached', and have the native still assent.
Orianne (p200) considers a fascinating 'thought-experiment' in assessment of Quine's theory. His conclusions, and those of
Margolis, arc palpably the same as those offered in the arguments given below, yet the details arc suggestive of intimate tics
between philosophical traditions that are invariably set apart. The anthropologist, Orianne writes, might learn the native tongue
as does a child, and become 'perfectly bilingual', using in his education in the language none of the resources or object lessons of
his first language. Could these 'unique credentials' allow S correctly to translate between the languages, for 'jijt would seem at
first obvious that the bilingual's translation possesses unique credentials, superior to that arrived at by the ordinary linguist by
means of analytical hypotheses'. Quine says no, for there are mutually exclusive translations, drawing upon the same
dispositions, but Orianne responds that one might argue that two bilinguals with identical dispositions in both languages must
agree in their translations; he assumes that either will use as the basis for a translation a readiness to use (in his Erst language), a
given sentence in the same cases in which he uses a corresponding sentence in the second language. This readiness, one might
add, evinces a 'sufficient degree' of intersubjectivity on the basis that this would constitute a linguistic community. (There are
conceivable objections saying that the readiness to use two sentences under the same circumstances is not necessarily a condition
of synonymy. That is, one cannot rely upon one's speech dispositions to rule out the synonymy of two terms. 'Notice... that the
bilingual is not in this respect in a privileged posilion with respect to the ordinary linguist. The latter can also consider his
unwillingness to use rabbit part talk in circumstances in which a foreigner uses 'gavagai' and make it tire basis of his
translation... Yet in this case, the argument does not seem to carry as much weight because we recognise readily enough that the
linguist and his informer are part of two different linguistic communities and hence that their respective usage may be at
variance. But this is equally true of the bilingual. He is also a member of two different linguistic communities' (p201). This,
Orianne says, is easily missed due to a general and unthinking acceptance of a theory of meaning as the mappings, according to
conventions, ofmeanings onto sentences. If this were possible, it would, as Oriannc says, be possible for a bilingual to find out
whether two sentences express the same meaning, and this by assuming an 'extra-linguistic' point of view. The assumption that
there are such conventions '...renders meaning inscrutable by assuming a contingent relationship between thought and
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Quine's first premise says that for any discussion of the ways and constitution of physical objects
there is always required some prior theory: in the first example, describing knowledge of the existence
of physical objects. One must postulate a theory, for experience will not cohere, and so a modulus must
be supplied for purposes of classification. The argument to follow says that such a theory is
inconceivable without appeal to analytic propositions. When Quine speaks of 'past conceptualisations'
of experiences had (rejected conceptual schemes or theories), he leaves opaque the criteria with which
such conceptualisations are formed, and the ways in which one may have faith in a particular
conceptualisation of theory. Having faith in physical objects (as a result of a successful theory), and yet
claiming that theories are continually to be revised through subsequent experience (as Quine does),
makes a compelling question ofhow sound, enduring conceptualisations may be made from a stream of
experience, and in their absence the ability to carry out the subtraction ofman's contribution from the
objective world is made more difficult. An obvious response is to say that Quine thinks of
conceptualisations relative to a theory, and the mere fact that he moots the idea leads one to consider
the corpus of conceptualisations for that theory24. Quine could refer to this point when faced with the
objection that his reliance upon induction is unjustified: the induction is justified relative to a specific
theory about the objective world25. Regarding this, Margolis questions other of Quine's points, and
pertaining to the difficulties of demonstrative reference26. Sentences not able to be distinguished in
terms of stimulus and response will needs be supplemented by ostension and elucidation: (is this, the
speaker asks while pointing, a rabbit?) Quine writes that the problem of the indeterminacy of
translation is acute here, for the ability to ask such questions requires a knowledge of the language the
questioner speaks; that is, he says, stimulus meaning suffices, and is, as Margolis says, '.. .altogether
neutral to hypotheses about the terms of the native language'. However, Margolis replies that only a
picture theory of language could achieve this, one not amenable to the indeterminacy of translation, for,
as Quine writes, '...the native may achieve the same net effects through linguistic structures so
different that any eventual construing of our devices in the native language and vice versa can prove
unnatural and largely arbitrary', and this problem is endemic in Quine's work on translation. Quine
does not provide sufficient explanation of how native or interpreter decide that the same effects
expression. In this connection [one] must note that Quine does not disprove the possibility of establishing a uniquely correct
translation. The strong point of his argument is that this cannot be done under the assumption that a correct translation has to
carry over from one language to another an invariant intentional meaning' (p202). (For development of these points see pp206-
209).
24 Cf. Plantinga (1979) pl48 and Lewis (1973) p.
25 The importance of this for Quine on analyticity will be returned to below in this section.
"Margolis (1968) pl30.
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obtained with use of one linguistic structure can be achieved with another (again, by native or
interpreter), while the reconstruction of the language under analysis remains potentially 'unnatural and
largely arbitrary', and itself always subject to revision".
Quine wants to reject a theory of language learning as response to sense-data precisely because of the
fact that it offers no complete, rational conceptualisation of past and present sentences. One can see
here that the plausible means of avoiding this putative objection by arguing that all conceptualisations
are made relative to a theory is not open to Quine. If conceptualisations are relative to a theory, then all
of the conceptualisations would be of sense-data observed under the aegis of that theory, a notion
Quine rejects. Moreover, if all language is a comparison of present with past conceptualisations, then,
almost by definition, a relative conceptualisation could hardly be compared with one made according to
a different theory, for they would report different conceptual schemes. Sentences are being assessed on
different criteria in the light of the different theories; different intentions inform each conceptualisation.
One must suggest that there is only one stream of experience that language learners must try to
conceptualise in one way or another, and this, on Quine's criteria, would give, not access to past
conceptualisations, but to a stream of undifferentiated sense-data, which positively obstructs attempts
to compare conceptualisations. The pressing question is what it is that permits language users to form
conceptualisations, and does an answer entail a commitment to the existence of analytic propositions?
Quine argues that stimulations, those which lie at the periphery of the holistic web, are logically and
causally connected with the responses appropriate to the associated experience. A second intuitive
objection may be stated: there is a problem with a theory, which rejects analytic propositions, stating
that there exists a logical movement from stimulus to response, for it is not unreasonable to say that this
implies that there are steps to be followed. This impairs the picture Quine draws of the web of all of
one's beliefs concerning language use coalescing in a vast network of interconnections, for he does
speak of specific paths through the web. (Quine argues later that logic permeates the entire web, and
this suggestion is considered in context). Quine's postulating 'occasion' and 'eternal' sentences is a
related point. Sentences are dubbed eternal when they are seen to possess a high degree of stable
meaning, with little experience suggesting their revision. (Margolis dubs them 'hypotheses'). One
might add that one discovers them in the only way, given one's access to sensory experience, that one
27
Margolis (1968) pi 31 adds that 'stimulus meaning' presupposes 'rules of identification and reidentification'. He continues:
Quinc says that terms and reference arc relative to one's conceptual schemes, but Margolis, agreeing in part, says that 'sentence'
and 'term' are correlates, and that theorising the sentences of a native language presupposes the use and meaning of relevant
terms in the language. This attacks the very foundation of the thesis of the indeterminacy of translation.
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could possibly discover them, and that is, again, relative to one's theory. Quine would object by saying
that there is no conceptualisation possible, merely a stream of undifferentiated sense-data, but this
merely motivates the charge of ambiguity in Quine's theory. With reference to the discussion of this
ambiguity one can see that Quine offers no independent standard, standing outside the stream of sense
data, with which to form conceptualisations and 'eternal' propositions. Recourse to conceptualisations
relative to a theory has been ruled out.
Similar objections can be made to Quine's rejection of analytic propositions in the holistic web, and
his preferred conceptualisations carried out in the one stream of undifferentiated sense-data. His
allowance for individual language learning processes to differ from person to person is surely support
for an holistic approach to knowledge, for one can have any one of the infinity of experiences available
at the periphery of the web, and logic will ease the transmission of one's thoughts to the appropriate
response. Logic permeates the web in its entirety, for it is vital to all of one's conceptual knowledge. It
is the case that logic has been taken out of the web not by receiving an exalted position, but by being,
as it were, spread throughout. Quine is surely not rejecting the status of logical principles as having a
unique, special role in the web; they still have a status above that of ordinary propositions, and fulfil a
role for which only logical constants can provide28. The difference between a referring and a non-
referring proposition or word is, for Quine, the difference between one grasping and not grasping the
relevant theory shown to be appropriate by.the web. While this strongly suggests the inclusion in the
web of propositions resembling, to all intents and purposes, analytic propositions, accounting for
movement between periphery and core, there is a palpable inconsistency. Firstly, if molecules are
explicable to the understanding, and wavicles are not, this requires, by Quine's theory, that molecules
have a prior theory base, indeed, one prior even to one's conceiving of them, and conceptualised in an
alien conceptual scheme. Quine could not accept this. Additionally, he cannot, as arguments have
shown, accept that the due conceptualisation is relative to the interpreter's own theory; if understanding
wavicles requires a recognition of the theoretical discussion concerning them (respective conjectures
and so forth), and there is only one stream of experience (sense-data) to conceptualise, the theory will
be of a kind that Quine repudiates29. What one understands by 'molecules', and what one's postulated
28 Nor does he reject this status in his work on convention, as described in IV. 1. See also Stroud, B.; 'Conventionalism and the
Indeterminacy of Translation', pp82-96 in Davidson and Ilintikka (1969).
29
Namely, one containing analytic propositions. Lewis' argument for a workable theory ofanalyticity for language (described in
IV), must be thought a response to all advocating a holistic view of language and the abandonment of the analytic-synthetic
distinction. It is thus a response to Rorty. Davidson, while advocating a holistic theory of language and mind, gives, in the
principle of charity and the attitude of holding true, invaluable aids in the analysis of linguistic theories, namely notions of social
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theory says about 'wavicles' are surely one and the same; any web of beliefs that is devised will be
either unduly (in Quine's estimation), conceptualised, or will be imposed upon one with a substantial
degree of theory already settled. The language will contain propositions expressing what are best
regarded as normative principles, or conventions, for its use, and if this is so, then the notions of
analyticity, and the way in which there may necessary propositions, are more satisfactorily explained.
The notion of a prior theory base which one accepts in coming to understand a word or proposition
could only be predicated on a theory with an independent standard by which conceptualisations may be
carried out. The analogy to the use of stimulus and response in scientific method is inappropriate for
explication of linguistic learning. One cannot hypothesise, or 'conceptualise', in a stream of experience
without an independent standard. There will, of necessity, be a basis of normative propositions around
which to form one's conjectures of stimulus and response30.
A more satisfying description of the way in which conceptualisations can be made is offered by
Davidson, in the principle of charity guiding interpretation, and it is this that provides the kernel of the
notion of convention to which reference will be made in describing the means by which convention and
intention play roles in theories ofmeaning. The growing points of language, Davidson argues, are those
to which philosophers neglect attention31. He gives as examples malapropism, Spoonerism, jokes and
puns, and the theory of radical interpretation with which account for such cases can be made provides a
theory of meaning for language without appeal to linguistic convention, one which accounts for
meaning and intentionality in the parasitical and fictional cases studied by Derrida. Davidson and
Derrida would agree that such cases are 'ubiquitous', but a meaning-scepticism need not follow32. The
fact of understanding of S's speech acts on H's part (of speakers acceding to a 'standard'
interpretation), does not evince error or mistake in interpretation, for homonyms serve equally as well
in suggesting alternative, viable interpretations, and the want, in a theory of language, of a correct
definition of words is no problem. What is needed is a notion of what words mean, '...spoken in
context...', provided by application of the principle of charity, and for this, a distinction between what
S means on an occasion and what his words mean, a distinction, Davidson writes, seemingly threatened
by '[t]he widespread existence of malapropisms and their kin...since here the [decipherment of]
and institutional convention. That Derrida misses the presence of these notions in Austin motivates the response to Derrida in
n.4-5 and III.5, and is the point from which Lewis' theory of convention begins.
30 Orianne (1976) pp202 and 206-209.
31 Davidson, D.; 'A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs', pp433-446 in Lepore, E. (ed.); Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the
Philosophy ofDonald Davidson (Oxford, Blackwcll) 1986, p433.
32 Cf. Davidson (200lj) ppl93-198. Davidson quotes Bennett (1976) pl5, and his remark that such creativity is seldom correctly
understood.
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intended meaning seems to take over from the standard meaning'33. This entails a clear distinction
between S meaning and 'literal' meaning, redefining what it is to know a language, or to define natural
language34.
Literal meaning is, for Davidson, 'first meaning', and, crudely, is reported in words and sentences
uttered by S on occasions. In 'standard' cases first meaning can be found by consulting a dictionary,
the first and most important resource in the 'order of interpretation'35. First meanings are the products
of settled conventions, set by repeated S intentions, and, '[t]he intentions with which an act is
performed are usually unambiguously ordered by the relation ofmeans to ends (where this relation may
or may not be causal)'. An utterance (p) spoken with an intention, pace Grice, is spoken with the
additional intention that H recognise S's intention to communicate p (ignoring cases of deception,
delusion and so forth); the appropriate recognition requires that S and H share mutual knowledge of the
conventions of p, and '[i]n general, the first intention in the sequence to require this feature specifies
the first meaning'. The enquiry can as easily emphasise H's ability to 'interpret' S36.
For the description of intersubiective (mutually-known), abilities allowing the interpretation of
speakers, Davidson moots three principles of first meaning for which any theory of mutual knowledge
must account37. It requires 'systematic relations' between semantical properties of words (and parts of
words), in utterances, and syntactical properties allowing the interpretation of utterances; these
relations are shared, and 'learned in advance', of occasions of use. Davidson argues that the transport
of intended meaning in communication requires only these conditions on mutual knowledge,
encapsulated in the principle of charity, and constituting the basis of any theory of intentionality. They
instantiate mutual, institutional, or better, social conventions, and can, it is argued (in IV, although
necessary details are given in this section below), serve for conventions of language38.
"Davidson (1986) p434.
34 Cf. Yu (1979) p.
35 Davidson (1986) p435 notes the ambiguity of the notion. The same reference goes for the following quotation.
16 Davidson (1986) p435. 'What the speaker knows must correspond to something the interpreter knows if the speaker is to be
understood, since if the speaker is understood he has been interpreted as he intended to be interpreted'. Davidson makes a point
vital to the understanding of the response to be made to Derrida, and to the case to be made in the coming chapters. Davidson
does not limit first meaning to language, and indeed first meaning is Gricean, conventional meaning™, that which, 1... applies to
any sign or signal with an intended interpretation'.
37 In the case, Davidson writes, the hearer and the speaker share a complex 'system or theory', making possible the discovery and
statement of logical relations between utterances. In TI, and in III and IV with application to Searle and Lewis, it is seen how
successful Grice is in accounting for these relations. The decipherment of these relations is the burden of the work of Griee and
Schiffer, of Strawson and McDowell, and Davidson emphasises that he wants to clarify in what sense this work is collect and
able to inform semantic theory.
38 Cf. Hacking, I.; 'The Parody of Conversation', pp447-458 in Lepore (1986). Davidson (1986) p437: 'The contrast in what is
meant or implied by the use of "but" instead of "and" seems to me another matter, since no amount of common sense
unaccompanied by linguistic lore would enable an interpreter to figure it out'. As Hacking notes, Davidson works with the first
two principles, rejecting (Hacking is too dogmatic here), the last. Davidson broaches the difficulties encountered in deciphering
the semantic roles ofwords, and thus of finding identities in semantic roles, and those of ascribing interpretative faculties to H
allowing him to recognise as significant, or intelligible, certain words. However, this is not the core of specifically linguistic
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Davidson argues that interpreters can understand sentences they have never heard before, that they
can learn the semantic role of a finite number of words, and of a finite number of 'modes of
composition'. In analogy to conflicting conceptual schemes, interpretation can proliferate, for the
modes of composition allow infinite iteration, and application to a vast number of sentences39. The
mechanism is a truth theory giving recursive definitions of the truth conditions of all of S's possible
utterances (Convention T)"°. Interpretation (communication) does not require that S and H speak the
same language: this is merely a convenience, for what is always shared, obviating the difficulties of
mere translation, is S's and H's understanding ofmeans of interpretation"". H has a faculty, developed
competence, which requires distinctions to be drawn between literal (first) meaning, and the implicatures of uses of words,
distinctions made, re-made, studied and shifted. As Davidson says, Grice studies the means by which such implicatures may be
discerned and mutually-known. A definition of linguistic competence is not simply a study of such skills, for they are both things
one could discern without, 'training or exposure', and things one, '...could get along without...'; both (types of) things one
expects an interpreter to be able to do, and which enrich communication. Novel or fictional contexts create the difficulties of
steering a course between these options, and so, again, malapropism and other creative uses of language threaten any 'standard'
description of linguistic competence and behaviour.
39 Davidson (1986) pp436-437.
40 Davidson (1986) pp437-438. Here Davidson will only emphasise that the theory has a finite base and is recursive, and that
'most philosophers and linguists' agree. He adds that while a theory for interpreting S is a model of H's linguistic competence,
this is not to suggest that H knows any such theory, though they may be brought to the realisation, concerning, say, the logical
constants they accept. Any claims for a satisfactory theory are not about propositional knowledge or about the 'inner workings'
of part of the brain. 'They are rather claims about what must be said to give a satisfactory description of the competence of the
interpreter'; this requires a recursive theory, which, if it describes H's linguistic competence, should not be thought also to
describe 'some mechanism' in H corresponding to the theory. In Grice and Schiffer there is made a similar distinction between
intending and believing that one intends, and this is seen to account for the difficulties of fictional contexts.
Hacking considers Davidson's conclusion that there is no such thing as a language, and argues that it can only force Davidson
to revise other of his principles. The passage from which quotations have just been taken (pp437-438) is, Hacking says, a
summary ofDavidson's work in the philosophy of language; it remains consistent because the passage, and so the work, speaks
only of interpretation, and yet the problems raised in the essay are of conversation and communication. (Hence, Hacking says,
the deference to Grice). Davidson's thesis is plain: a shared language described in Convention T and the principle of charity
requires no prior, systematic knowledge, for there can be none; language is nothing like what philosophers think it to be. Hacking
finds a sleight of hand in Davidson's talk of 'interpretation' rather than 'translation' in cases of collocution, and many questions
are raised. Does interpretation apply to the understanding of one's own language as readily as to those in Quine's translation
situation? Do speakers interpret other members of their own speech community, and are malaprops an independent case?
Hacking also finds a tension between uses of 'theory' in Davidson: interpretation (or theory), requires recursion, and yet the
passing theory is not able to be regularised or taught: it derives from luck, rules of thumb, scraps of discerned knowledge and so
forth. These problems are found elsewhere in Davidson. The modelling of speech, Hacking argues, does not need recursion, and
neither does the systematicity of first, literal meaning, and thus Hacking (pp456-458) argues against Davidson's holism. People,
Hacking argues, are 'non-total', and mutual exchange in passing theories should not lead one to entertain holism about language.
Exchanges might just be the playing of language games. Hacking (pp455-456) says that one ofDavidson's argument in favour of
recursion says that speakers perceive logical connections between sentences, and he replies that 'axiomatised formal theory',
requires all strings (not merely theorems and proofs), appearing in the theory to be themselves recursive. These facts, however,
have nothing to do with passing theories of others' speech. Human speakers make few, and then 'only the shortest', of deductive
inferences in interpreting another's speech; they frequently utter ungrammatical sentences, and even contradict themselves. As
for the assumption that others are consistent, Hacking finds this implausible: '[i]t is not charitable, but rather inhumane, to
pretend that 1 am talking to a god'. (Cf. Norris (1996)). S's skill in detecting and correcting errors is evinces a certain systematic,
consistent approach, but not a whole recursive system that 'goes on forever spinning unintelligible deductions'. S has tricks,
which the logician may order into formal systems, but which are a congeries of 'not too closely connected' methods. In IV no
claim is made on recursion in a purely extensional language for the explanation of the ways in which passing theories are created
and disseminated (and of analytic truth), and a longer study would consider the way in which Lewis' arguments. This notion of a
of is vital in the Lewisian response to Deirida on fictional contexts. Davidson's arguments are considered here as a means of
introducing the relevant notions of social, institutional conventions for use in the explanation of meaning in language, in
opposition to theories, discredited by Davidson, of conventions of language.
41 Davidson (1986) pp438-440 makes the connection with some issues of reference and denotation of non-existent and fictional
objects raised in 1.4, and concerning particularly the work of Donnellan, K.; 'Reference and Definite Descriptions', The
Piiilosonhical Review, vol. LXXXV, no. 3, pp281-304, 1966, and 'Putting Humpty Dumpty Together Again', The Philosophical
Review, vol. LXXVII, no. 2, pp203-215, 1968. Domiellan's distinction between referential and attributive definite descriptions
includes a distinction between sentences uttered with an intended meaning and the meaning of sentences. Davidson says that S
cannot change the meaning of words merely by intending to, but that he can change the meaning if he believes (justifiably), that
H has sufficient aids to show him the new interpretation. Contra discussions ofDonnellan, his distinction between referential and
attributive has nothing to do with words changing their meaning or reference. In referential use, if S refers to X, incorrectly, for
he is not guilty, by saying 'H's murderer is insane', the reference is achieved, owing to the normal meanings of the words. The
words have usual reference. Accepting this requires a 'firm sense' of the distinction between what words mean and what they
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through education and practice, describing the ways in which words match the world, and telling him
what S means on occasions of utterance. When S (or S' or Sspeaks with, say, Gricean intentions,
he is understood, for H applies the principle of charity to reveal S's intention. There is no 'correct
theory' in advance, nothing to be wrong or sceptical about, merely a learned, mutual sensitivity to ways
of speaking, a network of practices so rich as to account for new and novel utterances and contexts42.
Davidson considers proper names in dubbing or christening. How does one match names with
definite descriptions? As argued in 1.4 (and, indirectly, 1.2), the process clearly depends upon no rules.
Theories arguing for a demonstrative element in proper names are more promising, giving 'partial'
rules for dubbing. However, the element does not render names, and natural kind terms, pure
demonstratives, for new words in these categories create, or provide tokens of, new meanings or
contexts. Such creativity is carried farther, or rendered ubiquitous, by Mrs Malaprop, for she shows that
all words can be given new uses in new or novel contexts43. Although she adheres to a conceptual
scheme difficult of access, she can be interpreted44. Davidson has a 'short line' with theories arguing
for the necessity of mutual failure of interpretation or translatability cases: on the premise that an
activity that could not be interpreted in one's language would plausibly be speech, one may conclude
that an activity that cannot be interpreted in one's language as language is not speech. As one may
agree, an argument by fiat is surely unsatisfactory, for it makes 'translatability into a familiar tongue a
criterion of languagehood', a premise Davidson rejects45. Interpretation requires rather the issuing by S
in his speech acts of intentions and sincerity conditions, and the recognition by H of these intentions,
from which he ascribes to S prepositional attitudes (explanation of these points is detailed and is given
in 11). S and H must both have access to S's intentions (remaining respectively a first- and a third-
person perspective). Davidson allows a non-transitivity of intentions, but by no means are they
ineffable or inaccessible. It is this relationship, guiding the access of S and H to S's intentions and
refer to and what speakers mean and what they refer to. S refers, be it deliberately or mistakenly, to someone else in saying (of
X) 'H's murderer is insane1, and he says something true when X is indeed insane. Davidson's comments are, not unusually, wont
to seem alarming at first: 'S has said something true by using a sentence that is false. This is done intentionally all the time, for
example in irony or metaphor1, and 'coherent theory1 could not allow that in the circumstances S's sentence was true or that S
would think so if he. knew the facts. A belief changes neither the truth nor the reference of a sentence, and for the same reasons.
Humpty Dumpty knows he cannot be interpreted, for Alice has no means by which to discern the reference ofhis words ('til I tell
you'), and yet Mrs Malaprop and Reverend Spooner are interpreted, and owing, as Donnellan says, to relevant 'background'
information. This Davidson explains as simply the body of theory shared between S and H in a communication situation, as
described in the principle of charity: S speaks with the intention that H recognise his intention; that is, he speaks in a way he is
convinced H will be able to interpret. If needs be, H adjusts his theory. S and H may both, in reference to fictional entities, not
know that S refers to a phantom, but intended, true reference is still communicated.
42 This defuses Black's arguments against Grice, considered in II.
43 She and Reverend Spooner show up the problem which Davidson (1986) p441 wishes to examine, that of describing what is
entailed by the possession of a language, and of'...being at home with the business of linguistic communication'.
44 Cf. Davidson (2001j) p183.
45 Davidson (2001 j) pi 86. One might here refer back to Orianne's objections to Quine's arguments for failure of translatability.
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allowing interpretation, that is described by Grice, and it is to Grice that Davidson defers. This move is
accompanied by the relinquishing of the analytic/synthetic distinction, and a belief in the holistic view
that there is no demarcation between theory and language. In the writing, through Convention T, of a
purely extensional language, as following Quine (and contra Rorty), through learning and the testing of
theory one enriches one's vocabulary for explaining science and experience; this is a condition of
discovery and progress, and, in the limiting case, sentences previously taken as false become true
because provided with adequate scientific notation46. Davidson counsels caution, for the introduction of
new languages with 'shiny new phrases', may surreptitiously introduce terms for those found
discredited in past theories. This is by way of emphasising that one accepts a vocabulary on the
condition that it faces continual assessment with a view to revision47.
As with Quine, all sentences have empirical content, and are open to revision. A theory of meaning
for language is not the embodiment of a conceptual scheme, but a web of belief, or 'field of force', for
categorising experience48. Difficulty in categorising is difficulty in translating, and in some cases it may
prove immensely difficult. One's field of force serves to categorise, or translate, experience, and
attention must shift to how this may be achieved4'. Again, it is by the application of Convention T,
giving a theory of truth as a theory of translation, in a purely non-intensional vocabulary; it postulates
no shared meanings, no rigorous distinctions, and no view from nowhere; rather, it directs the reading
off of attitudes and the application of charity, as, '...all that can be done to ensure communication',
46 The arguments of Lewis (1969) pertinent at this stage are taken up in Part IV. From similar premises Lewis, as said, writes a
theory of analyticity and intentionality for language.
47 Davidson (2001j) pl89. The introduction of new vocabulary, describing physiological states, to avoid reference to intentions
and thoughts, might still for a speaker play the roles of referring to the 'messy old mental concepts'. One cannot tell, and the
retention of old vocabulary or the acceptance of the new provides no basis forjudging the two conceptual schemes to be the same
or different. Davidson writes, that what seems like a 'thrilling' discovery, that 'truth is relative to a conceptual scheme', is, by
these lights, nothing more than the truth of a sentence as relative to the language to which it belongs. Kuhn's scientists may be
only 'words apart'.
48 Davidson (2001j) pl89. Giving up an analytic/synthetic distinction abandons the conception of meaning that goes with it: that
some sentences have empirical content and meaning, and that others are true by meaning alone. Davidson argues that one can
maintain that all sentences have empirical content, and that this is explained by reference to facts, experience or stimuli.
'Meanings gave us a way to talk about categories, the organising structure of language, and so on; but it is possible, as we have
seen, to give upmeanings and analyticity while retaining the idea of language as embodying a conceptual scheme'. This issues in
a dualism of conceptual scheme and empirical content, and an empiricism without the dogmas of analytic/synthetic distinctions
or reductionism. It is an empiricism without the untenable idea that content can be allocated sentence by sentence.
Davidson avows the influence ofWhorf, Kuhn and Feyerabend on his thinking regarding the connections of conceptual scheme
and empirical content. Bernstein (1983) pi says that the incommensurability that these authors advocate, when correctly
understood, does not entail relativism.
49 Davidson (2001j) ppl92-193 assays some difficulties of translation and commensurability. A language may contain simple
predicates the extensions of which are satisfactorily translated by no simple predicates in another language. This point can be
made, for Ihe languages share a common 'ontology', with concepts individuating the same objects. 'We can be clear about
breakdowns in translations when they are local enough, for a background of generally successful translation provides what is
needed to make the failures intelligible'; but how is one to make sense of a language that cannot be translated at all. One cannot
turn to a common property of organising experience, for this can apply only to 'pluralities', which can only be individuated
according to tenets of one's own language. Perhaps language performs not the organising of experience but the fitting of, or
coping with, experience, and analysing this proposal turns one's attention from the referential 'apparatus' of language to whole
sentences. 'It is sentences that predict (or arc used to predict), sentences that cope or deal with things, that fit our sensory
promptings, that can be compared or confronted with the evidence. It is sentences also that face the tribunal of experience,
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against, '...a background of common beliefs'50. There is no demarcation of relative conceptual
schemes, for all can be translated; there is between oneself and one's interlocutor only ever a
'... difference of opinion'31.
The revision of theory, in the light of, 'recalcitrant experience' is not simply the improving of
methods of interpretation on the basis of more evidence (in particular of S's intentions and of
recognition of his intentions), for each theory used in interpreting an utterance is 'geared to the
occasion'; little or nothing is brought over to new interpretative situations from earlier for there is no
settled body of theory (no conventions), with which to work52. In making an utterance S exploits a
mutual knowledge condition (one of a number of such conditions which must recognised): he wishes to
be understood, and for H to recognise his intention, and so he utters words he believes will be
interpreted in a specific way. He forms a theory of the 'interpreter's readiness to interpret'. Davidson
adds a clarification: S does not necessarily speak in such a way as to prompt H to modify his 'prior'
though of course they must face it together'. In short, sensor;' experience provides ail of the evidence that there is for the
acceptance of sentences (or theories). The sentence describes, predicts or copes with and so forth, provided it fits the evidence.
50 The quotations are from Davidson (2001j) ppl97 and 196 respectively.
51 Cf. Davidson (2001j) ppl93-I98. Theories may be bome out by available evidence and still be false, for what is required is
attention to the totality of'... possible sensory evidence past, present and future... for a theory to fit or face up to the totality of
possible sensory evidence is for that theory to be true'. Furthermore, if the theory quantifies over objects, sets and so forth,
'...what it says about these entities is true provided the theory as a whole fits the sensory evidence. One can see how, from this
point of view, such entities might be called posits. It is reasonable to call something a posit if it can be contrasted with something
that is not. Here the something that is not is sensory experience—at least that is the idea'. The notion of fitting the facts adds
nothing to the concept of being true. Sensoiy experience, rather than mere evidence, expresses an idea about the source of
evidence, but adds nothing against which to test rival conceptual schemes. "Ihe totality of sensory evidence is what we want
provided it is all the evidence there is; and all the evidence there is is just what it takes to make our sentences or theories true';
there is no fact, of experience, or of experience rubbing up against reality, making them true.
Rival conceptual schemes are more or less acceptable as they provide viable descriptions of experience; they are, as Davidson
says, because genuine alternatives, 'largely true [because offering a viable description of experience] but not translatable'. The
matter ofwhether this is a workable criterion is simply that of whether one accepts Davidson's conditions on Convention T as a
theory of meaning and translation. Davidson repeats the derivation of Convention T, and that a satisfactory theory of truth for
language L must entail, for every sentence s of L, a theorem of the form's is true iff p', in which s is replaced by a description
and p by s if L is English and by a translation if not. Davidson repeats, that a truth theory, ('our best intuition as to how the
concept of truth is used'), is irreducibly a translation theory. This he applies to elucidating the notion of partial
incommensurability, or failure of translation, in opposition to that of total relativism, or, 'the possibility of making changes and
contrasts in conceptual schemes intelligible by reference to the common part', a theory of translation without assumptions of
sharedmeanings, concepts or beliefs. Belief and meaning are, as the discussion of Donnellan shows, interdependent, and because
the two relevant aspects in the interpretation of speech behaviour, attribution of beliefs and interpretation of sentences, are
interdependent. Davidson continues, in a presentation of the principle of charity and of Gricean meaning theory: H cannot
interpret S's speech without knowing 'a good deal' about S's beliefs, intents and desires, and distinctions between respective
beliefs require more fine-grained distinctions reported in understood speech. Davidson asks how one is to interpret speech and to
attribute beliefs and intentions. One adopts 'certain very general attitudes', toward sentences, and Davidson suggests as the core
attitude, that ofholding true. This begs no questions, for '... ifwe merely know that someone holds a certain sentence to be true,
we know neither what he means by the sentence nor what belief his holding it true represents. His holding the sentence true is
thus the vector of two forces: the problem of interpretation is to abstract from the evidence a workable theory ofmeaning and an
acceptable theory of belief. Davidson makes a response to arguments claiming the incommensurability or relativism of
conceptual schemes and beliefs. 'Ifwe choose to translate some alien sentence rejected by its speakers by a sentence to which we
are strongly attached on a community basis, we may be tempted to call this a difference in schemes; if we decide to
accommodate the evidence in other ways, it may be more natural to speak of a difference of opinion. But when others think
differently from us, no general principle, or appeal to evidence, can force us to decide that the difference lies in our beliefs rather
than in our concepts.
We must conclude, I think, that the attempt to give a solid meaning to tire idea of conceptual relativism, and hence to the idea
of a conceptual scheme, fares no better when based on partial failure of translation than when based on total failure. Given the
underlying methodology of interpretation, we could not be in a position to judge that others had concepts or beliefs radically
different from our own'. There is no independent reality against which one can check conceptual schemes, but this does not
jettison the notion of objective truth. Conceptual relativism turns upon the dogma of a dualism of scheme and reality, and without
this, while yet truth remains relative to language (described in Convention T), 'that is as objective as can be', and the problems of
incommensurability are avoided.
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theory (his conceptual scheme in its most recent constitution, or his field of force), although he may.
Prior theory is to be distinguished from 'passing' theory, describing the way in which H interprets S,
and how S intends H to interpret his utterance. There obtain no shared semantic theories and no guiding
conventions, for what is shared in successful communication is passing theory. 'Only if these coincide
is understanding complete'; according to the moment of the matter communicated, prior theory is
changed a little, a lot, or not at all. As conversation continues prior theories come more into line, as do
passing theories, and '[t]he asymptote of agreement and understanding is reached when passing
theories coincide'. Passing theories cannot define S's and H's linguistic competence (better the reserve
ofprior theory), for they contain ever-changing catalogues ofproper names and interpretations53.
Everj' deviation from ordinary usage, as long as it is agreed on for the moment
(knowingly deviant, or not, on one, or both, sides) is in the passing theory as a feature of
what the words mean on that occasion.
These are literal, first meanings, and they account for deviant, non-literal usage54. Only a recursive
theory explains why when a word or phrase takes the role of another, or appears in a demonstrative
construction, the implications for logical relations to other words and phrases are carried in the passing
theory, for, owing to its derivation from Convention T, it is a purely extensional theory. If one
considers prior theory as carrying sedimented uses of a natural language, and considers the case of a
first conversation between S and H, the theory will be that which one expects one hearing one's speech
to use. However, one invariably tailor's one's speech to situations at hand, and, '...we cannot fail to
have premonitions as to which of the proper names we know are apt to be correctly understood'55. This
being so, prior theories are infrequently shared; novel, parasitical and fictional utterances, or their
analogues, are 'ubiquitous', and nothing in a theory of communication depends upon prior theories.
Prior theories could not be compared to languages; indeed, they have the features of speaker's idiolects.
Another approach might emphasise the framework of 'categories and rules' codified in grammars.
This may facilitate study and interpretation of syntax, yet it could never describe or tabulate S's
intentions in speaking. Moreover, with a Mrs Malaprop or a Reverend Spooner, or indeed any creative
speaker, the provision of grammars would be futile, necessitating different axioms for different
52 Davidson (1986) p441.
53 Davidson (1986) p442 for both quotations and the intended quotation. As Davidson so rightly says, the matter of degree of
success in communication is irrelevant in assessment ofhis argument.
"Davidson (1986) p442-443. All meanings, all deviations, however transient, are literal, or first meanings. Passing theory is not
what anyone would call a natural language. Besides, comprehensive knowledge of one would be 'useless', for each is pertinent
only for a specific occasion. They cannot be said to have been learned, or to be guided by convention; and while things learned
are useful in arriving at a passing theory, nothing that can be leamt is the passing theory.
92
speakers, and the, '...more general and abstract [the grammar] is, the more difference there can be
[tolerated between grammars] without it mattering to communication'56. These problems indicate the
difference between prior and passing theories: what S and H share, allowing transport, in successful
communication, '.. .is not learned and so is not a language governed by rules or conventions known to
[them] in advance', it is a passing theory, changing in each instance the flux of prior theory.
Interlocutors, if lucky, 'converge' on passing theories, so enriching their body of prior theory, and
facilitating their operations with further passing theories for new situations; there is nothing else to a
shared conventional language, were there to be, there would be a, '...new language for every
unexpected turn in the conversation... '57. S's ability to interpret H is an ability to form a passing theory
for S; there is no such thing as knowing a language, for one understands '...knowing a language and
knowing our way around in the world generally' in palpably the same way, allowing only maxims and
generalities for the construction of passing theories, derived, perhaps, by, 'wit, luck and wisdom' from
a congeries of private vocabulary and grammar, knowledge of ways in which others have
communicated and other rules of thumb58.
Davidson concludes that one should try to say how convention is involved in language, or, '...give up
the attempt to illuminate how we communicate by appeal to conventions', and it is the concern of the
following chapters to offer precisely such an explanation. It is argued in II that intended meaning can,
again as it were, remain in S's utterance: full explication of this awaits II.5 in which the ramifications
of Strawson's distinction are described, not the least important of which is that a distinction can be
made between literal and parasitical in speech contexts, requiring only what is called in the following,
first intention, and sensitive only to conventions of language as described in Austin's work.
55 Davidson (1986) p443.
56 Davidson (1986) p444. Davidson argues that a framework complex enough to account for these difficulties, and divergences
between speakers, will go to show that they are, indeed, actual.
5' Davidson (1986) p445. There is, Davidson adds, nothing to characterising the abilities of one in command of a language.
58 Davidson (1986) pp445-446. Arguing that the ability to communicate is the ability to make oneself understood, and to
understand, is, for Davidson, fundamentally to revise 'standard ideas of language mastery '. There is no shared grammar, body of
rules or core of consistent behaviour. Language conceived of as the construction of passing theories abandons the ordinary notion
of language competence, and the distinction between 'knowing a language and knowing our way around in the world generally'.
Hacking (1986) pp453-454 offers arguments regarding the necessary revision ofDavidson's premises concerning Convention
T, and of being true-in-L (considering also 'Semantics for Natural Languages', pp55-64 and 'Reply to Foster', pp171-179 in
(2001)), and draws attention to the ways in which senses and references may emerge in the light of contextual evidence; as
Davidson writes, one can fit languages to speakers with '...various ways ofmatching words and objects'. One can then name the
language, making it, as Davidson says, one for which reference and truth have been given roles. Hacking replies that this leaves
outstanding the question of whether evidence allows one lo attribute the dubbed language to the speaker, and this changes the
picture presented in Davidson's philosophy of language. Davidson here implies, for Hacking, that H does not simply apply a
Tarskian truth theory, but works through a series of potential, and changing, Ls for tire discovery of one fitting S. This, Hacking
suggests, elides the two aspects of Davidson's theory, for Ls need not be languages at all, and could remain a part of theory even
if one denies there is such a thing as language. Davidson shifts his perspective with regard to Convention T in an illuminating
way; he sees that while Tarski defines truth for a formal language in such a way that translation is assumed, but later, that for
radical interpretation, this is what cannot be assumed: thus he attempts to illumine translation by applying a theory of truth. The
Ls in Tarski are formal languages; the Ls in Davidson, at least for the Davidson for whom there is no such thing as a language,
are 'merely formal constructs', and Flacking argues that Davidson's adoption of Tarskian truth theories is incorrect.
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Additionally, Grice's work itself gives a means of dealing with parasitical cases, the import ofwhich is
only fully apparent in IV. 5. Suffice to say that for the non-literal cases, those in which, Derrida says,
'transport' is impossible, Grice examines in the closest detail the ways in which intended meaning may
fail to be communicated. In deceptive or parasitical cases, one might think, H could only come to
understand S by inferring to S's real or disguised intentions, and as the complexity of the cases
considered rises so does the complexity and number of the associated intentions, and so the reasoning
required by H to understand them. In what follows, this is frequently referred to as a regress of nested
intentions, or second intention. However, Grice teaches one to think of intentions intended to be
recognised, in literal, sincere or parasitical, deceptive utterances, as sincerity conditions, from which H
can infer to S's intentions in speaking. In all such cases, S must appeal to types in his use of speech act
tokens, types he knows H will recognise (or, to conventions), be it to communicate a sincere belief or a
deception: his success in the latter depends upon this. Thus, Grice says, with application to cases of
mounting complexity, S, for communication to be successful (with sincere or deceptive intent), must
appeal to mutually-known conventions. In interpretation, H must appeal to the same conventions for
explication of what S says. These conventions could never be written, Derrida argues, for there is no
determinate context for each speech act type, and there are two points to be made in response. The first,
awaiting presentation of Lewis' work in IV, saying that the relativisation to literal and non-literal
contexts is obviated by the relativisation to acts in different possible worlds. Of immediate note is the
second, giving the theory of convention from which this possible worlds semantics derives; it allows
that conventions for language can be derived from simple, 'primitive' institutional, or social
conventions, and that one can follow the Davidsonian thesis that there is nothing to be said for the idea
of conventions of language, and that peculiarly Derridean meaning-scepticism would do well to
consider the conclusions of Lewis' work. Derrida's analysis correctly rejects the notion of conventions
of language for the reason that, on Austin's theory, there could be established no frilly applicable
speech acts for each context of use. A theory of meaning intentions derived from Grice and Lewis
shows how such a theory can be written.
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II MEANING
1. Meaning and Intentions
Grice's theory of meaning distinguishes between semantic and syntactical theories. The basis of his
analysis is S's intention in speaking: noises and marks have meanings as the products of intentions to
communicate, and communication is achieved when H recognises S's intention1. For some, Grice's
argument has a false premise, and it is argued that meanings are independent of psychological states2:
Chomsky makes this objection, and extends the criticism to Searle3. Suppes remarks that criticisms of
1 Cf. Avramides, A.; Meaning and Mind: An Examination of a Gricean Account of Language (MIT) 1989, p5. Avramides
emphasises that this entails (unspoken) notions of sincerity and truthfulness, and on this cf. 1.5 and especially III. The role of
sincerity conditions is fundamental to the analysis offered in this dissertation of intentions in speech acts. There are (detailed in
III. 1) consequences for theories using both formal semantics and pragmatics, and particularly to elucidate notions of convention.
As Loar, B.; Mind and Meaning (Cambridge University Press) 1981, p244 says, the communication intentions relevant to a
theory of S-meaning are those correlative with the sentences of a language as that of S and his population, thoughMillikan, R.G.;
'Proper Function and Convention in Speech Acts', pp25-43 in Hahn, L.E. (ed.); The Philosophy ofP.F. Strawson (Illinois, Open
Court) 1998, pp28-29 disagrees.
2
Lycan says that Avramides rejects this traditionally central tenet of Gricean theory. Cf. Lycan, W.G.; 'Review ofMeaning and
Mind: An Examination of a Gricean Account ofLanguage by Anita Avramides', Mind and Language, vol. VI, no. 1, pp83-86,
1991. Exegesis of this point is important for foil understanding of the substance ofGrice's theory. (See also Black, M.; 'Meaning
and Intention: An Examination of Grice's Views', New Literary History, vol. IV, no. 2, pp257-279, 1972, esp. p268, and for an
attempt to assay the 'foil significance' of Grice on this, Kuroda, S-Y.; 'A Formal Theory of Speech Acts', Linguistics and
Philosophy, vol. IX, no. 4, pp495-524, 1986. A companion piece is Kuroda, S-Y.; 'An Explanatory Theory of Communicative
Intentions', Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. XII, no. 6, pp655-681, 1989. (On the regress of intentions set up by Grice's analysis,
cf. pp675ff). See also, intriguingly for Davidson's appeal to Grice, Davidson (2001j) ppl84-186. The locus classicus of such
theories is Schiffer, S.; 'Intention-Based Semantics', Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol. XXIII, no. 2, ppl 19-156, 1982).
It is the case that Lycan overstates Avramides' objections: she rejects not the reductive component of intentional analysis, but its
most widely accepted interpretation, and of. Avramides (1989) px). See also Wiggins, D.; 'A Reply to Mr Alston', pp48-52 in
Steinberg, D.D. and Jakobovits, L.A. (eds.); Semantics: An Interdisciplinary Reader in Philosophy, Linguistics and Psychology
(Cambridge University Press) 1971, p48.
3 Cf. Lycan (1991) p84, and Avramides (1989). See also Coady, C.A.J.; 'Meaning by Stephen R. Schiffer', Philosophy, vol. LI,
no. 1, ppl02-109, 1976. Clarity concerning Chomsky's remarks on Searle requires further study of Speech Acts and consideration
of Searle's views in his later works. From this arises (in III.5) a suggestion that Searle offers a workable argument against
Derrida's for the relative importance of paradigms and parasites in speech act theory. Additionally, Searle introduces a broader
notion of literal meaning than that which Chomsky opposes to Grice, and contributes to the criticism of Chomsky's notions of
rules and conventions of language, given in Chomsky, N.; Reflections on Language (New York, Random House) 1975, pp53ff,
wi Rules and Representations (Oxford, Blackwell) 1980, pp81-85. See also Yu (1979), and Biro, J.; 'Intentionalism in the
Theory ofMeaning', The Monist. vol. LXII, no. 2, pp238-258, 1979.
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Grice focus on the tenor of his work and not the detail, and while this practice shall not be followed,
Suppes gives a classification of the main arguments with which a start shall be made4.
Firstly, the problematical concept of literal meaning, and whether it is required in a definition of S-
meaning. Chomsky takes this objection as good against Grice, Searle and Strawson, arguing that they
are not concerned to clarify the relevant distinction between theories of meaning and of
communication, and so to derive a theory of meaning for utterances from analysis of their syntax5.
Suppes replies that Chomsky's theory itself gives no adequate answer, and that, besides, Grice's is
merely a 'sketch'6. (There is here a genuine issue, echoing points raised by Derrida, and taken up in III,
for now some general points are made). Grice argues that meanings are reported in intentions to
communicate, and Chomsky disagrees7. Suppes grants Chomsky that the sentences of scientific
treatises may support an argument for his case, but that they are 'non-standard', when considering the
'primary use' of language8. (One might think that Derrida over-states the continuity between the two).
Context-dependency characterises the give-and-take of daily conversation, and analysis of literal
meanings will not grant this. Secondly, the question of whether one can talk about 'the' rules of
language (Suppes opposes this to 'some' rules of language'. Deliverance on this matter awaits the
discussion of Strawson in II.4 and 5, and, fully, m and IV. The discussion is held over).
Thirdly, and drawing on Chomsky's criticisms of Quine and B.F. Skinner, Grice is accused of
behaviourism. While Chomsky asserts the primacy of literal meaning against Grice's support for the
motley of communication, and while Avramides addresses none of her remarks to Chomsky's criticism
4
Suppes, P.; 'The Primacy of Utterer's Meaning', ppl09-129 in Grandy, R.E. and Warner, R. (eds.); Philosophical Grounds of
Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends (Oxford, Clarendon) 1986. Suppes' points must be referred back to the discussion of
Derrida in Introduction 3 and forward to that of Searle in III. Suppes attends with particular attention to Grice's notions of
propositions and mood markers, and on this cf. II.3.
5 Chomsky (1975) pp36ff and 54ff. Chomsky criticises Searle's theory on the basis that there are uses of language that are not
communicative, cases in which '...the speaker's intention with regard to an audience offers no particular insight into the literal
meaning of what he says'. In such a theory, Chomsky adds, literal meaning is 'reintroduced as an unexplained meaning'. One
may, for instance, be dissembling for whatever reason. Examples of the type Chomsky considers are amply represented in
Strawson (1971). Chomsky's hard-headed objections, to his regret, bring him close to Derrida. Cf. Cowley, J. (ed.); 'Twelve
Great Thinkers of our Time', New Statesman. pp201-237, 14 July 2003, and p36, 21 July 2003 in which Chomsky is quoted on
the 'postmodernist intellectual cretins, Baudrillard, Derrida and Negri', describing their work as 'bullshit'.
6
Suppes (1986) pi 12. Others stress the modesty ofGrice's theory, not least Avramides.
7 Searle, J.R.; 'Literal Meaning', ppl 17-136 in Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts (Cambridge
University Press) 1979, in presenting his theory of 'background', offers examples of apparently literal utterances having
'undetermined', literal meaning. Cf. especially ppl26ff. For the response see Chomsky (1975) pp62-63ff. On pp67ff sees no
reason why the speaker should have the intentions described. 'In the case of honest self-expression, the speaker does not care. In
the case of casual conversation, the speaker's intentions with regard to a hypothetical audience need not go beyond his intentions
with regard to the actual audience, and plainly there need be no intention that the actual audience believe that the speaker's
beliefs are such-and-such'. Suppose, he writes, that '...there are native English speakers who habitually misunderstand what they
read or hear... Then even if this speaker happens to liave the intention that Grice assumes to be necessary, it will be necessary to
take p to be something like "is a speaker of English who will think that the utterer believes that q upon learning x", where q is the
literal meaning of x'. The theory of speech acts, Chomsky (p73) writes, is a theoiy of communication and not ofmeaning
8 Cf. Chomsky (1975) pp59ff. This should remind one of Derrida (1977b) p233 seizing upon Searle's use of modelling in the
economic and social sciences for an exemplar of correct method. Suppes (1986) ppl 12-113 has an apt response: literal meanings
may facilitate exchange in theoretical but not in experimental science.
'
Suppes (1986) pi 13. One must say that Chomsky's questions about Grice's theory of linguistic rules are answered by Lewis'
replacing the notion of rules with that of conventions. Chomsky's opposition to Wittgenstein is clear (pp76-77).
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ofGrice, she charges others (specifically Schiffer and Loar), with a mistaken, 'reductive' analysis, one
leaving Grice's work open to the criticism it has received10. Grice argues for a reduction, but on
grounds common to Derrida and Searle, namely that intentions cannot be understood prior to
understanding language". From this he forms theories of speaker meaning, occasion meaning, and
timeless meaning, and in this lies his importance. Avramides writes that the question guiding Grice's
enquiry is, '...whether there can be thought without language"2; he, again in common with Derrida and
Searle, says there cannot, yet commits to notions (of timeless meaning, of intentions, of the worth of
philosophical analysis and of convention), vastly at odds with Derrida's scepticism. Derrida sees in
Searle a necessary commitment to an unworkable theory ofmind, namely, that the mind is 'objective',
and able to be, '...comprehended from an external, detached, and impersonal perspective"3. Grice has
10 Cf. Avramides (1989) pix and 6-7, and on the required 'asymmetry' between understanding and analysis, pp21-26. Also
Chomsky (1975) especially pp56-57. Though he receives none of Avramides' attention, Chomsky (cf. pp73ff) views Grice as a
reductionist. Chomsky states, in opposition to Grice, a theory of 'readiness' in the use of expressions. Recall that Derrida (1977b)
pl93 remarks that he and Searle (unbeknownst) agree that there can be no intentionality without language; from this premise,
shared with Grice, the latter may be cleared of Chomsky's charge. In place of the reductive analysis of Grice, Avramides (1989)
pp38ff argues that his theory gives account of how the semantic and the intentional (or prepositional) match up, without reducing
the one to the other. This is one of the lessons Derrida can leam from Grice
11 Cf. Derrida (1977b) ppl93ff. The most compelling argument for the way in which speakers come to leam operations with
language takes its beginning from McDowell in response to Strawson (studied in III. 1). The theory countenances no preference
for formal semantics or use theories, but is sensitive to the benefits of both, and carries notions of guiding intentions and
saturable convention with which one may reply to Derrida (cf. IV).
12 Avramides (1989) px.
13 Avramides (1989) p62. Cf. Derrida (1977b) p205. As seen in HI.3-5, Derrida is surely wrong on this matter, and cf. Searle,
J.R.; 'Response: Meaning, Intentionality and Speech Acts', pp81-102 in Lepore, E. and van Gulick, R. (eds.); John Searle and
his Critics (Oxford, Blackwell) 1991, p88 and p94 and especially p97. On p82 he is explicit concerning the grounding of a theory
of speech acts in a theory of intentionality. Cf. also Dummett, M.; 'Language and Communication', ppl92-212 in George, A.
(ed.); Reflections on Chomsky (Oxford, Blackwell) 1989. Dummett argues that an allied debate, between those regarding
language as vital for thought, indeed, its vehicle, and those regarding it is a means of communication, is misleading and
distracting. Bennett (1976) p25 puts consideration of the thesis that intentionality is prior to language at its heart. He finds Sellars
to be the author of the most potent arguments against the thesis, and it is well to recall that Rorty credits Sellars as having
rendered uninteresting the problem of intentionality: see Sellars, W.; 'Language as Thought and as Communication', Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, vol. XXIX, vol. 4, pp506-527, 1968; 'Intentionality and the Mental', pp507-539 in Feigl, H.,
Scriven, M. and Maxwell, G. (eds.); Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Volume II, Concepts, Theories and the
Mind-Body Problem (University ofMinnesota) 1958; and 'Notes on Intentionality', The Journal of Philosophy, vol. LXI, no. 21,
pp655-665, 1964. Rorty's comment is contained in the foreword to Wrathall and Malpas (2000a). All discussions of Sellars'
brilliance return to the ideas presaged in 'Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind', pp253-329 in Feigl, H. and Scriven, M.
(eds.);Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy ofScience: Volume I, The Foundations ofScience and the Concepts ofPsychology
and Psychoanalysis (University of Minnesota) 1956. Bennett finds an argument in defence of the thesis in Hampshire, S.;
Thought andAction (London, Chatto and Windus) 1959, pp90ff.
Bennett argues that language is coordinated communication, and emphasises the importance of practice, or 'behaviour' in
writing a theory (p3), endeavouring to forge non-Wittgensteinian connections between meaning and use. This includes a
rejection of Chomsky's arguments against behaviourism, and those to the end that there is no profit in considering human
language as purposive, intentional communication, or gesturing, or as a network of 'iconic' relationships (pl4). On p6 Bennett
rejects Chomsky's arguments against there being a primary use of language. In addition to the work on Grice, cf. Chomsky, N.;
Language andMind (New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich) 1972, especially, with regard to the issues raised in Derrida, J.;
'Form and Meaning: A Note on the Phenomenology of Language', ppl55-174 in (1982), 'Form and Meaning in Natural
Languages', ppl00-l 14.
For excellent discussion of the prospects for an epistemology based upon a realist account of linguistic truth, such as broached
by Dummett, cf. Scruton, R.; 'Truth Conditions and Criteria', The Aristotelian Society: Supplementary Volume, vol. L, ppl93-
216, 1976, and the response Wright, C.; 'Truth Conditions and Criteria', pp47-69 in Realism, Meaning and Truth (Oxford,
Blackwell) 1993. See in addition, 'Strawson on Anti-Realism', pp70-84, 'Anti-Realist Semantics: The Role of Criteria', pp357-
382, and 'Second Thoughts about Criteria', pp383-402, and on the continuities between Wittgenstein's arguments for rule-
following and Chomsky's generative grammar, see Wright, C.; 'Wittgenstein's Rule-Following Considerations and tine Central
Point of Theoretical Linguistics', pp233-264 in George (1989). In Fodor, J.; 'Meaning, Convention and Tlte Blue Book', pp73-94
in Macintosh, J.J. and Coval, S. (eds.); The Business ofReason (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul) 1969, Fodor argues that the
sense of 'convention' in Wittgenstein's arguments for meaning as use is unclear, and that applying a notion of convention to
explicate the meanings of words is misguided. The need for criteria of application is made at Wittgenstein, L.; The Blue and
Brown Books (Oxford, Blackwell) §§24-25, and commented on by Fodor pp77-78: their use against sceptical arguments brings
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no such commitment, holding only (a point clearer in Grice than in Searle), that meaning in
communication, in paradigmatic and parasitical cases, in inscriptions written, gestural or oral, is
understood by the application of a principle of charity, ascribing to S mental states and skills for the
manipulation of language, a conception entailing, following Davidson, that a theory of meaning
requires a prior theory of the anomalism of the mental. Much of this present section is devoted to
establishing terms.
Grice considers two sets of examples, the first illustrative of what he terms 'natural' meaning, the
second of'non-natural' meaning". The first set runs:
Those spots mean (meant) measles
Those spots didn't mean anything to me, but to the doctor they meant measles
The recent budget means that we shall have a hard year
Grice notes five points15. Firstly, in such cases 'x means that p' entails p; one cannot, for instance, say
'Those spots mean measles, but he hasn't got measles'. Secondly, one cannot argue from 'Those spots
mean measles' to a conclusion about what they mean: that is, one cannot argue that what was 'meant
by these spots was that he had measles"6. Thirdly, one cannot argue from 'Those spots mean measles'
to a conclusion saying that a specific person meant something by these spots. The same goes for the
budget example. None of the examples, to state the fourth condition, can be rephrased in such a way
that the verb can be followed by a sentence or phrase in quotation marks, and thus there can be no
formulation such as, 'Those spots mean "measles'" or 'Those spots mean "he has measles'". Fifthly,
the examples permit a restatement with the formulation, 'The fact that...': 'The fact that he had those
spots meant that he had measles'.
To these sample sentences Grice opposes the second set17:
Those three rings on the bell mean that the bus is full
That remark, "Smith couldn't get on without his trouble and strife", meant that Smith
found his wife indispensable
In these cases the conditions differ, as seen when the five points are restated18. Firstly, in these
instances 'x means that p' does not entail p: the driver, for instance, may be mistaken. Secondly, one
Fodor's response, pp89-91. Allen, B.G.; Criteria and Intentionality: Studies in Wittgenstein (Doctoral Dissertation, Princeton
University) 1986, is an incomparable study ofWittgenstein on criteria.
14
Grice, II.P.; 'Meaning', pp213-223 in Studies in the Way ofWords (Harvard University Press) (1989e). The examples are from
p213.
5 All from Gricc (1989c) pp213-214.
16 Hemight have painted them.
17 Grice (1989e) p214.
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can argue from them to statements about what is or was meant by the (non-verbal) rings on the bell,
and the remark respectively. Thirdly, and following closely, one can argue from the given utterances to
conclusions about what S meant, or, significantly, should have meant by the utterance". Fourthly, both
new examples can be restated in sentences in which the verb is followed by a further sentence, or
phrase, in quotation marks: 'Those rings on the bell mean "the bus is full'". Fifthly, a sentence, for
example, of the form, 'The fact that the bell has been rung three times means that the bus is full', is not,
in contrast to the examples in the first set, a restatement of the sample sentence. Examination shows
that the two are not approximate in meaning. The verb 'means', and its use in verb phrases, embodies,
in the first set, use in the 'natural' sense, and in the second, the 'non-natural' sense. (Grice adopts the
abbreviation 'meansNN' (or 'meaning^') for non-natural meaning)20. Black writes that Grice
distinguishes the interpretation of mere signs from the possession of meaning by an intentional
utterance, and, as must be recalled at all times in the discussion ofGrice, the scope of, 'utterance' in his
work covers gestures and all verbal and non-verbal communicative acts21. Difficulties in the
interpretation of terminology, pre-eminently in respective philosopher's use of 'convention', will be a
reoccuring theme in the three remaining chapters of this work, indeed it is to the point that a revised
definition undercuts sceptical arguments. For Black the first intimation of the difficulty is in the
definition of Grice's terms 'natural' and 'non-natural', a difficulty studied by Ziff. Ziff objects to the
distinction of meaning and meaning^. It is imperative, he writes, for semantics to make a workable
distinction between the senses of 'mean' in two examples ofGricean meanings, namely,
(1) The sentence 'Snow is white' means snow is white
(2) The adjective 'ungulate' means having hoofs22
IfGrice is correct one should be able to rewrite the sentences replacing 'means' with 'means^', these
both being mutable, conventional meanings. Ziff argues that this cannot be done, and that Grice's work
is 'counterfeit' coin. His arguments are considered below.
18 All from Grice (1989e) p214.
"Cf. Ziff, P.; "OnH.P. Grice's Account ofMeaning'. Analysis, vol. XXVIII,no. l,ppl-8, 1967,pp2-3.
20 Grice (1989) pp214-215. In the first class are gathered sentences of the type, 'A means (meant) to do so-and-so (by x)', and in
the second, of the type, 'A means (meant) something by x'.
21 Black (1972) pp258-259. Cf. Note and tire belief expressed therein that a distinction more productive than that Derrida makes
between the spoken and the non-spoken, the literal and the parasitical is that given precedence in Grice, namely between the
sincerely spoken and the insincerely spoken. It is argued here and in IV (and arguments from different premises are discussed in
III), that both sincere and insincere utterances (or if one prefers the vocabulary of 'Signature Event Context' and 'Limited Inc
abc...', literal and parasitical: the terms will be used interchangeably throughout), can be accounted for in a Griccan theory of
meaning. A summary of the argument to be made is introduced at the end of 1.5.
22 Ziff (1967) pi, and see his Semantic Analysis (Cornell University Press) 1960, pp25-26.
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Grice investigates the distinction set up by his examples, and the cases in which the terms 'natural'
and 'non-natural' apply. He adds a proviso important for Ziff: the distinction does not rule out a
definition of meaningNN in terms of natural meaning, for the distinction, Grice continues, is what is
elsewhere designated as that between 'natural' and 'conventional' signs, and, Black is correct, the
terms have been variously interpreted23. As shall be seen, Ziff and Avramides emphasise the dangers of
taking the wrong interpretation; Searle, for instance, finds difficulty in following a consistent line on
convention, and Strawson gives the means for a fuller interpretation of both Grice and Austin. Given
the potential for ambiguity, a control definition is given, following Black: 'meaning' is the reserve of
signification, the sense in which all signs mean; 'meaningNN' is the sense in which signs mean
according to conventions24. With this the burden is shifted from Grice's definitions (his proviso, as shall
be seen, draws part of Ziffs criticism), to the need to define 'convention'25. Black describes the
distinction between natural and conventional meaning as that between signification and S's meaning,
one showing an 'essential' difference according to the addition of S's intention. It is from this that
Grice develops his theories of S's meaning on an occasion of utterance, and of S's timeless (or
established) meaning in the use of an utterance26.
Grice wants more from his theory than a marker between 'natural' and 'conventional' signs: some
things that meanNN are not signs, and others are not conventional. Grice adds that many things that
mean naturally, referring to the budget example, are not signs of what they mean27. Here it is worth
considering Grice's arguments on an issue fundamental to (peculiarly Derridean), speech act analysis,
and the need for sincerity, or avowability, conditions in indirect or parasitical cases. Grice examines
self-defeating assertions ('p, but I do not believe that p'). Examples from Austin have been given, and
Searle has others. Clark asks how such assertions are explained in Gricean theory, for self-defeating
assertions seem to undermine one's picture of S's utterances as sincere expressions of belief8. Grice
appeals to Stevenson for clarification of meaningNN, and his formulation is useful in clarifying Grice's
23 Cf. Black (1972) p260. The problems in interpretation are at least partly due to the descent of the terms from Austin's
posthumous, edited text. As Strawson shows (III. 4 and 5) the distinction is not absolute.
4 Black (1972) pp261-262. This is a first response to the analogy Derrida (1977a) ppl72-173 notes between forms of
communication, natural and conventional; as one shall see when the detail of Grice's argument is encountered, they are
necessarily different, and subject to different analyses. Furthermore, the similarity between Grice's and HusserTs vocabulary is
noted in III. 1.
25 It should be emphasised that ZifPs work is far wider-reaching.
26 Black (1972) pp272ff discusses problems with the notions and their relation.
27 Gricc (1989c) p215.
28 Clark, M.; 'Utterer's Meaning and Implications about Belief, Analysis, vol. XXXV, no. 3, ppl05-108, 1975, pl05. One might
ask whether, in such cases, one perhaps doubts, or cheats, one's own intentions? Cf. Searle (1969) pp31-33.
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own theory®. Stevenson argues that for an utterance or sign to meanNN it must produce in H (or 'the
audience'), propositional attitudes (cognitive or non-cognitive, as Grice and Schiffer note), and in S the
attitude conducive to making the utterance. This is supplemented by a 'process of conditioning' on the
use of the sign in communication (and which is taken up in McDowell's discussion of meaning and
communication). There are two counter-examples: firstly, derived from cases in which an utterance
engendered by a belief, a cognitive attitude, meansNN something descriptive or informative30. Black
notes that in the early examples Grice considers (in the formulation of meanings), the intended effect
of the utterance is the instilling of a belief, owing to the truth-value of the utterance, and that a feature
ofGrice's analysis is the,
...subsuming under a single analytical formula all uses of language, including the
utterance of imperatives, interrogatives, optatives, and so on, whose different meanings
would be manifested in the different kinds of "effect" intended to be produced in a
suitable hearer31.
This is a notion of illocutionary force which develops from Austin through Grice to Searle, with which
Searle works in his reply to Derrida, and which can be given application to the grammatical moods
19 Stevenson, C.L.; Ethics and Language (Yale University Press) 1945. Grice's appeal to Stevenson introduces ideas, important
for later discussions, of propositional attitudes. Avramides (1989) pi notes the congruence between Grice's and Stevenson's
theories, adding a point worthy ofnote for Chomsky's criticisms of Grice (and Quine), namely, that Stevenson took his lead from
the father of behaviourism, John Watson: cf. Watson, J.B.; Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviourist (Philadelphia,
Lippincott) 1919. Watson's later views can be studied in Behaviourism (London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.) 1931,
especially, in light of Rorty's position, adumbrated in 1.1, chapter VII on William James' divergences from Darwin. For a further
connection between Stevenson and implicature, cf. Cooper, D.E.; 'Meaning and Ulocutions', American Philosophical Quarterly,
vol. IX, no. 1, pp69-77, 1972, p77.
Loar, B:,Mind andMeaning (Cambridge University Press) 1981, is predicated on the idea that a theory ofmeaning requires a
theory of propositional attitudes. Loar divides meaning theorists into groups: those who argue that meaning is read off from
language used in speech, and those who argue that it is carried in language used to form thoughts (pi); this classification allows
that both reductionists and anti-reductionists can appear in the former group. Loar is a reductionist, and, as above, in this he
claims to follow Grice, yet he lessens the burden on communication in a theory of meaning: propositional attitudes can, he
argues, reveal the underlying semantics of speakers' language. (He calls it, after Fodor, 'the language of thought'). This may
suggest, Loar admits, '...a picture of thought without language, with language a mere vehicle of communication' (p2), but he
replies, '...even if belief were a linguistic state, those properties of beliefs which constitute their propositional content can be
reconstructed independently of their linguistic aspects, especially connections with spoken language. The theory of propositional
attitudes abstracts from overt language or its inner connections. This may be too analytical for some tastes, not enough about
what beliefs and desires are—viz. perhaps lmguistic states. But how better to pursue that than by settling how any state, linguistic
or non-linguistic, must relate to behaviour and perception to be the belief that p or the desire that q'. Loar's work might
profitably be contrasted with Platts, M. de B.; Ways ofMeaning: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Language (London,
Routledge and Kegan Paul) 1979. Platts argues that understanding the structure of language requires a role for the, 'strict and
literal meaning of a sentence', and this, for Platts, goes hand in hand with realism about truth. Loar argues that there are different
types of understanding in literal, non-literal, metaphorical and misfiring speech acts.
Loar (p2) argues that Gricean reductionism does not, by restricting talk ofmeanings to talk of beliefs, preclude consideration of
the fundamental questions in the theory of meaning. Another illustrative quotation runs: '... nothing in the reduction suggests that
propositional content is not in turn explicable. Some may have reasoned thus: "If semantical properties are explicable in terms of
propositional attitudes, the latter must be non-linguistic, and therefore relations to propositions. But propositions hypostasise
precisely what needs to be explicated, and so the reduction obscures the problematic concepts of tire theory of meaning.'" Loar
argues that propositions can themselves be reduced: '...their roles can be played by unproblematic entities. If we resist being
mesmerised by propositions and concentrate on propositional attitudes, sensible reconstructions are forthcoming, with no
implication that we are platonic intellects whose mental lives consist in grasping essences. This all implies that much of the
"theory ofmeaning" has not been aboutmeaning but about the content ofpropositional attitudes'.
30 Grice (1989e)p215.
31 Black (1972) p273.
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only after consideration of Lewis' arguments32. (McDowell examines the transmission of belief in
utterances; and on the debate between himself and Strawson concerning the correct parsing of the
meaning conditions, Grice's work has much to contribute. Grice wavers between saying that S must
bring H to 'think' or to 'believe', but emphasises that the conditions remain the same, and his example
introduces essential ideas of mutual knowledge33). Many people 'have a tendency' to don a tailcoat to
attend a dance; one seeing a wearer of a tailcoat will, very likely, conclude that the wearer is going to a
dance. Grice asks: does this mean that putting on a tailcoat meansNN that one is going to a dance,
adding that there is nothing gained by referring to the idea of a convention in the qualification,
'...dependent on an elaborate process of conditioning'34, for this leaves open the possibility that
donning a tailcoat meansNN. (A more grave interpretation of Stevenson's condition issues in a circular
argument for meaning^35). The difficulties of describing intentions and their appeal to conventions
lead Armstrong and Avramides to consider Grice in a tradition of semantic theory deriving from
Locke. As noted, the characteristic of Gricean projects is the impossibility of thought without language,
and in this links with Lockean themes can be forged. The pertinent question, asked by Avramides, is
precisely the difficulty of deriving conventions from communicative use of signs: if the meaning of
utterances derives from their associated ideas, the difficulty is shifted a stage farther back: how did the
ideas derive their meanings? As Avramides writes, the burden of Grice's work must be to give
solutions to an analogous problem: how the contents of intentions and beliefs give meanings to
utterances36.
32 Described in IV.
33
Again, to be examined in IV.
34 Grice (1989e) p216. The process of conditioning might better be called teaching.
33 Because it would appeal to a convention ofmeaning in donning a tailcoat as engendering the specific associated propositional
attitude, and how did this convention come to obtain? With this can be noted a vital aspect of the Gricean programme in
elucidating the use of signs in communication; the connection to Lewis' arguments for coordination in meaning will arise in turn.
One might decide that the wearer of the coat is going to a dance, but that the act does not itselfmean anything, but it shall be
contended (here and in IV) that Grice's arguments provide a means for settling precisely how one may communicate with signs,
given a convention embodied in a 'process of conditioning'.
36 Avramides (1989) p23. It is argued (in IV) that solutions can be given only after consideration of Lewis' arguments.
Armstrong, D.; Meaning and Communication', The Philosophical Review, vol. LXXX, no. 10, pp427-447, 1971, notes the
connection, approaching an identity, Locke sees between the signifying use of sounds and inscriptions and their meaning. Cf.
Tiles (1988) p87. Armstrong says that this is accompanied in Locke by a clear distinction between mental states and their
linguistic expression, reversing the due priority of language and intentionality described by Grice, Derrida and Searle; speech,
'gives birth' to progressively more complex thought in a 'feedback process', and, Armstrong argues, Locke's errors in
determining these premises can be discerned (p428). Cf. Bach, K. and Harnish, R.M.; Linguistic Communication and Speech
Acts (MIT) 1979, ppxiiiff. The thesis that the unit of meaning in communication is the sentence, contra Locke's arguments for it
being the word, raises a problem of distinctly Gricean, and Husserlian, flavour: how can utterances operate as signs, as may
clouds or flags? Armstrong is unambiguous: 'My hypothesis is that utterances of sentences in the communication situation are
signs in exactly the same sense of the word "sign" that black clouds are a sign of rain'. (This can, he maintains, be made true to
Locke's analysis). Armstrong encounters problems that will become familiar from Grice's discussion: how do signs work as
signs; what permits, and what makes correct, a 'true inductive generalisation' from sign to meaning? What of signs that go
unperceived, or that can never be deciphered? The defence of his hypothesis includes a significant correction to the forms of
words used to describe signs, important given the theory of intcntionality appealed to in this dissertation: '... like the sign, the
thing signified is always a particular state of affairs. It is semantically wrong to say, "This phenomenon is a sign that the law of
gravitation holds." The correct thing to say is, "This phenomenon is evidence that the law of gravitation holds".' Armstrong
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The second counter-example considers implications drawn from utterances. The utterance, 'Blake
performs regularly before an audience of thousands', implies 'Blake is talented': one, very likely,
believes the latter having heard the former37. Appeal to rules of grammar permitting one to speak of
conditions in which Blake is wholly inept is not meaningless, or, as Grice has it, does not, 'violate the
rules of meaning for the expressions concerned'38. There is again the scent of circularity. Grice adds
that appeal to rules for the distinction ofwhat is meant from what is implied militates against appeal to
processes of conditioning (the same applies for non-verbal utterances). What is more, the analysis
offered by such a theory gives a definition only of what is called by Grice 'the standard meaning' of a
sign, not of what S may mean by a sign on a particular occasion of its use39. The definition of the
meaning of a sign requires explanation of what users mean by it on particular occasions, and to what
settled convention they appeal in so doing. This is given in Grice's theory of'timeless meaning'.
With this in mind Grice begins again with another set of examples®. The understanding of the first
four assists in the understanding of the last two.
x meantNN something (on a particular occasion)
x meantNN that so-and-so (on a particular occasion)
A meantNN something by x (on a particular occasion)
A meantNN by x that so-and-so (on a particular occasion)
x meansNN (timeless) something (that so-and-so)
A meansNN (timeless) by x something (that so-and-so)
Grice focuses on informative or descriptive utterances, and offers an example. It might be that to say 'x
meantNN something', is true if x is intended by S to induce in H a belief; saying what the belief is is to
describe what x meantNN- Grice's counter-example recounts the leaving of an item at the scene of a
crime with the intention of leading a detective to believe that the owner is the culprit, again, a case of
non-verbal, insinuating communication. Grice contends that that one would surely not want to say that
the item itself meantNN. or that the act of leaving it meantNN that the owner is the culprit. A necessary
defends his thesis against objections (pp430-433) and cf. Holdcroft, D.; Words and Deeds: Problems in the Theory of Speech
Acts (Oxford, Clarendon) 1978, pl32.
37 From a Gricean theory of conversational implicature Huang develops semantic and syntactical theories of anaphora. Cf.
Huang, Y.; The Syntax and Pragmatics ofAnaphora: A Study with Special Reference to Chinese (Cambridge University Press)
1994, and Anaphora: A Cross-Linguistic Approach (Oxford University Press) 2000. See also Bach, K.; Thought and Reference
(Oxford, Clarendon) 1994.
38 As Stevenson does, cf. fh. 35. Also, cf. Schwayder, D. S.; 'Meaning and Saying', Foundations of Language, vol. IX, no. 1,
pp66-97, 1972, especially pp81-85.
39 Both points are raised at Grice (1989e) pp216-217.
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additional condition is that for S's act (itself and its performance), to have meant?® it must have been
uttered with the intention of inducing a certain belief (or, with sincerity), and that H (the detective)
must recognise the intention'". Again, and as Black implies in his comments on this example, there is
evidently a link to the sincerity condition in Austin and Searle42. Grice contemplates further counter¬
examples43:
Herod presents Salome with the head of St. John the Baptist on a charger.
Feeling faint, a child lets its mother see how pale it is (hoping that she may draw her own
conclusions and help).
I leave the china my daughter has broken lying around for my wife to see.
The conditions Grice specifies for meaning?® are stated: for instance, in each case, there is an intention
to instil a belief, and an intention that H should in each example realise that S has an intention to make
him so believe, yet Grice has qualms. The difficulty comes down to the distinction, studied by
Strawson and McDowell, between letting someone know and getting them to think, and the distinction
ofboth from telling or saying44. Grice illustrates by further examples45:
I showMr X a photograph ofMr Y displaying undue familiarity to Mrs X
I draw a picture ofMr Y behaving in this manner and show it to Mr X
Grice gives an analysis similar to that for the previous examples: the photograph (and the act of
showing it), do not mean?®, yet the drawing (and the showing of it), mean?®, namely, either that Mr Y
was guilty or that S, in its showing, meant?® that Mr Y was guilty. There is here a palpable difference,
the sense ofwhich falls to the role of intention in the latter case. Recognition by Mr X of the intention
to make him believe the worst about his wife and Mr Y is irrelevant to the instigation of this by the
photograph (and even more so by its showing). The photograph may have been put into Mr X's hands
purely by accident, or have been fabricated, and he will believe the worst without any process of
intentional belief-transmission. The difference is very grave in the case of the picture, however, for the
understanding of its having been drawn to convey an intention truthfully, and to be recognised as such,
makes all the difference toMr X's coming to have a belief6.
40 From Grice (1989e)p217.
41 All of the remarks in this paragraph are from Grice (1989e) p217.
42 Black (1972) pp272ff, and of. the discussion in III.
43 Grice (1989e) p218.
44 Cf. III. 1, and for discussion of Schwayder II.3.
45Gricc(1989c)p218.
46 In respect of this Black (1972) p259 says that Grice's work illustrates a trend to, '...recover and refine the insights of
continental idealism...', to mark the distinction between intentional action andmere behaviour, and [so] to maintain that between
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Grice adds a further example of non-verbal utterance, namely frowning47. Frowning spontaneously
might be taken as a sign of disgust, doing so deliberately, to show disgust, is still taken by one
recognising one's intention as a sign of one's disgust. Non-verbal utterances, therefore, on this bald
analysis do not meanNN. Grice meets the challenge with a counter-example: although the cases are
potentially the same, deliberate frowning can be expected to have the same effect as spontaneous
frowning only on condition that H takes the expression as intended to convey disgust. There is, as it
were, a priority, and the rejection of the recognition of intention leads to the rejection of the expression
as producing belief8. Again, the conclusion is drawn that H's recognition of S's intention is essential
for the transmission of belief or knowledge, and Grice arrives at the formulation of S-meaning, with
modifications and counter-proposals to be considered: for S to mean something by an utterance he must
intend to communicate a belief to H, and must intend his utterance to be recognised as uttered with this
intention. On this analysis the case of self-defeating assertions is dealt with in short order49. S intends to
induce belief by the recognition of an intention to do so: belief in the truth of the sentence stated, and
his authority and sincerity, and yet in his 'incredulity'. However, in uttering his incredulity S
undermines his authority for categorically stating the assertion, and so his first intention, to
communicate a belief, fails. As Austin, Grice, Searle and Schiffer repeat, one cannot, in general, have
intentions that one could not conceivably fulfil. (Grice's doubts concerning his theory of meaning
render the analysis unsatisfactory, and compel its rewriting, and the discussion is undertaken below).
Clark examines this definition. Grice emphasises that the intentions are separate. The second intention,
that S intend that his intention to communicate is recognised, can misfire, and thus disappoint S's
intentions, a 'covariance' which, Wilson maintains, is inadequate for Grice's purposes, while the
speech act itself can achieve S's desired effect in literal or parasitical cases50. Additionally, there is here
the tacit acceptance that S requires this condition, that he cannot rely on the relevant belief being
transmitted in the first intention. Thus Grice arrives at a detailed statement of non-natural meaning: '"S
the life-world and the scientific, and the physical and natural sciences. Cf. Von Wright, G.H.; Experience and Understanding





According to Clark, M.; 'Utterer's Meaning and Implications about Belief, Analysis, vol. XXXV, no. 3, ppl05-108, 1975,
pl06. Cf. Avramidcs (1989) pplO-11.
0
Wilson, N.L.; 'Gricean Meaning: The Ultimate Counter Example', Nods, vol. IV, no. 3, pp295-302, 1970. It is argued in this
dissertation that the 'covariance' is indeed adequate. There are intimations here of Strawson's distinction.
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meantNN something by x" is roughly equivalent to, "S uttered x with the intention of inducing a belief
by means of the recognition of this intention'51.
Grice, in his next examples, moves from consideration of assertions to imperatives. Suppose, Grice
asks, that S is in the company of an avaricious man (H), and that S would like him to leave. S throws
£1 out of the window with the intention of getting H to leave, and with, presumably, the intention to
communicate this: is this an utterance with meaningNN? Grice says that it is not, and draws the parallel
with his example of the incriminating photograph: there is no intention ofH's recognising S's intention
to effect his leaving: it is enough that he follow the £1 out of the window. Had S pointed to the door
and even pushed H in its direction, the case would resemble more that of the drawing of the unfaithful
wife, for the recognition of an intention to speed H's departure is more in evidence. Grice has a second
example. If S, now an examiner, fails a candidate (H), S may upset H. In certain circumstances, S may
intend this upset and intend that H recognise this intention. However, the act of failing H does not in
itself meanNN. (Grice suggests one contemplate the difference between stopping a car by flagging it
down and stopping it by standing in its path)52. Grice collates his results, giving a definition Black dubs
'The Formula'. Firstly, S meanings by an utterance to produce an effect in H through the recognition
51 Grice (1989e) p219. Grice remarks here that the statement of meaningNN is just the statement of the conditions of
communication.
In Yu (1979) pp275-276, some observations are made regarding the logical priority, inherent in Gricean analysis, of sentence
meaning on S-meaning, and of S-meaning on intention and its recognition. The definition of S-meaning, Yu argues, conceals an
equivocation 'pernicious' for good understanding of Grice, one that has positively led astray followers and critics alike. He finds
the consequent confusion in Black (1972) p271 and in Bennett, J.; 'Psychology and Semantics: Comments on Schiffer's
"Intention-Based Semantics'", Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol. XXIII, no. 3, pp258-262, 1982, and concerning
whether a full analysis of meaning can be the consequence of explication of beliefs and desires. Yu charges Griceans
(specifically Searle and Bennett) with equivocating between 'reportive' and 'stipulative' explications of meaning and intention:
the former clarifying pre-existing notions and the latter offering new notions, for which can be written their own conditions of
adequacy (p276). The Schiffer essay is itself relevant to assaying arguments for the necessity and sufficiency of conceptual
analysis, for he moots the thesis that meaning is a construct from intentions and beliefs, and not merely derived by logical steps.
(It might be noted that relevant terms are ill-defined in Schiffer, S.R.; 'Intention-Based Semantics', Notre Dame Journal of
formal Logic, vol. XX11I, no. 2, pp 119-156, 1982). Bennett (1976) pp8f shows greater sensitivity to these matters, and yet (p9)
maintains that the virtue of Grice's programme is its taking the 'instance' ofmeaning, 'by one speaker at one time', as basic, with
all other statements derivative. See also p22 on the due method of analysis being to yield necessary and sufficient conditions for
meaning.
Yu asks what are, and what should be, the targets and motivations of philosophical analysis, as typified by analytical
philosophy, a tradition Yu thinks, 'not altogether honourable' (p276). It is slightly to anticipate later arguments to say that the
necessity and sufficiency of analysis is precisely at issue in the work of Strawson on Grice and the subsequent exchange between
Strawson and McDowell (II.4 and 5 and III respectively), and cf. Avramides (1989) p23, and Strawson, P.F.; 'Reply to
McDowell', pp282-287 in van Straaten, Z. (ed.); Philosophical Subjects: Essays Presented to P.F. Strawson (Oxford, Clarendon)
1980, pp285-286, and Lyoan (1991) p83. Avramides (1989) ppl9ff brings out well the fact that the work in the tradition of
speech act analysis, and especially that of Grice, Strawson, McDowell and Searle, shows what philosophical analysis can (and
should) do, namely, clarify concepts and rigorise thinking to the highest degree. This is not, she adds, antithetical to study of the
phenomenology of language; indeed it is essential for the writing of the fullest theory, and is to be contrasted with the pure,
descriptive philosophical analysis, as practised by Moore. Avramides (1989) p7 argues that Davidson's and Dummett's
'pessimism' concerning philosophical analysis as a basis for a theory of meaning is unfounded. She notes also the differences
between Dummctt's and Davidson's position, with specific reference to Gricc. Bennett (1991) rejects the idea of necessary and
sufficient conditions for meaning, and Avramides (pl2) goes on to consider McDowell's rejection of analysis alongside
Dummett's. McDowell asks (cf. III. 1), why should one accept Grice's suggested foundation for a theory of meaning, and says
that his (McDowell's) alternative accounts for the 'phenomenology' of language; he is, however, as Avramides says, committed
to viewing Grice as a reductionist. (Cf. McDowell (1980) pl36). Bennett (1976) argues that none of what McDowell says rules
out a version ofGrice's mechanism, and cf. Avramides (1989) ppl7-18, and on the relation to Searle, cf. ppl2 and 15. Apel, K-
0.; 'Is Intentionality more Basic than Linguistic Meaning?', pp31-55 in Lepore and van Gulick (1991), pp52-54 makes a
connection with the notions of responsibility and sincerity in Habermas' theory of communicative action.
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of intention is equivalent to the case in which S intended the utterance to produce an effect in H by
means of the recognition of intention53. The effect intended must be able to be given a specific
description, ideally introduced by a 'that' clause54. Secondly, the sentence 'x [an utterance] meant
something' is equivalent to the sentence, 'Somebody meantNN something by x'. (Grice concedes the
existence of vague cases)55. Thirdly, and vitally for later discussion, Grice returns to the notion of
'timeless meaning', (his 'first stab' at its definition): 'x meansNN (timeless) that so-and-so', is
equivalent to a statement about what is intended by S to be the result of his uttering x. Ziff notes some
ambiguities in the three characterisations, and, he argues, affecting any case for a congruence between
(1), (2) and their 'non-natural' counterparts56. Firstly, concerning the replacement of 'someone' by a
name, and 'x', but not necessarily, by a sentence, Ziff is unequivocal: that none of Grice's
'generalisations' apply to words (parts of sentences), and consequently, focus should be only on (1).
However, only the third of the generalisations applies to (1), it being a statement of an homology
between language and world with no reference to S intentions and their recognition, yet it is far from
unambiguous. This notwithstanding, Ziff studies the first and second generalisations for the
clarification of the third, and his remarks are considered with Grice's additions to his analysis.
Grice considers a further case, in which an effect is intended, which could not but be one of
meanings. There is a surfeit of examples to make the case, all of which suggest that for the utterance
to meanNN the intended effect is in some sense within H's control, by dint of his knowledge being the
condition on the recognition of intention57. It must, as Grice puts it, be for H a reason and not a cause,
and the questions which may be asked about H's reasons for believing are questions about the worth
and veracity of evidence and not (necessarily) about reasons for action. Grice writes that it should be
noted that the first intention is of importance in the meaningNN of the utterance58. This bears
52 Grice (1989e) pp219-220. MeaningNN is transported by an instance of S 'cutting' (ignoring) H; H could not be expected to feel
offence unless he recognised an intention on S's part to give offence.
53 And this may include the act ofutterance, in appropnate circumstances.
54 This condition re-emerges in McDowell's criticism of Strawson.
55 Grice (1989e) p220 says he feels inclined to say that, as regards the changing of traffic lights, a change to red meansNN that the
traffic is to stop, but that saying that 'somebody means™ by the red light that the traffic is to stop' is eccentric. Grice thinks that
there is nevertheless some type of reference to somebody's intentions.
56 Ziff (1967)
51 Grice (1989e) p221. By telling H that by making a certain noise he is signalling to H and that he is to respond in a certain way,
S is plausibly settling with H a means by which he may recognise his intention, but is this meaning™? Surely, Grice writes, the
effect of recognition must be 'in some sense' within H's control.
58 Grice considers the thought that the recognition of S's intention in an utterance gives H reasons for believing the intention by
which it is motivated, and hence is akin to H's 'having a motive' for so believing. On this, recognition 'that...' is better parsed as
recognition 'to...', and again the conclusion is stated that the recognition of the intended effect is in the control not of S but ofH.
This draws some of the force of Searle's objections to Grice (cf. Ill), namely that his theory is, in truth, one of perlocution not
illocution, for if Grice notes the application of his work to assessment of perlocutionaiy utterance, it seems otiose to argue that
his theory is (Scarlc seems to think, unbeknownst to Gricc), a theory of pcrlocutions. It is a raft of the thesis offered in this
dissertation that Grice's theory is, in its appeal to first and second intention, equally a theory of illocution and perlocution.
The remark concerning first intention neatly sets up Schiffer's extension of the Gricean analysis (IV.3).
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implications for the correct definition of convention, for if S makes his utterance with the intention of
affecting H in a specific way, then the fact that he intends this recognition to bring about a further
effect (say, of understanding or successful deception), notwithstanding the dependence of the one upon
the other, means that the second cannot be thought dependent upon the recognition of the intention to
bring about the first: if S intends to get H to do something by giving him information, the definition of
what S intends H to do has no bearing on the meanings of the utterance®. Ziff s examples resonate
with all of those discussed. On being ordered to identify himself, S in Ziff s example, thinking the
order demeaning, mumbles incoherent nonsense, and by the first condition of 'The Formula' he
meansMN to give offence (by recognition of intention). Ziffwrites that the case described accords with
the conditions Grice adds to first and second intention (H, Ziff says, could refuse to be offended, and
thus prove that the success of S's effect is in some way within H's control), but that it shows up a
confusion of S-meaning an utterance, and his meaning the corollary effect (understanding or to
deceive); his charge is that this is an endemic problem in Grice's theory60. What is more, there is an
effect of contamination on the second generalisation: S may have meantNN but his answer to the order
to identify himself surely did not61. Patten and Stampe argue that Ziffs example is wide of the mark62.
It does not meet the conditions Ziff caricatures as Grice's first generalisation, for, as Grice writes, not
any kind of intended effect (in this case communicated in incoherent nonsense) will do, and Ziff pays
little heed to the essential qualifications of the first generalisation, saying that the sense is not any noise
S may issue (for this has no conventions governing the ways in which it is to be understood), but
59 Ziff objects, and the continuity with Searle's example of the German-speaking soldier (described in III.3) should be noted. The
examples described in the following paragraphs are from Ziff (1967) pp2-3.
That is, S meant™ something by his incoherent nonsense, and he intended to produce his desired effect by the recognition of
intention.
01 Black (1972) pp272-274 considers the fact that on the Gricean analysis what H is intended to think is identical with S's
meaning, and after offering cases of S meaning in which Gricean conditions on H-recognition are not met (those derived from
Ziff), writes (p273): '[t]his sounds suspiciously circular, since it amounts to saying that S will count as intending to mean what
the words he uses would normally mean, a move that is clearly out of order in a theory that ultimately hopes to explicate standard
or "timeless" meaning by reference to speakers' meaning in particular speech acts'. However, this is unduly pessimistic. It has
been intimated that Grice's work needs amendment, and this is provided by Lewis in showing how conventions for language use
(normal, or timeless, use) can be established in exchange between S and H, and without tacit appeal to standards to which,
without inconsistency, the simple Gricean theory cannot appeal; such standards are simply not required. In his arguments against
meaning relativism Norris (1985) ppl96ffmight have made good use ofLewis.
There is, in the distinction between S meaning™ and his utterance meaning™, an intimation of Strawson's distinction, and of
Millikan's adaptation, that between K-I and K-II acts (explication must await II.4-5). In questioning whether S's utterance can
itself mean™, Ziff makes apparent the need for a mutual knowledge between S and H regarding what it is S means by the
utterance. The case in which S mumbles ungrammatical nonsense allows, Ziff writes, a variation. In reply to the same question S
says 'pi.hi.y pi.hi.y', meaning™ what he meant™ by the nonsense, and meaning something both by the utterance and by its
utterance. He thinks his sentence will be taken, again, as nonsense, but 'pi.hi.y pi.hi.y', is Hopi for 'I do not know'. (One can fill
in one's own reasons for why S chose to reply in Hopi). S may not have known an answer to the question, but he surely meant
something by his utterance. Ziff feels justified in writing, '[tjhat S meant™ something by [the Hopi] is wholly irrelevant to the
question whether S meant something by [the Ilopi]', and this because S can mean™ the same by all manner of different
sentences, even, in this case, ungrammatical nonsense. What the Hopi means has nothing to do with what S intends to effect by
an utterance in Hopi.
62 Patten, T.E. and Stampe, D.W.; 'The Rudiments ofMeaning; on Ziff on Grice', Foundations of Language, vol. V, no. 1, pp2-
16,1969.
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something yet to be specified according to a conventional (timeless) meaning, within H's control, and
for them a reason and not a cause. In more familiar vocabulary, the argument turns on a notion of
illocutionary force (not given), and as Patten and Stampe have it, the sense of intended effect (that S
wishes to engender in H), with which Grice works is one for a reason for H to do or to believe
something in light of S's utterance, and for which H decides to reciprocate with appropriate action or
belief3. Patten and Stampe, as Austin and Grice before them, note that one cannot, for example, decide
to be offended by an utterance in this way (the engendered belief or reason for action coming with
'uptake', or the illocutionary force of the utterance): it may be a corollary (perlocutionary), effect that
one feels offended, and it may be due to the recognition of an intention, but the understanding of the
utterance (in the relevant sense), cannot be a reason for one's taking offence64.
ZifFs second example, in which S utters a meaningful reply to the examiner's question but in a
language, say, Hopi, the examiner does not understand (that is, S does indeed mean something by his
utterance, but thinking H will take it as babbling), is similarly weak. Ziff allows that one must be
careful not to confuse 'S did not mean what he said' (for he did, his utterance was a perfectly
reasonable answer to the question), and 'S did not mean anything', for, again, he plainly did. Patten and
Stampe write that ZifFs belief that S meant something by the utterance is argued for, '...in the belief
that for someone to mean something by an utterance it is necessary and sufficient for this to be the
utterance of a sentence in some language.' As was brought out above, and as will be returned to, this is
not an objection to Grice. Ziff s example requires that S know what the Hopi sentence means, for
otherwise there is no motivation to argue that S can intend the meaning of his utterance. However,
there are many cases in which S may utter a sentence, knowing its meaning, but without intending to
communicate its meaning, and, Patten and Stampe add, the utterance of a sentence is not enough for
Ziff s purposes, for had S not known what the Hopi meant, there would be no stimulus to say that S
meant by its utterance 'I do not know'65. (Patten and Stampe make a stronger argument. S cannot truly
be said to have meant and said 'I do not know', for he is not trying to enlighten or inform by his act of
communication, but to frustrate or inconvenience: he is trying not to communicate). Cases in which S
63 Schiffer (1972) pp95ff gives a detailed discussion of this point (cf. IV).
64 Patten and Stampe (1969) p5 note that Grice is aware of the fact that cases of 'cutting', might resist assimilation under the
analysis of the recognition of intention, and because one is hard pushed to say that, in such cases, the intended effect is, in some
sense, in H's control, or for them a reason and not a cause. Patten and Stampe argue that, '[i]f the cutting is intended to offend or
distress, as opposed, say, to informing the person that he is out of favour, then the case is substantially like Ziff s and could
legitimately, we think, be similarly excluded'. Other cases arise in reminders: S intends that his intention to bring H to recall y be
recognised, but this recognition cannot function as a reason for remembering specifically y. Patten and Stampe write (pp5-6) that
'...perhaps in such cases we may construe the effect wanted to be that of considering or attending to the matter of which the
audience is reminded, or which is pointed out or brought up'.
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means something by his utterance, but in which the utterance is itself nonsense, point up Ziffs
difficulties with the notion of convention. If S says '#sf*jF meaning, by the recognition of intention, to
offend H, he uses '#sf*jP as, he thinks, an appropriate means by which this may be done. H has no
recognition of the sentence itself ('#sf*jl'). S goes away from this exchange thinking he has achieved
his intention, one recognised by H, owing to a shared, conventional understanding of what S intends by
such an utterance in such circumstances with such intonation and so forth. ZifF allows this much of
convention, but denies that the sentence itself can have any mutual conventions obtaining, describing
its meaning, appropriate utterance and so forth, and yet the latter notion is precisely what is to be
established by Gricean meaningNN. It theorises the ways in which any sentence or expression can come
to have meaning in a convention, and how in use its constituents might uphold or deviate from
standards established by the examples of natural meanings. The three rings on the bell may have come
to mean that the bus is frill; the driver may issue them incorrectly, or for another reason. The spots,
however, mean (according, say, to the best medical opinion), measles; they are (or are a symptom of),
measles; one cannot reason from them to a separate conclusion, or use them as signs of something else.
Natural meanings are those established without conventional dubbing, but obtaining as natural, hard
facts (recall that one cannot say, of S, that his spots mean measles but that S does not have measles).
However, the sense of 'meaning' in both cases is the same; they both explain how it is that a sign or
mark or utterance can have a meaning after it has received a sense through natural fact or dubbing.
Arguments for the absence of 'meaning' in intended nonsense sentences are irrelevant to assessment of
Grice's work. ZifF argues that the nonsense sentence means nothing, yet the difficulties regarding
definitions of convention noted at the beginning of the discussion of Ziff on Grice apply, for the
identity Ziff claims between meaningNN and meaning is incorrect. Patten and Stampe make the same
point and raise a deeper argument. They suggest an example: suppose two auditors wonder what S
means in a nonsense sentence by which S appears to think he means something clear and unambiguous;
it may be that they cannot imagine what was meant or what S meant, or that they decide the utterance
and S most likely meant nothing; the differences between the responses are small, and this, for Patten
and Stampe, counts against Ziffs claim that the nonsense plainly meant nothing, for the nonsense is,
Ziff says, 'compatible' with S's having meant by its utterance that he, say, felt fine. However, S and H
could not know of this convention, and thus it is, 'qua non-sentence', that the nonsense meant
65 Searle (1969) p26 gives examples.
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nothing". That the utterance means nothing is 'no more obvious' than that the responses to the sentence
are misguided, and Patten and Stampe aver that none of the responses are misguided in the case that a
context of utterance is apparent in which S is convincingly described as having the intentions he
indicates67.
66 Patten and Stampe (1969) pll add that in a case in which S cries ungrammatical nonsense he intends to produce in H, by
means of the recognition of intention, a certain belief, it is not correct to assume, as they argue Ziff does, that the cry necessarily
means nothing. He assumes that Grice's statement that 'x meant™ something' is roughly equivalent to 'Somebody meant™
something by x', is rendered by the fact that, in such ungrammatical cases, S could not possibly have meant anything by his
statement.
67 If Grice's statement applies in the case of S speaking ungrammatical nonsense, then, as Patten and Stampe (1969) ppl 1-12,
concede, it is 'misleading' to say that what x meant can be described as meaning something specific, for such descriptions are
most frequently used to report natural meaning, and this is plainly not appropriate in this case. Patten and Stampe suggest that
there be made a switch to passive constructions: what S means by x is, say, that it is snowing in Tibet. Saying in response to S's
ungrammatical nonsense that one cannot imagine what the utterance means is, Patten and Stampe suggest, not strictly speaking
the correct response: this response does not in truth carry the implication that the utterance means nothing at all. 'That "is
supposed to (verb) such and such" in its idiomatic use does not generally imply "is not such and such" can easily be seen from
such examples as these: "Why ask me whal we've got in the treasury? You're supposed to be the treasurer!" (which implies not
that you are not treasurer but that you're a pretty poor one); "What's that supposed to be a picture of?"—a question which may
be answered either "It's a bear" (with no sense of having contradicted and implication of the question), or "It's supposed to be a
bear" or "...a picture of a bear". (These come nearer implying that it is a bear, or a picture of a bear, than that it is not). What
"supposed to (verb)" adds is the implication that the performance, picture or utterance is irregular, defective, somehow not up to
standard. But that S's utterance is irregular, and that the standard from which it deviates is that of the language we speak, are
facts fully consistent with Gricc's equivalence (ii)'. Black (1972) p273 considers the fact that, on the Griccan analysis, what H is
intended to think is identical with S's meaning, and gives examples of cases of S meaning in which Gricean conditions are not
met.
Ill
2. Occasion Meaning and Timeless Meaning
In justifying his terminology and usage Grice broaches the question ofwhether he is a behaviourist. He
rejects the accusation of, '... peopling all our talking life with armies of complicated psychological
occurrences...', and denies that there are difficulties in his use of intention as a basis for a theory of
meaning1. Some utterances are (pace Austin), preceded by a 'plan' formulated with an express
intention, they are explicit performatives2, yet Grice notes that the gap between familiar and unfamiliar
uses of utterances may be bridged, and the importance of intentions as a coherent body of guided
behaviour over time emphasised. There are, in passing, still more difficult cases for Austin's theory,
instances of confused intention, and of latent, 'coming to' after having conceived an intention to act
differently. Links to conventional explanations of intentional behaviour arise again in Grice's statement
that such explicitly avowed intentions are rare, and that in most cases one relies upon the criteria used
in identifying intentions in non-linguistic behaviour, namely, appeal to generalised, common and time-
honoured usage. S is thought to intend to convey by his utterance what is 'normally' intended by it;
there must be, 'good reason' for suggesting divergence. 'Similarly in non-linguistic cases: we are
presumed to intend the normal consequences of our actions'. In cases of doubt about the intention to
convey in particular utterances, in either linguistic or non-linguistic instances, one refers to the context
in which the utterance is made and asks how a plausible alternative is fitted into a schema of S's other
behaviour and guided purposes. Grice states the situation pithily: '...relevance to an obvious end is a
criterion in settling why a man is running away from a bull'. Black considers such a case in arguing for
the insufficiency of the Gricean analysis, and his examples are of handshakes or gifts given3. S intends
that H think one well-disposed toward him, on the basis that such an intention is difficult to conceal. S
is happy to let his intention be taken as a reason for H's response. Need S mean in this case that he is
well-disposed? The conventions of handshaking allow only a 'precarious' inference to a friendly
disposition. In neither case is one communicating a message. In some 'linguistic' cases H can ask S
about his intentions, and in some such cases S will reply not with a report of a now exhausted intention,
but with a description, arrived at after reflection. (Grice admits that he, 'cannot find a nonlinguistic
parallel here', but adds that the existence of the case is an insignificant addition). Therefore, Grice
states the conclusion to which his argument has led: the criteria forjudging linguistic and non-linguistic
'Grice (1989e)pp221-222.
2 Grice's appeal to Austin here is unacknowledged.
3 Cf. Grice (1989e) p222 for all of the examples on this page. The work ofAvramides is important here, and raises the notion of
mutual cooperation for the success of communication, and cf. Black (1972) p271.
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intentions is the same, and so, '... linguistic intentions are very like the non-linguistic intentions'4. Once
again, Grice appeals to a notion of conventions for the expression of intentions, not of pre-linguistic
intention.
Ziff suggests other difficulties with the characterisation of 'x meant^- something', by 'Somebody
meantNN something by x'. He offers the utterance, 'Claudius murdered my father', and three contexts:
(a) in a soliloquy (on or off stage); (b) in a discussion5; and (c) while 'delirious with fever'. Ziff asks
whether the sentences mean the same, and, on the model of the analysis of his (1) and (2), whether they
meanNN the same. Again, as above, the analysis is taken as applying only to statements6. Ziff writes
that, 'evidently' no-one meant anything by (c) for it was uttered in a fever, with no audience present:
the utterance was not intended to produce a response. Ziff is again muddling the two notions he finds in
Grice, for, he repeats that,'... one need not confuse "What S said meant nothing", which may be true in
one sense of "what S said", with "The expression which S uttered meant nothing", which is untrue.'
Utterance (b) Ziff says, confirming concerns of Derrida and Quentin Skinner, is paradigmatically a
case ofmeaningNN: it is issued, after all, in a dialogue. Ziff argues that though the sentences may mean
(and for Ziff, astonishingly, they mean the same), they do not (all) meanNN, and his response to (a) is
clearer still,
... it could hardly have been intended to produce an effect in an audience. (But perhaps
Grice would wish to maintain that, in so far as S was speaking to himself, he was his own
audience. But then could he intend to produce an effect in himself by means of a
recognition on his own part of his own intention? These are mysteries one may
cheerfully bequeath to Mr Grice)'7.
"Grice (1989e)p223.
5 Grice's examples are all, at this stage, of collocution, and the criticism of this tenet of speech act theory in Skinner, Q.;
'Conventions and the Understanding of Speech Acts', The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. XX, no. 79, ppl 18-138, 1970, shall be
discussed (II.5). Skinner argues for the 'essential conventionality', of speech acts, and that the dialogue situation is, following
Strawson's distinction, in truth a singular case, which, '...misleadingly oversimplifies the role of conventions' (pl33). Speech act
analysis, Skinner says echoing Derrida (1977a) pl96 fn. 3, cannot be predicated on a study of such synchrony. Once again, these
points are discussed in II.5.
Ziff (1967) pp3-4 argues that the sentences in their contexts all mean the same; and for the purpose of stating further arguments
against Gricean analysis (on the model of the case of S being asked to identify himself), he reintroduces the notion of sentences
meaning something iff somebody meant™ something by them.
7Ziff (1967) p4. Ziff writes that in case (c), although S means nothing by the utterance, the utterance itself is indeed meaningful;
and Ziff suggests that one can add cases in which S means something, but in which the utterance is meaningless. (His example
might be compared to Schiffer's of a neuroscientist communicating with H without any process of intentional belief
transmission). '[S] has had his head tampered with: electrodes have been added, plates mounted...', and when, again, asked to
identify himself, he replies with more nonsense; later, however, when questioned, he says that what he meant by his utterance
was that he felt fine, and that he, when making the utterance, thought that all would know this. For Ziff, by the collation of
Grice's results (Black's Formula), S meant™ something by his nonsense and the nonsense itselfmust have meant™ something,
but, Ziff replies, the utterance is perfectly meaningless. 'On Grice's account, good intentions suffice to convert nonsense to
sense: the road to Babble is paved with such intentions' (p5). Avramides (1989) p66 gives a good hearing to the notion that S
soliloquising or writing notes to himself is indeed intending himself as his own H.
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The idea that the sentence means the same in the three contexts is examined by Patten and Stampe, and
the matter of the restriction placed by Ziff on his analysis considering only sentences is raised8. With
their comments in mind, it shall be argued that Ziff uses notions of convention to argue against Grice
that he denies to Grice, and in this it is seen how this is of a part with Ziff s confusion of S-meaning
and perlocutionary effect.
Ziff pays little regard to conditions of utterance in his arguments for the identity in meaning of (a),
(b) and (c); though utilised in making the distinction, they are, write Patten and Stampe, for Ziff
'... never relevant to the question ofwhat was meant by what was uttered, or what an utterance mean/.'9
Ziff s objections have purchase on timeless utterance, in that conditions of utterance (context, and an
enduring, mutual convention), are thought irrelevant to timeless meaning, but this is categorically not
Grice's point in the generalisation Ziff discusses, which concerns the statement that 'x meantMN
something' is equivalent to 'Somebody meantNN something by x'. (It may be argued that Ziff s
criticism does not apply when timeless meaning is correctly understood. This is broached in II.3). Grice
writes that an utterance remains tied to a time, a place and an author, and that the distinction between
utterances (one's and others, and outside of contexts), allows a theory of timeless meaning, but again,
Ziff s examples are all predicated on the condition that all elements to be meant in Gricean theory are
sentences in some language10. There is, as Patten and Stampe say, a 'dogmatism' in Ziff, a refusal even
8 Patten and Stampe (1969) p7 say that the argument that the sentence in the three contexts means the same is less misleadingly
expressed by the following formulations: "'Claudius murdered my father" as uttered by S in soliloquy meant the same as
"Claudius murdered my father" as uttered by S in discussion with H which meant the same as "Claudius murdered my father" as
uttered by S when delirious which meant the same as "Claudius murdered my father" as uttered by S in soliloquy', which means,
'What S meant by "Claudius murdered my father" in his soliloquy was the same as what he meant by "Claudius murdered my
father" in his discussion with H which was the same as what he meant by "Claudius murdered my father" in his delirium which
was the same as what he meant by "Claudius murdered my father" in his soliloquy'. Ziff would not accept this, for precisely this
is rejected in his argument against The Formula. That is, he would have to reject both paraphrases. Cf. Cohen, L.J.; 'Do
Illocutionary Forces Exist?', The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. XIV, no. 55, ppl 18-137, 1964, pl20.
' Patten and Stampe (1969) pp8ffbring out the consequences ofZiff s restriction to sentences as his paradigm utterances.
10 The self-perpetuating regularities of timeless meaning that Grice countenances are conventional (meanings) meanings. Full
discussion of how these are disseminated awaits IV.1-2. Unlike Grice's, Lewis' theory faces no problems of how one accepts
procedural rules for ones linguistic practice.
Patten and Stampe (1969) p8 write, with textual support from Grice, that it is seldom to sentences that meanings are ascribed.
'Utterance', has what Grice (1989e) p216 calls 'convienient act-object ambiguity'; utterances remain, as the discussion of
indexicals shows, tied to a place, a time and an author. In cases of their repetition or quotation, one does not without oddity, say
that the sentence S uttered, repeating one of H's, in any way belongs to S or H. Sentences acquire timeless meaning by use in
contexts, but timeless meanings depend upon no particular contexts: to repeat there is, on the theory offered here (and as
established by the method advocated for the treatment of demonstratives and indexicals in 1.2), no claim for the centrality of any
specific speech acts; indeed, it is maintained, in II.5 and III.5 that the distinction between literal and parasitical can, with a theory
of what Skinner (1970) pl33 calls 'socially conventional intention', be disregarded, as of little or no importance in speech act
analysis.
By the analysis Ziff (1967) p3 proposes, (a), (b) and (c) are sentence 'tokens', but Patten and Stampe (1969) p8 argue that he
treats them as sentence types, as '...conceived in abstraction from their utterance or inscription'. The argument that the sentence
means the same in the three contexts is 'trivially true', if they are conceived as types, and, Patten and Stampe note carpingly, this
means that the use of the word 'meant' in Ziffs argument is 'incoherent'. They suggest a viable alternative: can not (a), (b) and
(c) have meant the same by virtue of being utterances of the same sentence? S might, with (a), be referring to a defeat at tennis,
and with (b), to a heinous crime. They may be thought to mean the same, but not in the sense in which one might be ascribing
intentions to S, and, as Patten and Stampe say, for ZifFs arguments to be subject to such a simple refutation is a symptom of his
lack of clarity in distinguishing types and tokens. What can serve as a disambiguating element between sameness and difference
ofmeaning in 'historical' utterances? There is, Patten and Stampe suggest, the need for a set of distinctions such as those Austin
(and Cohen and, most profitably, Skinner, cf. in.5) makes between phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts. What sense can be made of
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to allow that the utterance may be more fundamental than the recursion of sentences in semantics; with
this one is taken to the third condition ofGrice's analysis. Ziff gives more examples (I, II, and IInn):
(I) He is the son of a stickleback fish
(II) Sentence (I) means the male referred to is a son of a small scaleless fish (family
Gasterosteidae)...
[(IINN) is formed as before, as with (1) and (Inn)]-
Ziff has no sensitivity to the examples as uses of metaphor, and yet he says that the use of 'means' is
here the same as in (1): they are both, '...simply of the form: sentence X means m.' (The question of
what intentions motivate the utterer of such a sentence is ofminimal importance for Ziff; he does some
speculating (see below)). However, for Patten and Stampe, the case is oversimplified; the matter of
what a novel utterance means is no less simple and no more difficult than that of what S intends by its
utterance and one should heed the Gricean analysis of the belief S intends the utterance to elicit". The
semantical structure of the sentence is itself deviant, because unusual or metaphorical, and speculation
as to what it means would hardly be more than guesswork, yet from this Ziff draws invalid
conclusions12. Ziff continues, if 'means' in (II) has the same sense as in (1), as he is satisfied they do,
(1) and (Inn) are not equivalent, for (1) and (Inn) differ as do (II) and (IInn); by Grice's theory (II) and
(IInn) are different. Ziff declares that (II) is a correct statement of the meaning of (I), and that since (II)
and (IInn) are equivalents, (II) must be a 'disjunction' of statements about what people intend in
uttering (I). The oddness of (I) leads Ziff to state that one could only ever profitlessly speculate about
what S intends by uttering it. The likelihood is that it is not described in (II), but that the intent is
derogatory. (II) restates the meaning of (I) but not the intention motivating its utterance; thus (1) and
(Inn) are not equivalents.
the thought that two phonetic acts mean the same; or that two tokens issued in phatic acts do, for what makes an utterance
conform to a certain 'syntax', as Patten and Stampe have it? Can it be merely S intention? Skinner, Strawson and Millikan each
have answers to this question.
11 Patten and Stampe (1969) pp9ff.
12 The invalidity affecting equally ZifFs alternative: the form with 'acoustic similarity' (Ziff (1967) p6). That is, the form in
which S explicitly says what he intends by 'He is the son of a stickleback fish', which, Ziff says, is a 'familiar form of
expression, given that sticklebacks are known to be tough fish, [and] given that the sex of a fish is not readily determined by the
uninitiated.there could only be intent to '...denigrate a contextually indicated male person'.
The problems in ZifPs work should not, Patten and Stampe add, obscure the fact that he has, inadvertently perhaps, directed
attention to the notion that must be elucidated in a study of meanings, namely recursion. In studying recursion in meanings it is,
Patten and Stampe say, natural to abstract from utterances to their contained sentences (or the types they report), and the
problems with Ziff s theory (raised in fn. 73) are encountered. However, such reduction is carried out, and is useful, not least for
the analysis of ambiguous sentences in generative grammar. Cf. Chomsky, N.; Syntactic Structures (The Hague, Mouton) 1957.
A typical means of testing for different or ambiguous meanings is to ask subjects whether they can understand a sentence in
which the meanings are bome, but, as Patten and Stampe say, '...methodological soundness here presupposes that there be
distinct utterances of some sentences that differ in meaning in non-imaginary cases', and these meanings cannot be identified
with any putative 'timeless' meaning of an ambiguous sentence, for, by definition, there can be none. For Patten and Stampe,
linguists must have recourse to what authors mean for the identification of what utterances mean, and this, it might be suggested,
is part of a deeper response to Chomsky's work on Grice.
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Patten and Stampe argue that ZifFs arguments against Grice are unconvincing13. The search for an
appropriate disjunction of statements may be fruitless, and no equivalents found for intentions, but the
tmth of equivalence relations need not depend upon the discovery of an indubitable method of
equivalence in the analysis of sentences. Patten and Stampe add that knowing what a sentence means is
distinct from 'knowing how to tell' whether what the sentence says is true: the problem can be stated as
easily in Gricean terms: how can one know what is intended by a 'novel utterance'. For Patten and
Stampe, Ziff oversimplifies what (I) may mean, for, by his own standards, (I) is 'semantically deviant',
having no clear criteria of application '...at best one could guess at what it might mean'. By Gricean
theory, and a condition to which Ziff holds Grice, this would constitute a guess as to what might be
meant by someone on an occasion of their uttering (I), and by the first condition of 'The Formula',
what might be meant is a matter of what people might intend in its utterance. Patten and Stampe
wonder how Ziff can betray such certainty concerning what (I) can mean, for even if one could find a
canonical, etymologically correct meaning for (I), it would still, potentially, be used in novel (non-
literal or non-straightforward), utterances, and, in such circumstances, could it be said to keep the same
meaning? Taking it that the meaning of (I) could never be natural, but only ever conventional (or non-
natural), in Grice's sense,
...what would S probably have in mind as being the meaning of (I)? This is hard to say,
although our "tough or stickling scoundrel" was a try, since (I) is deviant and its
predicate, were it used, would be idiomatic, and this is so for other uses of the utterance.
It is clear (and will become clearer) that Ziffs objections may be written into Grice's analysis with no
change in the substance of the theory, while he indicates the distinction between sentences and
utterances (the latter tied to occasions, and their meanings determined for occasions), sentences
themselves have an enduring ambiguity, and hence Ziffs search, ultimately unsuccessful, for a
disjunction ofmeanings for types14.
The problem of novel utterances in Grice's theory is not, Ziff argues, solved by a theory of what S
'would intend', for what would S intend by a novel utterance: not likely anything to do with the
meaning of the sentence spoken15. Once again, this is not an objection to Grice. Patten and Stampe
13 Patten and Stampe (1969) ppl-2: they are simply not sensitive to the details of the theory.
14 Patten and Stampe (1969) pl6 moot the idea that the constructs, the most basic parts, of a theory such as Ziff proposes are
entities amenable to unambiguous semantic characterisation, namely utterances. Some means of carrying out this unambiguous
characterisation are described in 1.2, II.5, III.5 and IV.3-5.
15
This, it should be emphasised, is what S would intend as opposed to what he does intend. Ziff (1967) pp6-8. There can, he
says, be no such method.
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argue that Grice's condition on timeless meaning would have to utilise such a theory for application to
novel utterances (as indeed it does), but bizarre utterances such as Ziff describes fail to meet Grice's
conditions on the recognition of intention, for no such utterance would be made with the intention to
elicit a response on a Gricean model, for S would not utter it thinking he could achieve recognition16.
Ziff s misunderstanding of Grice's theory is so grave that he can accuse him of (because he, Ziff
thinks, allows the meanings of identical sentences to apply in different circumstances), a lack of
concern with the use of an expression17, and also of a lack of attention to the 'projective devices', (the
recursiveness), between the sentences of a language. However, as has been seen, this would affect
nothing in a Gricean theory. Ziff writes that '[wjhat any given sentence means depends on what
(various) other sentences in the language mean', and, in so doing, appeals to the types of convention
(although between sentences and not utterances), that he denies to Grice, and his most significant
addition is that of a 'regularity': his remarks show that these are both linguistic and non-linguistic18.
Patten and Stampe object to Ziff s claim. A set of projective devices is not the basis of a theory of
meaning, and Grice can with justification ignore it. Ziff s arguments for the recursive structures of
semantics and syntactics tell one only about the structures, not about meaning, and Patten and Stampe
note Grice's condition on the meaning of non-verbal, non-linguistic, and one may add, metaphorical,
utterances, (the rings on the bell; Smith's remarks about his 'trouble and strife'). The rings on the bell
are not 'expressions in a natural language', and can be described in no recursive semantic system, yet
they can in Gricean meaning theory. 'There is no set of projective devices that is relevant in the
16 What S means by an utterance can be 'irrelevant' to the meaning of the utterance. If Grice's statement applies in the case of S
speaking ungrammatical nonsense, then, as Patten and Stampe (1969) pp11-12 concede, it is 'misleading' to say that what x
meant can be described as meaning something specific, for such descriptions are most frequently used to report natural meaning,
and this is plainly not appropriate in this case. Patten and Stampe suggest there be made a switch to passive constructions: what S
means by x is, say, that it is snowing in Tibet. Saying' in response to S's ungrammatical nonsense, that one cannot imagine what
the utterance means is, Patten and Stampe suggest, not strictly speaking the correct response: this response does not in truth carry
the implication that the utterance means nothing at all.
That 'is supposed to (verb) such and such' in its idiomatic use does not generally imply 'is not such and such'
can easily be seen from such examples as these: 'Why ask me what we've got in the Treasury? You're
supposed to be the Treasurer!' (which implies not that you are not Treasurer but that you're a pretty poor one);
'What's that supposed to be a picture of?'—a question which may be answered either 'It's a bear' (with no
sense ofhaving contradicted any implication of the question), or 'It's supposed to be a bear' or '...a picture of a
bear'. (These come nearer implying that it is a bear, or a picture of a bear, than that it is not.) What 'supposed to
(verb)' adds is the implication that the performance, picture or utterance is irregular, defective, somehow not up
to standard. But that S's utterance is irregular, and that the standard it deviates from is that of the language we
speak, are facts fully consistent with Grice's equivalence [the second condition of The Formula]'.
Patten and Stampe (1969) ppl2-13 suggest an instance in which S says 'snow is white'. 'Of course a person uttering the sentence
in question might just have the relevant sort of communicative intention—say, to induce by means of the recognition of that
intention, the belief that snow is (perhaps monotonously) white. If, as is unlikely, anyone were to mean anything by this peculiar
utterance, that would be a fair guess as to what he and hence the utterance would mean. This taken together with [Grice's
condition on timeless meaning: "'x means™ (timeless) that so-and-so" might as a first shot be equated with some statement or
disjunction of statements about what "people" (vague) intend (with qualifications about "recognition") to effect by x'] nicely
explains one's inclination to say that Ziffs deviant sentence ['Snow is white and snow is white and snow is white...'] "could
only mean" "snow is white'".
17 That is, in relation to other expressions.
117
relevant way to the truth or meaning of... [the rings on the bell].' Patten and Stampe reject the idea that
the rings on the bell mean in an 'extended' sense of 'mean', and that there is any distinction to be
marked between ZifF s (2) and Grice's example of Smith (a sentence), concluding that ZifFs analysis
identifies a feature of language, not a feature of meaning: Grice's theory is more fundamental, asking
what it is for a mark to mean something. Having settled these points a return to the details of Grice's
shall be made.
Grice introduces notions of'conversational' and 'nonconventional' implicature in describing the full
requirements for a theory ofwhat H assumes S intends in speaking19. He goes on to analyse the notions
of saying, of conventional meaning and of implicature by convention, and of the relation between
conventional implicature and saying respectively20. Grice begins by considering the characterisation
which says that'S said that p', entails 'S did something x by which he meant that p'. He finds that the
latter formulation includes cases which could not be gathered under the rubric 'cases of saying'21, and
makes a substitution and an elaboration: 'S did something x by which he meant that p, and which is of
a type which means that "p"', a sentence expressing the conventional meaning of the utterance. Grice
likes the 'laxity' which means the variable 'p' will remain in speech, and thus could not be a quotation
of a clause following the phrase, 'S meant that...'. Again, however, the notion of saying is no clearer22,
and Grice tries again, emphasising the significance of linguistic rules or conventions:
S did something x
(1) by which S meant that p;
(2) which is an occurrence of an utterance type u... such that
(3) u means 'p'
(4) u consists of a sequence of elements (such as words) ordered in a way licensed by a
system of rules (syntactical rules)
18 Ziff (1967) p7. However, regularities, or conventions are, pace Lewis, Wittgenstein, and most significantly Davidson,
conveniences for exposition, they are not needed in a theory of meaning or of conventions in language, and can account, as
Lewis argues, for the regularities in S intentions.
19 Grice, H.P.; 'Utterer's Meaning and Intentions', pp86-116 in (1989). The notions are introduced in order to preserve the
assumption of the 'Cooperative Principle', (saying that S and Hmust at all times make their contributions to dialogue, '...such as
is required, at the stage at which [they] occur, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which [they] are
engaged'), if not at the level of the utterance, at that of what it implicates, and at that of what S may be taken to imply by the
utterance. For the quotation see Grice, H.P.; 'Logic and Conversation', pp22-40 in (1989), p26, and cf. pp28-31.
20 It is conversational implicature that, Neale argues, unites the two parts, on meaning and conversation, of Grice's work; it
provides a foil to 'overzealous' analytical philosophy, while remaining attentive to the importance of language in use. Neale
writes that in the wake ofGrice, any serious theory ofmeaning must distinguish,'... genuinely semantic facts and facts pertaining
to the nature of human interaction.' Neale, S.; 'Paul Grice and the Philosophy of Language', Linguistics and Philosophy, vol.
XV, no. 5, pp509-559, 1992. Hugly, P and Sayward, C.; 'A Problem about Conversational Implicature'. Linguistics and
Philosophy, vol. Ill, no.l, ppl9-25, 1979, raise many fascinating points regarding the difficulties of grasping implicatures.
21 Grice (1989b) p87. One might communicate with a simple gesture.
22
Again, because of the use of gestural communication.
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(5) u means that 'p' in virtue of the particular meanings of the elements of u, their order,
and their syntactical character23.
The statement is abbreviated: 'S did something x (1) by which S meant that p; (2) which is an
occurrence of a type u which means "p" in some linguistic system'. Grice finds counter-examples in
utterances of the type, 'She was poor but she was honest', in which what S means and what the
sentence means are each contributed to by the word 'but'. This is not part of the analysis of what S
says24, but part of, 'conventional implicature'. To the notion of first intention Grice introduces a second,
viz. 'central meaning', by which it can be elucidated what precisely S (centrally) meant. Therefore, 'S
said that p' can be read as 'S did something x (1) by which S centrally meant that p; (2) which is an
occurrence of a type u part of the meaning of which is "'p'". Four questions remain: firstly, how is 'S
meant that p' explicated; how is 'W (word or phrase) means explicated and related to 'S meant
that p'; how is 'u means "p"' (and 'u meant that "p" here, on this occasion', and 'S meant by u "p"')
explicated and related to the first two examples; and how is'S centrally meant that p' explicated? The
analysis follows examination of the notions ofmeaning and saying.
Grice examines meanings and its role in convention and communication. He gives an example: 'If I
shall then be helping the grass to grow, I shall have no time for reading'. In one or other of two
meanings the reference of the noun is to a lawn or to marijuana. Both are specifications of timeless
meaning for 'a "complete" utterance type'25. The same specification can be made for 'incomplete'
utterance types, that is, words or phrases or their non-linguistic counterparts. One must attach one of
the potential timeless meanings to the utterance to the exclusion of others, and this Grice calls the
specification of applied timeless meaning of an utterance on an occasion26. A further specification to be
made is the 'occasion-meaning of an utterance-type': drawn from the use of 'recognised' idioms or
implications in an utterance and their specified timeless meaning27. Writing the last specification
demands consideration of indirect speech, and of'utterer's occasion meaning': the definition ofwhat S
intends, on this occasion, by this utterance28. Grice studies the two categories, and their distinction, and
23 Grice (1989b) p87. The abbreviation to follow is from p88. It is vital to note here the nature of the relationship between
sentences and constituent parts, namely, words. This will reoccur in later discussion, of both Schiffer and Lewis (TV). The
relationship to rules and their conventional character is no less important.
24 As seen in Grice (1989e), especially pp216-217.
25 Grice (1989b) pp88ff. The utterance type is 'complete' because its tokens may be linguistic or non-linguistic; that is, the type
expresses the thought of a sentence, be it expressed in a vocalisation, gesture or inscription.
24
Again, the same must apply to the constituents of utterances.
27 These specifications, Grice (1989b) p90 notes, all make use of quotation marks for the specification of what is meant. Cf.
Derrida (1977b) ppl64 and 243.
28
This, as shall be recalled, is a Davidsonian distinction.
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Yu and Wilson note ambiguities29. Grice offers a definition of utterer's occasion meaning in terms of
utterer's intention, and he returns to the definition of meaningNN, for, that 'S meant something by an
utterance x' is true iff for H, S uttered x with the intention that H give a specific response, that H
recognise that S intends that H give the response, and H give the response on the basis of his
recognition of S's intention. Wilson sees a confusion between what S intended to say and what S
intended to effect by his utterance30. This is a point exploited in Grice's analysis, but incorrectly, and
Wilson thinks that on this, Grice's theory can be rectified. (He does not specify whether the effect is
illocutionary or perlocutionary, and in Searle's criticism of Grice, this becomes an objection of some
force). The two intentions may 'vary independently', and so Grice's work is open to a plethora of
counterexamples. Wilson gives an example: S says, 'x is y' meaning that x is y: he means something
by the utterance. On Grice's analysis, S intends (I), (II) and (III). Wilson writes that while S may intend
to communicate to H that he has (I), his secondary intention may just as easily be not to have (II) and
(III), and no emendation of Grice can avoid this. The problem is more acute in relation to Grice's
earlier definition31.
For Wilson the premise of Grice's theory is wrong. One deciphers S's meaning with dictionaries,
lexicons and grammars; this precedes the ascription to him of intentions. One applies a principle of
charity, interpreting sentences as a body, on the basis of as much relevant information as is obtainable,
garnering the best possible approximation32. Wilson explains Grice's condition in terms of this
principle: the utterance has meaning if it can be interpreted according to other utterances ascribed to S.
If x means y in this corpus of interpretation, then 'x means y' is defined. This allows the diagnosis of
the main confusion in Grice: Wilson's definition says that the utterance x means something, Grice's
that utterance x meansNN (is conventional) and is sincere, neither covert nor quasi33. However, there are,
discerned by Wilson and Ziff, speech acts which are not signalings, and signalings which are not
locutions.
29 Yu (1979) pp273-274 distinguishes the underlying thesis on broadly Chomskyan grounds (as Patten and Stampe (1969) pl5
indicate), from those about the genesis of language. Grice (1989b) p91 gives 'o (x)', with o a complete utterance-type, and x
(complete or incomplete). He then gives '<p' as a further utterance type, and 'o (tp/x)' as the result of substitution of (p for x in o.
How the sentences come to have the same meanings is a different question, one which it is argued (here and in IV), can be
answered in a Gricean theory.
30 Or a 'covariance'. Wilson, N.L.; 'Gricean Meaning: The Ultimate Counter-Example', Nous vol. IV, pp295-302, 1970.
31 Wilson (1970) p297.
32 Wilson (1970) p300. Wilson suggests that for a definition ofhow this method must proceed one should, 'Ask Ventris'.
33 The convention is a 'signalling' in Wilson's terminology. It is part of the defence of broadly Gricean theories made in this
dissertation that the apparently dire consequences following from cases of speech acts in covert and quasi contexts can be
avoided.
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Grice considers such alleged counter-examples. He credits Urmson with the observation that S might
elicit an intended effect by duress. H has information that S wants; H knows S wants the information; S
tortures H into giving the information, and with the intention of so doing. Grice questions whether H
was to recognise, from the application of torture, S's intention that he speak. One should say only that
what S meant was that H speak. Nevertheless, an amendment is in order, due to two analogous
examples, in one ofwhich recognition is taken from an utterance, and in the second ofwhich it is not. S
goes to H (a friendly shopkeeper), and, saying nothing, proffers the cost of the item usually purchased:
H gives S the item. Alternatively, S goes to H (now unknown), and asks for an item; H waits to see S
can pay before giving the item. Nothing has been meant in the latter case, but in the first something has
been meant, and an 'inducement' given. The second premise is amended, reading, S intended H to
recognise, at least in part from the utterance given, that S intended to produce the response34. Vlach
dubs the inference of (III) the 'Gricean mechanism'. His first example is Bennett's, and emphasises
that the inference is based only on H's belief in S's sincerity35. (He gives, in addition, developments of
the case in vocal, linguistic utterance36). Case A3 requires that H reason on the basis of S's utterance,
'beyond' its conventional meaning, to its implication37. There are cases (accusations, insults), in which
there is no attempt by S to convince H, merely to instil the recognition that S believes p. The Gricean
mechanism fails here, for the inference made is to that which H believes, not to the fact that S means p.
Analogous cases include reminding, in which S has no intention to get H to believe anything, and H
does not reason on the basis of S's intentions, the latter point being known to H. Again, the mechanism
34 Thus the definition reads: (I) S intended, by uttering x, to induce a certain response in H; (II) S intended H to recognise, at least
in part from the utterance of x, that S intended to produce that response; (III) S intended the fulfillment of the intention
mentioned in (II) to be at least in part H's reason for fulfilling the contention mentioned in (I). Grice (1989b) p92. Recanati
focuses on this definition, and considers variants of 'neo-Gricean', claims that communication requires (as necessary or
necessary and sufficient), recognition by H of S intention. Recanati, F.; 'On Defining Communicative Intentions', Mind and
Language, vol. I, no. 3, pp213-242, 1986. (A 'neo-Gricean' who might fit this definition is Bennett). On the given definition, as
Recanati says, this condition is a 'sub- [or perlocutionary] intention', and will probably, in the course of events, occur. Recanati
considers whether the definition can and should be amended, and whether the 'neo-Griceans' (Searle, Bach and Harnish,
McDowell, Sperber and Wilson), have a better claim to have analysed communication. Bach, K.; 'On Communicative Intentions:
A Reply to Recanati'. Mind and Language, vol. II, no. 2,pp)41-154, 1987.
35 Vlach, F.; 'Speaker's Meaning', Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. IV, no. 3, pp359-391, 1981. The reference is to Bennett, J.;
'The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy', Foundations of Language, vol. X, no. 2, ppl41-168, 1973. Cf. Bennett (1976) pp!25ff.
Bennett presents the Gricean conditions for meaning, and stresses the unspoken requirement (unspoken by Strawson and
Schiffer), for there to be a reliance by S on the mediation of a trusted mechanism of meaning to achieve his intended effect
(communication with H). It is the difference intending using U to produce an effect in H and relying upon U to produce it in H.
Evidently this introduces notions of choice and of rationality, for S would not rely on the mechanism if he thought he could not
with it achieve his intentions. This, as Bennett says, leads to Strawson's sceptical responses, in which S speaks intending H to
believe as per the mechanism, but yet giving LI to believe he relies on a different mechanism entirely. As Schiffer says (below),
Strawson's additional condition shall not suffice to obviate the difficulty, and the regress of further, and more otiose, stipulations
begins. Bennett paraphrases Strawson: further stipulations become contrived and both defeat 'any humanly possible state of
belief (pl26), and ignore the fact that true (ideal) communication is 'open and above board', without 'contrived cross-purposes'.
Bennett's own response to the regress is described on ppl26-128; for further discussion of the same points, cf. Loar (1981)
ra>243ff.
3 Vlach (1981). Cf. Boer, S.E. and Pappas, G.S.; 'The Epistemology of Speaker Meaning', Australasian Journal of Philosophy,
vol. LIII, no. 3, pp204-219, 1975, especially pp204-207.
37 Vlach (1981).
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fails. A further case is reasoning from a body of shared propositions. For instance, cases of 'direct
evidence', epitomised in Grice's example of the bandaged leg38. Stampe offers a counter-example3'. S
wants, as skilfully as he can, to communicate to H (his bridge opponent, and, in the example, his
manager), that he wants him to win. S feigns to smile in a certain way 'very like' but not 'quite like' a
spontaneous smile when dealt a good hand, and in producing it intends that H thinks he has a good
hand, that H should think this on the basis (partly), of the smile, and that at least part of the reason for
thinking S has a good hand is that S intends him to think so. Strawson suggests a further condition: that
S smile also with the intention that H recognise that S has this first intention40, in what he is to take as a
'spontaneous giveaway'. Black offers counter-examples of this type, arguing that Grice's fear that there
may result a regress of intentions in the move to prevent the case becoming one of real communication
is, 'well-founded', for such a theory is 'suspect'41. A third case derives from Schiffer: S's intended
response is a practical one, namely, the effecting of the departure from the room of an avaricious yet
proud man (H): H leaves not in pursuit of the £1, but because he is evidently not wanted. This
notwithstanding, Grice contends, the utterance (tossing the money), does not mean42. A further feature
for note is that though H's leaving was intended by S to be elicited by H's thought that S wanted him to
leave, S did not intend that his (own) intention was so motivated. A condition is added: that S intends
that H recognise that S intended that in leaving the room, at least part ofH's reason should be that H
recognised that S intended that he leave. Grice adds, again with reference to Strawson, that the new
analysis has the feature that S's further intentions are all intentions such that H should think that S has
them.
Grice questions Strawson's belief that the regress of intentions is virtuous, and attacks the idea that
workable examples can be constructed with iterations of' S intended H to think that...'. Grice considers
38 Vlach (1981) p says that the mechanism remains good for cases of indirect evidence, perhaps Strawson's rat setter. Less
amenable are those cases, suggested by Searle, of utterances made out of a sense of duty. Vlach goes on to argue that the
condition in Grice's analysis, shared by Armstrong, Bennett and Schiffer, stating that H must come to believe by recognising S's
intention, should be replaced with a notion deriving from Searle: that of 'understanding', 'undertaking', or 'commitment'. This is
defined as a commitment, given by S in his utterance, to the truth of his utterance as depicting accurately, or asserting, an
existing state of affairs: this is, in Searle, an 'essential condition'. This is of a part with Searle's response to Grice that meaning
something by an utterance is an illocutionaiy and not a perlocutionary act: S stands guarantee for his assertion, not merely
presents it for survey by H. The Austinian influence on Searle is evident. Full discussion of this awaits III. This is evidently a
notion of responsibility for S's intended actions and utterances; it is a condition of utter internal consistency. Cf. de Mulder, W.;
Demonstratives and Intentionality: Searle andHusserl onMeaning andPerception (Antwerp Papers in Linguistics, no. 79) 1994,
pp8-9.
3'Grice (1989b) pp94ff.
40 Of letting H think he has a good hand.
41 Black (1972) p274-279 presents his response to this logical embarrassment. It is argued in IV that there is no regress. That all
ofGrice's work is directed to getting round the regress, and to emphasise the problem of speaker's speaking with deceitful intent,
is considered by Avramides (1989) pp51 and 58ff. She brings to attention that Grice writes elsewhere that the regress of
intentions is a mark in favour ofhis analysis. Communication has a value, and successful communication is its optimal condition;
communication is an ideal, one never fully attained in particular speech acts. This is grist for Schiffer's mutual-knowledge
conditions. Cf. Grice, H.P.; 'Meaning Revisited', pp283-303 in (1989g).
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Schiffer's example of S singing in order to get H to leave. S intends that H recognise his intention to
get him to leave. H should think that the singing is a result of S's intention to get rid of him, but S just
wants rid of him. In Grice's words: 'S's scheme is that H should (wrongly) think that S intends H to
think that S intends to get rid ofH by means of the recognition of S's intention that H should go'. One
making this argument holds that one cannot argue that S meant by his utterance that H should leave, for
Grice's iterated intentions confuse the dual aspect of the intention, for how does H recognise that S
communicates also a first intention: that S wants rid of H by his singing. Does S have to sing
beautifully, in a way he knows is a pleasure for H to hear, but a pain for all other people? Grice
continues: ifH is aware of this reasoning on S's part (as the example requires), he will likely conclude
that S's singing is intended to drive him out; he will not reason to a further intention. The beginning
regress presages confusion in the communication of iterated intentions, and there are greater
difficulties. Not only is the multiplying of clauses implausible, but it suggests that the 'definitional
expansion', of a statement reporting the meaning of an utterance might be given differently from case
to case, and include matter extraneous to the analysis of a meaning utterance: '...the nature of the
intended response, the circumstances in which the attempt to elicit the response is made, and the
intelligence of the utterer and the audience'43. Grice sees no objection to adding a clause to his analysis,
halting the regress: meaning may be negatively described as requiring that S not have a certain sort of
intention, namely, the complex intention described in the singing example:
"S meant something by uttering x" is true iff (for some H and for some r): (a) S uttered x
intending (1) H to produce r; (2) H to think S to intend (1); (3) H's fulfilment of (1) to be
based on H's fulfilment of (2) (b) there is no inference-element E such that S uttered x
intending both (T) that H's determination of r should rely on E and (2') that H should
think S to intend that (1') be false.
The regress of nested intentions initiated (though not infinite), demands justification, for it is yet a
regress. It requires that S reason with reference to pre-established conventions, and, Grice adds, shows
that one must use caution when assessing Searle's example of the German-speaking soldier (described
below).
42 For the same reasons as given above.
43 Grice's examples are unconvincing, but his point is made. Parikh, P.; 'Communication and Strategic Inference', Linguistics
and Philosophy, vol. XIV, no. 5, pp473-514, 1991, theorises Gricean communication using the machinery of Barwise and Perry's
situation and semantics and game theory. The latter is derived from Lewis, and shall be presented in IV. The former offers, in
Parikh's words, a theory of language as able to communicate different propositions '... in different circumstances with the same
sentences'. It is a theory of contexts, and answers the very same questions Grice asks. Parikh studies directedness in greater detail
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Grice writes that in cases in which a sentence is uttered S's intentions are to be recognised through
H's knowledge of the conventional use of the sentence (he notes also the role for non-conventional
implicature). However, Grice's account takes conventional links between utterances and elicited
responses to be only one way in which they may be correlated, for it is a tenet of Gricean theory that
utterance meaning precedes, and guides, sentence meaning. Searle's example contains ambiguities.
Does S intend that his captors (non-German speaking), having no idea what he says, conclude that his
speaking German compels the conclusion that he is a German officer? As Grice says, it is difficult to
avoid the conclusion that S intends his captors to carry out this reasoning. There is, however, a
difficulty encountered, as before, of intending a result without the likelihood of its occuring. In this
case S would not mean that he is a German officer, for though he intends his captors to believe this, he
does not intend this on the basis of their recognition, for they do not understand the sentence. (On the
reading that S's words were intended to be taken by the captors as the sentence 'I am a German
officer', Grice is adamant that this may be what S meant, though in an aside says that in this case it is
difficult to elicit a conventional context)44. This raises a broader point: whether S intends H to think his
sentence has a given meaning, and whether this intention is to be recognised by H. Grice rejects the
German-speaker case as one of meaning, writing that there is 'characteristically' a correlation between
an utterance and an intended response. It is not pertinent whether the utterance is really so correlated,
or indeed whether S thinks so, '...though of course in the normal course S will think [the utterance] to
be so correlated'; there remains, that is, a distinction between what an utterance means and what S
takes it or wants it to mean. Grice accommodates this into a revised analysis.
Ranges of variables: H: hearers; f: features of utterance; r: responses; c: modes of
correlation (such as iconic, associative, conventional); (3A) (3f) (3r) (3c) S uttered x
intending:
(1) H to think x possesses f
(2) H to think S intends (1)
(3) H to think of f as correlated in way c with the type to which r belongs
(4) H to think S intends (3)
(5) H to think on the basis of the fulfilment of (1) and (3) that S intends H to produce r
(6) H, on the basis of fulfilment of (5), to produce r
inParikh, P.; 'Communication, Meaning and Interpretation', Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. XXIII, no. 2, ppl85-212, 2000.
Much of this essay duplicates the first.
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(7) H to think S intends (6)
One may as Grice states, fulfil all of the first few intentions with an utterance which is not
conventionally correlated with intended responses, and yet regard the utterance as one by which S
means something. This is due to the presence of f (say, being an utterance of a particular French
sentence). In Searle's example there is no such unambiguous feature, for the captors are intended to
recognise S's utterance as being a token ofGerman, but to think that they are intended to recognise the
utterance as having been a particular German sentence45. (Black likens Searle's example to the case of
an incorrigible liar whose 'Yes' is always taken for 'No' and his 'No' for 'Yes': the effect elicited is
the reverse of that intended, or the liar means 'No' by 'Yes'). With some exclusions and revisions
Grice gives the second revision of the third redefinition:
(3A) (3f) (3r) (3c): (a) S uttered x intending
(1) H to think x possesses f
(2) H to think f correlated in way c with the type to which r belongs
(3) H to think, on the basis of the fulfilment of (1) and (3) that S intends A to produce r
(4) H, on the basis of the fulfilment of (3) to produce r, and (b) there is no inference-
element E such that S intends both (l1) H in his determination of r to rely on E (2') H to
think S to intend (1") to be false
Grice returns to the beliefs or actions engendered by indicative and imperative sentences, those S
intends as the outcome of his utterance through H's recognition. Black has intuitive objections to the
point: a 'good Gricean' could never intend to get another to think what they already believe. He could
not reply to 'demonstrate', his knowledge, for he would still 'need to mean' his answer. Grice likes the
fact that in both indicatives and imperatives here both S and H have propositional attitudes, and that
agreement to the utterances 'The engine has stopped', and 'Stop the engine', signifies respectively
belief and intention and he suggests further cases. Grice offers a counter-example to the analysis of
'[b]y uttering x, S meant that so-and-so is the case', with 'S uttered x M-intending to produce in H the
belief that so-and-so'. The activating sense is too strong. What is needed is a theory ofwhat S meant by
an utterance on an occasion, not of the proposition S intended to produce a belief. (Grice considers the
cases of questioning, confessing, reminding, reviewing mutually-known facts, drawing conclusions and
44 Grice (1989b) plOl. The example is discussed further in III and IV, and is from Searle (1969) p44.
45 That is, on the most charitable interpretation of the example. It can be seen that the case of the communicating bridge player is
to be treated in an identical manner: H is intended by S to recognise S's knowing smile as meaning that he has a good hand. For
the reference in the following sentence, cf. Black (1972) pp274-276.
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telling a counter-suggestible man. The first example is described). S asks H 'When was Waterloo?',
and H replies '1815'. Grice writes that H hardly intended to engender the belief in S that Waterloo was
fought in 1815, though he meant that it was. S's beliefs are irrelevant to the eliciting of H's answer.
Grice considers that the intended effect is that S knows or thinks that H thinks Waterloo was fought in
1815, or that S knows whether H knows the correct answer to the question. These examples raise two
difficulties, one described here and one in the following section. The first concerns the tie of
convention between an utterance and the intimation that S intends by it the engendering of a specific
belief. There are cases (paradigmatically, reminding), in which the indicative mood is not given by S's
intention to induce a belief, and one could not consistently say that the intention of the indicative is to
engender belief. A conventional tie seems clearer for imperatives, but Grice demurs at the question of
whether the indicative can analogously be treated, and the points are taken up in the following section.
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3. Timeless Meaning and Conventions
Grice makes a distinction between the meaning of an indicative sentence and of what S means by an
indicative sentence1. Sentence meaning ever entails reference to the fact that an indicative
conventionally indicates S's intention to communicate belief; there are, however, cases in which
sentence meaning does not coincide with S's meaning2. The second difficulty follows. If one accepts
the idea that the indicative is connected by convention to the indication of the intention to engender a
belief, one must allow that S meaning differs for different occurrences of the same indicative. Grice
considers the example again: 'Waterloo was fought in 1815', spoken by S in a class, by H in response
to S's question, and by S in a 'revision class'. Each use embodies a different meaning. Grice argues
that even if H intends to engender the belief that he thinks Waterloo was fought in 1815, it does not
seem correct to say that when he said this he meant that he thought Waterloo was fought in 1815. (This,
Grice adds, distinguishes him from S lecturing to H). The examples may be revised by considering the
intention communicated an 'activated belief3; H, '...should be in a state of believing that p and having
it in mind that p'. (Reminding and inferring may receive the same response, but with an intent to
'remedy a different deficiency'). There is, however, a counter-example. If S reminds by saying
'Waterloo was fought in 1815', he can be said to intend to induce activated belief in H and to intend
that this be recognised by H. In cases in which H believes but has temporarily forgotten the fact (it
might be, as Grice says, on the tip of his tongue), the activated beliefwill be instilled, but despite S's
intention. However, the relinquishing of the condition is not acceptable: Herod, showing Salome the
head of St John the Baptist, cannot be said to have meant that John was dead; S showing a bandaged
leg in response to an invitation to dance can be said to mean that he cannot take up the invitation or that
he has an injured leg, but not that his leg is bandaged4.
Grice considers that a third condition applies only when S intends to engender activated belief by
eliminating 'assurance-deficiency', and not 'attention-deficiency'. The idea can be extended to
imperatives also. Grice offers a redefinition, in which *\|/ is a 'mood marker' reporting a propositional
attitude:
"S means by uttering x that *v|f p" = S utters x intending
(1) that H should actively \|/ that p
1 Grice (1989b) pl02. Here is a vital Gricean distinction, and he reapplies it to previous examples: the German soldier and the
communicating bridge player.
2 And consider the example of S asking H the date of the battle ofWaterloo.
3 A notion considered by Strawson, McDowell and Schiffer, and discussed below.
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(2) that H should recognise that S intends (1) and (unless S intends the utterance of x
merely to remedy attention-deficiency)
(3) that the fulfilment of (1) should be based on the fulfilment of (2)5.
This, however, will not serve in cases in which S intends by his utterance to give H the belief that p, for
it is required that H should think that S thinks that p; to this locution one might add the need for a direct
intended effect, that H should think that S thinks that p. (The indirect effect is H's coming to think that
p), This permits the retention of (3), and extension to cases of reminding, questioning, counter-
suggestion and fact review. A problem arises with the application to non-indicative cases, described in
two contrasting examples: (a) 'You shall not cross the barrier', and (b) 'Do not cross the barrier'. The
explanation of intended meaning for (a) is clear, but for (b) would need to include the statement that S
intends that H shall not cross, and that H must himself form the intention not to cross. Grice dubs the
cases 'exhibitive' and 'protreptic' respectively, and gives the fourth redefinition:
"By uttering x S meant that *\|/ p" is true iff (3A) (3f) (3c): S uttered x intending (1) (2)
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) [as in the third redefinition, version A, with "\|/-ing that p" substituted
for "r"6] and (for some cases) (8) H, on the basis of the fulfilment of (6), himself to v|/ that
P-
(The fourth redefinition, version B, is obtained by adding (8) to the defmiens of the third redefinition,
version B, as subclause (a) (5) together with a modification of clause (b) to account for the fact that the
intended response is now specified by \]/-ing that p)7. In this, Clark writes, S saying, 'p, but I do not
believe that p', invokes both his belief that p, and that he does not believe that p; a case, Clark says,
requiring Grice to account for the roles of unconscious beliefs and deception (of oneself or by others).
Clark adds that this self-evidently compromises the condition on recognition of intention. Cases of self-
deception are the most intriguing, precisely because they raise the issue of private colloquy, for which
Grice accounts in his final version of S meaning8.
4Cf. Holdcroft (1978) pl32.
5 Grice (1989b) pi 10. As remarked at the beginning of II, Suppes argues that it is upon this that the major criticisms of Grice
should be focused.
6 Given at the end of II.2.
7 Grice (1989b) ppl04-105. The definition runs: '(OA) (3f) (3r) (3c): (a) S uttered x intending (1) H to think x possesses f; (2) H
to think f correlated in way c with the type to which r belongs; (3) H to think, on the basis of the fulfillment of (1) and (3) that S
intends H to produce r; (4) H, on the basis of the fulfillment of (3) to produce r, and (b) there is no inference-element E such that
S intends both (10 H in his determination of r to rely on E and (20 H to think S to intend (10 to be false'. For the references in
the following paragraph cf. Clark (1975) p.
8 Chomsky (1975) pp64-68. Chomsky considers cases in which S, before a hypothetical H, has intentions as in Gricean analysis.
He argues that ineluctably 'suspect', notions of linguistic and literal meaning intrude, and that the Gricean nested intentions are
unnecessary in 'normal' language use. Significantly, in light of the rumbling on of Derrida's analogy between forms of
communication, Chomsky marks distinctions between linguistic and other forms of communication and the literal meaning of S's
expression and what S meant by producing the expression. (He makes no distinction between the latter notion and saying,
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Grice considers whether S means something by an utterance addressed to no-one. Such cases seem to
undercut his analysis, and Black offers this response. Black deals perfunctorily with the notion that
such a case may be explained as one of S communicating with his future self, as not serving in cases of
'pure soliloquy', for S cannot, in uttering, 'I must...', intend to give himself a reason for doing as he
demands. Black repeats Chomsky's point that there is an indefinite number of uses of language and of
utterance contexts, and of innumerable language tokens, that will never be uttered'. He asks, carpingly,
that if all Gricean examples are to be modelled on collocution, must cases of soliloquy be 'derivative'
of discussion with a potential audience? Black allows only that this applies to cases of prior rehearsal
or, less convincingly, notes for the development of ideas. The additions Grice makes can deal with
exceptions, but at cost of mounting complexity. He draws attention to difficult cases: the posting of
notices ('Keep out'), diary entries, notes to self, soliloquies, rehearsals for conversations and silent
cogitations. These require a fifth and final redefinition. Grice postulates <p and cp' as ranging over
properties ofpossible audiences.
"S meant by uttering x that \p p" is true iff (3tp) (3f) (3c):
I: S uttered x intending x to be such that anyone who has (p would think that,
(1)xhasf,
(2) f is correlated in way c with \p-ing that p,
(3) (3<p'): S intends x to be such that anyone who has cp' would think, via thinking (1) and
(2), that S \|/'s that p;
(4) in view of (3), S \|/'s that p;
II: (operative only for certain substituends for "*\p") S uttered x intending that, should
there actually be anyone who has cp, he would via thinking (4), himself ip that p;
'whatever expressions S used'). For Chomsky, a theory of linguistic meaning is 'unilluminated' by an analogy to the sense of
'meaning' carried in an act of slamming a door, though a theory of communication may be, ('perhaps'). That is, Chomsky argues
that the two elements ofDerrida's analogy are inherently separate. He cites difficult cases for Grice: S without an audience, or in
private collocution. (Cf. Yu (1979) p278). Derrida would demur at Chomsky's exposition; the cases Chomsky cites say nothing
of intention and its recognition, but are cases in which what is said has 'strict' meaning, and S means what he says. (S could, on
this, say something to himselfwith strict meaning and mean what he says). While Derrida says the analogy results in all forms of
communication being subject to the same arguments against saturable conventions and indeterminable intentions, Chomsky
would reply that there must needs be a distinction between communication and meaning. It should be said that it is a virtue of
Gricean analysis that it makes no distinction between forms of communication, beginning from a premise passably similar to
Derrida's, and aiming to account for the ways in which all marks can come to have conventional meaningNN.
Suppes (1986) pill thinks the problem of soliloquy to be of no importance. He dwells longer on the concept of intention, and
Chomsky's 'superficial' notion. Suppes emphasises the primacy of communication over meaning, contrary to Chomsky in his
rejection ofDerrida's analogy. Suppes writes that if S writes a diary entry or notes to self, it is not acceptable to say that S writes
something with a strict meaning but without intention to communicate. Suppes himself makes the point raised above: that
Chomsky attributes to Grice, by implying an undue reductionism, a theory not obviously his. Cf. Bennett (1991) p7.
' Black (1972) pp273-278. See also Chomsky (1975) pl9 and (1980) pp84-85.
129
Ill: It is not the case that, for some inference-element E, S intends x to be such that
anyone who has (p will both (1') rely on E in coming to \|/+ that p (2') think that (3cp'): S
intends x to be such that anyone who has (p1 will come to \p+ that p without relying on E10.
There is plainly an ambiguity in the formulation, centring on the 'such that' condition (and skewing
the interpretation of Schiffer)11. As Hyslop says, S utters his sentence intending that it have the feature
that it would inform H, and this, Hyslop argues, deals with Schiffer's objections, in both the soliloquy
case and that of the order made without H12. Hyslop is not so sure that the argument works for Grice's
example (as given in Grice's descriptions), for it may still be said that the requisite Gricean intentions
(given in the analysis), are present, but that the intention relevant to and needed on this occasion, is
wanting13. As Hyslop writes, the utterance in this case is to serve as a token of a type used to inform,
but it might be said that this leaves behind the lesson of Grice's core analysis of meaning intentions:
that the utterance itself is to have certain effects: namely, to communicate with H were one present.
(This, as should be clear, aptly describes the interpretative problem found in II. 1 and raised by
Wilson)14. Black rejects the fifth definition, owing to what he thinks an incomplete notion of intention.
Every speech act, and indeed all 'social intervention', has consequences which '...can always be
brought under the rubric of a certain desired state-of-affairs, p\ One can, he suggests, read off the
intention in all speech acts, even, with the series of nested, regressive intentions, in deceptive cases; to
avoid objections such as those Clark makes, one should dissect the notions of context and
communication on which the ascription of intention depends, for, on Grice's theory, securing the
recognition of intention is wont to seem 'automatic', or 'ritual'. The ascription of intentions should
10 Grice (1989b) p 114.
11 Cf. Hyslop, A.; 'Grice without an Audience', Analysis, vol. XXXVII, no. 2, pp67-69, 1977. Yu (1979) p279 maintains that his
criticism is equally effective here (owing to his scepticism concerning the primacy of intention to S meaning and sentence
meaning), and the analysis can be reapplied.
12
Hyslop (1977) p67 and cf. Schiffer (1972) p.
13 As will be seen in III, this is the tenor of Searle's criticisms ofGrice, which awaits full explication in IV. Schiffer (1972) pp73-
80 rewrites the example. Cf. also Green, O.H.; 'Intentions and Speech Acts', Analysis, vol. XXIX, no. 3, ppl09-112, 1969.
Green concentrates on the addition to the condition of the recognition of intention, by Searle and Alston, of S's utterance as a
conventionally recognised sentence, using the example Lewis (1969) pl77 finds in Wittgenstein.
14
Lycan (1991) pp85-86 on this Chomskyan objection. Clark (1975) pl07 raises difficulties for Grice's analysis pertaining to
notions of context and convention: <p and tp' may be replaced by 'certain substituends', and Grice's definitions are doubted. (Cf.
Bber andPappas (1975) p213). In the case of silent cogitation, for instance: '[w]e could perfectly well... replace... every process
of speaking to oneself by speaking aloud or writing'. (Cf. Wittgenstein, L.; The Blue and Brown Books (Oxford, Blackwell)
1958, p4). More pertinently, an utterance might be made without intention that anyone hear it; indeed, there are some utterances
for which no possible H is allowed, and while this is not pertinent to Clark's analysis, his point about Grice's definition is good.
Grice's commitment is to a view of language (verbal and non-verbal) as a means of public communication, and it is this that is
used in private communication. (Clark is surprisingly blunt in this straightforward transference; he is positively Searlean). Non-
communicative ('private') uses are 'parasitic' (Clark's word) on communicative uses, and it is enough if 'standard' cases are
defined and the results applied across the board. Clark is of the belief that Grice's definition achieves this, and that no more need
be asked of it.
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rather be thought impossible without reference to rules and contextual conventions, and Black
considers how such notions may be included in a Gricean theory of S-meaning15.
Black theorises the application of these notions in a theory of communication as per Gricean analysis.
By 'The Formula' for establishing conventions it is necessary that H come not just to recognise that S
has a specific prepositional attitude to some state of affairs, but to share it, to have it himself. This
situation, Black urges, cannot arise in Gricean (and Austinian), analysis, for, firstly, a theory of
prepositional attitudes requires a theory of perlocutions and not illocutions, H's coming to believe
something from S's utterance being a perlocutionary effect16. Secondly, Grice wants for a theory of
convention. (It is argued in IV that the requisite additions are made by Schiffer). Black asks whether, in
cases in which S's illocutionary effect is unambiguous and achieved, H can come to have an attitude to
the proposition expressed without understanding S to be asserting the fact contained in the proposition.
He writes that S has still, surely, communicated his meaning, as he has in, say, cases in which he is
understood but not believed. In this there are broad agreements with Searle's response to Grice, both
regarding a theory of perlocution as immaterial to the notion of communication or of S-meaning, and
arguing that the notion requiring clarity is that of the 'understanding' of H elicited by S's
communicated intention". Any attempt to shore up Gricean theory not heeding this must meet three
demands. Firstly, echoing Clark, that the postulated intentions occur in the situations in which they are
invoked (Black says elsewhere that this occurs in 'standard cases' of illocutionary utterance, in which
S's intention is, '.. .constituted by the meaning of what he says'; that is, in cases neither ironic nor
protreptic, and categorically not perlocutionary); secondly, and quite simply, that the bald notion of
'intention' be clarified; and thirdly, that the clarification not be dependent on the notion of meaning.
Black quips that there are few, if any, explicitly formulated intentions, and Grice's condition that S
intends to communicate what is 'normally conveyed' by his utterance brings a charge of circularity18.
15 In giving a theory of S meaning one must separate the relevant intended effect from the array of other effects (illocutionary,
perlocutionary, rhetic) achieved in a speech act. In utterance in the absence of an H one or more of these attendant effects simply
is frustrated. Black (1972) p273-274 sees in Grice's response to Searle's example of the German soldier a tendentious shift from
meaningfulness to meaningful content, and this pertains (as discussed above) to the interpretation of the case of the German
soldier. Black adds that the tenacity with which Grice pursues the purification of his analysis is like that of the logical positivists
in shoring up the verification principle; the principle eventually 'faded away', and the condition of the recognition of intention
will follow.
16 Cf. Skinner (1970) pl20.
17 Black (1972) pp270ff argues that there is no distinctive 'criterion' of understanding communications (as opposed, one must
suppose, to acts of communication); they are not 'specifiable events', and he takes this as good against all Gricean theories.
McDowell (1980) offers an eminently hermeneutical solution to the problems Grice raises (cf. III. 1).
18 Black (1972) p272 asks whether one can, 'without the introduction of fictions', recognise, in 'standard' cases of 'successful
communication', S's primary intention, and indeed, '...the second-order and higher-order intentions needed by Grice...'. 'Can
we, for instance, agree with Grice, that when... S seriously says to... H, "It is snowing now,"..., he intends H to think that it is
snowing, and also intends H to recognise that S intends him to think that, and so forth, through the whole chan of supplementary
intentions?' This notion demands the deliverance of Lewis (1969), but Black suggests that one might 'improve' Gricean analysis
with the following formulation: 'When S utters U [a sentence], he knows, or has a good reason to think, that H will be led, on the
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Furthermore, this will not serve for novel uses of language, and Black suggests an alternative, similar
in many respects, as shall be seen, to McDowell's in response to Strawson, eliminating reference to
psychological events 'preceding or accompanying the actual utterance', and contending that
conventions of language are read off from overt linguistic behaviour. Black says that the circularity
remains in the condition requiring H's recognition of S's intention, and hence his argument that Grice's
analysis is unworkable.
Grice shows sensitivity to these concerns. He writes that the relation between meaning and
meaningMM might provide the key to showing that,'... any human institution, the function ofwhich is to
provide artificial substitutes for natural signs' must encapsulate the features of S's occasion-meaning,
and to this he adds a further complexity19. In saying of S that by doing (uttering) something he meansNN
something specific, and of a word or sentence that it means something specific, there is a further, vital
distinction to be noted, between what S says and what he implies by what he says, compelling an
explication of the notion of 'saying' and its relation to that of convention20. There are six stages to the
analysis. Firstly, a distinction between locutions of the form 'S meant that ...', and those of the form
'[a]n utterance-type means Secondly, the provision of a defmiens for statements of occasion-
meaning, with, again, the proviso that an utterance may be linguistic or non-linguistic, conventional or
non-conventional. Thirdly, and most importantly, a means of clarifying the notion of the conventional
meaning of an utterance type: of sentences which make use of the form '[a]n utterance-type means
"*p"', or 'X means This is the explication of timeless meaning in sentential and non-sentential
expressions, and the classification may be sub-divided, firstly into statements of, 'idiolect-meaning'
and 'language meaning', and secondly with recognition of the fact that an utterance-type 'may have
more than one conventional meaning'. Fourthly, with respect to the last point, one must provide an
explication of the applied timeless meaning of an utterance type; that is, an analysis of '[a]n utterance-
type meant here making a distinction between the applied timeless meaning of an utterance type
and the occasion-meaning of the utterance. (Schwayder pursues Grice's discussion from this stage,
basis of hearing U, to think that something is the ease (and to think that S wanted him to think that, because S uttered U, etc.).
Hence, since "we are presumed to intend the normal consequences of our actions", S does intend the expected response ofH\
19 Grice (1989b) pi 16. Black (1972) p272 thinks that the reformulation allows that S knowing the consequences of an act
(utterance) accepts responsibility for the act, and that, '...such acceptance of responsibility will be the viable content of the
attribution to him of a corresponding intention'. Correlatively, H's understanding requires that he, guided by previous experience
and knowledge of the relevant context, see that S assumes this responsibility. The appropriate conventions are established before
S can intelligibly invoke them in utterances, and thus the faculties used in H's understanding precede the ascription of intention.
Black gives formal expression to his argument that Grice's analysis is unworkable (pp278-279).
20 The distinction between S's meaning something by an utterance, and an utterance meaning something begins the analysis of
Schiffer (1972) p 1, and cf. IV.3. Grice writes that implication can be carried conventionally (by the meaning of a word or
phrase), or non-conventionally (by a use of words outside the specification of their conventional meaning). Cf. Grice, H.P.;
'Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning and Word-Meaning', ppl 17-137 in (1989), pi 18.
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defining saying as meaning21. Schwayder thinks Grice too modest: words such as 'therefore' and
'however' are conditions of politeness or deference; in their use they conventionally affect the ways in
which S may say what he means to say, but not what he means to say). Fifthly, the distinction between
what is said and what is conventionally meant compels the task of describing the conditions in which
what S conventionally meant is also part ofwhat was said. Grice does this by specifying, '...conditions
which will be satisfied only by a limited range of speech-acts, the members of which will thereby be
stamped as specially central or fundamental', and by specifying that in making the utterance S will
have said *p if he has done so with a 'central speech-act' in an utterance embodying, 'some
conventional device', the meaning of which, by its appearance in the utterance, shows that the speech
act means that *p. A central speech act constitutes a conventional illocutionary act in Austin's sense
(one that meansNN), and carries with it Grice's substitute for the explicit performative, namely an
indication, carried in the act itself, that S performs this very act22.
Schwayder's alternative definition of meaning and saying states that meaning is communicated in
acts of meaningNN, and makes radical appeal to convention. Schwayder removes all reference to
intended effects, for they are correctly assigned to, '...the perlocutionary intent of the illocutionary
act', and his account has no role for illocutionary force23. He argues that the events (speech acts),
described in his theory as conventional are prone to success or failure, with consequences to follow for
misfires or infelicities: a bet is laid in a locutionary act iff the act contains the indication that it is
performed. (Schwayder puts it succinctly: '... an act would have succeeded if the answer to the question
"What was he meaning to do?" itself also conveys an answer to the question "What did he actually
do?"'). Schwayder considers his work to reckon the ways in which one, '...performs an act of
conventional meaning'; his own taxonomy of illocutionary acts ('action-sorts') would proceed by a
listing of the conditions, '...under which acts of that action-sort logically could not succeed', and
sincere, or, using Strawson's term, avowable, acts are performed in the belief that no contrary
21 Schwayder, D.S.; 'Meaning and Saying', Foundations of Language, vol. IX, no. 1, pp66-97, 1972.
22 Additionally, Grice (1989c) ppl21 -122 defines a formula for all members of the group of 'central speech acts' in terms of
occasion-meaning.
23 Schwayder (1972) pp82-83. Certain rhetorical devices conventionally affect what S says, namely, those conditions considered
as oblique statements or implications. Some speech acts are, Schwayder writes, traditionally identified as answers to the question
'what was he meaning to do?' and are also answers or implied answers to the question 'what was he doing?'. Schwayder
responds '[a] possible answer to such a question is 'Apologise', where I assume that apologising would pass muster as a kind of
non-natural or conventional meaning. Also, if you ask me what to do, I might reply 'Apologise'. He adds, apropos this and what
follows, that a central notion in this conception of action is 'the possibility of failure', described as the tendency to, when
identifying a piece of behaviour as a type of action, imagine that it could be successful or a failure, but' [i]t might be wondered
whether acts of conventional meaning can be said to fail'. However, Schwayder offers an example. 'Suppose I bet that UCLA
will beat Kentucky in the finals, and then it turns out that Jacksonville is one of the teams that gets there. The bet is off. Although
I certainly meant to make a bet, no bet got made, and the act failed. Again, my act of apologising to Thalberg might fail because
the person to whom I address myself is not Thalberg, as I thought'.
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conditions obtain. An action meant is defined by a list of its 'conditions of success', and all such
conditions constitute also a definition of conventional meaning24. Schwayder is unequivocal: S means
everything identified in a wide categorisation of things indicated in the act, things that, in normal,
sincere cases, constitute an analysis of saying. For cases of insincere utterance, what S says is what
'wouldbe' identified in 'standard conventions'. In challenging Grice's definition Schwayder opposes
two senses of 'convention', approximating those in Strawson's distinction governing K-I and K-II acts
(described in II. 5). He argues that everything S includes in his speech act: its intonation, its rhetorical
turns, its use of implicature and so forth, indeed, all of the extra-linguistic conventions appealed to
(including those considered by Austin), are pertinent to their analysis; again, a speech act cannot fully
be analysed with cognisance only of its appeal to linguistic convention, crystallised in the explicit
performative. (Millikan's means of dealing by this method with parasitical speech acts is detailed in
II. 5). In emphasising this role for extra-linguistic conventions Schwayder considers himself to be filling
in the details of Austin's nebulous theory of rhetic conditions, and, recalling that in the interpretation of
Grice it was argued that a notion of convention can be supplied for first intention, Schwayder writes
that the determination of,'...what is said is made in relation to specifiable standard conventions', those
defined, '...relative to the language...', but adds that, '[o]ne can know what acoded message says only
if one knows the code or is given a translation from the code... [and this]...may leave the question of
what the transmitter meant still unsettled'25. As species of conventional action, meaning and saying are,
24 Schwayder (1972) pp83ff considers what is added by what Austin called 'rhetic' acts, namely, the way in which acts are
performed allowing the introduction of conditions good for politeness and deference. Schwayder considers how these conditions
affect the ways in which one performs an act of conventional meaning (how one indicates what one means to do in doing what
one does), and he says that the answer is given by his 'general theory of action'. 'My theory maintains that an action-sort can be
defined by listing conditions under which acts of that sort logically could not succeed. An agent does such an act only if he
believes that no such condition obtains. I prefer to put this by saying that he believes that every "condition of success" is
satisfied'. An act an agent means to do is defined by listing the conditions of success for the act; such a definition implies nothing
as to whether the act was successful or not. 'There are to be sure other classifications of action which may be laid across this
central one to provide for such further implications. So, for example, to identify an act as murder would imply it was a case of
culpable killing. Again, to identify an act as sawing would imply that it was a case of cutting with a saw. Still again, an
identification may carry implications bearing on manner of performance: so, stalking is deliberate pursuit and chasing is quick
pursuit.
Every such kind of action is also, inter alia, a kind of action of one of our preferred sorts, defined in terms of "conditions of
success'".
25
Schwayder (1972) pp84-85. Schwayder adds that S means what he means to say if the conditions of success for his act are
indicated by the conventional occurrence of the expressions he uses. However, he may mean more than what he says if, firstly, in
his use of the expressions he chooses, he indicates conditions conventionally affecting the style of utterance, and secondly, if he
indicates conditions of 'success or manner', that are not indicated in the standard occurrence of the expressions used. Schwayder
is bolder:
[a] speaker says what he does not mean if the standard occurrence of the expressions he employs would
indicate conditions which are not conditions of success ofhis act.
It now appears that neithermeaning nor saying are, withinmy taxonomy of action, preferred classifications of
behaviour. The identification of what a speaker said always carries implications about the means he employed.
The identification of what a speaker meant may carry implications about performance style. Saying is
something like sawing, and meaning is something like stalking, although a still closer analogy could be drawn
between meaning and certain conventionalised dance routines.
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for Schwayder, typical, convention-guided behaviour: saying is done with tools united by convention to
the action, and meaning simply introduces to the same analysis further conventions.
The sixth stage of the analysis appeals to Grice's recognition of the necessity of an account of the
elements in the conventional meaning of an utterance which are not part of what has been said. This is
given in the following way: the elements not part ofwhat has been said are 'linked with certain speech-
acts', posterior to, and dependent upon, some member or disjunction of members of the central group.
For instance, the meaning of 'moreover' is linked with the speech act of adding, 'the performance of
which would require the performance of one or another of the central speech-acts', each of which must
be distinct from, yet indefeasibly linked to, other non-central speech acts. (It might now be suggested
that Chomsky's arguments for the primacy of literal meaning, and his appeal for support to Grice's
invocation of rules and conventions, are challenged26. Suppes rejects Chomsky's arguments for the
rules of language and the autonomy of syntax, and suggests in its place a bare minimum of agreement,
(some rules of grammar, words, and acoustical properties), between S and H27. 'The rules they use are
similar enough for them to understand each other and communicate with each other, but they are not
using the same rules [those of a language].' The way in which S and H differ, writes Suppes, is brought
out by the rhythm or 'prosody' of their speech, '... surely anyone not committed to the written word as
the final embodiment of language will want to argue that [they]...effect the meaning of speech and
therefore, utterer's meaning')28.
Grice returns to the analysis given for meaningNN, now abbreviated to 'UM-intends to produce in H
effect E', and he pursues the analysis of the intended effects of imperative and indicative utterances. He
states two conditions for the cases: that for imperatives the M-intended effect must be that H come to
intend to do something, and for indicatives that H should think that S believes something. With this the
account ofmeaning must be reformulated. ('H' ranges over hearers, and '*p' is a variable standing for
a 'mood-indicator' corresponding to the propositional attitude \|/-ing. Grice gives a first definition29:
26 Part of a case against a too literal interpretation of conventions of language has been intimated in the discussion ofDavidson at
the close of LI; detail must await IV, and as Chomsky (1980) pp81-85 applies his arguments to Lewis, this discussion is a
preface of IV. The discussion raises issues of the development of identical and similar meanings in language communities, of the
logical priority of some utterances upon others (explicit performatives or 'central speech acts'), and of the development of
communication from primitive instincts. This last matter takes McDowell's attention, and is discussed on in III. 1.
27
Suppes (1986) pi 13. 'These matters are unexceptionable and easily stipulated by all parties'.
28
Suppes (1986) ppl 14-116. This raises the issues at the heart of the debate between formal and use theories. The Davidsonian
tenor of Suppes' remarks becomes clearer on ppl24-128.
19 Grice (1989c) pl23. The following quotation is from pl24.
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"By uttering x S meant that *\\i p"= df. "(3H) (S uttered x M-intending [i] that H should
think S to v|/ that p and (in some cases only, depending on the identification of *\j/ p) [ii]
that H should, via the fulfilment of [i], himself \\i that p)."
Grice gives "*|/+" in 'that H should \|/+ that p' as an indicator which may be interpreted in two different
ways, as 'that H should think S to \|/ that p', and as 'that H should vp that p (via thinking S to \p that p)'.
The earlier definition may be reformulated: '"By uttering x S meant that *\|/ p"= df. "(3A) (S uttered x
M-intending that H should \p+ that p).'" With this he considers the relation between timeless meaning
and occasion-meaning, and between sentences as utterance types and their 'incomplete structured and
unstructured elements' (words and phrases), beginning by considering unstructured utterance types,
and the example of a simple gesture, directed in the first example to an individual, and in the second, to
a group, elucidating respectively the notions of 'established and 'conventional' meaning. A full
analysis must relate how conventional timeless meaning can come to guide S's occasion meaning, and
Grice offers, '[i]t is S's policy (practice, habit) to utter HW if S is making an utterance by which S
means that [say] S knows the route.' Significantly, Grice adds that when read correctly, the definition
in the formula reintroduces the notion ofM-intention, which is now, for Grice, 'otiose', the analysis
requiring only first intention, for if S's policy in the use of the gesture is an intention to effect H, it
follows that when doing the gesture he does so M-intending to effect H in this way.
If S is to have the intentions good for all implementations of his policy, he must be confident that his
intentions will be realised: H, as before, must be aware of S's policy and know that it applies to the
gesture. The definition 'For S, HW means "I know the route'"= df. "It is S's policy (practice, habit) to
utter HW if, for some H, S intends (wants) H to think that S thinks S knows the route"', is rejected for
two reasons30. Firstly, S may give the one gesture two uses, so giving it two meanings, and secondly,
the effect of the gesture may be achieved by other means (S could even use an explicit performative: 'I
know the route'). For elucidation Grice turns to a notion of 'having a certain procedure in one's
repertoire', a notion with application outside 'linguistic or otherwise communicative' utterances. The
definition must further be refined: "'For S utterance-type x means (has as one of its meanings) '*v|/
p" - df. "S has in his repertoire the following procedure: to utter a token of x if S intends (wants) H to
i|f+ that p'". This allows the study of timeless meaning among a group or class of individuals. To access
the communicated meaning of the gesture, each H of a group G must want his response to the gesture
30 Grice (1989c) pl26. The reasons bear comparison with those given by Chomsky (1975) pp36ff and 54ff.
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harmonised with that of G, and this can be factored into the analysis. For Grice, a redefinition
accounting for this carries the idea of an utterance's correct and incorrect use, and not merely of normal
and novel use, and thus rigorises the definition of convention, which Grice gives, tentatively, as a
readiness to utter a '...member of the same family... as an intention to do that thing'. (He remarks that
this must be distinguished from S's 'being equipped to utter the expression). The gesture can similarly
be defined for timeless meaning, covering cases in which S indicates one thing by his gesture and by
the same gesture on another occasion, another thing entirely. In both cases, however, S expects that H's
understanding of the gesture will be based on his knowledge that S has a procedure good for a context.
A similar analysis can be applied to structured utterance-types and their parts, after the introduction of
certain 'apparatus', firstly, 'sife)' to denote a sentence of which s2 is a sub-sentence (with the proviso
that sentences may be sub-sentences of themselves), and secondly, 'v [si(s2)]\ to be a complete
utterance token of si(s2). Thirdly, and owing to the property of sentences by which they have meaning
as a consequence of the meanings of their parts, Grice adds a 'resultant procedure', describing both an
utterance-type determined by the understanding of procedures for particular utterance-types featuring
as elements in the utterance, and a sequence of utterance-types featuring an ordering of syntactical
categories. Grice ventures a definition ofapplied timeless meaning31:
"'S in v [sj(s2)] meant *\|/ p"= df. "(3H) (3q) (S meant by v [s1(s2)j that *'q, and S
intended H to recognise that S meant by v [sj(s2)] that *'q at least partly on the basis of
H's thought that S has a resultant procedure for s2, namely (for suitable H') to utter s2 if S
wants H' to \|/+ that p)"'.
Chomsky regards these arguments as Grice's 'most careful' work, demurring that a standing
readiness to do something is a notion of similar compass to an intention to do it32. He rejects the
extension to group situations, even when the analysis for the connection of timeless and occasion
meaning is accepted, for there are no 'contours of preparedness' permitting account for 'normal
creative' use of language, but the outgrowth of innateness and generative grammar. However, Grice
makes no grave use of the terms 'practice' or 'custom'; it is only, as Suppes writes, '...ordinary talk
about behaviour'. While the notion of the 'resultant procedure' is unclear, and the elucidation of 'word
meaning' in its connection to 'meaning that' demands the elucidation of notions more fundamental
than resultant procedure, Grice is not a behaviourist, for he does not make concepts of 'practice',




'habit', and 'procedure'33. There is nothing behaviourist about this usage, again, '...it is just ordinary
talk about behaviour', compelling no account of the creative use of language but merely generalised
descriptions of practices or procedures. While Grice admits that there is an attractiveness in the idea of
a 'general schema' giving the roles ofword meanings as determining sentence meanings, he warns that
the most that could be achieved in such a theory is an assessment for a 'very restricted (but central)',
group of types and forms: 'a fragment of what might be the kind of theory we need', and to this he
turns.
Grice takes as his range the 'affirmative categorical (not necessarily indicative) sentences including a
noun (or definite description) and an adjective (or adjectival phrase)', and adds that an explication of
such procedures requires that c, a sentence, be taken as an indicative, with provision available for
imperative versions, and so on for other grammatical moods. It requires also that there be added an idea
of the predication of an adjectival clause on a nominal base, and that there may occur extension to
referential and denotational correlates, of particular objects as referential correlates of nominals, and of
all members of groups of objects as denotational correlates of adjectivals. Grice postulates as basic the
procedures of uttering the indicative version of o if S intends H to think that S thinks '...' (the
infinitive of a, with obvious changes for imperatives), and as uttering an \p+-correlated predication of
the adjectival on the nominal if S wants H to \|/+ a particular referential correlate of the nominal to be
among the set of denotational correlates of the adjectival. Grice adds that for S the following two
correlations hold: 'x's dog is an R [referentialj-correlate of "Fido"' and 'Any hairy-coated thing is a D
[denotational]-correlate of "shaggy"'. The following inferences can be made concerning S's resultant
procedures: determined by Pj and P2 is RP [resultant procedure] 1: to utter the indicative version of a
predication of the adjectival on the nominal if S wants H to think S thinks a particular referential
correlate of the nominal is one of a particular set of denotational correlates of the adjectival. From RP1
and CI one can infer that S has RP2: '[t]o utter the indicative version of a predication of B [the
adjectival] on "Fido" if S wants H to think S thinks x's dog to be one of a particular set ofD-correlates
ofB'. From RP2 and C2 one can infer that S has RP3: to utter the indicative version of a predication of
'shaggy' on 'Fido' if S wants H to think x's dog is of the set of hairy-coated things. One can also infer
that S utters 'Fido is shaggy' if he wants H to think that S thinks x's dog is hairy. The definition of a
complete utterance-type follows: "'q is complete"=df. "A fully expanded definiens for "q means'...'"
33
Suppes (1986) pi 17. Suppes' objections might be questioned, and on grounds derived from a discussion of Quine on the
prepositional attitudes, a discussion which cannot here be undertaken. Cf. Quine, W.V.O.; 'Quantifiers and Propositional
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contains no explicit reference to correlation, other than that involved in speaking of an R-correlate of
some referring expression occurring within q"'. Grice explicates the notion of correlation with
reference to the model given by linguistic and non-linguistic items in speech acts or gestures, asking
how such expressions match the world. Over and above his intention in making this act of correlation,
S has by his utterance established a relation of the expression uttered by him on a particular occasion in
'juxtaposition' to the name of a class to which each such expression belongs. He has also set up an
analogous relation (by excluding all that does not belong), naming the 'complement' of the class to
which it belongs. However, he intends only to set up the first relation. This may be expressed formally.
Grice asks one to suppose that an utterance-token of a type, when uttered, correlates the utterance with
each thing in the set: '(3R){(S effected by V that [Hx] [R "shaggy" x=x E y (y is a hairy-coated
thing)]) and (S uttered V in order that S effect by V that [Hx]...)}.' The correlation holds if there is 'an
identifiable R" for which the condition in the definiens holds. Grice suggests 'R'xy = x' as a word type
such that the corresponding utterance may be included in a sequence made up of a token of x followed
by a colon and an expression, 'the R-correlate of which is a set ofwhich y is a member'. The regress
begins again. Saying of y that it instantiates a correlation by being a member of a class that usually
fulfils such correlations, makes prior, indefinite reference to the relationship S invokes in his utterance,
and how is this established34? How may the circumstances of application be stipulated, and how do
correlations grow? Are they created? What of tacit correlations, in situations never articulated, or 'non-
explicit'? S may think that in stating his condition for correlating word and object he has a 'free hand',
but Grice asks, must S be able to give a 'non-arbitrary condition'35; and, he adds, 'it is tempting to
suggest that [S] is to make his explicit correlation such as to match or fit existing procedures'. Grice
asks whether the circularity is tolerable, and, a more palatable suggestion, whether it is an outgrowth of
apparent 'linguistic rules' which determine one's linguistic behaviour, 'as if one accepted these rules
Attitudes', ppl83-194 in (1966).
34 Grice (1989c) ppl34-135, although aware that this seems not to be the most dangerous regress (he says in defence that
'correlation' is not used in definition of correlation, but rather in specification of an indefinite reference occuring in the definition
of correlation), considers an alternative: namely, 'ostensive' correlation, but questions again the nature of the relationship
between word and object. He considers a case in which a word, a token of a part-utterance type, is ostensively correlated with a
property of being such-and-such. S performs a number of acts in which properties are ascribed to an object; in each predication
the token in question is uttered with the intention of ostending of the object whether the property obtains of the object. For
successful predication, it 'seems' necessary (and sufficient) that there be a relation holding between word and an object, and how
is this to be specified? Grice replies that the relation between the token and the property is constituted by the fact that the two are
related, and would be, by S rather than not. 'In other words in a limited universe consisting of things which in S's view are either
plainly x or not x, the relation R holds only between the word... and each object which is for S plainly x'.
5 The most plausible candidate being Strawson's 'avowability condition'. Cf. Strawson, P.F.; 'Intention and Convention in
Speech Acts', ppl49-169 in (1971), pl58.
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and consciously followed them'36. Such rules do not detail facts about linguistic practice but explain it,
and lead one to believe that 'in some sense', 'implicitly', the rules are accepted. Why the rules are
accepted, and how this acceptance is distinguished from the existence of practices governed by the
rules is a question Grice does not consider, but an answer is provided in IV37. What must here be
discerned in Grice is the postulation of claim and counter-claim regarding the matter of S-meaning
something by an utterance by the recognition of intention, and how far an answer seems to take one
from analysis of the spoken utterance itself. It is not unreasonable to assume that a theory of linguistic
meaning, while, as Grice has surely shown, needing a theory of intentions in communication, must
remain sensitive to the matter of what S's utterance can mean, as established by conventions. The
means by which such conventions may be established without pre-established standards (a circularity
feared by Grice and Derrida), is presented in IV. The utterance of a sentence in a parasitical context,
and its difference from a literal utterance, is explained by Lewis in a possible worlds semantics, and
shows that if one interprets Grice as saying that an utterance, for it to be understood as communication,
requires more than the meaning immanent in the (explicit) performative, then S's intentions, and the
conventions to which he appeals, can be established without circularity or regress. While the argument
that there can be no contexts supplied for performatives in speech acts determining them as literal or
parasitical is subject to the same response from Lewis, another argument can be made to the end that
these (explicit) performatives performed in accordance with conventions of language (in which S
intention is carried in the utterance itself), can definitively be classed as literal or parasitical, and owing
to the distinction Grice draws between S's meaning in an utterance and his intending, by H, the
recognition of intention. The thread is picked up by Strawson, because Grice, as seen, does not
consider how conventions are accepted.
36 Grice (1989c) ppl36-137. One is left to consider a non-explicit correlation determining that S would explicitly correlate the
word and the object in order to generate 'relevant existing procedures'.
37
Chomsky (1980) p44 asks one to consider the act ofmeaning as 'primitive and isolable'. There is an original stipulation and
the association is conveyed to others.
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4. Strawson's Distinction
Strawson, as Grice and Husserl before him, asks what it is to have sense as words, sentences and
signals do1. He is chary of the complex of timeless meaning, and alive to the dangers of too facile
connections between 'meaning in general', and 'what it is for particular expressions to have particular
meanings', for, the question arises again, how can conventions for the latter be established? In
discussions of the matter, there is joined, he argues, a 'Homeric' struggle, between formal semantics
and use (pragmatic, intention-based) theories, yet, Strawson says, intercession is possible, and the
referral of the analysis in terms of, '... rules and conventions, semantic and syntactic', to the explication
of linguistic meaning2. The need for mediation is shown not least by reflection on the fact that the
capacity for conventions to generate and inculcate an infinity of further sentences (as has been seen, a
necessity for Gricean analysis), takes one far from the type of 'primitive' situation in which Grice
envisages the explication of bald S meaning must take place3. Conventions 'govern human practices
and purposive human activities', yet Strawson, and Lewis (in IV), take up the task of rigorising the
definition of convention4.
Complex, compound thoughts and their analysis tell against Austin's theory of conventions as
immanent in paradigm performative utterances. If language is a system of rules for facilitating
communication, and its analysis 'is not to be circular', must one not, Strawson quips, postulate
complicated intentions, and these independent of the means of their successful communication, and in
so doing, commit to a notion of pre-linguistic intentionality? Strawson replies that use theory requires
merely that the working of convention in communication be explained at Davidson's preindividuative,
'primitive' level, and in this section and the following it is argued that this is the kernel of a response to
Derrida's interpretation of Austin. Strawson's analysis is devoted to filling out the details for a case in
1 Strawson, P.F.; 'Meaning and Truth', ppl70-189 in (1971).
2 Strawson (1971c) pl72. Use theories argue that the meanings of speech acts (utterances) are 'largely a matter of rule and
convention', instantiated and disseminated in S's intentions. Formal semantics argues that the rules of language are discerned in
analysis of, and describe, the structure of drought, the study of which is to be distinguished from the study of processes of
thinking, cf. Wettstein, H.K.; 'Cognitive Significance without Cognitive Content', ppl32-158 in Has Semantics Rested on a
Mistake?: AndOtherEssays (Stanford University Press) 1991 and Dummett (1978) p458. They are not rules for communication,
indeed communication is merely a useful correlate of language. One could conceive, Strawson writes, of an instance in which
one has complete understanding of a workable language, '...without having even the implicit thought of the function of
communication'.
Use theory makes the explanation of linguistic meaning dependent upon a prior theory of intention in communication. What is
meant by an utterance is given by identifying the intention with which it was uttered. The Gricean notion of timeless meaning is
Strawson's first target in his assessment of use theory, for it is a theory potentially fraught with difficulty to establish language
conventions upon S intentions. The irreducible, indefeasible unit of communication-intention is S's act of utterance, in which he
means something in an utterance directed at H (the condition that this must be a particular H has been considered, and will
reoccur) on a particular occasion. The utterance, Strawson emphasises, need not be vocal, and Grice, it will be recalled, makes
particular cases ofnon-verbal utterances.
McDowell (1980) pl22 finds this to be a problem in Strawson.
4 Strawson (1971) pl73. They are, for the use theorist, rules the observance of which will assist S in the achievement of his
purpose, namely, of communicating successfully.
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which S achieves with H, by means of a specific utterance, a pre-conventional communication of a
primitive cast (by grunts, smoke signals and so forth). If the same recourse later recommends itself in
similar or identical situations, S and H have reason to repeat their behaviour. Over time, '[bjecause it
has worked, it becomes established; and then it works because it is established'5. That is, a movement
occurs from S meaning p in a pre-conventional communication situation to the utterance type coming
conventionally to mean that p,'now in accordance with the conventions' (Developed and clarified, this
thesis constitutes a powerful response to meaning-scepticism concerning intentions and conventions).
Strawson considers objections to the apparent restriction of this suggested analysis to utterance types,
and finds them unfounded. Cases in which meaning is not derived from the meanings of constituent
parts seem to point up the relevant difficulty, namely, that characteristics of linguistic utterance types
are complexity and structure, or, that the '...meaning of a sentence is a syntactic function of the
meanings of its parts and their arrangement', and in such ultimately simple cases there are, it might be
argued, no other meanings established. There is, however, Strawson says, no reason why in the analysis
he gives pre-conventional utterances should not have analogous 'complexity', allowing tolerance of
repetition as part of an utterance, and the application to new and varied cases. An idiolect of utterance
types becomes established, and, in time, meets needs unknown at the first communication. More
sophisticated language allows the formation ofmore complex thoughts and so a richer language6.
Parties to formal semantics and use theories agree that sentence meanings are (mostly) guided by
rules and conventions of language such as those promulgated by Austin. Possession of a mutual
language offers a means of communication, and '...thereby of modifying each other's beliefs or
attitudes or influencing each other's actions'7. Furthermore, a broader notion of convention, again due
to Austin, is shared between formal and use theories: the means of communication are used in
conventional ways, giving relations between intentions and sentence meanings. Mutual differences
centre on the function and importance of communication, and the sensitivity of truth-conditions to
spoken sentences. Avramides adds that a further congruity between formal and use theories is a
commitment to treating sentences, written or spoken, as the bearers ofmeaning, and while the analysis
of the structure of entailment in formal languages takes this as a principle, along with the view that the
constituents of a sentence determine its sense in a way congenial to analysis, Austin (and Wittgenstein)
5 Strawson (1971c) pl74. This is precisely a 'coordination problem in Lewis (1969) p24.
6 Strawson (1971c) pl75. Strawson calls this 'alternating' development an incremental, augmenting growth.
7 Strawson (1971c) pl76.
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stress that use of language operates, and more productively, beyond the imperative mood8. Regarding
these mutual similarities and differences, and in a discussion of the means of giving sense to a
sentence, Wiggins raises many of the points discussed in P. He writes that clarifying the central tenets
of Fregean semantics cannot be achieved, owing to the arrested development of philosophical
linguistics; work continues because of the reappearance in philosophy of perennial problems:
demonstratives, writing definite descriptions and so forth, demanding the ascription of sense to words
such as 'good', 'right' and 'true'. With quantification into the oblique and opaque contexts, he asks, do
words come to have more than one sense? Wiggins argues that an answer requires prior consideration
of three other questions: (1) whether the word has one or more lexical contents; (2) whether the shift in
contexts makes the word express a different proposition; and (3) whether a change in lexical content
means the substituted word remains a homonym of the first. (1) is answered by consulting a dictionary,
and a study of the changes in lexical content gives, Wiggins argues, the most workable interpretation of
Fregean Sinn. Answers to (2) and (3) are answers to the problem of ascribing properties to lexical
contents, and await an answer to (1).
A reason for the arrested development, Wiggins says, is mistaken interpretation of Frege. Sinn and
noema have been found useful for addressing the problems of demonstratives and of definite
descriptions (I.2-I.4), and Wiggins emphasises that the ascription by Frege of sense and reference to
proper names and definite descriptions must not obscure the fact that he ascribed them also to
sentences and predicates10. Addressing Frege's notion of sentence meaning as constituted by the
meanings of their parts, Wiggins writes that it is proper to say that Frege explains sentence sense via a
prior notion of dubbing (of parts or constituents), and that, by this, sentence meaning is just the
reference of a proposition to its truth value (on a model of dubbing)11. Wiggins, as Evans, notes Frege's
understanding of the sensitivity to context, or speech conditions, of demonstratives and other
8 Avramides (1989) p21. It is worth remarking that both formal and use theories treat what goes, in primitive cases, for sentences
as bearers ofmeaning. Searle (1971) p writes of the influence of Austin that he shifts, '...discussion ofmany of the problems in
the philosophy of language into the larger context of the discussion of human activity and behaviour generally '.
'
Wiggins, D.; 'On Sentence Sense, Word Sense and Difference of Word Sense: Towards a Philosophical Theory of
Dictionaries', ppl4-34 in Steinberg and Jakobovits (1971).
10 Cf. Frege (1952c) p57.
11 Cf. Husserl (1970) p271. This is dubbing in Husserl's first sense, that of demonstration (cf. 1.3). Husserl (1970) p272 is, in his
of states of affairs, more attuned to the sensitivities of the notion of sentence meaning as simply the reference of a proposition to
its truth value. Wiggins (1971) pl6 rehearses some objections to a Fregean theory of names and indexicals. In sincere, literal
expressions, in which as Frege has it, the target is the True, why should S not, '... choose the easiest way of hitting the target and
always say snow is white, or the cat is on the mat, or anything at all that is as a matter of fact true? Is there one message always
and an indefinite number of media? Or if there is more than one message, is the message the medium itself?' As has been seen,
one interpretation of Frege reveals there to be no way in which these points can be accounted for in his semantics. What is more,
in insincere, non-literal cases, in which perhaps, as Wiggins says, one refers to the False while aiming at the True, there will,
'...never apparently be room for anything but a rigidly extensional theory of designation and reference. What then of sense
without reference?'
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indexicals, evident, Wiggins ventures, in all of Frege's work: signs (names) express senses, references
and thoughts, the sense of which thoughts reveal that certain truth-conditions are fulfilled'2. Each
sentence asserting a reference expresses a thought.
The simple or composite names ofwhich the name of a truth-value consists contribute to
the expression of the thought. This contribution of each is its sense. If a name is a part of
the name of a truth-value, then the sense of the former name is a part of the thought
which the latter expresses.
This is a theory of conditions under which a sentence is true13. A strictly formal semantics theory,
Strawson argues, accounts for far too little of significance in collocution, even in the emphasis on the
indicative case. In distinguishing the meaning and the force of an utterance, Austin's theory of
locutions, Wiggins argues, utilises a Fregean distinction between sense and reference, which in Frege
and Austin limits the meaning of indicative sentences to considerations bearing on their truth-
conditions". Grice makes an analogous distinction, under Austin's influence, but works on both sides
of it, between sentence implication and conversational implicature, and these differences between
formal and use theories still do not (as above), for Wiggins, shift the focus in a theory ofmeaning from
study of what is said, or disprove that the meaning of what is said matters fundamentally to the
conditions under which what is said is true. (An argument to the end that there remain vast numbers of
utterances which are not indicative in form requires, says Wiggins, a thorough analysis of
performatives, and an argument for the right of the indicative to be considered first among moods. The
arguments are considered in III, and in IV Lewis' conditions on convention are seen to obviate
concerns about the priority of moods)15. As Davidson argues, both use theories and formal semantics
must be harnessed for a theory of meaning, and the fact (called a virtue), that Grice offers a theory of
12 Cf. Wiggins (1971) pl6. Wiggins contends that Fregean theory is best viewed not as predicated on a theory of the mode of
presentation of sense, and because of the insistence elsewhere (especially (1956)) that reference is '...unintelligible outside the
context of a complete sentence or thought'. The theory of the sense and reference of proper names occurs rather in a general
theory of language, with a foundation in sentence-sense and not reference. For Wiggins, this explains the '...production of
familiar and unfamiliar utterances by an account of how the constituents of sentences can systematically contribute to the
meaning of the complete sentences within whose structure they figure'. This being so, there follow no difficulties of mediation,
for there is no 'analogy... to bear the weight of explaining the meaning of sentences', and so no passage, in the explanation of an
utterance, from the designation of specific objects to truth values. A theory of sentence sense has as its core a theory of saying,
and with account of the way in which words contribute to sentence sense, Wiggins suggests, there is possible an analogy between
the way in which a function ( )2 determines value 4 for argument 2, and the way in which predicate '...() is wise' determines
truth value True for argument Socrates. The meanings of predicates, their roles in complete sentences with meaning, are
explained as truth functions of those sentences. The senses of referring expressions are 'special' cases of senses in general.
13
Wiggins (1971) pl7, and is to be contrasted with a theory ofmeaning as use (Wittgenstein), or as recognition of S intention
(Grice), for it requires no means by which semantic terms be explained before they can be talked about. Flowever, it faces some
familiar difficulties (ppl7-18), concerning the intensionality ofmeaning, the concentration on the indicative mood, the potential
for confusion between sentences and statements, and the absence of a rigorous connection between truth-conditional definitions
for sentences andmeaning-definitions for their constituent words.
"
Frege (1952c) p63.
15 Cf. Wiggins (1971b) pp49-50.
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meaning good for all meaningful marks or utterances may proffer nothing due to the absence of a
workable notion of convention16. However, as shall be seen in IV, Grice's sins are of omission not of
substance, and the pertinence of both formal semantics and use theories has and shall be seen to assist
the writing of a theory ofmeaning offering conditions for both intention and convention".
Strawson writes that some sentences exist for which the application of a truth conditions theory
seems unclear, namely, '...imperatives, optatives, and interrogatives...'. Others, particularly those
containing demonstratives, though congenial to a truth-conditions analysis, contain parts making a
difference to their conventional meaning that cannot simply be explained in terms of truth-conditions18.
Although both formal semantics and use theories must exhibit sensitivity to such issues, Strawson
describes a notion which he discerns in Austin, Grice and Searle. They implicitly acknowledge that in,
... almost all the things we should count as sentences there is a substantial central core of
meaning which is explicable either in terms of truth-conditions or in terms of some
related notion quite simply derivable from that of a truth-condition, for example the
notion, as we might call it, of a compliance-condition in the case of an imperative
sentence or a fulfilment-condition in the case of an optative19.
(One should add that Grice is hardly of the belief that this is implicit, and that Davidson's suggested
means for the distinction of illocutionary and perlocutionary effects can be challenged, and by a
Searlean analysis20. For Strawson, if good account can be given of the notion of truth-conditions, then a
theory of meaning may be written without reference to communication-intention, and this Davidson
offers, although, of course, Strawson thinks Davidson's theory unsuccessful). For the completion of
'general' and 'particular' theories additions are necessary. To a particular account must be appended a
notion of the required 'transformations' of truth-conditions to, as in the above description, yield
compliance-conditions and fulfilment conditions; the general theory must describe the derivation of
sentences, and Strawson asks, what does this demand of the function of communication? For
completeness sake, he clarifies his use of the phrase 'the truth-conditions of sentences'. Strawson has
16 See also Note.
17 As Searle (1969) ppl 8-19 says they are complementing not competing. Harnessing the best of formal semantics and use theory
(as desired by Davidson) turns, according to Avramides (1989) p8, on two prior questions, namely, the interpretation made of
Grice (reductionist or not), and the worth and methods of linguistic analysis and ordinary language philosophy. The latter point
emerges in the debate between McDowell and Strawson, and is mooted by Derrida (1977b) p211.
18 With regard to convention, Bennett (1976) ppl48ff considers icons as bearers of intended and demonstrative meaning. It is
seen that words are the paradigms of non-iconic meanings. Bennett references Schiffer's point that intentions require that S
(again in accordance with the means presented in this dissertation of getting around the regress), believe that his utterance has a
feature (mutually-known) that leads H to fill in the intentional relationship, to connect the utterance with the thing identified.
" Both quotations are from Strawson (1971c) ppl77-178.
20 See the discussions of Searle in III.
145
spoken of them as determined by the rules (semantic and syntactical), of the language in which the
sentences are uttered, and he now adds that 'sentence' should be read 'type sentence', one that may be
uttered on a host of different occasions by many people. Ascription to them of truth or falsity is
redundant, for it is rather the propositions expressed by the sentences, on occasions of their utterances
that may be assessed for truth and falsity, and Strawson considers how a statement of truth-conditions
for a particular sentence may be relativised to relevant contextual conditions ofutterance21.
Strawson argues that a general statement of truth-conditions for a sentence is not a statement of
conditions in which the sentence is a truth, but a description of types of conditions in which different
particular utterances of the sentence issue in different particular truths. He says that the bald statement
of a formal semantics theory (that the notion of truth-conditions underpins a general, and all particular,
semantic theories of meaning), leaves unanswered the question of how truth is defined. Strawson
rejects Davidson's faith in a definition of truth-conditions given through Tarski's analysis of truth in L,
and precisely because of its unwarranted appeal to recursion; for Strawson this avoids the vital
philosophical difficulty of applying one's notion to difficult cases, those, say, of indirect or
demonstrative utterances. One might think, Strawson writes, that there is something 'uncontroversial'
or 'general' about truth, that one might define a statement as true iff things are as S states them to be,
and that the same might be gainsaid for supposition, questioning and so forth. Adding the consideration
that the meaning of a statement is determined by the rules which determine how things are stated to be
by S making a true statement, with the (Gricean) condition that rules are bound by context and
convention, Strawson argues that one is returned '...to the notion of the content of such speech acts as
stating, expressly supposing and so on'22, and that the communication-intention theorist may here
intercede and say that any elucidation of the content of speech acts requires study of the speech acts
themselves, and even that for speech acts, '... in which something true or false may, in one mode or
another, be put forward, it is reasonable to regard that of statement or assertion as having an especially
central position'. Here, as in the discussion of McDowell in III. 1, the singular role given to assertion
carries no metaphysical ramifications, for, contra Derrida, it is not taken to exclude any other cases.
The due study can only be made via a theory ofH-directed intention.
21 Strawson (1971b), his work on convention in speech acts, is discussed below and in the following section.
22 This might be considered a generic statement of the relationship between meaning and truth conditions. As Strawson says, it, at
first, seems 'general' and 'uncontroversial'. Strawson (1971c) pl80 and see ppl76-179. Cf. Wiggins (1971a) ppl6-17 and
McDowell (1980) pi 27.
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The central case of stating or asserting, '...in terms ofwhich all variants must be understood...', is
the case of a sentence uttered with a specific intention, and one, as Strawson has it, wholly overt in the
sense given in the analysis of S meaning23. The paradigm case is, as before, '... letting H know, or
getting him to think...' (and the correct description will be seen to be most vital), that S has a certain
belief. 'The rules determining the conventional meaning of the sentence join with the contextual
conditions of its utterance to determine what the belief in question is in such a primary and
fundamental case', and in this latter determination the rules also determine what statement is made.
They occur simultaneously. Strawson sees an indecent haste with which the use theorist reaches this
conclusion. Having begun with the premise (itself unsatisfactory Strawson says), that the rules which
determine truth-conditions of sentences determine also their meaning, one faces an argument that the
same rules determine what statement is made (or what speech act is performed), by one who utters the
sentence. This again belies Strawson's dissatisfaction with the Tarskian recursive definition. He
suggests an alternative: to describe truth-conditions without reference to the notion of communicative
speech acts, giving instead a statement of necessary and sufficient conditions for the correlation of the
utterance with the meaning of the description, '...under whatever contextual conditions are envisaged',
that is, a theory of truth conditions emphasising their sensitivity to use in specific circumstances24.
Communication-intention might, the formal semantics theorist may argue, be allowed this much: that
the notion of truth-conditions has been seen to issue in a description of what is said, to the '...question
ofwhat is being done when utterances are made', and thus to have important lessons fundamental to a
study of 'belief-expression', lessons which must be learned in tandem with those describing a truth-
conditional analysis of statements. A putative theory need say only this: there are meaning-determining
rules for the sentences of a language, those which determine the beliefs articulated by one who utters
the sentence in the appropriate circumstances. As in the above case, the process of determining these
beliefs is identical to that of identifying what assertions are made: a belief is expressed in accordance
with the conventions governing the making of assertions25. This development of the formal semantics
theory argues that the communication of an H-directed intention is a mere corollary to the prior notion
of belief expression: it is this that requires elucidation, for Strawson rejects the (distinctly Searlean),
23 Strawson (1971c) pi81, as for the quotations to follow in the paragraph.
24 Strawson (1971c) ppl82-183 moves against a further possible alternative, one considered in response by McDowell (1980)
pl32, and characterising the work in intentionality of the early Wittgenstein (cf. 1.4), namely, that one might exchange the idea of
the relation of sentences to truth-conditions for that of a correlation between sentences uttered in contextual conditions and
certain possible states of affairs. Required notions of possibility and of state of affairs, Strawson says, cannot clearly be defined.
25
Again, a tenet of use theory.
147
addendum to Gricean theory stressing H recognition, in favour of one solely concerning S meaning,
and he goes on to consider some difficulties with this position.
In discussions of the respective positions of formal and use theories Strawson finds '... a mixture of
truth and falsity, of platitude and illusion...', and a persisting delusion (again, Searlean), that one can,
from the notion of S meaning, extract an element corresponding to the expression of a belief which
does not itself include S's intention. The expression of a belief is equally the expression of an attitude,
and one intended to be communicated and recognised as such, and Strawson raises two intuitive
difficulties for an explanation of belief-expression26. Firstly, in analogy with the ascription of a man's
actions expressing beliefs when they are seen to be directed to a goal or end, Strawson writes that this
forbids reference to the goal of communication as coming under this ascription, for communication is
immanent in the speech act, not the reading off from an associated belief. Secondly, the strictness of
the theory being outlined must be emphasised: it aims to group under conventions the meaning-
determining rules of a language to aid the regulation of linguistic behaviour in its role as belief-
expression. On the assumption that a concept ofbelief expression is given which satisfactorily accounts
for linguistic meaning, it follows that there will be an appearance of contingency in the statement of
conventions determining meanings as public and mutually-knowable. One would not, on this, be able
further to analyse the obtaining of conventions as a fact about language, and there is nothing to prevent
one settling the foundations of a theory of meaning on the premise that each language user uses a
language which he alone understands, and in this there would be left no role for mutual convention
whatsoever27. Strawson suggests a response for the formal semantics theorist, one which again invokes
the notion of communication-intention. In this speech situation S might be thought of as recording, for
his own use, a description of his relevant beliefs and their contextual appearance in utterances for the
convenience and accuracy of communicating in identical or similar contexts at later times, yet for
Strawson one need not regard this as strictly speaking a formal semantics position, for one might say
that '...the earlier man communicates with his later self28.
Strawson suggests that one might, in an effort to keep apart formal and use theories, state that
language is public ('socially common'), and argue that the connection of public rules with the
26 Strawson (1971c) pl85. That is they are immanent in the self same speech act. One might describe a case in which the
expression of a belief is qualitatively separate from S's expression of his intention, but there remains a logical dependency of the
imagined case on that in which S has such an intention. Furthermore, as seen in the discussion of Schiffer (1972) p72 one cannot
simply stop short at appeal to notions ofbelief-expression, for as the discussion of the prepositional attitudes has shown, the term
itselfneeds explanation.
27Cf. Derrida (1977b) ppl90-191.
28Cf.Derrida (1977b) pl85.
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phenomenon of communication is a corollary of their guides for belief-expression, and a mere
contingency. Teaching language is a model of getting pupils to do the right thing; with emerging self-
consciousness pupils come to realise that the skills they have learned can be used to express belief; this
latter is an 'unconnected benefit', unconnected to what it is to know the rules of a language. In cases of
communication, in which S directs his utterances to H (on the model of Gricean analysis), H is to take
it that S holds the belief in question, and that he intends H to think that he holds the belief. This reveals
the possibility of varieties of linguistic communication other than those based on the transference of
belief-expression (again, belief-expression is a corollary of consummated communication), typified in
the cases studied by Grice as meaningNN, and the concession of some 'outlying' areas of semantic
theory to communication-intention. 'As far as the central case is concerned, the function of
communication remains secondary, derivative, conceptually inessential'29.
A further point is directed against both formal semantics and use theory:
Of course, there are many ways in which one can say something which is in fact true,
give expression, if you like, to a true proposition, without thereby expressing belief in it,
without asserting that proposition: for example when the words in question form certain
sorts of subordinate or co-ordinate clauses, and when one is quoting or play-acting and so
on.
Strawson argues, in response to both, that the saying of something true requires reference to an
accompanying, sincere belief; S says something true if things are as he says; and following this,
Strawson suggests the replacement of 'says' with 'propounds' (owing to the conditions on
communication described above), and states that S propounds something on the basis of his belief that
things are as he says30. Again, the reference to belief and to the communication of intention emerges,
and Strawson concludes by noting a fault typifying the work of philosophers regarding 'true' as a
predicate of type-sentences; this is to forget '...what sentences are for', adding, '...as theorists, we
know nothing ofhuman language unless we understand human speech.'
The study of true expression bearing its truth in an accompanying belief brings Strawson to an
analysis of Austin's notion of the illocutionary force of an utterance and of respective speech acts
29 Strawson (1971c) ppl88. (The following quotation is from pl89). Strawson draws together some conclusions of this 'perverse'
debate, remarking that the means have been promulgated of providing an acceptable answer to the question which started his
reflections, stressing the need for assessment of both formal semantics and use theories and forcing one to recognise the
importance in any theory ofmeaning of conditions ofutterance, (of the means by which one '... says something true').
30 A means by which this hypothesis can issue in a theory of intentionality, writing the connection between word and object, is
described in 1.4. For the quotation at the end of the paragraph see Strawson (1971c) pl89.
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performed31. Strawson notes the distinction that Austin marks between 'normal', 'serious' uses of
speech and the 'parasitical' uses that he excludes for want of a general theory. Strawson thinks the
distinction unclear, and remarks that the notion of illocutionary force, by virtue of Austin's exclusion,
is worked out only in appropriate detail for literal use32. Strawson asks what it is about 'meanings' and
'locutions' that classes them as deviations from the ideal, total speech situation justifying their position
as '...the second term...', of the distinctions between the illocutionary force of an utterance and its
meaning, and the illocutionary and locutionary acts performed in an utterance. Strawson writes that
they must be distinguished mutually and in relation to illocutionary force, but argues that Austin does
not do this. Strawson ventures some difficult cases, those showing the meaning of 'serious' utterances
as marking limits to the possible force they may wield; and showing that for explicit performatives, the
meaning of the utterance comes to exhaust its force33. He notes, additionally, instances in which there is
a surplus of illocutionary force in a speech act. Furthermore, the notions of the force of an utterance
and of the illocutionary act performed cannot be invoked in the same relationship, for there are cases in
which, say, a warning is not understood as such, in which there is a lack of 'uptake'. Strawson makes a
hypothesis, consonant with his earlier analysis: to know the force of an utterance is a species of the
securing of uptake: it requires the same knowledge as that required to know what illocutionary act is
performed in the issuing of the act.
Strawson groups together the points of Austin's theoiy on which he wishes to focus. Firstly, on the
premise that the meaning of an utterance is known, there may still arise additional questions concerning
how what was said was meant, in what way the words were used, or, how S intended the utterance to
be taken. Secondly, although the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts as that between
acts of saying something and acts performed in saying something is given as basic, there must be
considered Austin's reservations concerning the distinction34. Thirdly, it is sufficient but not necessary
that a verb being the name of an illocutionary act means that it can appear in the first person indicative
as an explicit performative. Fourthly, that illocutionary acts are 'conventional' means that they are to
31 Strawson (1971b) pl49.
32 Cf. Searle, J.R.; 'A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts', ppl-29 in (1979), especially pl7ff. There is in this (presented in III.5), a
powerful argument against Derrida.
3 In that the meaning of the utterance in the explicit performative is the canonical means ofperforming the act reported. It could
not be performed in a more effective or explicit way. This, of course, raises all of the problems with intention and convention in
speech acts which Derrida describes in such detail. The arguments of 11.5, III. 5 and IV. 4-5 show a way in which explicit
performatives can be accounted for in a theory ofmeaning intentions.
34 Austin (1962) p99. Austin countenances that the distinction does not correctly delimit the class of illocutions, for it admits acts
which he wishes to exclude.
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be contrasted with the production of effects by means of an utterance (their perlocutionary effects)35.
Regarding the fourth, the most important, Strawson writes that Austin is usually seen to affirm the
conventional nature of illocutionary acts in 'unqualified' ways (substantially the view of Austin by his
interpreters), but that on the very first statement of conventionality in illocutions, he is more guarded.
Austin says of illocutionary force that it may '.. be said to be conventional in the sense that at least it
could be made explicit by the performative formula'36. Austin's point is familiar: the determining of the
meaning of locutionary acts requires reference to linguistic conventions for the making of utterances.
All speech acts are conventional in that there must at least be a link to conventions of grammar, syntax
and so forth, and yet Austin's point is more subtle: the force not exhausted by meaning, that is, by the
linguistic convention, and indeed the fact that meaning is exhausted or not, is itself determined by
conventions, those of collocution, mutual interaction and social coordination. It is imperative to
distinguish the types37.
Strawson dismisses the prospect of describing every act as conventional according to a certain type or
description. Austin gives ample evidence for the conventional nature of illocutionary force, yet there
are cases in which an illocutionary act is performed with force not exhausted by meaning, and without
it conforming to any accepted social convention, (in what Strawson calls Austin's second sense)38.
Paradigm cases are warnings, and the cases Derrida considers are all pertinent. The utterance of the
words 'The bull is dangerous', is the issuing of a statement with the force of a warning, according to its
locutionary conventions, but cases could be multiplied in which it is made without reference to any
statable convention for illocutionary acts. One might append bona fides, entreaties, confirmation from
an independent source, and a host of other locutions, none ofwhich need conform to any conventions.
What makes a naming is an additional something, a deference or obedience to social convention,
'...relating to S's situation, attitude to Y [the object named], manner, and current intention'39. Strawson
asks why Austin does not remark the fact that some illocutionary acts are conventional and others not;
what does he discern as the '...fiirther, and fundamental, feature...', making the link? For an answer
Strawson looks to the original statement of the force contained in illocutionary acts: that they can be
given as conventional when put in the explicit performative form. Strawson notes an ambiguity
35
Again, as Grice makes abundantly clear, this conventionality covers also non-verbal utterances.
36 Austin (1962) pl03 and Strawson (1971b) ppl51-152.
37
By this distinction Austin emphasises, following Grice, that verbal and non-verbal acts are conventional in the very same ways.
38 Strawson (1971b) pl52. John Jones may say to H 'The bull is dangerous' and by so doing issue a warning (a statement with
the force of a warning), yet without there being any '... statable convention at all (other than those which bear on the nature of the
locutionary act) such that [S's] act can be said to be an act done as conforming to that convention' (pl53).
39 Cf. on naming in Kripke, Chomsky (1975) pp44ff.
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pertinent to the two types of convention that have been discerned, and eluding the standard
interpretations of Austin: the force of an illocution is not indefeasibly conventional, but is '...capable
of being conventional"10; illocutions may be vocalised explicitly and conventionally by the use of the
correct, corresponding first person performative form (given, say, in the authentication by John Jones),
yet Strawson argues that the potential for conventional status of illocutions describes not simple
linguistic convention, for the catalogue of illocutionary acts include many that can be performed
without their possessing a first-person performative alternative, but requires elucidation via meaningNN.
By now familiar, the analysis runs41: '.. .the securing of the response r is intended to be mediated by the
securing of another (...always cognitive) effect in H; viz. recognition of S's intention to secure
response r\ and this, as has been seen, demands understanding of the ways in which two parties to a
convention may come to settle on and coordinate their behaviour according to the convention. This is
provided in IV, but in the following and final section of this chapter it shall be described how the
consequences of Strawson's distinction affect Derrida's analysis of Austin on performatives. Millikan
marks the distinction between the two types of convention as K-I and K-II speech acts. The distinction
is of the greatest importance, and will reoccur; it marks a fundamental difficulty with the Derridean
criticism of Austin on convention, and is a tenet of the argument to be made. Strawson's argument is
that there are illocutionary acts (K-I type) which are not characterised according to their conventional
roles (in the explicit performative), but by S's purposes or intentions, and it is these can be described in
their literal and parasitical status42.
10 Strawson (1971b) pl55.
41 Strawson (1971b) ppl55-156. Strawson's remark is apt for seeing how vital the securing ofAustinian uptake is in the Gricean
definition.
42 It should be remarked here for reference that Searle, J.; 'How Performatives Work', Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. XII, no.
5, pp535-558, 1989, marks the distinction between linguistic conventions and social conventions. Millikan (1998) p26
emphasises the 'aspects' under which Austinian speech acts may appear: as animated by speaker intention; as vocalised by an
expression having a conventional function in a context; and as an action with a conventional outcome. She speaks of the array of
speech acts appearing as if on a continuum, for while they 'tend to coincide' in an illocutionary act, they can 'come apart', and
152
appear in illocutionary acts not obviously classifiable emphasising either end of the spectrum. Millikan argues for the continuum,
and thus against Strawson's distinction.
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5. Convention: A First Try
Strawson gives a counter-example to the Gricean analysis of communication. S fulfils Grice's
conditions, yet does not give a sense of'communicate' along Gricean lines1. H takes S as '...trying to
bring it about...' that he become aware of something, but he will not think S is trying '...in the
colloquial sense, to "let him know" something (or to "tell" him something).' Unless S brings it about
that H takes him '...to be trying to let him know something, he has not succeeded in communicating
with H'. The example gives a case in which S does not even try to elicit communication, stressing the
fact that there exists a further condition, namely, that S should not only intend H to recognise the
intention to get him to think something, but that S should also intend H to recognise his intention to get
H to recognise his intention to get him to think something: thus the regress begins. Grice's way of
dealing with this example has been discussed, but Strawson emphasises the need for explanation of the
ways in which S and H may exhibit their attitudes to S's utterance, or, to demonstrate their mutual
knowledge2. Strawson suggests that for H to understand something by the utterance issued by S it is
'...necessary (and perhaps sufficient)...', that there be a complex intention...which H takes S to have,
and that it is necessary for H to take S to have. It is in this that Strawson sees the connection with
uptake, and, by extension, with the notions of illocutionary force and illocutionary act. Securing uptake
is simply the understanding of meaning and illocutionary force, and, Austin argues, securing
understanding of illocutionary force is essential to the success of bringing off the act itself. The
importance of uptake, for Strawson, is as a '...standard, if not an invariable...', element in the
performance of an illocutionary act, and its identification with a notion of H-understanding invokes
Grice's meaningNN, now, Strawson says, to be thought equivalent to an analysis of illocutionary act and
illocutionary force. If the identification can be made good, then, '...to say something with a certain
illocutionary force is at least (in the standard case), to have a certain complex intention of the... form
described in setting out and modifying Grice's doctrine', and this Strawson applies to other features of
Austin's theory of illocutionary acts3. Firstly, Austin's saying that, '...the production of an utterance
1 Strawson (1971b) ppl56-157. The first tenet of the example (and so of Grice's conditions) is taken up in McDowell (1980)
pl25. Skinner (1970) pl20 remarks, of Strawson's treatment of illocutionary force, that he gives conditions, "... sufficient or at
least necessary...' for uptake and for workable distinctions from cases of perlocutions and of utterances in non-serious contexts.
This derives from an adoption and adaptation of Grice's conditions on meaningNN, and is vital to the analysis of intentions and
conventions in speech acts offered at the end of this section.
2 This invokes (or perhaps, evokes), Austinian 'uptake'.
3 Skinner (1970) pl20 adopts Ziff s criticism: Grice fails to distinguish 'what S meant by the utterance', and 'what S meant by
his utterance of the utterance'. Strawson's adoption and adaptation allows the writing into a meaning theory of this vital
condition; and Skinner substantiates the point to be made, namely, that it is of use in distinguishing serious and non-serious
illocutions. Furthermore, with it Cohen's doubts regarding illocutionary forces may be eased, and by taking the kernel of an idea
from Ziff. Ziff, as has been seen, shows (no matter how successfully), that there are cases in which S means something by his
uttering the utterance, but in which the utterance itself means nothing. (This may be thought especially so in the non-verbal,
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with a certain illocutionary force is a conventional act in that unconventional sense of "conventional"
which he glosses in terms of general suitability for being made explicit with...an explicitly
performative formula', and secondly, the point at which he '...considers the possibility of a general
characterisation of the illocutionary act as what we do, in saying what we say'. Austin, of course,
considers how insufficient the latter distinction is, and Strawson ventures that the analysis he presents
explains '...the exclusion from the class of illocutionary acts of those acts falling under this
characterisation which Austin wishes to exclude [parasitical cases].' The class of K-I acts are those
deemed successful (uptake is secured), according to the laws of the Gricean (or Austinian) analysis: H
recognises S's intention to get him to form a belief or take an action4. A naming is recognised as
intended as a naming, a reminder as a reminder, and so forth. S may add entreaties or bonafides and so
forth, and there are applicable Austinian conventions: that S be in an appropriate position of power, and
so forth5.
The explanation of the first point requires reference to two matters Austin distinguishes in his
account of illocutionary acts: the 'general' and the 'special' point about intention. The general point
says that one may speak of one's intention in performing a certain utterance with an authority one may
not apply to the production of the outcome, for it may not come about. S wishes to produce a response
in H specifically by means of the recognition of his intention to produce that response. The recognition
is part of the reason H has for making his response, and part of the complex intention on S's part is that
this recognition should occur. (It is important to indicate here that, if Grice's theory is successful, he
has theorised communication). Essential to S's desire is a means ofmaking his intention perspicuous,
and he may utilise an available, conventional linguistic means. One such example, close, as Strawson
notes, to the use of the explicit performative, is to append to the utterance 'a force-elucidating
comment', such as 'That bull is dangerous...let this be a warning to you'. As Strawson has it, these
comments should be thought part of the unitary speech act, showing that the first-person performative
'...manifestly has that logical character of which Austin rightly made so much...', namely, that of
making explicit the communication-intention with which S makes the utterance, or the force with
gestural cases). However, in such cases, as Skinner argues, meaningly is still communicated; that is, the utterances are uttered
with a (potentially peculiar), force. His arguments arise at the end of III.5.
4 Millikan (1998) pp26ff.
5 Skinner (1970) pi 18 notes Austin's concerns regarding the incompleteness of the theory of illocutionary force, firstly focusing
on the nebulous theory of 'uptake' (it lacks, as Derrida shows, applicable notions of convention and guiding intention), and
secondly (important for Searle's arguments against Grice), the possibility of a workable distinction between perlocutionary acts
and illocutionary acts. Skinner adds the difficulty of distinguishing sincere illocutions and the 'non-literal' and 'non-serious'
things done with words (cf. Skinner's apt examples on pi 19). In the face of a raft of criticism (most potently, Derrida's), Skinner
writes, Strawson has done more than anyone to fill the gaps in Austin's theory.
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which he speaks. (Strawson remarks on two points before looking to the second feature: it is plausible
to argue that Austin describes merely a 'utility' of explicit performative formulae for cases of
illocutionary acts not essentially conventional, and that the intentions intimated may not be of the
complex form described in the Gricean analysis. Both of these points are answered by Strawson, the
first in his distinction, and the second saying that the regress of intentions can be halted. This arises in
IV, where doubt is cast on the argument that complex intentions underlie all illocutionary acts. Millikan
remarks on these explicit avowals, in which the conventional meaning of the expression exhausts the
illocutionary force of the utterance)6.
Regarding Austin's exclusions from the class of illocutionary acts Strawson considers two cases,
those of 'showing ofF and of 'insinuating'7. In the first case, though speaking with animation and
effect, it is not part of S's intention to secure the recognition of his intention by H. This is positively
antithetical to S's success. A subtle point arises. In making an utterance directed to H, motivated by an
intention, S often intends to produce additional effects by means of the primary recognition by H. For
instance, S may wish H to change his behaviour. The question this raises is whether such additional
effects, and their being secured, change in any way the illocutionary speech act performed. Austin's
analysis makes no provision for ulterior motives or additional effects: uptake, or successfully
performed communication, occurs if H understands S to be, say, informing him of something. The
further effects are not in the illocutionary act. If one takes an example of S aiming at a complex
primary response in the making of an utterance the case is quantitatively more complex. (Strawson
considers the case in which S both warns and informs H of something). Among the intentions S intends
H to recognise (as intended to be recognised), are not only those to confirm H in the belief, but also
those to confirm to H that he should, '...guard against [say] /"-perils.' From this follows a distinction
between the showing off case and that ofwarning and informing: in the latter H's recognition of S's
intention to warn should contribute to H's behaving in a guarded fashion; in the former the recognition
of intention militates against S achieving his goal. Insinuating fails as an illocutionary act, and because
6 Millikan (1998) p27.
7 For further examples of eases which do not fit Austin's criteria for illocutions one might consider Skinner (1970) pi 19. It might
seem that S can warn, express surprise, evoke terror, inform and so forth, in saying 'There is a bull in that field'; that is, that S
can perform all of these illocutionary acts and more. However, genuine illocutions must be distinguished from a range of other
linguistic acts. The explicit performative will not work for making this distinction, as Skinner shows. In cases such as expressing
anger, terror or surprise, prefixing 'I am angry that...', to '...there is a bull in that field', explicates no sense of what S did by
saying "There is a bull in that field'.
Another suggestion, deriving from Alston W.; 'Meaning and Use', The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. XIII, no. 51, ppl07-124,
1963, is no more successful. Alston postulates a test for deciding what linguistic act is performed: to see which rejoinders, cavils
and other responses H could make to S which the latter would deem relevant. How, Skinner replies, can this elucidate
specifically illocutionary acts, forH might reply with, say, 'What do mean by that?', or, in oblique cases, 'Are you telling me, or
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the intentions making up a complex illocution are potentially overt; they have 'essential avowability.'
Strawson calls this 'logically embarrassing' for Gricean analysis, for to give account of convention it
must be amended with the addition of further nested intentions. The nesting gives rise to the regress
discussed by Grice, and analysed by Schiffer and his critics, and Strawson writes, '[w]hile I do not
think there is anything necessarily objectionable in this, it does suggest that the complete and rounded-
off set of conditions aimed at in a conventional analysis is not easily and certainly attainable in those
terms.' This analysis allows the inclusion of insinuation in the class of illocutionary acts, for
insinuation is getting H to suspect that S has an intention to communicate a belief; but, as Strawson
says, insinuation could only ever be non-avowable8.
Strawson criticises the Gricean analysis for not having even general application in a partial analysis
of the force of an illocutionary act. S's utterance 'Don't go', may have the force of a request or an
entreaty; in either case the primary intention of the utterance is to command H to remain where he is.
The other intentions present in the analysis relate to the recognition of this primary intention, and the
question of greatest significance is how one accounts for the illocutionary force of requests as against
entreaties. Strawson writes that an explanation arises from supplementation of Gricean analysis. S's
entreaty may be read as an attempt to secure the desired primary response not merely by getting H to
recognise his intention, but by getting H to recognise the larger complex attitude of which the primary
intention is a vital part. S's desire that H stay may be held in varied ways and with varying degrees of
intensity, and part of S's intention in this case may be to communicate this intensity. That is, the case
of ordering H to stay is, Strawson writes, not simply accounted for as a case of illocutionary force, for
in it the role of social convention and context are of the utmost importance. S's order is given with the
intention that it will elicit a response, and that its recognition as an order be a reason for the response.
Its being recognised as an order can occur only in an understood social context in which certain rules
and conventions apply. Analysing conventions and mutually-known procedures raises difficulties too
great, Strawson thinks, for Gricean analysis to bear. He writes that one cannot plausibly say that an
umpire's primary intention in giving a batsman out is to secure a response, and nor can one isolate, in
merely insinuating or showing off?', neither of which reply indicates the utterance by S of an illocutionary act, but rather, a non-
literal and an expressive non-illocutionary act respectively).
8 Strawson (1971c) pl63. Skinner (1970) pl21 writes that the act of communication as theorised by Strawson is of 'the greatest
value' in dissolving the confusions deriving from Austin. H's understanding of the intention ('essentially avowable') on S's part,
in a sense, defines all illocutionary acts: all acts of communication which are not essentially avowable are not illocutionary.
Skinner works on the two points of ambiguity Strawson finds in his own theory, namely, the matter of whether genuine
illocutionary verbs demand that the essential avowal be made in the form of an explicit performative, and the existence of
intermediate and stubborn cases between the conventional and rule-governed utterances (both problems solved by Millikan), and
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another case, among all the participants in the situation to which the utterance belongs, '...a particular
audience to whom the utterance can be said to be addressed'. Strawson remarks that this type of case
can be made amenable to a description of illocutionary force.
What Grice gives is a 'partially analytical account' of an act of communication, one which may be
performed non-verbally and yet possess all of the characteristics of an illocutionary act. These acts
obey linguistic conventions, applicable up to the point at which the utterance's illocutionary force is
exhausted by meaning (and, as Strawson says, in this the notion of an 'essentially avowable' intention
is vital). In such cases, of illocutionary acts as conventional according to linguistic rules, the act is
conventional in that, ' ...the means to perform it are conventional'; it is the case that the conformity of
the act to conventions is a factor determined only by the extent to which conventional linguistic
meaning exhausts the illocutionary force of the utterance. K-II acts (laying a bet, launching a ship),
bear no intention to secure a response, but are performed according to rules of conventional
procedures9. (They may come to report intentions). There is no dependence on H's recognition or
'cooperation' in discerning the force of the utterance. However, S's intention in speaking or acting is
overt (or avowable) in both cases. Austin's primary focus is on illocutionary acts which are essentially
conventional, those which have no existence outside rule-governed practice, and there is, for Strawson,
a 'standard' case, one in which S and H know the roles they should play and the rules and conventions
governing the situation, and participate in good faith. Between this instance and the illocutionary act in
a non-conventional case there is both a likeness and a difference. The likeness is seen in the case of an
utterance, in a practice governed by convention, showing S's utterance as intended to further the
practice in a way governed by the convention: the point is simple: such practices could be performed
unintentionally, or without meaning.
Forms can take charge, in the absence of appropriate intention; but when they do, the
case is essentially deviant or non-standard. There is present in the standard case, that is to
say, the same element ofwholly overt and avowable intention as in the case of the act not
essentially conventional10.
The difference concerns the conventional nature of the standard and non-standard cases. There are two
points. The first says that if things go in accordance with the rules of the procedure, an act done in
the, '...ordinary and non-oonventional utterances which Austin ignored and which it is Strawson's whole point to emphasise'.
The filling in of such detail assists the writing of a full theory of illocutionary force.
9 Millikan (1998) p27 gives her first definition ofK-II acts.
10 Strawson (1971b) pl66.
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furtherance of the practice is an act permitted by the rules, and the second that an act in such a situation
is identified '...because it is performed by the utterance of a form of words conventional for the
performance of that act.' In the absence of breaches in the conventional conditions for furthering the
procedure in a conventional way, S's utterance will further the procedure in a conventional way, and
the two types of case may be contrasted in the light of these considerations. In the case of non-
conventional illocutionary acts, the act of communication succeeds in the cases in which uptake is
secured and the utterance is taken as issued with the intention with which it was issued. However, even
though the act of communication is in this case performed, the overt intention at the heart of S's
complex intention may, . .without any breach of rules or conventions, be frustrated' by the obtaining
of extra-linguistic circumstances. For an utterance made as a part of a wholly convention-governed
procedure, in those cases in which uptake is secured, any frustration of S's communicative intentions
can be ascribed to a transgression of a pertinent rule or convention; S, abiding by conventions, intends
to further procedure if he takes it that conventional conditions are satisfied, and hence that his utterance
will put into effect his intentions; there is nothing comparable in the case of illocutionary acts in
practices not wholly conventional. In both cases '... speakers assume the responsibility for making their
intentions overt', but in the conventionally-guided procedure, S using a performative form also
assumes responsibility for making his overt intention effective. In the non-conventionally guided
procedure S cannot assume this responsibility in a speech act, for there are no conditions which
conventionally can guarantee the transmission of his overt intention.
Acts belonging to procedures constituted by convention are by no means the whole or the
fundamental part of a theory of human communication. They are not, '...the model for understanding
the notion of illocutionary force in general', as Austin is wont to imply when he gives illocutionary acts
as essentially conventional, and '...connects this claim with the possibility of making the act explicit
by the use of the performative formula'. This is a mistaken analysis ofAustin. It is equally mistaken to
generalise an account of illocutionary force from Grice's analysis, for such a theory involves S
accepting that the complex overt intention in an illocutionary act always includes an intention to derive
a definite response from H, in addition to that which is secured if the illocutionary force of an utterance
is understood. This is where Strawson loses momentum, and should turn to Lewis, for account can be
made for the complex intention. Strawson can, however, generalise something for all types of case,
including the intermediate. The illocutionary force of an utterance is essentially something to be
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understood, and the understanding of illocutionary force 'in all cases' involves the recognition of an
overt H-directed intention (intended to be recognised as such). 'It is perhaps this fact which lies at the
base of the general possibility of the explicit performative formula; though, as we have seen, extra
features come importantly into play in the case of convention-constituted procedures.' Having
discerned the common element in illocutionary acts, it is simpler to acknowledge that there exist varied
types of H-directed intention, and that different types may be instantiated in the same utterance.
Strawson contrasts cases in which S's overt intention is to forward a convention-guided practice, and
those in which the overt intention includes in addition securing a response in H over and above that of
securing uptake. The contrast, however, is not definitive. S may offer information, yet be indifferent as
to whether the information is accepted or acted upon. S's overt intention may be simply to invoke
information available; he may exhibit only 'general' intentions, being merely the 'mouthpiece' of a
desire. These 'complications', however, are not difficulties, for one cannot expect a general account of
communication to give more than 'schematic outlines', and all of the benefits garnered may be lost
when qualifications, '.. .which fidelity to the facts requires', are added.
Millikan finds an ambiguity in Strawson's distinction and returns to its statement for clarity
concerning terms". Austin's argument that all illocutionary acts are distinguished according to the
(conventional) roles they may play, or 'fit' in appropriate utterances is, Strawson replies, subject to a
fundamental misunderstanding concerning the ways in which conventions obtain in speech acts.
Millikan develops the point. Strawson's distinction distinguishes linguistic and 'wider' social, or
institutional, convention12. The first tenet, following Gricean theory, says that all that is required for
meaning (communication) is that H recognise S's intention in speaking; it describes the conventions
governing explicit performatives (in which S makes his intention paradigmatically clear). As Millikan
has it, these (K-I) acts are differentiated '... by reference to the purpose of [S] in speaking', captured in
the relevant grammatical mood: imperative, indicative and so forth; she regards purposes as kinds of
intention, and adds, so importantly, regarding S intention, that a conventional expression used in an
appropriate context, and conventional moves made as classified by conventional outcome, are elements
that may come apart in some acts, a point to which Austin never shows sufficient awareness13.
Strawson's distinction (ofK-I and K-II acts), Millikan is correct, suitably corresponds to that between
S intention and conventional outcome, and she remarks that Austin's examples frequently confuse the
11 Millikan (1998) p26.
"Millikan (1998) p25.
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two, now emphasising the role of the explicit performative (and with Grice's addition the recognition
of intention), now the need for conventional, social conditions ('I name this ship'). (Millikan wishes to
argue that the distinction between the two types allows some overlap, even that it might be regarded as
expressing the two ends of a continuum with shades between. This, however, does not threaten
Strawson's distinction, but it merely illustrates how important a dichotomy he discerns)14.
K-I acts, Millikan argues, are not 'essentially conventional', and Strawson's point is clear: why
should one want to say that S can only perform acts ofwarning, promising, entreating and so forth with
acts conforming to conventions (love affairs need not attain the heights of the Roman de la Rose).
There is, categorically, nothing to distinguish or constitute S's act of warning as a warning, though S
may explicitly perform the act he intends by invoking the appropriate linguistic convention in the
formulation with the explicit performative. K-II acts, those capable of being essentially conventional,
apply, say, in cases of umpires giving batsmen out, dignitaries naming ships and so forth. These cases
may, of course, be frustrated (by the bottle not breaking and so forth), and the convention not furthered,
but this not due to S's failure to secure the recognition of intention; K-I acts may indeed be frustrated in
this way, but, reciprocally, without any breach of the conventions of conventional procedures15.
Millikan considers K-I acts (explicit performatives) which are described by conventions exhausted by
their illocutionary force. How do they come to constitute warnings, promises and so forth? She states a
vital point, that it cannot be that, say, a warning is conventionally regarded as a warning by being
dubbed a warning, remarking that the fact that '... S has a given intention cannot be a mere matter of
convention'. Regarding certain acts as warnings, as embodying specific intentions, cannot make the
acts constitute warnings. Millikan adds that equally one cannot say that having an intention to warn in
performing a speech act can count as performing an act conventional for warning, for intentions to
warn or promise cannot be thought mutable like conventions, and able to be changed for another if it is
so wished. (Millikan surely betrays in this her acceptance of the thesis that there can be intentionality
without language, and it is a fascinating question to ask whether all intentions can bear her analysis:
13 Millikan (1998) pp25-26.
14 Millikan (1998) pp26-27 writes that the distinction is unequivocal and important. She writes that the original distinction says
that K-I acts are successfully performed when H recognises S's intention in speaking, that is, to secure a response of
understanding or belief or to engender action. Therefore, an act of, say, reminding performs a different act and requires a
different understanding, and a different intended effect, than, say, an act of warning. Millikan adds, '[vjarious K-I acts that
involve intending identical hearer responses are then further differentiated in accordance with more exact mechanisms by which
the speaker intends or expects to procure the intended response. For example, in the case of requests versus entreaties... S intends
H to understand how he holds the intention that H comply... and S intends that this knowledge should motivate H to comply...
15 Millikan (1998) p28. Common to the two types of act is that S's intention is intended to be recognised by H, their main
difference lies in the fact that with K-I acts the intention is to engender a response through the recognition of intention (with a
speech act able to be given expression in the explicit performative), and with K-II acts, to continue a conventional (social)
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does, for example, promising report an intention, or reveal and repeat a vestige of an utterance
structure, of a very primitive cast, from pre-linguistic communication?16) Millikan offers another
solution, connected to the way in which, it shall be argued, Strawson's distinction deals with parasitical
or non-literal cases. Suppose, she suggests, that one denies that use of the explicit performative turns a
K-I act into a conventional act. By this, explicit performatives are natural acts of expressing intentions,
and their being performed in ways described by conventions is merely happenstance: that is, they
report events that can be described in natural vocabulary (or better, an explicit performative reports an
intention which makes the utterance into the associated act), and which could be accomplished in a
world without conventions. (Again, it is immaterial that a specific intention, say to warn, has come
conventionally to express what is to be taken as a warning). For cases of S uttering a performative
without 'normal and serious' intentions, but intending only to trick, or to be indifferent as to whether
his information is recognised, accepted and so forth, Millikan suggests a solution: K-I acts are defined
by their 'purposes', and conventional acts directly, 'as such', have purposes17.
Regarding these cases, Millikan writes that it is not a matter of convention that S communicates his
intention, and nor is it a matter of convention that H should respond as intended by S. H follows
convention when he believes that what S says is true. Millikan writes:
In each such case H completes the reproduction of a conventional pattern of movement
from S words into H reactions. Correlatively, in each of these cases S makes a
conventional move having a conventional outcome. He lays down the beginning of a
procedure. Millikan notes that Strawson advises due caution in thinking that all acts may easily fall into one or other of the
categories, and suggests an example of S giving information yet being indifferent to whether it is accepted.
16 Millikan (1998) pp28-29. It is not reasonable, Millikan writes, to assume that having a specific intention in performing a
speech act is to perform a specific conventional act. Conventions are, Millikan says by definition, arbitrary, '... something for
which another thing might have been conventionally substituted. One's intentions in speaking cannot be supposed to play that
sort of pawnlike role'. Additionally, it is not the case that having a certain type of intention inevitably has certain social
consequences. One might intend to deceive, and this has appropriate consequences derived from rules of ethics and good
conduct, but the intention does not count as anything in accordance with conventions.
17 Millikan's definition of convention deserves close study (Millikan (1998) pp30-34). She studies the conventionality of acts,
defined as reproduced tokens of types of established behaviour. Had the types been established differently, appropriate tokens
would have differed accordingly; when defining functions they are seen to have the essential arbitrariness that characterises
conventions. 'Thus patterns of skill, though they may be handed down by copying and instruction, are not as such conventional
patterns. The shape of a conventional act or pattern is not dictated by function alone. A reproduced act or pattern that has a
function is conventional only if it might have differed or been replaced by differently shaped acts or patterns which, assuming
similar proliferation in the culture, would then have served the same function. This does not give as a sharp boundary for the
conventional. A borderline case might be, for example, certain "conventional" techniques handed down in different schools of
violin playing. These techniques are not totally interchangeable. They have subtly different musical effects. But the conventions
of each school taken in toto accomplish pretty much the same'.
Conventional act tokens are such, in part, because they are reproduced instances of a type. However, Millikan adds, they must
needs be performed intentionally and as explicitly following a specific convention. (Some conventional act types are able to be
performed in more than one convention). Millikan describes how some patterns of conventional acts are very complex: Millikan
offers the procedures of institutions or of formal meetings, and others requiring the reproduction of relationships between
patterns (cf. for conditions pp32-33).
Some tokens in complex procedures put constraints on what may follow, and '... if the conventional pattern is to continue to
unfold, the rest must be conformed to this piece, so as to bear the right relation to it'. (Millikan suggests the examples of chess
andmarriage ceremonies).
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conventional pattern in a way that constrains what can follow in accord with the
convention1S.
She adds that following a convention is not mandatory ('as such'), and that, importantly, '...following
conventions is not always following conscious rules'19. S's act of utterance and H's response or
recognition respects, in each act, a repeated pattern (owing to its prior success), the effect of which
might, in other circumstances or different traditions, be achieved with different means. A case is
described: in directing H to do something, S utters a token of a conventional pattern, completed when
H acts according to S's intention, in accordance with conventional rules, from signs given by S. The
completion of the pattern as according to convention demands the due response ofH, for, as Millikan
says, S would not be moved to issue conventional signals reporting intentions unless he knew that there
is, very likely, a specific response to be expected from H: indeed, this explains why his signal can be
thought conventional, with a due response to follow20. Millikan considers a case of S's issuing an
utterance with intention to instigate a specific response in H, one described by convention (in a K-I
act). This says that in this case a (potentially explicit performative) K-I act is performed with a specific
outcome in mind, and Millikan's response is illuminating. She states the thesis for which she shall
argue, that K-I acts can be performed by the issuing of utterances or actions conventional according to
the context in which S and H find themselves, yet merely aping the act of S conventional for the
situation, and '[i]n the absence of a conventional device for performing the designated K-I act, having
made the conventional response of believing that S is indeed performing this act, H must conclude that
S's intention accords with the act'21. There can, for both cases, be made a distinction between literal
and parasitical utterances. When H responds or understands, a pattern, or convention, emerges, one
which, Millikan says, begins with S intentions to elicit appropriate responses from H in repeated
conventional situations, exploits explicit performatives, or their ersatz, and ends with H recognising S's
intention, or acting appropriately as the case may be. In this way, the conventions of speech situations
arise, but, as above, how can the obtaining of convention reveal the possession, or expression, of an
intention? In respect of cases of explicit performatives made without 'normal and serious' intentions,
Strawson remarks that in such cases, S is the, '...mouthpiece, merely, of another agency [that which
18 Millikan (1998) p34.
19 Millikan (1998) p34.
20 It is, Millikan (1998) pp34-35 writes, conventional both for S to tell H in an appropriate way and for H to respond in a
conventional way. The full conventional pattern is incomplete unless H has been, through recognition of intention and by
conventional rules, 'guided' to belief; S would not issue further initiations of the pattern unless he thought, from past experience,
that he could expect a likely response. Patterns do not result from voluntarily following rules, they are produced in processes of
reproduction resulting from learning.
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established the conventions for the utterance in sincere cases] to which may be attributed at least
general intentions of the kind that can scarcely be attributed, in the particular case, to him', and
Millikan adds that such cases are warnings, entreaties and so forth, by 'analogy'22. However, she argues
that all cases are, for Millikan, literal, for all K-I acts may be grouped according to 'purposes', or
'cooperative proper functions' (as defined above). The latter Millikan defines as the function fulfilled
by items connected in repeated or causal situations, those in which, following repetition, the function
served is revealed. (Her best example concerns learning by trial and error)23, and the use of specific
speech acts and moods in natural languages are paradigm reproduced figures, those, say, from speakers
to children, and sustained because they work, and replaced or modified as required, in what Millikan
says is an evolutionary mechanism2". The function of explicit performatives is to elicit associated H
responses: the conventional outcome expected of the speech act accords with its proper function25.
Millikan replies that all associated, passably similar, means of, say, warning (shouting and waving,
reporting 'I warn...', setting off flares, raising flags and so forth), have common purpose (as defined),
and, in sincere cases, are cooperative proper functions, fulfilled by H's completing the act issued by S.
For Millikan, K-I acts are defined by cooperative proper functions, and the grammatical moods (given
in acts ofordering, indicating, questioning and so forth), are such functions (as defined), and are speech
acts of broad kinds. The behaviour reported in speech acts is further differentiated by '...more fine
grained speaker (rather than expression) purposes...'26, with which S intends to elicit the specific
intended response in each instance. In the case of explicit performatives, the acts name themselves, or
are 'self-verifying'27. S warning in a play or to joke, or, in more Davidsonian fashion, misunderstanding
21 Millikan (1998) p35.
22 Millikan (1998) p36.
23 Millikan (1998) pp36-37 elaborates. A proper function is the product of a device designed to change or elaborate its products
(or tropisms) in changed circumstances. These products are 'derived' proper functions, and one might refer to the dances of bees
or the more complex behaviour in humans. These functions '... coincide with what we would usually identify as the purposes of
these behaviours or of the individuals exhibiting them. Human intentions, understood as goal representations harboured within,
have as derived proper functions to help effect their own fulfilment. And human artifacts have as proper functions the purposes
forwhich they were designed'.
24 A mechanism, Millikan (1998) p37 says, identical to that which tailors a song to a species of bird, but '...with learning
standing in for natural selection'. 'Speakers (collectively) learn how to speak and hearers leam how to respond in ways that serve
purposes for both, each leaning on the settled dispositions of the other. This kind of co-tailoring requires there to be functions
served at least some of the time by cooperation some of the time between the paired cooperating devices—(just enough of the
time to keep them tuned to one another. So there must be purposes that are sometimes served for hearers as well as speakers,
served at least often enough, by hearers' responding in the right way to speakers' utterances of the various language forms. For
example, often enough there are rewards to motivate hearers who satisfy imperatives. Indeed, simply pleasing the speaker is
usually enough reward. And speakers often enough speak the truth, so that there are often rewards for hearers who believe
indicatives. A proper function of the imperative mood is to induce the action designated, and a proper function of the indicative
mood is to induce belief in the proposition expressed'.
25 Millikan (1998) pp38-39. '(In the sorts of cases that account for the survival and proliferation of the English imperative mood,
of course, these two kinds of purposes do not conflict)'.
26 Millikan (1998) p38.
"Millikan (1998) p38. Millikan's description is worth quoting in full: '[q]ua instances of the original informative conventional
pattern from which they were derived... and which they also exemplify (they still are ultimately reproductions of it), their more
recent conventional purposes automatically accord with what they say is the purpose of the saying'.
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'...the public language function of the words he uses...', has two proper functions, one from the
language forms he reproduces (mood and 'fine grained' purposes reporting the proper function of the
expression used), and the second from his intention in speaking, derived, as Millikan says, from neural
mechanisms created by learning, trial and error, experience and so forth28. This latter is not a
cooperative proper function, for S is insincere and has no ambition to further the practice embodied in
the associated procedure, and so is, by the argument, irrelevant in assessment of the K-I act S performs;
S is merely mouthing a performative. Millikan writes that one might say that the cooperative functions
are in such cases 'conflicting', but that whatever the case may be, the acts of warning performed are
assuredly not paradigm K-I acts, and that the cooperative proper functions of the expressions used are
not accompanied by intentions to further appropriate practices; the question of whether the act is
performed can be answered affirmatively or negatively according to whether or not one thinks that S
having, in a play, an intention to warn does in fact have the intention. Once again, this matters nothing
for assessment of the literalness of the speech act performed, for it is not with reference to the intention
with which it is uttered that a speech act is described as literal or parasitical, but to a far broader notion
of social, or institutional, convention which requires qualitatively different treatment in a syntactical,
pragmatic theory, one for which Searle attempts to account (as described in the following chapter)29. It
is the case that a theory such as Searle's, and more successfully Lewis', can describe the way in which
the conventions applying to repeated language forms can come to obtain. Millikan quips:
[i]s jokingly asking you to leave really asking you to leave? Perhaps it is really asking
you to leave but not seriously—as I might really slap you in the face in a skit but not
seriously. In cases in which cooperative proper functions do not match S's intentions,
then in answer to the question of whether the reported act is performed, one can answer
as one wishes, ... [as] long as you don't mislead in the context.
28 Millikan (1998) p38.
29 Millikan describes K-II acts as those not conventional according to the reproduction of tokens of act types but given by law or
explicit regulation described by institutions (1998) pp39-41. They have 'regulated outcomes', and require 'regulated moves',
which, Millikan adds, may have a proper function, derived from the intentions of those responsible for the definition of the move
and its outcome. 'Conventional and regulated moves are classed, as such, by their conventional outcomes. K-I illocutionary verbs
classify by purposes that accord with the conventional outcomes of the moves made when these expressions are used
performatively. At the opposite of a continuum are performative verbs and other descriptions which apparently classify by
conventional outcome alone. These appear to designate conventional moves as such: Strawson's K-II illocutionary acts. These
are moves whose outcomes, for a number of good reasons, could not reasonably be intended by speakers in the absence of
conventions to determine them. Also, these outcomes may routinely fail to be strongly intended by speakers'.
Paradigm K-II acts (say, performing a marriage ceremony), have outcomes that require the coordination of many persons
(some possibly absent and cf. p41), in a complex pattern, with appropriate sanctions attending the connected convention, and the
obtaining of Austinian 'felicity conditions'.
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Ill | ILLOCUTIONS AND PERLOCUTIONS
1. Conventions and Philosophical Analysis
McDowell, like Grice and Strawson before him, argues that any viable theory of linguistic meaning
must consider the claims of both semantical and syntactical traditions. His work is a response to
Strawson's on truth, meaning, intention and convention, and its importance to the discussion
undertaken here is that McDowell begins the process of describing how acts (linguistic and, in
Strawson's terms, non-essentially conventional (or K-I and K-II)), may be discerned as conventional,
and as good for successfully carrying out specific associated intentions. There are four important points
to be taken from the discussion: firstly, and again following Grice, Derrida, Searle and (presumably)
Strawson, language precedes intentionality, but secondly, McDowell's argument is far stronger against
Derrida's advocating that such a reduction of operations with language to prior to intentional states is a
pre-requisite of speech act theory. There need be no such reduction. McDowell begins the description
of the ways in which conventions for K-I and K-II acts can emerge in the most primitive of exchanges,
their complexity and utility hardening into speech act conventions in sophisticated languages. The
reduction, and the claim of the meaning relativists, that intentions and conventions to perform certain
speech acts must derive from a pre-linguistic capacity to formulate intentions to act in ways that will be
successful and recognised as such by others (and are thus subject to a vicious regress), is, in the third
point, soundly challenged in McDowell's practice-based theory. The fourth point must be cross-
referenced with 1.4, and the potential fears regarding first intention (K-I acts) in Grice (found in II. 5
and ID.5), and Davidson's application of Tarski's truth condition. It shows how, with a strong
Wittgensteinian influence, sentences describing a state of affairs or reporting a speech act (and so
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forth), can be the linguistic correlates of the logical forms of the structure of the world, and thus can be,
in their utterance, performances of the acts of describing, reporting and so forth. The point is again
made that Derrida's scepticism regarding the establishing of conventions for meaning is fuelled by
insufficient attention to syntactical theories.
McDowell credits Strawson with raising the matter of the relation of formal and use theories'.
Strawson mediates between the two, arguing that a theory of meanings described by truth-conditions
needs appeal to a use theory, for, '...the theorist of communication-intention can claim to be closer to
the philosophical foundations'2. He suggests ways in which the competing theories need each other,
allowing that communication-intention concedes (in some cases), that in sentences there is a core of
meaning, '...explicable either in terms of truth-conditions or in terms of some related notion quite
simply derivable from that of a truth-condition", and that notions of truth 'in general' appear
platitudinous4, and in supplying truth-conditions, assert that, '...to specify the meaning of an indicative
sentence is to specify how things are stated to be by someone who makes a statement by uttering it'5.
Strawson sees in this an opportunity for a use theory.
There is no hope, he says [the use theorist], of elucidating the notion of the content of
such speech acts without paying some attention to the notions of those speech acts
themselves...[0]ne cannot...elucidate the notion of stating or asserting except in terms
of H-directed intentions. For the fundamental case of stating or asserting, in terms of
which all variants must be understood, is that of uttering a sentence with a certain
intention...which can be incompletely described as that of letting H know, or getting H
to think, that S has a certain belief...".
Determining the meaning of an indicative sentence is determining what statement is made in uttering it,
and, this, in turn, is determining the belief the sentence may lead H to think S has7. Strawson writes that
this,'... so far from being an alternative to a communication theory of meaning, leads us straight in to
such a theory of meaning'8; theories of meaning may be promulgated in formal semantics, but the
1
McDowell, J.; 'Meaning, Communication and Knowledge', ppl 17-139 in van Straaten (1980), pi 17.
2 McDowell (1980) pi 17.
3 McDowell (1980) ppl 17-118. Strawson (1980) pp282-283 notes that this is an area of agreement between himself and
McDowell.
4 And hence Strawson's objections to Davidson's use of the Tarski truth definition: cf. Strawson (1971c) ppl76ff.
5 McDowell (1980) pi 18. Cf. Scruton (1976) and Wright (1993a).
6 Strawson (1971c) pl81. Derrida would, of course, object.
7Cf. McDowell (1980) ppl 18-119.
8 Strawson (1971c) pl82.
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explanation of the concept of meaning used in such theories is given not by appeal to the 'notion of
truth', but to S intention9.
McDowell agrees that formal semantics can make this appeal to communication for a notion of truth,
and he states some premises. In collocution, there is 'transport' between S and H. H understands S's
utterances not as noises but as speech acts spoken with meaning and intent: he secures something
approaching Austinian 'uptake': H is able to understand and to work with S's utterances, and how does
this understanding arise? H garners knowledge as to the content of the speech acts, knowledge
inaccessible to those not sharing the language shared by S and H'°. H is distinguished from non-
speakers by a theory, containing no interpreting conditions, offering descriptions of possible utterances
in a language: a theory describing the language in which the utterance is made (perhaps a grammar) as
alloting a recognisable content to individual speech acts performed. Such a theory explains the
competence of H in understanding and altering his cognitive capacity, and in the light of his
understanding speech acts in use; this reveals the network of relationships of signification between
noise and meaning, which, '... in a sense, constitute the language. It is hard to see what could have a
better claim to count as a theory of meaning for a language"1. As in Grice and Schiffer, the discussion
is focused on examination of the indicative mood, reported in sayings. Explaining H's cognitive
competence12 requires a description which,
...for each object-language sentence...entails a theorem whose form we can represent
schematically as "s...p", where "s" is replaced by a suitable designation of the object-
language sentence and "p" by a sentence, in the language in which the theory is stated,
suitable for expressing what can be said by uttering "s"13.
A condition is added. The description must express the relevant content, demonstrated in the utterance
of sentences of the language with understanding, as the result of the, '...contribution from repeatable
'McDowell (1980) pi 19.
10
Although, McDowell emphasises (and the point is described below), the unmediated information reported is equally available
to those who do not share the language. It may for them have a pragmatic value; they may learn to behave in ways similar to
those with the language having seen the benefits they may accrue.
11 McDowell (1980) pl20. This remark should be read with Dummett's claims, as expressed in (1976). Contra Wittgensteinian
theories ofmeaning as use, Dummett responds (with Frege), that sense/reference, meaning/force distinction gives, in addition to
a truth-conditions theory, a hint of a significant addition, for one '... who knows, of a given sentence, what conditions must
obtain for it to be true does yet know all that he needs to know in order to grasp the significance of an utterance of that sentence'.
Supposing that he does, attributes '... an understanding of the way in which the truth-condition of a sentence determines the




parts or aspects of it"4. It is 'inconceivable', McDowell says, but that this be considered a sine qua non
for a theory ofmeaning for any natural language; and it must allow that the,
...theorems would need to be deducible on the basis of the structure of the object-
language sentences, in such a way that the premises which register the contribution of,
say, a word to a given sentence figures also in derivatives which reveal its contribution to
other sentences in which it occurs15.
Replacements for 'p' offer necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of predicates to the
sentences of the object-language. They show what can be said by the utterance of its relevant
sentences18. McDowell adds that the description may be applied to moods other than the indicative
without change in terms, and the role of generating sentences for the specification of content remain
with the core of a theory of meaning written for indicatives17. If the object-language has more than one
mood, a theory giving interpretative descriptions of all of its possible utterances must classify them as
of respective kinds, and thus, following the point just made, a requirement can be placed on the theory:
it must be written in such a way that cases of non-assertoric utterances come with an indicative
sentence able, via the argument given above, to express the content of the original non-assertoric
utterance. This central role in McDowell's theory for assertives (or indicatives), suffers none of the
problems Derrida finds in Austin, as is seen below.
McDowell's theory of language as offering sentences for the ascription of cognitive content (or
interpretative descriptions), does not entail that it be thought, in light of the quotation on the previous
page, a 'characterisation' of a theory of predication; however, this is a useful way in which it may be
understood18. It may also, again in keeping with formal semantics, McDowell argues, make appeal to
notions of communication, and this may be illustrated by comparison with Strawson's theory, which,
for McDowell, is incomplete. In describing the ways in which formal semantics may utilise
communication-intention, Strawson gauges the Gricean notion of 'sentence-meaning' according to the
content of the associated assertion, and McDowell asks why philosophers pause at the introduction of
this 'overtly linguistic notion', when any analysis with pretence to fullness should break down the
14 McDowell (1980) pl20. Thus it is that McDowell's may be considered a theory of the repetition of utterances established by
conventions for the performance of specific, particular intentions.
15 Both quotations are fromMcDowell (1980) ppl20-121.
16 With reference back to Strawson (1971c) pl80, McDowell (1980) pl22 adds that this demonstrates the utility of considering
the component of a language that yields sentences suitable for specifying the contents of utterances as a characterisation of a
truth predicate, and he notes Tarski's influence.
17 McDowell (1980) p 121. References at the end of this paragraph are all to this page.
"McDowell (1980) pl22. The theory accounts also for changes in cognitive content. McDowell cites Chomsky and Tarski, and
refers back to the conditions imposed on his putative theory by the quotation above.
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matter into progressively prior elements19. The notion of assertion 'seems to be on a level' with that of
sentence-meaning, yet McDowell writes that a deeper analysis can be made, and an assessment of
assertion made in non-linguistic terms, namely those of belief, intention and convention20. McDowell
argues that formal semantics can make sense of the notion of the intentional content of an assertion,
and that one need not appeal to Strawson's analysis of sentence-meaning through the provision of the
truth conditions of the associated assertion21. Indeed, McDowell's model is a Davidsonian predication
theory, giving transformations of the object language via the provision of truth predicates in a Tarskian
meta-language. This is not a product of sentence-meaning, but a consequence, from Convention T, of
what gives sentences their meanings. McDowell asks why any other theory could suggest itself, for
why should meaning as a philosophical problem demand reductive analysis; an ability to understand
language, '... is an ability to know what people are doing, in the way of performing significant speech
acts, when they speak in it...'. The significant problems lie not with speech act analysis, but with how
the ability to understand may be seen to be instantiated over time and be given systematic description.
This is achieved not by '...conceptual analysis, but [by] a perspicuous mapping of interrelations
between concepts which ... can be taken to be already perfectly well understood'. Indeed, ' [s]o far from
analysing the notion of meaning, [entertain] the radical thought that in describing the understanding of
a language we can get along without it'22. Speech act analysis emphasises the role of communication
and human interaction in language, and McDowell remarks that this need not be rejected by formal
semantics. However, there is wanting precision in the definition of communication23.
Strawson makes the connection between assertoric communication and the satisfaction of an
intention of, in part, '...getting an audience to believe that S has a certain belief24. His analysis says
that an at least partial description of what it is to communicate is that S fulfils his intention in the
19 All of the remarks regarding Strawson's theory are from McDowell (1980) ppl22-123, and they anticipate Searle's and
Schiffer's queries concerning the logical priority of elements in an assessment of a theory ofmeaning. (See III.2 and IV.3).
20 McDowell (1980) pi23. McDowell remarks in a footnote that the full import of the notion of intention would of necessity
introduce the notion of convention and its role in the execution of intentions, and McDowell is (following Davidson),
"...sceptical about the idea that linguistic behaviour is conventional...'.
21 There need be no aiming at the truth in a speech act, merely a Davidsonian endeavour to make oneself understood. The
deleterious effects of the search for truth in speech act analysis noted by Derrida, are one might say, never encountered.
22 McDowell (1980) pl24. The connection of this to Davidson's theory is deep.
23 McDowell (1980) pl25. McDowell expresses the hope that a rigorous definition will give an answer to the question of when
transformative descriptions and interpretations of speech acts may be given (those, respectively, in which an account of the way
in which language affects and changes lives is given, and those in which it is determined ofwhat type is a particular speech act).
24 McDowell (1980) pl25. McDowell notes in a footnote the ambiguity between the two notions introduced in Strawson's given
definition, namely, getting the audience to think and 'letting an audience know'; much of this has emerged in the discussion of
Grice. Strawson's theory, it should be remarked, is an outgrowth of his theory of saying or asserting. McDowell's theorist may,
as the example indicates, make a further commitment to communication-intention (for Strawson's account of saying or asserting
says that assertoric communication is to be equated with the fulfilment of an intention (to get H to believe that S has a certain
belief), and thus does not merely countenance 'innocuous concession' to use theories. This notwithstanding, McDowell finds
much to criticise in Strawson's theory.
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communicative act: H '... should come to believe that S believes that p'25. McDowell asks how S might
communicate that p without it being the case that p, for Strawson's partial description is not sensitive to
the truth of'p'. McDowell adds his own example to the problems raised by deceptive, parasitical cases,
suggesting a means, already considered, by which intentions can remain sensitive to the truth of the
speech acts reported26. (His Tarskian formal semantics, as the picture theory in 1.4, turns upon the
homology of statements to states of affairs reported). The verb 'communicate', McDowell writes,
belongs to a class (other members 'disclose', 'reveal'), whose characteristic is that their appearance in
sentences of the form's v's that p' gives the truth of the 'embedded sentence', or, '"a decision as to the
presence or absence of knowledge'"; or, to put it another way, with 'communicate' it is the presence of
knowledge, and not belief, which is determined by 'the applicability of the verb'27. With reference to
Gricean examples, McDowell rejects the thesis that S's fundamental (first) intention in making his
utterance is to make H believe what S believes, for, say, if one examines the communicative intentions
behind questions, for example, it is not the case, as Grice says, that they are asked with the intention of
getting H to induce in S a belief about H's belief8. As for assertions, they are made to inform, not
necessarily to foment beliefs: in many of the examples given, S's assertions may not be S's beliefs29.
McDowell asks why communication is thought the instilling or alteration of beliefs, noting that this
could not possibly be in H's interests in all cases30. H must, for instance, have faith in S's honesty. A
sharing of knowledge or beliefmust, one might think, be predicated on the idea that each such sharing
is beneficial (and Searle studies this, below), but McDowell considers the opportunities for deception
or coercion. There are, additionally, instances in which S is mistaken, though his intention to
communicate is honest and truthful31. Theories regarding communication as the fundamental
characteristic of linguistic behaviour must account for such cases, and, for the kernel of a response,
25McDowell (1980) pl25.
26 And so, one might add, offer a potential solution to problems of ontological commitment in non-denoting contexts.
"McDowell (1980) pl26.
28 Grice (1989b) ppl06ff.
29 McDowell (1980) pl27. In this, as McDowell indicates, Strawson again elides the two formulations (letting someone know
and getting them to think), and the knowledge in the communicative act to that forming the content of S's beliefs. As the
discussion ofGrice has shown, and a point Strawson raises, a real philosophical question is to ask how one is to define 'saying',
and, in this case, as McDowell shows, 'assertoric communication'. Strawson (1980) p283 remarks that McDowell appears to
offer an analysis of assertoric communication while denying the need for an analysis of saying. However, Strawson writes that
McDowell's is an analysis of saying, and that if an essential feature of saying is that each act is 'standardly' a case of assertoric
communication, then an account of the latter be (part of) an account of the former. (Strawson writes in a footnote that he follows
McDowell in thinking assertion the 'primary' speech act, analysis of which leaves other variations presenting no problems). For
detailed assessments of assertions in speech act theory, see Vandervecken, D.; 'A Complete Formulation of a Simple Logic of
Elementary Illocutionary Acts', pp99-131, and Merin, A.; 'Algebra of Elementary Social Acts', pp234-263 in Tsohatzidis, S.L.
(ed.); Foundations ofSpeech Act Theory: Philosophical andLinguistic Perspectives (London, Routledge) 1994.
30 McDowell (1980) ppl27-128. McDowell asks why the mark of communication-intention should issue in a notion of coercion,
even if the notion ofbelief in other's beliefs may communicate truths about the world?
31 A further case, found in Austin and Searle, concerns speech acts in which no assertion is made, perhaps, say, in simple
exclamations.
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McDowell bruits an analogy to perceptual capacities gathering knowledge about the external world;
knowledge is not gathered in every use of perceptual capacities but they are ceaselessly in use, and
imperative to the development of human faculties32. (One may of course be deceived, and the analogy
is furthered in the potential for misperceptions)33. Likewise, assertoric speech acts (accepting for the
sake of argument that they are the fundamental speech acts), are essential for communication, yet there
may still occur communication in S's honest mistakes. McDowell argues that to deny that
communication occurs in cases of deception or error is implausible, for holding this view would seem
to deny that the fount of communication-intention, the sharing of knowledge, can occur in cases of
non-assertoric uses of language. The core of communication-intention, McDowell writes, theory is the
claim that all speech acts are communicative by virtue of being intended and directed at a specific H or
end to be achieved. For clarity regarding the way in which this is achieved, the theories of perlocutions
and illocutions must be given precedence, and the claims of all utterances, assertoric and non-
assertoric, considered in light of them. This, McDowell writes, can be done while retaining the notion
that communication is the passing on not ofbeliefbut of knowledge.
For elucidation of the concept of knowledge-transmission McDowell precedes again by analogy. He
asks how one ascribes knowledge to creatures (non-human and children), that are not recognised as
forming or fulfilling intentions. McDowell suggests a situation in which a speech act is performed: the
knowledge disseminated is, as it were, equally available to one understanding the language in which
the speech act is made and to a non-speaker (or one who is yet to achieve facility with the language); a
difference obtains in that the former has the ability fully to receive and to process the information.
However, McDowell writes that the non-speaker may still acquire information about the world,
information to affect and alter his behaviour, for he can come to realise the pragmatic benefits of acting
in the same or qualitatively similar ways to the speaker (indeed, this is learning). The connection
between the stimulus condition and the engendered response will be more or less obvious, more or less
direct, and the difference, McDowell argues, between this and the conditions described in
communication between fluent subjects is the ascription of intentional behaviour, and this causes him
to consider the conventions underlying the ways in which S may influence H (fluent or non-speaker),
by his behaviour, and to the notions of mutual knowledge and mutual awareness34. In the canonical
32
They must account, McDowell says, because of the obtaining in each case of a Tarskian truth condition.
33 Searle (1983) pp37ff argues that perceptions are as intentional as the propositional attitudes: they have the same sincerity
conditions as beliefs, desires and so forth, and the 'mind-to-world direction of fit'.
34McDowell (1980) ppl27-130.
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statement of Gricean theory S communicates the intention that H should ascribe to him knowledge by
having H recognise an intention to communicate. This condition of mutual awareness (and,
importantly, of overtness), could be present in cases in which S's intention is not recognised: H, say,
might 'fail, or refuse' to oblige35. McDowell aims to rigorise this condition. It is better to postulate, he
argues, that the condition of mutual awareness is aimed at in S's 'primary communicative intention',
and that communication is dependent upon this successful transmission. As with second intention, it is
the condition requiring mutual understanding that brings ambiguities, and McDowell's Tarskian theory,
like Searle's in III. 5, makes the case that intentions are simply stated in utterances appropriate for
articulating such intentions.
Speech acts, McDowell says, are 'publications of intentions'; they are uttered to make public a report
(allowing its mutual consideration), and the intentions are those, in each sincere case, always
accompanying specific acts. In this McDowell makes a vital distinction, ambivalent in the discussions
ofGrice and Strawson, between the notion of an intentional performance and the notion of the intention
to make the performance, the former being, in McDowell's words, more 'fundamental'36. It is more
fundamental because while H can 'sometimes' discern an intention behind a misfire or a deceptive
utterance, correctly executed speech acts 'carry their intentions on their surface'. (A 'normal'
understanding of 'correct' speech is not, in McDowell's phrase, '...a matter of elimination...and an
account of the understanding of language must start with the understanding of correct speech').
Intentions in correctly executed speech acts, whose publication is their statement, require the same
analysis as those intentions guiding the transmission of knowledge or the imparting of reasons for
action, for in the latter case S's intention to make public his intention to transmit knowledge or impart
belief is realised by uttering an appropriate speech act, and so by letting H know what act he performs.
For McDowell this shows communication to have a two-fold aspect, firstly as the promulgating of
information (understood by native speakers and potential stimuli for non-speakers), and secondly, as
the transmission of sincerity and veracity conditions concerning S's intentions, and thus an appeal to
H's mutual knowledge. In cases of'properly executed' speech acts recognised as such, these conditions
are transmitted, '.. .not only in informative assertions but also in assertions by which information is not
transmitted and in speech acts which are not assertoric at all'37. For McDowell there is no distinction,
35 McDowell (1980) pi 30.
36 McDowell (1980) pl30.
37 McDowell (1980) pl31. Kearns, J.T.; 'Meaning, Structure and Speech Acts', pp50-79 in Tsohatzidis (1994), argues that
speech acts are, indeed, intentional, but that they are marked by S's intention to make his act one of asserting, promising and so
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such as that found in Grice, between first and second intention, for knowledge is derived from all
speech acts in the same way, and the correctly-executed bear in their statement a report of the logical
structure of the world. McDowell is clear about the import of these aspects: if the premise that the
content of an intention is made public in the utterance of speech acts includes, as both the Gricean and
the Derridean analysis do, an immanent relationship to the types of speech act that may be made, then
the prospects for analysis are indeed, as Derrida says, bleak, for one cannot, following from the
arguments made in II, give account of speech acts purely in terms of the intentions of those performing
them. There is, again, needed an attention to conventions observed in their performance. The need for
substantial emendation ofGricean analysis is not feared by McDowell for, '... once we have burned our
books on analysis of the concept ofmeaning, we have no obvious reason to regret this renunciation'38.
For McDowell, Strawson puts too great an emphasis on the primacy of assertoric speech acts, his
motivation being to explain the content in these 'central' speech acts, and apply the results to all other
types. For a response, McDowell refers to the dual aspect of communication: 'first-level'
communication (the promulgation of information), is, it is true, typified by assertion, but there are
inadequate negative reasons for singling out their case (namely, that assertions need not transmit
information), but what constitutes a positive reason? As Strawson himself says, mining the content of
speech acts requires elucidation of the speech acts themselves and their appeal to conventions. His own
theory for determining the meaning of indicative sentences specifies conditions in which the sentence
could be used to assert something true, and Dummett replies that such a theory runs the risk of
superficiality: it should not be taken to imply that truth and falsity are simply alternative properties
which an indicative sentence may have, for there must needs be a reckoning of the role of the truth or
falsity of a sentence (its success in reporting a state of affairs), as affecting any account of its content
and of the conventions attending its utterance39. Strawson takes for granted not only that the content in
forth. This raises the prospect that an act is successful without fully securing Austinian uptake (cf. Warnock (1989) pl27).
Kearns distinguishes between an intention for an act and an intention of an act: the meaning of an utterance is given in the
former; however, words are conventionally related to certain acts, and can, owing to 'slips', fail to inform H of the act performed.
(Kearns adds a fascinating element to the analysis of expressions (or utterances), thought by Derrida to be as speech: to vocables
and inscriptions he adds 'neural episodes). Correspondingly, Kearns gives a theory of semantic and syntactic structure for
'linguistic acts' and not expressions. 'Semantic structure is constituted by meaningful component acts being combined in
characteristic ways' (p51). He goes on to argue that this has significance for a theory of 'where meaning resides', for his theory is
contrary to 'conventional understandings of syntax and semantics'. A similar distinction is made in Schwayder's 'conditions of
success', and 'conditions for doing'; see Schwayder, D.S.; 'A Semantics of Utterance, Formalised', pp80-98 in Tsohatzidis
(1994).
For competing theories of the ways in which correlation might be found between the potential for illocutionary acts of
sentences and their grammar, once part of transformational grammar, see Harnish, R.M.; 'Mood, Meaning and Speech Acts',
pp407-459, Sadock, J.M.; 'Toward a Grammatically Realistic Typology of Speech Acts', pp393-406, and Croft, W.; 'Speech Act
Classification, Language Typology and Cognition', pp460-477 in Tsohatzidis (1994).
38McDowell (1980) pl31.
39 Strawson (1971c) pi 81. Strawson raises a similar point in his examination of the formal semantics theory, and McDowell
concedes that his characterisation of the theory might be thought to take for granted the notion of the content of the assertion, or
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a saying carries the meaning of the speech act, but also that the content of S's belief, which S intends to
communicate, is carried in the speech act, and McDowell warns against the temptation to think of
representations of the truth and content of states of affairs as inhering in mental states. Dummett's
suggestion that the classification of sentences as true or false be sensitive to the fact that S aims at
making true statements allows that statements intended deceptively are still articulated as standing
representations of the way things are; subsequently, it can be reckoned whether the statement attains to
truth or not, and McDowell wishes to include this condition in his theory, approximating again a
statement of Convention T40. He writes that content and truth-conditions seem independently of
intentions to be connected, adding that, '[i]t is natural to suspect that facts about the normal or proper
aims of statement-makers are not themselves what we are looking for'41.
In considering the idea that communication is the transmission of information McDowell revisits the
cases of actions performed by creatures to which one would not ascribe intentional behaviour.
Communicative behaviour between such creatures promulgates information about a shared
environment, and when what is communicated is 'misinformation', there occurs a 'malfunction' of a
natural process, constituting 'as such a defect' (although, as Dummett says, the act of communication,
and its matter, have pragmatic uses). Utilising this McDowell splices the problems of the distinction
between true and false statements and that of the distinction between the proper function of a statement
and its misfiring. In explicating the meaning of a statement, there is no condition requiring S's sincere
intention and its recognition by H. In its place is the notion of a 'repertoire' of behavioural functions, a
corpus of conventions, fulfilling the role of content, and requiring nothing of intention. This function,
writes McDowell, instantiates the use or effect (even the content), of an assertion, a role previously,
and incorrectly, assigned to an aiming at truth42. In a case of full and proper communication, H's
understanding of S's utterance is a proxy for H's direct 'confrontation' with the state of affairs S
represents: the former is surrogate for the latter, for they share logical form.
the saying. One should not, McDowell says, echoing Grice, reject such matters of philosophical perplexity. Cf. Dummett (1976)
Austin's arguments for the conclusion that performatives are not statements, and are thus are neither true nor false, are
precisely at issue in Searle (1989) especially p557. The theme is continued, with objections to Searle's other contentions, in
Bach, K. and Harnish, R.M.; 'How Performatives Really Work: A Reply to Searle', Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. XV, no. 1,
pp93-l 10, 1992. The debate is continued in Reimer, M.; 'Performative Utterances: A Reply to Bach and Harnish', Linguistics
and Philosophy, vol. XVIII, no. 6, pp655-675, 1995. Bach and Harnish are fundamentally Gricean in their approach: declarations
do not carry intentions, intentions are communicated by speakers and inferred by hearers (pp94-97). This goes for 'ordinary'
performatives. For Bach and Hamish, '...communicating is the act of expressing an attitude...' (p96). Cf. Austin (1971) pl6. The
explicit performative is a more sophisticated, precise method of achieving illocutionary effect than, say, intonation or gesture. It
is of a part with the evolution of,'...more complex forms of society and science'.
41 McDowell (1980) pl33.
42 McDowell (1980) ppl 33-134. Again, in an assertion one is not aiming at truth.
and 104-111.
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McDowell considers that the apparent 'core' of linguistic behaviour, namely assertion, is a
descendent of such instinctive communication43. He suggests that assertions can serve purposes other
than transmitting information, particularly so with the nested addition of conditions for mutual
knowledge, or in cases of secondary illocutions44. From assertions knowledge can be gained 'second¬
hand (as in the case of the non-speaker)'45, and this is not explicable by an argument that such
knowledge obtains because H can argue for its cogency from S's reliability and the communication of
his intention. McDowell suggests a 'more attractive' proposal: that the repertoire of linguistic
behaviour retains, in the changing of H's cognitive situation by the transmission of knowledge, a
vestige of an instinctive, 'pre-linguistic' ancestor; and that, in 'suitable' circumstances, uses of the
faculty constitute proxies for the state of affairs spoken about, and this occurs only in cases in which H
sees that S's utterance fits the role for which he offers it45.
But all standard assertions—excluding, that is, special cases like irony [until
competences become very sophisticated]—purport to it [the due epistemological role].
Thus their possession of content—their capacity for representing states of affairs—is
intelligible in terms of a suitable modification of the simple idea which seemed
appropriate in the case of instinctive communication.
As representations of states of affairs, assertions perform the task of revealing S's states of mind,
without requiring the reading off of intentions and without traducing the thesis of there being no
intentionality without language. In the formal semantics sketched by McDowell, one regarding the
transmission of guides for interpretation, promulgated in teaching, as making linguistic behaviour
intelligible as communication between S and H, the rudiments upon which meanings depend are the
relevant propositional attitudes ascribed by H to S47. In the light of S's behaviour and collated
dispositions and attitudes, his assertions are regarded, when assessed by standards of accepted practice,
as expressive ofbeliefs. The virtue of significance in indicative or assertoric sentences owes not to their
potential for expressing beliefs, but language use develops over time from primitive instinctive
communication supplemented by the learning of new potentialities created by the presence of more
complex desires and wants, and significances change and develop in relation to other potentialities, and
43 Strawson (1980) p283 agrees with the broad outlines of the theory.
44 In Searle (1979) p30 he suggests an example in which one might request that another pass the salt by asking the question 'Can
you reach the salt?'
45 The paradigm of the communication of information.
46 These points and the quotation are from McDowell (1980) pl35.
47Cf. McDowell (1980) ppl35ff.
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as a speaker develops facility in this the operations of the linguistic capacity develop from
instinctiveness to self-consciousness, growing as assertions are found to be suited to, and widely
accepted as, expressive of beliefs'18. The practice of ascribing content to assertions in these operations,
and its dependence upon sensitivity to, and knowledge of, previous like and correlative instances, lead
S to reflective, self-conscious linguistic competence, yet, following Davidson, and his rejection of
language conventions, the display of instinctive communicative capacities reports no states of mind, for
'...there are no states of mind, in the relevant sense, to be expressed', merely operations with
competences®. Progressively, as a speaker develops, the repertoire becomes less instinctive, and moves
through 'conditioned reflex', to issue in communicative behaviour under rational control. As Strawson
has it, for McDowell, the condition of mutual awareness of intention is achieved when successful
communication occurs, and Strawson captures McDowell's sense well: the intention in communication
is'to say what is said, to,
.. .perform linguistically in a way which would be appropriate to transmitting such-and-
such a piece of information. No further analysis of the intention of which mutual
awareness is secured in successful communication, hence no analysis, in such terms as
suggested in 'Meaning and Truth', is either required or appropriate50.
Regarded as conditioned reflex, an instance of communicative behaviour simply represents or
misrepresents reality as it is true to the facts, or as it 'goes wrong'. Once communicative behaviour is
under S's intentional control, '...so that deliberate misrepresentation of reality is possible', the second
aspect of the dual nature of communication is introduced, and in this, McDowell writes, S becomes,
along with the contextual circumstances, himself an object of representation. S misleading H about the
cast of his thought reports both incorrect information and false intentions, and, '...in a sense which
seems to apply only when questions arise in this way about the sincerity or insincerity of [his]
expressions'. H, McDowell adds, might see through S's deception owing to a greater sensitivity to such
contexts, and an audience made up of those still carrying the conditioned reflex will not be deceived
about the second aspect, owing to their simple grasp of the primitive, brute meaning of the information
promulgated51.
48 This evolutionary theory should put one in mind ofRorty's Darwinian epistemology (described in 1.1).
"McDowell (1980) pl36.
50 Strawson (1980) p284.
51 McDowell (1980) ppl36-137.
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McDowell argues that indicatives allow the representation of the very constitution of reality, and that
thus their analysis may be used to assess S's beliefs as to this constitution, precisely because S's
manipulations of the linguistic repertoire are wilful and self-conscious. It does not follow from this that
the use of utterances to represent reality 'breathes life' into them, giving speakers representing ability
by virtue of instantiating prior conventions; rather the primitive capacity enabling speakers to acquire
and manipulate knowledge renders them capable of expressing beliefs. Those in the primitive situation
imbibe knowledge from utterances before they develop the faculties to doubt S's honesty and veracity:
content is imparted, and stimuli issued and received, before the utterances are recognised as
expressions of certain beliefs. If S's sentences include terms which can only occur in the context of a
body of theory, then a comprehension of their content without proper knowledge of the context is
imperfect and incomplete. (McDowell allows that there may be a form of acceptance yet no
understanding). The gap cannot be bridged by a statement of the thoughts or intentions motivating S,
but by H's coming to the understanding and acceptance of further sentences stating the conditions of
the theoretical context in which the utterance is made. H must develop an 'appreciable' amount of such
belief before he is able to engage in and be sensitive to acts of assertion and expressions of belief, and
McDowell argues that this defines the way in which conventions are present in language, deriving not
from a developed understanding of S's use of utterances to communicate belief, but,
'...because...operations with sentences have fitted into his life [even at the earliest stages] in such a
way as to permit us to suppose that the sentences have been serving as vehicles for the transmission of
knowledge'52.
Strawson, in response, finds McDowell's an (incomplete) analysis of saying, referring to cases of
communication with full overt intention, with mutual knowledge obtaining; while these cases have
been seen to require a theory of convention, there follows a distinction vital to elucidating the
distinctions Derrida sets up and their assessment by Gricean analysis, saying that the clause in
McDowell requiring that S's act be 'apposite to transmitting information that p\ is subject to an
ambiguity centring on whether it requires that H recognise nuances attached to S's utterance. Strawson
(and Grice), say H must, at least in cases of communication, 'between mature language-users', and that
consequences follow for the 'nature' of 'genuine' intention in the communicative acts McDowell
studies (H-directed assertions). Few if any Hs, Strawson suggests, would not know of the chances of
52 McDowell (1980) ppl37-138. One should here cross-reference the work ofCavell on Wittgenstein and Augustine.
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error, and of intention to mislead: S's act might be thought governed by assumptions concerning his
sincerity, and this is part of S's intention in a genuine communication, a position Strawson finds
continuous with his own53. This is surely provided for by the analysis of Grice offered in this
dissertation, accounting both for first and second intention, but this notwithstanding, McDowell writes,
the Gricean-Strawsonian description is, due to its wanting a theory of convention, an 'unrealistic'
analysis of the 'normal' case. McDowell's work begins this, and recalls formal semantics to the priority
of the realities of speech and 'speech-like behaviour', arguing that all semantics is 'secondary' to the
theory of communication54. The reduction of operations with language to corresponding S-intentions is
unnecessary, and indeed, misleading, for a theory of illocutionary force requires at least some account
of the ways in which utterances can fulfil specific conventional roles written in the (admittedly rather
nebulous), theory of perlocutionary force, and this is attempted by Searle, whose work is considered in
the rest of this chapter.
53 As expressed in Strawson (1980) p285.
54 McDowell (1980) pl38. Strawson (1980) p286 finds a parallel between McDowell's evolutionary story and his own
communication-intention theory with their faith in a notion of 'representative response'.
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2. Speech Acts and Reference
Searle discusses together formal and use theories: they are not 'competing' but 'complementary', for
any theory of language and mind requires consideration of the role played by conventions1. He offers
two principles, firstly the principle of expressibility, or, '...whatever can be meant can be said'. In
Searle's words,
... for any meaning X and any speaker S whenever S means (intends to convey, wishes to
communicate in an utterance, etc) X then it is possible that there is some expression E
such that E is an exact expression of or formulation of X2.
This, and the second, that, '... speaking a language is engaging in a rule-governed form of behaviour',
establishes what Richards calls Searle's 'corollary', that rules for language use are rules for uttering
linguistic elements, or, Searle again3:
...for any possible speech act there is a possible linguistic element the meaning ofwhich
(given the context of the utterance) is sufficient to determine that its literal utterance is a
performance of precisely that speech act. To study the speech acts of promising or
apologising one need only study sentences whose literal and correct utterance would
constitute making a promise or issuing an apology4.
Thus it is that speech acts determined by the meaning of elements in a language (by applying their
constitutive rules, see III.3), are determined also in their linguistic or semantic content and role5.
Richards argues that the difficulties of establishing whether the speech act rules match the semantic
elements of the language in which the utterance occurs cannot be overcome without abandoning one or
both of Searle's principles6. The speech act of promising reports the semantic features of English
relevant to making a promise, yet Searle's point, is as Richards' says, opaque, and too easily delegated
1 Searle (1969) pl8-19. Fraser, B.; 'Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language by John R. Searle', Foundations of
Language, vol. XI, no. 3, pp433-446, 1974, makes the point with interesting cross-reference. The work of the structuralists points
up the need for theories of syntax. It is argued by some, Fraser writes, that the development of this work falls within the domain
of morphology, and is to be studied there, but Fraser says '[semantics was often the convienient rug under which to sweep
problems in syntactic description, at least as long as syntax and semantics were held separable and distinct'. Semantics has been
found to be unable to account for the problems arising in the linguistic disciplines, and speech act theory should be thought part
of the newest solution: pragmatics.
Fraser states a number of theses, of which the ninth makes Searle's point, following upon his utilisation of Fregean senses,
(points which will reoccur), that the study of the meanings of sentences and the study of speech acts are not independent, but the
same practice beginning from different sources.
2 The quotations are from Searle (1969) ppl9-20. This is the first premise to which Richards holds Searle in Richards, B.; 'Searle
onMeaning and Speech Acts', Foundations of Language, vol. VII, no. 6, pp519-538, 1971.
3 Cf. Searle (1969) p22. This is the first of the theses which Fraser discerns in Searle. Cf. Fraser (1974) p and Richards (1971)
p519.
4 Searle (1969) pp20-21.
5 Richards (1971) p520 says correctly that this prefaces Searle's discussion of demonstrative reference, and continues that one
might find numerous counter-examples to this analysis, but that the that speech acts are performed in utterances using elements
of the language, for contextmay,'... supply what the meaning of the elements leaves unspecified'.
8 Cf. Cohen (1964) pl31.
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to the linguist7. Searle's premise that semantic structure is the conventional structure of sets of
constitutive rules, rules described in linguistics, leads him to postulate rules without reference to
natural languages, stating conventions but unusable in practice as conventions for natural languages8.
Searle gives some of the rules used in the speaking of a language, and the conditions necessary and
sufficient for the performance of different kinds of speech act. From this he extracts 'sets of semantic
rules' for the use of utterances, and by which they can be marked as speech acts of specific types.
Richards' arguments apply equally against Searle's taxonomy of illocutionary force (later dubbed
illocutionary 'point'), for the inconsistency in Searle's premises regarding convention allows no
distinction between types to be made9. Searle imagines a speech situation containing S, H and a
context, in which '... in appropriate circumstances S utters one of the following sentences':
1) X smokes habitually
2) Does X smoke habitually?
3) X, smoke habitually!
4) Would that X smoked habitually,
reporting respectively an assertion, a question, an order and a wish. Each act is, additionally, an act of
referring to, or of designating, an object (X) and something predicated of him10. The examples show
that the same reference and predication can occur in the performance of different complete speech
7 And Searle (1969) ppl4 and 64 defers to Chomsky. Richards (1971) p521.
8 He explicitly says so: Searle (1969) p41. A solution is given by Lewis (described in IV). (It is pertinent to recall that both Searle
and Derrida reject the thesis of intentionality without language, and to add that both fail to mark Strawson's distinction).
Habermas, J.; 'Comments on John Searle: "Meaning, Communication and Representation'", ppl7-29 in Lepore and van Gulick
(1991) pp21ff argues that the framework of Speech Acts is not fruitful enough to account for Searle's intersubjectivist view of
conventions in language. (The debt of Searle's work to the Gricean mechanism is described in Alston, W.P.; 'Searle on
Illocutionary Acts', pp57-80 in Lepore and van Gulick (1991). Alston is less sanguine than Bennett that Searle's conditions on
understanding as a replacement for the Gricean recognition of intention are successfully met). Habermas compares the Gricean
'intentionalist' view with the Searlean 'intersubjectivist' view. The latter is characterised thus: 'In producing the utterance x S
allows [H] the option of responding with "yes" or "no". It is the achievement of a mutual consensus with respect to a (potentially
questionable) matter, and not the transfer of ideas, that serves here as a model of communication' (pl7). Habermas says later that
with the intersubjectivist view (foregrounding 'the representation of states of affairs'), '...a relation to the world of events and
objects and a dimension of validity come into play which essentially provide the criteria for a successful performance of a
communicative intention' (pl9). This plainly has implications for the arguments for the priority of language over intentionality,
codified in Habermas' two theses, for '[mjental representation of states of affairs in terms of an analysis in terms of satisfaction
conditions is more basic than linguistic representation', and, '[ijllocutionary types can be distinguished like representations of
states of affairs and corresponding propositional attitudes of the speaker'. See also Apel (1991). The view of Searle (1991) p90 in
response to Habermas (1991) is one that must be echoed here. The 'intentionalist' and 'intersubjectivist' views are perfectly
compatible, the first elucidating the structure of meaning and communication, and the second requiring the foundation of the
first, viewing successful speech acts as achieving consensus and agreement between S and H on a subject in the world.
In Searle's theory of the understanding of H, rather than the (following Grice), intention of S, there is a notion of the way in
which meaning is a 'matter of rules or conventions'. (Searle (1969) p43). As de Mulder (1994) pll says this makes an
illocutionary/perlooutionary distinction: illocutions being conventional meanings of speech acts and perlocutions being
conventional outcomes of speech act performances.
' The extraction of sets of semantic rules allows a taxonomy. Richards follows out the consequences of Searle's argument that
speech acts 'presuppose' conventional sentence meanings. (Richards writes that this argument is given in an unpublished essay,
'Meaning and Speech Acts' (typescript, Cambridge University) 1969). Richards, it should be noted, thinks of Searle as trying to
forge a 'general theory' from Austin's insights.
10 Searle (1969) pp22-23. Searle says elsewhere that intentional acts ('states') represent objects or states of affairs in the same
way as do speech acts, the latter being derived from the former. Cf. Searle (1983) pp4-5. Chapter one is devoted to making the
connections between the work on intentional meaning and speech acts and the philosophy of mind. Searle has a notion of
mediation in his theory, ppl3ff.
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acts". In uttering any of the four statements S performs at least three types of act: he utters words,
sentences or morphemes, and therefore performs utterance acts; he refers to objects or predicates
something of objects, and therefore performs propositional acts; and he makes statements, promises,
warnings and any number of other speech acts, and so performs illocutionary acts'2. From this Searle
draws further distinctions: that different illocutionary acts can be performed by the same propositional
acts, and that S can thus perform utterance acts without performing any propositional or illocutionary
act13. A further example,
5) Mr X is a regular smoker of tobacco,
shows that in the performance of the same propositional act as in l)-4), and the performance of the
same illocutionary act as in 1), a different utterance act is performed: none of the same words is used,
and only some shared morphemes, whence, in the performance of the one utterance act S may perform
the same propositional and illocutionary acts. Furthermore, S may use the same utterance on different
occasions to perform different propositional and illocutionary acts: that is '...the same sentence
may.. .be used to make two different statements'. Searle finds that the only unequivocal distinction that
can be made is that, 'fujtterance acts consist simply in uttering strings of words. Illocutionary and
propositional acts consist characteristically in uttering words in sentences in certain contexts, under
certain conditions and with certain intentions..."4. The latter term of the distinction leads Cohen to
object, and since his theory bears affinities with that offered in this chapter in reply to Searle, his
arguments shall be presented.
Close textual study leads Cohen to reject the theory of illocutionary force: the concept is 'empty', and
witness, he suggests, exclamations with only locutionary aspects and no illocutionary aspect
11 These point up the importance ofAustin's theory of illocutionary acts.
12 Searle (1969) pp23-24. This is the second of Fraser's main theses. Searle's rationale for the distinction is given in Searle, J.R.;
'Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts', The Philosophical Review, vol. LXXVII, no. 10, pp405-424, 1968.
13 Searle (1969) p24.
14 The distinctions and the two quotations are from Searle (1969) pp24-25. The detail of the distinctions, and their soundness,
(the 'spirit' ofwhich derives from Austin), is Fraser's sixth thesis, and Searle's remark that it is possible for every speech act to
be determined by a sentence on the assumption that the speaker speaks literally and the context is appropriately constituted (e.g.
one has the right to launch the ship, etc.) his eighth. Cf. Searle (1979b) pl30. Contexts in literal meanings are like the
background of intentional states. The notion of literal meaning is, '...the notion of conventional and hence fungible
intentionality'. Searle (1983) pl43 argues that 'The Background' is a set of 'pre-intentional' mental capacities allowing
representation to take place. It is not itself intentional. 'The Background' constitutes a means of knowing-how without knowing-
that (Searle gives as examples, walking, eating and perceiving among others) (pl44). On pi 54 Searle writes that the belief that
'The Background' is a product of social interaction, '...[or] that it consists of cultural objects in the world such as chairs and
tables, hammers and nails...in a Heideggerian vein', is only partly true. The foundation of 'The Background' are 'practices', or
'capacities', and not representations (pl56). Part of Searle's reason for coming to the hypothesis of 'The Background' was to
refine a view of literal utterance. Searle (1983) ppl45-148. Literal meaning is context relative: 'it only has application relative to
a set ofpre-intentional background assumptions and practices' (pl45). On the importance to intentionality of seeing-as, cf. Searle
(1979b) pl36.
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whatsoever, perhaps obscenity or solecism15. 'Damn' is at once a phonetic, a phatic and a rhetic act16, its
rhetic aspect carrying its sense and reference, and its phatic aspect its intonation, pronunciation,
grammatical construction and use of vocabulary17. The force of 'damn' is, as it were, carried without
nuance in each instance of its utterance, which conceals nothing //-locutionary, and furthermore,
analysis of such speech acts must be made with nothing as simple as Austin's means of distinguishing
illocutions (namely, the construction in explicit performative form), for phatic acts are reported
immanently in direct speech, rhetic only indirectly, with connotation to independent conventions for
sense and reference, as described by Frege18. (As Derrida notes, it is essential to distinguish force from
meaning, and sense from reference 'within meaning'). Cohen continues: the cognation of Austin's
distinction of illocution and perlocution and Grice's, and of Austin's speaking baldly of the 'use of
language', obscure both the distinction of locutions and illocutions, and the true distinction of
illocutions and perlocutions19. Use of language for illocutions is for Austin conventional, and not so for
perlocutions, and the difference is marked by the use, in the former cases, of explicit performatives.
Further indeterminate cases are supplied by Strawson: '[w]e may speak of the use of language in poetry
or for joking, and we can also use language to make insinuations or to express our feelings, as
[following the first example] in swearing'20. For Austin, the types of illocutionary act that may be
performed accord with the conventions of illocutionary force; following the act's performance,
'uptake' is required, and H's response is assessed against the appropriate conventions. In all of these
ways do illocutions differ from perlocutions. Cohen replies that the difficulties he prefaces (described
15 Cohen (1964) p. As intimated in Part II, the details of Cohen's criticism, his method of deriving his arguments, make points
similar to Skinner's.
16 Cohen (1964) p. Skinner (1970) p argues that illocutionary force is rhetic force. (The arguments are considered in III.5). As
Austin writes, the performance of a rhetic act is, '... generally to perform the act of using that rheme or its constituents with a
more or less definite "sense" and more or less definite "reference" (which together are equivalent to "meanings"). Austin (1962)
pp92-96. Austin views the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts as clearer than that between illocutions and
perlocutions, and, as Cooper (1972) p72 says, Austin does not elucidate the theories of sense and reference with which he works.
The provision of such a theory is the main concern of Vandervecken, D.; Meaning and Speech Acts: Volume /, Principles of
Language Use (Cambridge University Press) 1990, and with formal notation, Meaning and Speech Acts: Volume II, Formal
Semantics of Success and Satisfaction (Cambridge University Press) 1991. Cf. Searle (1968) pp410ff. Searle finds an
inconsistency in Austin's characterisation of the elements of the locution (phonetic, phatic and rhetic), and argues that the
locutionaiy-illocutionary distinction is unworkable. He presents a different analysis: what is stated in an act of stating can be true
or false; propositions stated are 'neutral' as to the illocutionary force with which they are expressed, but statements are not.
Statements are 'construed' in a context of intonation, stress, punctuation, and so forth (cf. p419).
17 The sense and reference of a locution being, as Austin says, equivalent to meaning. Austin (1962) pl48.
18 Skinner (1970) pThe product of phatic acts are units of language, and of phatic acts units of language. They are meaningless or
void respectively. Cf. Cameron, J.; 'Sentence Meaning and Speech Acts', The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. XX, no. 79, pp97-
117,1970.
" In this there are major consequences for Searle's charge against Grice, namely, that he gives a theory of perlocution not of
illocution. He gives a theory of both, and the argument given here shows Searle to be far wrong, and the thrust of Cohen's
argument plainly has a similar motivation. See also Cohen, T.; 'Illocutions and Perlocutions', Foundations of Language, vol. IX,
no. 4, pp492-503, 1973. Cohen argues that, when cleared up, the notion of perlocution is much closer to that of illocution than
Austin and subsequent authors have argued. A relation of convention (p499ff), Cohen continues, might be stated which would
clarify the distinction Austin makes between illocutions and perlocutions (pp493-494). Austin's distinction is not clear-cut.
Cohen rejects the 'formulaic' utterances of legal contexts, for they are not 'parts of live speech situations' (p502). Cf. Kuroda
(1989) pp658ff and pp668ff, and in particular for the latter, Searle's criticism of Grice. Kuroda argues that Gricean meaning™ is
an intention to produce an illocutionary effect (p680).
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above), arising in the discussion of locutionary meaning, perlocutionary effect and illocutionary force,
are shared, and thus that there is no such thing as illocutionary force, its work being done by
conventions of sense and reference and of syntax, intonation, pronunciation and so forth. He assesses
the notion that led Austin to formulate the theory, and to abandon the performative-constative
distinction21, finding that problems of demonstrative reference are, as Derrida realises, more directly an
influence on Austin, and Cohen's points are fully detailed below22.
Searle is well-disposed toward Austin's notions of illocution and perlocution. He writes that for
propositional and illocutionary acts there are characteristic kinds of expression uttered in their
performance: for unambiguous illocutionary acts they are complete sentences, and for propositional
acts, parts of complete sentences, the latter comprising, '...grammatical predicates for the act of
predication, and proper names, pronouns, and certain other sorts of noun phrases for reference'23.
However, propositional acts do not occur alone, for S cannot simply refer and predicate in a speech act
without performing an illocution: Searle gives as the linguistic correlate of this point that sentences and
not words are used to say things24. This remark draws an apt response from Fraser: it would be justified
if language were used only to communicate, and if communicating linguistically were necessarily to
perform illocutionary acts. 'But since language is used for self-expression, thinking and problem-
solving as well as inter-personal communication in the ordinary sense, it is easy to imagine cases where
one performs propositional acts without having any intention to create an illocutionary effect'25. This
recalls Strawson's counter-examples to Gricean analysis, and informs Searle's work on indirect speech
acts26. (Fraser notes elsewhere (as his seventh thesis) Searle's repetition of his first principle: that
whatever can be meant can be said; one might venture that this is part of the reason for the ambiguity
Fraser notes in Searle, and why parasitical, indirect instances constitute obstacles for any Fregean
theory)27.
20 Cohen (1964) pi 19.
21 Cf. Cohen (1964) ppl20-125 for an excellent discussion.
22 In III. 3.
23 Searle (1969) p25. This is Fraser's third thesis.
24
Although one might recall Evans' case for the sense and reference of singular terms in a Fregean theory (11.2). Cf. Wiggins
(1971) pl6.
"Fraser (1974) p434 fin. 3.
26 Presented in III.5.
27 Because by the principle, and the thesis of there being no intentionality without language, one must, it seems, mean the
statement contained in the act before one performs it. It would be a profitable avenue of enquiry to examine the exchange
between Perry and Evans on demonstratives, and the possibility of establishing conventions for the situations in which they may
appear, for its relevance to this debate. For criticisms of Searle, see Bertolet, R.; 'Are There Indirect Speech Acts?', pp335-349,
Holdcroft, D.; 'Indirect Speech Acts and Propositional Content', pp350-364 and Tsohatzidis, S.L.; 'Speaker Meaning, Sentence
Meaning andMetaphor', pp365-373 in Tsohatzidis (1994).
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Searle describes the way in which his use of the verb 'predicate' differs from that of traditional
philosophical usage, wishing to bring out the connection between the notions of predication and of
truth. For Searle the same predication occurs in l)-5) (above), and conceding this gives a third
principle: that the same predicate expression is used, with different inflections, in different
illocutionary acts; this, he says, goes for other illocutions, and further emphasises the distinction
between illocutionary acts and propositions. Referring expressions such as 'you', 'Caesar', 'the battle
ofWaterloo', in their utterance, pick out, point to, or identify one object or entity apart from all others.
Such expressions answer questions, 'Who?', 'What?' or 'Which?' They are known by their function,
not by their grammatical form or the manner in which the function is performed. They are to be
contrasted with other kinds of expressions, encapsulated for Searle in those beginning with indefinite
articles, ('A man...'), which, '...might be said to refer to a particular man, but [could not] come to
identify or... indicate S's intention to identify an object in the manner of some uses of expressions with
the definite article, such as "the man'", and thus a distinction must be marked between definite and
indefinite referring expressions in the singular and the plural, and another between referring and non-
referring uses of expressions formed with the definite article, for example, 'a man' in the utterances, 'A
man came', and, 'John is a man', respectively28.
The notions of definite reference and of a definite referring expression are as yet imprecise. Searle's
examples elucidate 'paradigm' cases of reference, but fail to account for doubtful cases. Does
signifying one's name constitute a reference to oneself; what of fictional reference; and does the use of
a tensed verb refer to its time of utterance?29 For clarity Searle states his method in assessing speech
acts: he looks to those cases, '.. .which constitute the centre of variation of the concept of referring...',
and extrapolates the conclusions to 'borderline' cases, '...in light of their similarities and differences
from the paradigms'30. The concept of referring should not be abandoned, he says, for want of an
unequivocal answer to the question of the worth and status of paradigm cases, and Searle explains the
function of the paradigms in utterances given as complete illocutionary speech acts, and the means of
contrast with parasites31. The class of paradigmatic referring expressions good for surface structure
comprises '... proper names, noun phrases beginning with the definite article or a possessive pronoun or
28 Searle (1969) pp26-28.
29 Cf. Searle (1989) p537 for constructions with the present continuous, a plural subject, and the passive mood.
30
Searle makes these restrictions in (1971b) p40. He says he sacrifices 'thoroughness' for the sake of'scope'.
31 Searle (1969) p28.
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noun and followed by a singular noun, and pronouns'32. In cases in which two illocutionary acts contain
the same reference and predication, and in which the meaning of the two expressions is the same, the
same proposition is expressed, and Searle adds to l)-5),
6) If Sam smokes habitually he will not live long
7) The proposition that Sam smokes habitually is uninteresting,
illustrating (in light of l)-5)) that propositions must be distinguished from their assertion or statement,
both ofwhich, unlike propositions, constitute acts33. Propositions are asserted in acts of asserting, and
stated in acts of stating. The expression of a proposition is a prepositional act, and not an illocutionary
act, and prepositional acts (as above) cannot occur alone: one cannot express a proposition, and do
nothing else, in performing a complete speech act. The characteristic incomplete sentence form for
propositions is 'that...', and by this locution can they be isolated34.
Searle distinguishes two elements in the syntactic structure of a sentence, dubbed the 'prepositional
content indicator' and the 'illocutionary force indicator'. The latter shows what illocutionary act is
performed35. The general form of ('very many kinds of) illocutionary acts is F(p) in which F takes
illocutionary force indicators, and p propositions, accounting, Searle says, for questions other than
those requiring a yes-no answer, and clearly indicating the difference between prepositional and
illocutionary negation. From this account can, Searle argues, be derived an account of the refusal to
perform an illocutionary act as a statement of an autobiographical kind36.
32 Searle (1969) p28. The confinement of Searle's theory to cases of literal and correct utterance constitutes Fraser's tenth thesis.
The hypothesis that the speech act is the basic unit of communication, and the network of connections between speech acts,
speakermeaning, sentence meaning, utterance meaning, speaker intention, hearer recognition and rules, his eleventh.
33 Searle (1969) p29.
34 Searle (1969) p29. The point is simply expressed, Searle distinguishes between the illocutionary act and its prepositional
content, with a proviso that not all illocutionary acts have prepositional content. Cf. Cohen (1964) pl21.
35 Searle (1969) pp30-31 writes with reference to examples that the elements corresponding to the illocutionary force indicator
can be identified separately from those corresponding to the prepositional content indicator. 'I promise to come' and 'I promise
that I will come': the deep structure of both sentences reveals the phrase marker: 'I promise +1 will come'. This Searle gives as
the syntactic 'analogue' of his semantic distinction between the context of the utterance showing illocutionary force and the
explicit invocation (explicit performative) of illocutionary force. On the saturation of phrase markers, cf. Miller, J.; 'The Parasitic
Growth ofDeep Structures', Foundations of Language, vol. XIII, no. 3, pp361-389, 1975.
36 Searle (1969) pp30-33. Again, in this context, Searle notes the (apparently) necessary restrictions on his procedure: having
listed the types of illocutionary acts, separate studies can be made of each of illocutionary force, referring and predicating. He
deals with '... simple illocutionary acts of the sort that involve reference to a single object (usually in the utterance of a singular
noun phrase) and the predication of simple expressions.' Again, he focuses on the simple cases for clarity concerning the
complex cases, and to this end he ignores '...subject expressions, relational predicate expressions, and molecular propositions.'
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3. Rules and Conventions
Searle has a fourth principle, a distinction between 'regulative' and 'constitutive' rules1. Regulative
rules govern antecedently or independently existing forms of behaviour. Constitutive rules create or
define new forms of behaviour2. Richards rejects the distinction, and so argues that Searle's theory of
convention is unworkable. The uses of expression in the ersatz language Searle presents are exhausted
by the two types of rules given, which Richards formalises: the regulative, (a) 'x is to be uttered only
if...', and the constitutive, (b) 'The utterance ofx counts as...', adding that, as Searle specifies none of
the elements for which the rules obtain (those which might fill the blanks in the formalisations) he
relies on an unspoken formulation of the most general type: (c) 'The device (whatever it is) for...', in
which the blank is filled with the name of a speech act, and the denotation of an expression (in a chosen
language). Following Richards, one might emphasise that marking rules has consequences: one obeys
or disobeys their conditions, and one's behaviour is assessed against them; there is, as it were, success
and failure3.
Searle's second principle says that speaking a language is participating in a procedure performed
according to rules, and writes,
The form this hypothesis will take is that the semantic structure of a language may be
regarded as a conventional realisation of a series of sets of underlying constitutive rules,
and that speech acts are acts characteristically performed by uttering expressions in
accordance with these sets of constitutive rules4.
1 Searle (1969) pp33ff, Fraser's sixth thesis. Davis (1979) p234 contrasts Strawson's avowability thesis with Searle's theory of
constitutive rules constituting the meanings of the phrases.
2 Searle says that they appear tautological, for they exist to define what the element of the game they govern is to do: the rule for
the move of checkmate in chess seems to (in part) define 'checkmate'. Searle notes the importance of such rules in philosophy,
and for an example he turns to the question 'how can making a promise give one an obligation?' Constitutive rules may be
characterised according to two formulae, which Searle examines, the first governing their status as creating new forms of
behaviour. In cases of purely regulative behaviour (rales) strictures in accordance with them could be given the identical
description regardless of whether or not the rule existed. However, in cases of constitutive rules, behaviour made in accordance
with them can be given specifications not available in the absence of the rule. Of the statement of the form of constitutive rules
Searle admits that this may not be offered as a formal criterion for their distinction, for any regulative rale could be moulded to
fit the characterisation. Holborow, L.; 'Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy ofMindby John R. Searle', Mind, vol. LXXXI,
no. 323, pp458-468, 1972, p465 insists that any account of games must give reasons for their roles in the lives of men, and
comments on the difficulty Searle encounters in incorporating facts of this latter sort into an account of constitutive rules. There
are, however, adjustments easily made to the standards of appraisal and judgement and not simply those of specification or bald
statement. 'Where the rule naturally can be phrased in this form and where the Y term is a specification, the rule is likely to be
constitutive.' However, Searle has two caveats. Firstly, that since constitutive rales appear in broader, more sophisticated,
systems, it may plausibly be the case that the rule is instantiated in fact by the system in which exemplifies the form and not the
individual rales found in the system. Secondly, within these broad systems the phrase which picks out the act which is subsumed
under a rule will not in general be simply a label.
'Richards (1971) pp521-522.
4 Searle (1969) p37. This is Fraser's fifth thesis, and the first premise Richards discerns. These rales are those for the successful
performance of speech acts, and are not all imperative. The sense in which constitutive rules impact upon the speaking of a
language is elucidated for Searle through an example. The difference between promising and fishing which compels one to say
that the first is possible only due to the existence of constitutive rules describing operations with the elements of a language, and
that the latter does not require such a set of rules due to the fact that there are no given conventions for the catching of a fish.
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It is a matter of convention that the utterances of certain expressions in certain conditions or contexts
qualify as specific speech acts, and Searle distinguishes convention from, '...strategy, technique,
procedure, or natural fact'5. This normative status of constitutive rules leads Holborow to argue that
Searle's analogy to achieving checkmate in chess fails, for such rules define terms, or give 'ends-and-
constraints' conditions, determining how, in this case, one successfully achieves checkmate, yet they
are silent on their broader, practical significance, to which any theory of rules for language, Holborow
argues, must attend. Chess, as languages, instantiates a series of rules, observance of which allows one
to perform permitted moves, exploit strategies and so forth. In language one must accede to similar
rules, of, say, grammar or logic, but one must, additionally, observe rules and conventions defining the
ways in which speech acts 'fit' into the contexts Austin describes, how their significance and
performance may change in time and be observed in different traditions. (These are K-II acts, and it
shall be noted throughout the following discussion that Searle is only fitfully aware of Strawson's
distinction). Because Searle does not make this distinction his rules can appear, as he claims, analytic,
and as binding for practice.
Holborow argues that there is 'room for cultural variation' within Searle's, 'vaguely drawn limits',
and it is this vagueness that Richards seizes upon in his objections. Richards argues that in Searle's
conditions on rules there is a series of unspoken premises. Determining the use of expressions
according to rules requires four features in a Searlean theory6; firstly, that each rule be either of type (a)
or (b) (as given above); secondly, that the set contain one or more type (a) rule, and thirdly, at least one
of type (b); fourthly, the set is ordered such that (b) rules apply only if some (a) rules are satisfied. The
significance of these conditions shall be seen when consideration is made of Searle's analysis of the
conventions of illocutions, and, in preparation, some of Searle's further remarks on conventions shall
be noted. Searle asks whether languages, specifically as opposed to language, are conventional,
whether illocutionary acts are conventional, and whether language is rule-governed. Searle says that the
answer to the first question is obvious, for in speaking or writing one observes the conventions of one
language and not another. The second, in general, is answered affirmatively, though,
5 Searle (1969) p37.
6 There will be many rules for each expression not one.
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[s]ome very simple sorts of illocutionary acts can indeed be performed apart from any
use of any conventional devices at all, simply by getting the audience to recognise certain
of one's intentions in behaving in a certain way7.
Fraser is correct to say that Searle equivocates (perhaps not intentionally), between two differing uses
of 'convention', one for the conventions of a language (English, Swahili, Hopi and so forth), and
another for illocutionary conventions good for all languages. Richards picks up this point, and shows
that conventions of the latter type could not be applied to natural languages8. Holborow adds that Searle
does not work sufficiently to establish the differences between language, languages and the role of both
as conventional. The simple hypothesis of constitutive rules is insufficient to mark these necessary
distinctions, and to establish a notion of convention rich enough to give a full analysis of standard cases
for application to non-standard cases, a particular problem, as Strawson shows, for theories of
language9. Fraser articulates the dissatisfaction with Austin which led to Strawson's distinction: how
can one invoke rules for conventions when the device by which one does this must itself be a part of a
conventional system, or one conventionally interpreted as indicating the intention to perform a
particular act according to a convention?
In answer to the third question (whether language is rule-governed) Searle writes that, in general,
illocutionary acts can be performed in language in virtue of certain rules, and could not be so
performed unless language permitted them10. In explication Searle weaves a second fiction, one in
7 For this and the above points see Searle (1969) p38. Fraser (1974) finds great difficulty in following Searle's use of the terms
convention and conventional, difficulties which one might respectfully suggest would be dissipated by a study of Strawson's
distinction.
8 Fraser (1974). The central thesis of this dissertation regarding convention is that Derrida's animadversions regarding Austin on
convention are dissipated by a fall development of the ramifications of Strawson's distinction.
'. The sadist example (Searle (1969) p39), makes the same point differently: Searle writes that anyone could experience the pain
they enjoy without being aware of a convention. Searle appeals also to conventions in translation (again, incidentally, confusing
the case with regard to the conventions for utterances), and goes on to say that illocutionary acts are performed only in
accordance with the rales, and that there must be a way in which rules may be invoked. Holborow (1972) is concerned at Searle's
slipshod distinction and the use to which it is put, and he notes Alston's concerns. Having conflated language and languages, and
intimated observance of the conventions of one language rather than those of another, Searle proceeds as if he theorises a set of
rules for language (as Searle puts it, '...the underlying rules which the conventions manifest or realise...'). This, Holborow
writes, muddies the connection (elsewhere foregrounded by Searle), between rules and one's practices. Were they independent,
they would play a rdle different from that envisaged in the broader theory of speech acts. Holborow suggests that one might
theorise certain changes in the details of the conventions governing one's practices without affecting the practice, and that one
might identify dispositions to perform the rules of one's practices, but that neither give the existence of rules independent of the
practices. They are rather processes of clarification. As has been seen, however, Strawson's distinction is still not overcome, and
this is of greater importance. In this context Searle notes the weakness of the analogy with games.
Searle writes that 'mean' translates comfortably into neither French nor German. Searle, J.; 'Meaning, Communication and
Representation', pp209-226 in Giandy and Warner (1986), p209 and cf. p213. Searle asks how a wave, shout and so forth, comes
to mean, wishing principally to elucidate the role of intentions in his earlier work. He revisits examples of H not understanding
S's utterance, even though S means what he says by his utterance (say in which uptake is not secured), or in which S speaks out
of duty, knowing that H is paying no attention. (Searle adds, as an analogous case, that of a diary writer writing entries to
himself). Searle now maintains that, in communicating, S reports his intentions in order to produce effects on H, and adds,
supplementary to Speech Acts, that this succeeds by representing the world (a state of affairs), in,'... one or more of the possible
illocutionary modes...' (p212). Distinguishing meaning from communication in this manner leads Searle to declare the Homeric
struggle a draw, and to suggest again that the bestmust be used of both formal and use theories (pp225-226).
10 Searle also wants to make it a tenet of study that there is a system of rule-governed elements required for the obtaining of
certain types of speech act.
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which the relationships between rules, acts and conventions may be indicated". One is to imagine the
playing of chess according to different conventions in different communities. In such cases the rules
must be realised, or codified, in some forms for the game to be playable at all, that is, they must be
regulative. A second example describes a group of sadists who enjoy terrifying each other. Unlike the
chess players, there are no conventions regarding the ways in which the sadists derive this pleasure:
any convention they may establish is '...not a realisation of any underlying constitutive rules. Unlike
the chess case, the conventional device is a device to achieve a natural effect"2. From this and his
earlier remarks Searle draws conclusions: languages involve conventions, and speaking a language and
performing illocutionary acts are, '...like the chess case in ways that they are crucially unlike the
[sadist] case.' 'Different human languages, to the extent that they are inter-translatable, can be regarded
as different conventional realisations of the same underlying rules"3. For many kinds of illocutionary
act there must be a conventional device within the scope of which the act must be performed
(additionally, there is a means by which the accompanying rules can be, if necessary, invoked or made
avowable). Specified in the rules are not natural effects (described in regulative rules), those which can
be caused without the invocation of rules, but the holding of conventions, governing speech acts and
expressing commitment to the existence of the state of affairs reported".
Holborow investigates an analogy (drawn by Searle) between games and speech acts sincerely and
literally made: that a provision be made in any definition of games that both sides play to win, making
no exceptions, and giving no quarter. Holborow replies that in games one can play to the rules without
playing to win, and that the analogy does not work, and because of an opacity in the definitions of
regulative and constitutive rules for speech acts. The latter, Holborow suggests, be restricted to the
definition of'ends-and-constraints' conditions, adding that Searle's remark that the distinction between
regulative and constitutive tolerates a distinction between 'specifications' of behaviour and
'appraisals' of behaviour, holds further difficulties. Many rules are introduced to regulate existing
forms of behaviour, not to specify the behaviour appropriate to newly-inaugurated forms, and they
continue to exist by defining subsequent behaviour as correct by these rules, and thus specify
conditions essential to constitutive rules. The distinction is not clear cut, and, on Holborow's
11 Searle (1969) pp38-39. The example derived from Wittgenstein, and the relation to Wittgenstein's work on convention being
clear. Searle's first fiction is that enjoyed by Derrida (1977b).
12 Searle (1969) p39.
13 Searle (1969) p39. Cf. the remarks ofHolborow on the previous page.
14 Searle (1971b) p42. Searle says that scepticism about rules (conventions) of language arises because of an incorrect
understanding ofwhat the rules must be like. Illocutionary acts are performed according to constitutive rules. He again uses the
case ofpromising (cf. pp46-53).
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conception, the introduction of rules introduces a scheme of permissions and proscriptions to order
practices, with penalties for infringement, and this questions Searle's distinctions, for a class of rules
defining technique for existing forms will also broach 'convention' and 'natural fact"5.
Searle emphasises that he does not argue that illocutionary acts always occur (and alone) according to
rules described in conventions. While the appeal to the recognition of intention must be held over for
discussion of Searle's criticism of Grice's analysis, he does say, in a similar vein to Grice, and again in
ignorance of Strawson's distinction, that 'in general' illocutionary acts are performed, '...within
language in virtue of certain rules, and indeed could not be performed unless language allowed the
possibility of their performance'16. This raises two problems in light of the analogy with games. Can
there be, as Holborow asks, as it were, penalties for violations of languages (insincerity, lies, and
perhaps fictional utterances); and can one follow a rule without knowing that one does so? Searle
answers no to the first question (because if one performs the speech act, observing the due conventions
of language, one has successfully performed the act (once again, Searle pays no heed to Strawson's
distinction), and to the second, that there are cases in which rules of language are discovered or found
to obtain, even though the rules instantiated by the practice have been unknowingly followed in prior
practice. Furthermore:
[t]wo of the marks of rule-governed as opposed to merely regular behaviour are that one
generally recognises deviations from the pattern as somehow wrong or defective and that
the rule unlike the past regularity automatically covers new cases. Confronted with a case
he has never seen before, the agent knows what to do17.
With this Searle turns to the matter explicitly raised in the ascription of meaning to illocutionary acts,
and concerning the difference between merely uttering sounds and performing acts. In the latter cases S
is said to intend to mean something18. Gricean meaningNN makes a connection between meaning and
intention, but Searle suggests a caveat: the analysis does not account for the extent to which meaning is
a matter of rules and conventions". Searle writes that Grice does not elucidate the way in which what S
says comes to mean in the common, shared language in which he speaks (the points were raised at the
15Fraser (1974).
16 Searle (1969) p38. Is this within a language (languages) or within language? Holborow gives two reasons why Searle requires
an appeal to 'language'. Some illocutionary acts are of such a type as to demand constitutive rules, while others, though not
requiring convention, are complex enough to require formulation in language. Searle's paradigm illocutionary act, in a move to
which Derrida seems acutely aware, is that of promising, an act requiring, on Searle's theory, issue in a conventional act. It is
here that Searle appeals to Grice's meaning and meaningNN. de Mulder (1994) pplO-11 brings out how conventional, non-natural
meaning in Grice derives from repeated instances.
17 Searle (1969) p42.
18 And the act itself said to mean something.
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end of II.3); in defining meaning in terms of intended effects, Grice confuses illocutions and
perlocutions, and Searle rejoins: '...Grice in effect defines meaning in terms of intending to perform a
perlocutionary act, but saying something and meaning it is a matter of intending to perform an
illocutionary, not necessarily a perlocutionary, act'20. In response Searle asks: can it follow that what
the captured soldier means by his utterance is that he is a German soldier, (or better, 'I am a German
soldier'), for, Searle says, what can be meant is a function ofwhat speakers say, can say, or are saying:
'[mjeaning is more than a matter of intention, it is also at least sometimes a matter of convention', and
Searle suggests amendments to Gricean analysis21. It should make clear that meaning something in
uttering a sentence requires more than merely relating by force of will noises or marks to what they
mean in the language S speaks; that is, a full analysis of illocutionary acts requires full understanding
of both their intentional and their conventional aspects, and of the relationships between the two.
Following Grice, Searle says that acts performed according to conventions are acts with meaningNN22.
(The amendments, for Searle, make the connection he needs to the conditions of the recognition of
intention). It should be recalled that Grice's meaningNN invokes, without adequate substantiation,
conventions, for if Searle is to communicate with H, his act must draw upon mutually-understood
conventions, and for Searle this may be remedied by a condition saying that the performance of such
illocutionary acts (in 'utterances' he writes), count as obligations, owing to S's sincerity, '...to the
existence of some state of affairs'23. As the discussion of Strawson's distinction shows, there are
difficulties regarding whether an illocutionary act is successfully performed with this simple appeal to
linguistic convention, and it should be recalled that Searle repeats that this is the sense in which he
argues that languages are conventional24. (However, as Holborow says, Searle later writes that in cases
in which,'... illocutionary acts all can be performed standing outside any system of constitutive rules, it
still would not follow that performing them in a language is not engaging in a rule-governed form of
behaviour', and this implies at least some understanding of Strawson's distinction)25.
" Given in IV.
20 Searle (1969) p44. Hornsby considers the difficulties of clearly distinguishing between illocutions, locutions and perlocutions.
Her own theory resembles Alston's and Searle's. Homsby, J.; 'Illocution and its Significance', ppl87-207 in Tsohatzidis (1994)
makes illocution an act which is successfully performed when H recognises, not an intention, but an attempt to perform this very
act. There is 'reciprocity' (pi 92), and for Homsby this raises important issues of participation and inclusion (and exclusion) in
and from social groups in which one's illocutionary acts could be recognised. Reciprocity, and its denial, is, she avers, written
into language, and she cites cases of the denial of free speech and the proliferation of pornography as 'silencing' ideas. She
references Dworkin, R.; 'Two Concepts of Liberty', ppl00-109 in Margalit, A. and Margalit, E. (eds.); Isaiah Berlin: A
Celebration (London, Hogarth) 1991.
21 Searle (1969) p45.
22 Cf. an act ofpromising.
23 Searle (1969) p47.
24
This, Searle says, is how illocutionary acts are mle-govemed.
25 Holborow (1972) and Searle (1969) p47.
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Searle considers how constitutive rules apply to illocutionary acts performed in non-conventional
contexts (that is, as subject to infelicity as defined by Austin), and to non-verbal utterances; he also
contrasts conventional, 'standard' cases of collocution, and those in which the complexity of the
propositions demands that they can be expressed only in fully-fledged, rule-governed language. With
this distinction (and those above), Searle makes a vital addition to his hypothesis of language as rule-
governed; as Holborow writes:
[i]t...seems that the important contribution made by the constitutive rule is not that the
effect achieved by the performance of an illocutionary act in language is one which could
only be brought off by invoking rules, but rather that it is brought off in this way when
the illocutionary act is expressed in [rule-governed] language26.
A second point, made contra Grice, concerns the account his meaning analysis makes for
perlocutionary utterances. S's success in getting H to recognise his intention turns upon the instilling of
a perlocutionary effect (recognition of intention, understanding or what you will). The analysis is
correct, says Searle, save for the designation, which should read 'illocutionary' act, for there are many
kinds of sentences used to perform illocutionary acts which have no perlocutionary effect whatsoever.
Searle offers the examples ofgreeting, and, paradigmatically, that of promising. Gricean theory studies
only S-meaning for an analysis of how S may communicate an intention to H, and, as said, it lacks a
theory of convention. Even in cases in which there is a correlative perlocutionary effect, S might in
many instances, say something and mean it without intending the perlocution. Additionally, the reasons
H may have for believing what S says (taking him as truthful, reliable and so forth) are not, in the main,
those S supplies in communicating an intention. The end to which Grice has recourse, namely the
reflexive, or nested, intention, will not work for perlocutionary effects without a notion of pre-
established, mutual convention, and Searle finds in this justification for his argument that
communication between humans has properties not shared by other kinds of human behaviour, among
which is that if S is trying to tell H something, and H recognises this and the content of what S says, S
will have succeeded. Applied to illocutionary effects, S succeeds in getting H to recognise what he is
trying to do in the illocutionary act by making clear the intention with which it was done by drawing
upon appropriate conventions. The effect need not be described as a belief or a volitional response, but
can simply be constituted by H coming to understand the utterance, by securing uptake of the
26 Holborow (1972).
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illocutionary effect, and so the definition of the way in which the reflexive intention works may be
stated: '...S intends to produce an illocutionary effect IE in H by means of getting H to recognise S's
intention to produce IE'27.
Cohen replies to these points. He remarks the fact that one sentence may be said with types of
intended illocutionary force (as command, request, order, recommendation and so forth); however,
determining the force of the utterance in the absence of an explicit performative, one refers to the
context of utterance, to, '...what else is said both before and after the utterance...and to the situation
in which the utterance is made28. His argument is offered in rejection of Austin's distinction between
meanings and illocutions: Cohen argues that there is both a 'general' meaning of a 'sentence-type' and
an irreducible pragmatic effect in all tokens (Austin's illocutionary force), but that they share the
means of determination29. As Searle, Cohen betrays a Fregean influence in arguing that the meaning of
a simple subject-predicate sentence is given by its sense and reference. Sentences containing indexicals
and demonstratives hold no difficulties, '...[i]f we do not suppose in these cases that the context-
dependent element in the commonly accepted meaning of the utterance is not stricto sensu meaning at
all, then we should treat any utterance of "Go to London to-morrow!" analogously'30. What Austin calls
illocutionary force is an irreducible characteristic of the meaning of sentences; once again, and with
reference to 1.2, they all exhibit a context-dependency, and their meanings must be discerned in
context31. Searle adds, commenting on Grice, that successfully communicated meaning between S and
H requires only the understanding, and mutual recognition, of conventions of language appealed to in a
speech act, and that bald Gricean analysis will not account for the irreducible perlocutionary, or
pragmatic, effect the analysis of which, Searle and Cohen agree, should be the basis of a theory of
27 Searle (1969) p47.
28 Cohen (1964) pl26. With all of the Austinian conditions on utterance in place: S must be in appropriate position of authority
and so forth.
29 The difficulties that pragmatics may cause for speech act theories are studied in Dascal, M.; 'Speech Act Theory and Gricean
Pragmatics: Some Differences of Detail that Make a Difference', pp323-334. More current proposals, notably Sperber and
Wilson's, are assessed in Bird, G.H.; 'Relevance Theory and Speech Acts', pp292-311, and Kasher, A.; 'Modular Speech Act
Theory: Programme and Results', pp312-322 in Tsohatzidis (1994).
30 Searle (1979c) pp 118-119 briefly addresses indexicals ('token-reflexives'), and distinguishes them from other elements of
context outlined ('background assumptions'). The relation of context to practices governed by constitutive rules is made on pl27.
31 Cohen (1964) ppl27-128. Cohen writes that certain patterns of English sentences are commonly uttered with one specific
meaning that when they are given a different meaning this appears an addition and not an alternative. (Cohen offers 'I wish you
good afternoon': a wish but also a dismissal, the latter property bearing the sentence's illocutionary force). Cohen allows that
there are surely cases in which the two properties are present together, but that if the wish is only a dismissal '...there is no need
to suppose that it retains any of the sentence's original, common meaning'. One could not sensibly reply 'That's a lie', and thus,
Cohen asks, how can one distinguish illocutionary force from the meaning of the utterance?
Cohen considers cases in which speakers do not produce utterances that are as clear in meaning as they might intend. 'Go to
London tomorrow!' might be offered, depending on context, as a request, an order, a recommendation and so forth. (The speaker
might be called upon to clarify his intention). One might plausibly say, Cohen adds, that the force of the utterance is
distinguishable from its meaning, for the latter was understood prior to the force being elucidated, but that it might be better
practice to clarify how much of the intended meaning was understood in the utterance and how much needed elucidation. For
Cohen, the distinction between intended illocutionary act and illocutionary act performed is simply that between meaning
intended andmeaning expressed.
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meaning. The Gricean mechanism for explicating meaning cannot provide an analysis of understanding
(this perlocutionary effect), for the reason that meaning and understanding are too closely connected
for the latter to be used in any analysis of the former, and Searle examines what it is that constitutes
understanding 'a literal utterance', studying the rules governing the elements of the uttered sentence
and ofH's recognition that the sentence is subject to those rules. For S, saying something and meaning
it is closely connected with intending to produce in H certain effects; and for H, understanding S's
utterance is closely connected with recognising S's intentions. 'In the case of literal utterances...' the
gulf between S and H is bridged by the possession of a common language, described in the following
way. Understanding a sentence requires knowing its meaning, the conditions of its production and what
the utterance counts as in the common language. Uttering a sentence and meaning it is a case of
intending to get H to know that a certain state of affairs specified in the rules obtains, and to achieve
this by means of getting H to recognise S's intention to do this, and on the basis of H's knowledge of
the rules for the appropriate utterance of the sentence. Thence the uttered sentence exploits the
conventional means of achieving the intention to produce the illocutionary effect, and thus, if S utters a
sentence and means it, he has the nested intentions given in Gricean analysis, and ifH understands the
utterance this consists in the achieving of these intentions on S's part. Reciprocally, this turns on the
fact that H knows the meaning of the sentence and the rules governing its elements32. Searle endeavours
to supply the notion of convention seen to be necessary for Grice's theory. He gives his analysis formal
expression:
S utters T and means it (i.e., means literally what he says) = S utters T and,
(a) S intends (i-1) the utterance U of T to produce in H the knowledge (recognition,
awareness) that the states of affairs specified by (certain of) the rules of T obtain.
(Call this effect the illocutionary effect, IE)
(b) S intends U to produce IE by means of the recognition of i-1
(c) S intends that i-1 will be recognised in virtue of (by means of) H's knowledge of
(certain of) the rules governing (the elements of) T33.
This marks the addition to Gricean analysis of a condition regarding what S literally means in
accordance with certain conventions, and Cohen notes the effects of infelicitous cases on this analysis34.
32 Searle (1969) pp47-50. In the description of the illocutionary act of greeting, Searle uses the word 'greeting', and he notes that
the example would be circular if it were presented as an analysis ofmeaning, for greeting involves the notion of meaning. (The
Strawson-McDowell dialogue on these points is discussed in III. 1).
33 Searle (1969) pp49-50.
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There is a difference he says between successful and unsuccessful speech acts: those in which a name
is announced, a bottle broken and a ship floated, and those in which one or all of the acts fail. The bald
utterance remains meaningful in both cases, yet, in the second, the performance is 'unhappy'. Cohen
says that no more can be said of performatives than that they are happy or unhappy in this sense. One
can say that S tried to name a ship, but that the ceremony was invalid, or that he tried to name it, but
that there occurred a 'misfire' or a mistake. Cohen describes the senses that may characterise any
performative, labelling them 'happy-or-unhappy' and 'happy' respectively. The latter apply in cases in
which the sentence spoken remains coherent and meaningful. 'In the former we either leave it open
whether the attempt was successful or imply that it was not: in the latter we imply that it was'. Cohen
notes an equivocation in Austin as to how these designations apply to performatives, explicit or not.
Austin says that performatives can potentially always be unhappy (not possible in Cohen's second
sense), and yet also suggests cases (say, the naming of a ship), in which if the circumstances are
inappropriate for the making of the performative, then the act is simply not performed. This views
performatives not as happy or unhappy but as happy (in accordance with conventions of language), or
not performed at all, and allows only the application of Cohen's second sense. With the happy or
unhappy sense describing the class of performatives, the concept of illocutionary force cannot simply
be distinguished by noting its difference from misfires and infelicities, for all cases, happy or not, share
identical force, and consequently, the condition requiring that successfully performed illocutionary acts
must secure uptake is challenged. The 'happy-or-unhappy' sense renders nugatory the notion of uptake
in illocutionary acts, for it can only result in, '... illocutionary acts that are happy in the appropriate
respects', namely, according to linguistic conventions describing illocutionary force. Austin is right to
say that naming ceremonies must be valid and appropriate, but it is also the case that, say, a warning is
only effective ifH hears and understands S, S is sincere and so forth35.
In his theory of convention Searle distinguishes between 'brute' and 'institutional' facts, the former
describing what exists and is incontrovertible, and the latter the realm of values and judgements; the
34 Cohen (1964) ppl28-129. All of the references in this paragraph are from these pages.
35 Cohen (1964) ppl29-130. 'In the happy-or-unhappy sense of "warn" I can say, without contradicting myself, "I warned him by
shouting in his ear though he was too deaf to hear', but in the happy sense I can only say "I tried to warn him by shouting in his
ear though I failed because he was too deaf. For a speaker's utterance to be a warning in the happy-or-unhappy sense what is
required is that it should be ofa kind that he could reasonably expect to secure uptake. I cannot warn a man fifty yards away by
whispering. But a warning, in this sense, does not actually have to achieve uptake. Thus it is quite possible to preserve the
general principle that the meaning of an utterance does not include any of its effects even if we regard naming, warning,
concluding etc., as aspects of meaning, provided that we concern ourselves here only with the happy-or-unhappy senses of these
verbs or with the corresponding 'try', 'seek', 'attempt', 'endeavour', etc. expressions as with 'I an trying to warn you'. These are
the only usages in which these verbs may occur in an exclusively performative phrase. When used in their happy sense they must
normally be supposed instead, if in the first person present indicative active, both to perform an act of the appropriate happy-or-
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statements, say, of ethics or aesthetics36. The latter group, Searle argues, presupposes the existence of
human institutions or conventions, or, in now familiar terms, they describe, or report, systems of
constitutive rules. Every institutional fact is founded on a system of rules as described in the above
criterion for constitutive rules, namely, that 'X counts as Y in context C', and this invokes Searle's
second principle: that the fact that one performs a certain speech act means that one subscribes to an
institution or convention (a 'rule-governed form of behaviour'), for the speech act is an institutional
fact, founded on constitutive rules, and Searle writes that the application of this to language reveals the
semantic rules underlying the brute regularities of communication31. Searle's paradigm illocutionary act
is making a promise38: for a promise to successfully and non-defectively have been made in an
utterance there is entailed a condition such that there is a set of propositions of the conjunction of the
members of the set which, in turn, entail the proposition that S indeed made a successful and non-
defective promise. (The proposition that S made such a promise entails this conjunction)39. Each
condition is, on this assessment, necessary, and taken together sufficient, and while, '[tjhere are various
kinds of possible defects of illocutionary acts.. not all of these defects are sufficient to vitiate the act in
its entirety'. As seen in Cohen's discussion, in some cases a condition intrinsic to the notion of the act
is not performed in a given utterance, yet the act is itself performed; Cohen says that such cases are
'defective', or infelicitous. Some conditions are, while stated as separate, in truth, entailments from
others, and from the set of said conditions one can extract rules for the use of the illocutionary force
indicator. Cohen concludes from this that nothing more is needed for a definition of force than a
description of the speech act, '... in virtue of the meaning of what was said', and with due attention to
the context of utterance and of conversation. In this way is both an act declared happy or unhappy
unhappy variety and also to imply the occurrence of circumstances, consequential or otherwise, that render this performance a
happy one'.
36 Searle (1969) pp50ff.
37 Searle (1969) pp50-53. In this they must be distinguished both from theories of linguistic behaviour as a species of stimulus
and response, and as the discerning of correlations between utterances and states of affairs.
The class of rules Holborow (1972) discusses (those with regulative and constitutive aspects) may also fall under the 'X counts
as Y in context C' formula while yet remaining good in Searle's definition of speech acts. Such cases are creative in that the
behaviour described is afforded new significance, but not in all cases will the newly-sanctioned behaviour facilitate one's action,
and he studies Searle's paradigm case of promising. In a promise one is obligated to others regarding the performance of future
action, yet there are, for instance, cases in which one gives one's word reluctantly. Does this then show that Searle's governing
hypothesis, that speaking a language is engaging in a rule-governed practice, contains situations allowing the introduction of
cases that it should, to remain general, exclude. This raises again, the matter of the definition of'convention' being worked with.
38 Searle (1969) p55. The lessons learned in the discussion of the case are of'general application'.
Felman notes the Nietzschean contribution to study of the 'paradox' of promising in speech act theory. Felman, S.; The
literary Speech Act: Don Juan with J.L. Austin, or Seduction in Two Languages (New York, Cornell University Press) 1980.
Nietzsche speaks of the 'right' to make promises.
39 The later work of Searle on illocutionary verbs can be prefaced with a consideration of the exchange of Hare and Wamock on
speech acts and meaning. (Cf. Hare, R.M.; 'Meaning and Speech Acts', The Philosophical Review, vol. LXXIX, no. 1, pp3-24,
1970, and 'Hare on Meaning and Speech Acts', The Philosophical Review, vol. LXXX, no. 1, pp80-84, 1971). Hare, like Cohen
and Fraser, argues that an account of the meaning ofwords (those counting as illocutionary verbs), requires account of the force
they may have in utterances. He adds that the account is then applicable to accounting for the force of words such as 'good',
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(though Searle would not accept Cohen's distinction), and the questions raised that need to be settled
before a definitive verdict as to the act's status is given40. These conclusions, Searle says, should not
lead to the wholesale rejection of the project of philosophical analysis as practised by Griceans; all that
must be cautioned is that certain forms of analysis are likely to lead to the idealisation of the concept
analysed, in this case intention, or illocution41.
Searle repeatedly emphasises that his analysis of the conventions of speech is, '... directed at the
centre of the concept of [for example] promising. I am ignoring marginal, fringe, and partially
defective promises'. For Searle, such counter-examples would not refute his analysis; they would,
rather, point up the need for further clarification of the 'central' cases for application to the difficult. To
this end he ignores promises made by hints, metaphors and allusions, and deals with simple and
idealised (control) cases, for the purpose of systematisation42. (Searle considers peripheral cases in later
work, cases in which, he says, 'notoriously' cases of meaning are not as 'simple' as the central cases.
'In hints, insinuations, irony and metaphor—to mention a few examples—S's utterance meaning and
the sentence meaning come apart in various ways')43. Until then, Searle ignores promises made in
sentences containing elements strictly speaking irrelevant to the making of the promise; and declares
that the study of categorical promises can 'easily' be applied to a study of hypothetical promises. There
is, Searle believes, a non-vicious circularity in the appearance of institutional concepts such as
'obligation' in both the analysans and the analysandum of a statement of the conventions of promising;
this makes no claim on reductionism or of the idealisation of concepts, but rather, Searle says, shows
that '...certain statements of institutional facts, statements of the form, "S made a promise", [may be
analysed] into statements containing such notions as intentions, rules, and states of affairs specified by
'commendable' (not, of course, illocutionary verbs). Cf. in addition, Genova, A.C.; 'Speech Acts and Illocutionary Opacity',
Foundations of Language, vol. XIII, no. 2, pp237-249, 1975.
40 Cohen (1964) pl30. Cohen adds that Austin is rightly concerned regarding the distinction between what is said and the act of
saying it, [i]ndeed Austin himself, by speaking of locutionary acts (that have meaning) as well as of illocutionary ones (that have
force), makes it quite clear that this is not how he himself would seek to defend his theory'.
41 It should be recalled that this is precisely what Derrida finds most objectionable in the theory of speech acts given in Searle,
and (one must add, with less justification) in Austin.
42 The importance in the theory of the Background of attendant theories of literal meaning (and thus of metaphor and
indirectedness) is referenced by Cerbone (2000) p263. de Mulder (1994) p4 notes that the Background plays a significant role in
Husserl's theory of demonstratives, and is hard to bring in to line with Searle's methodological solipsism. It is Husserl's move
from the theory of meaning as species to the theory of the lebenswelt that affirms the link with Searle (lebenswelt being, de
Mulder says, in many ways similar to the Background). However, one must recall that the lebenswelt is an intersubjectivist
theory ofmind. Cf. Fodor (1982).
43 Alston develops a theory of sentence meaning as the 'potential' for it to be used for the performing of specific illocutionary
acts. Alston, W.P.; 'Illocutionary Acts and Linguistic Meaning', pp29-49 in Tsohatzidis (1994). He refers to 'Meaning and Use',
The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. XIII, no. 51, ppl07-124, 1963, and Philosophy ofLanguage (New Jersey, Prentice-Hall) 1964.
Alston studies the relation between speaker and utterance for an illocutionary act to successfully be performed; he develops a
theory of 'responsibility' or 'liability' of a speaker in accurately reporting a 'normative' state of affairs. That the speaker made
an illocutionary act means he is open to questioning and criticism about his act in context. An illocutionary act, as in Searle, is
constituted not by the intention with which it is performed but by conventional relations existing between speaker and audience.
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the rules. Sometimes these states of affairs will themselves involve institutional facts'44. It is argued in
this section and following that Searle cannot claim for his theory of convention this non-vicious
circularity; the conditions that he uses to write conventions for meaning and illocutions derive from
careless assumptions derived from analysis of an ersatz language, and that cannot be applied to natural
languages.
With this Searle states the following conditions for a promise to have been made45. There must be in
operation 'normal' input and output conditions, no cases of deafness or aphasia, and categorically no,
'...parasitic forms of communication, such as telling jokes or acting in a play'. Secondly, S must
express the proposition that p in the utterance of T. In this way can the proposition be 'isolated' from
the rest of the speech act, and focus be made on the peculiarities of promising as an illocutionary act.
Thirdly, in expressing that p, S predicates a future act of his; it is a promise to do something. It is, as
Richards writes, an utterance giving an obligation to do something, and in promising, this is, as Searle
says, the only (b) rule applicable46. (These two conditions are the 'prepositional content' conditions).
Fourthly, H would prefer S's doing action A to his not doing A, and S must believe that H would prefer
that he does A than not. S's promise is defective if that promised is something H does not want, and if
S does not believe that H wants it done. (A (b) rule is applicable if two (a) rules are satisfied, and this
is, says Richards, the first, that is (al))47. By Searle's analysis a non-defective promise is, at least in
part, one intended as a promise: a promise can be defective because it was not so intended. The fifth
condition says that it must not be obvious to both S and H that S would do A 'in the general course of
events'; acts must 'have a point', and when they do not, they are again defective. This defines the
second (a) rule Richards identifies in Searle, namely (a2). Richards assesses the analysis so far: it is a
tenet of Searle's theory that no speech acts are specified entirely by (b) rules; there are regulative,
conventional, contextual (a) rules as part of each and every speech act. (B) rules require the application
of conventional conditions (more than one (a) rule), before they can be satisfied48. Knowledge and
44 Searle (1969) pp55-56. Seaxle's analysis considers the case of 'sincere' promises, and the conditions are modified for
'insincere' promises. Such idealised cases are in analogy to those constructed for control purposes in economic theory or the
natural sciences, and in Derrida (1977a), the possibility of drawing such an analogy is itself questioned. Searle gives his revised




47 Richards (1971) p524. One is at this point close to the Gricean analysis. Already the relation to the Derridean analysis is clear,
but the example Searle gives should be followed out.
48 Richards (1971) p523 uses due caution here. That there must be rules satisfied before a (b) rule can be said to have been
utilised in an utterance does not justify the conclusion that they are (a) rules. There are no alternatives offered; '... unless we are
willing to accept a certain incompleteness in the analysis of the constitutive rules for speech acts, we must agree at least that the
rales whose satisfaction is presupposed for the application of the b-rules must themselves not be b-rules'. Richards lets this pass,
for his objections to Searle's theory go much deeper.
199
understanding of the appropriate rules guide the performance of illocutionary acts; as 'preparatory'
conditions, they are the 'sine quibus non of happy promising'.
The sixth condition says that S must intend to do A, and that this marks the distinction between
sincere and insincere promises, giving again a link to the actual knowledge and understanding of rules
and conventions. A related condition is that S must intend that the utterance of T will put him under the
obligation to do A, and this distinguishes the illocutionary act of promising from those in which an
obligation is not entailed. (Presumably Searle would say that the condition can simply be removed in
analysis of these other speech acts). The seventh and final condition states that S intends (i-1) to
produce in H the knowledge (K) that the utterance of T is to count as placing him under an obligation
to do A. S intends to produce K by means of the recognition of i-1, and he intends i-1 to be recognised
in virtue ofH's knowledge of the meaning of T. (This allows the intention stated in the sixth condition
to be achieved in the making of the utterance). The semantical rules of the language spoken by S and H
are such that T is correctly and sincerely (non-defectively), uttered iff the preceding conditions obtain49.
Although Richards grants, with demur, that Searle shows the need for (a) and (b) rules for the
specification of speech acts, he does not accept that they are together able to determine their semantical
features, asking again, what makes the device, 'I promise...', mean that S promises50? Why, for
example, should one accept that rules (al) and (a2) are basic to the promising function in language?
Richards studies Searle's account to hold him to every word: given that the rules determining every
speech act must include at least one (a) rule, then, by Searle's second principle, the semantic
constitution of every speech act device includes at least one (a) rule (as defined by Searle's fourth and
fifth conditions), and thus (a) rules are fundamental to the meaning of speech act devices. Richards
challenges this argument, saying that for most speech acts, rules of type (a) required for their
specification cannot be among the semantic features used in their performance. Illocutionary acts,
particularly those reported in explicit performatives, have meaning which fulfils, exhausts or 'saturates'
the force of the utterance, yet, like Strawson, Richards wishes to analyse the conventions
accompanying illocutionary acts51. He writes:
49 Searle (1969) pp60-61. That is, the utterance is a promise according to the semantical rules of language in which the promise is
made.
50 Richards (1971) p523. 'In fact, intuitively speaking, we might reasonably feel quite disinclined to include rules (al) and (al) as
part of the meaning of the device while nonetheless favourably disposed to include (bl); but, of course, this proves nothing
except perhaps about our intuition. However, it is just such an intuition that Searle's hypothesis is supposed to over-rule'.
51 Searle allows only that performatives are Austin's explicit performatives. Searle, J.R.; 'How Performatives Work', Linguistics
and Philosophy, vol. XII, no. 5, pp535-558, 1989, p536. One might perform an illocutionary act by one ofmany means, but only
very few utterances are performatives. Searle's distinctions are again in place, namely, a, '... performative sentence is a sentence
whose literal utterance in appropriate circumstances constitutes the performance of an illocutionary act named by an expression
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(1) To utter an illocutionary-act device under certain conditions is to perform a particular
illocutionary act; (2) The particular illocutionary act performed is determined by the
semantical rules of the device; (3) The particular conditions under which that
illocutionary act can be performed are equally determined by the semantical rules of the
device; (4) The device can be used to perform no illocutionary act for which the
semantical rules of the device do not provide an appropriate determination under both (2)
and (3)52.
Furthermore, it follows from the principle of expressibility that all sentences are categorised in one or
other of two classes: '(A) those whose semantical rules fully determine and thereby exhaust the force
of their utterance', and (B) those that do not53. Richards studies the subset of (A) containing sentences
with one illocutionary act device, its force determined by the rules of the language, adding that thus the
same rules apply to the subset (the naked illocution) as to the sentences themselves, and so any
distinction between speech act device and embedding sentence is muddied54. (Richards quips that he
can find few sentences which unequivocally contain only one illocutionary act device, allowing
Austin's 'Out' in cricket, and for the sake of his argument, 'I promise...', 'I apologise...', 'I assert...'
and so forth)55.
in that very sentence in virtue of the occurrence of that expression' (p537). In response to Searle, Bach and Harnish (1989) p99
say that, '...though conventions involve precedent, precedents do not always involve conventions'. Ginet, C.; 'Performativity',
Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. Ill, no. 2, pp245-265, 1979. Ginet considers the distinction between the explicit performative ('I
hereby...') and the class of verb phrases which can act as performatives. Having done this he considers that between verb phrases
uttered with intended meaning (meaningum) and those that cannot be given explicit form: why, he asks, can the former be
performatives and the latter not? Ginet's answer appeals to convention: a verb phrase is performative 'in certain circumstances'
(p246) if a description of the act (promising, etc.) makes it possible in the circumstances to promise by saying 'I hereby
promise...'. Ginet is more radical still: the 'brute convention', saying that an explicit performative is one way to perform an
illocutionary act is 'useless', for performatives can operate in the latter sense Ginet presents.
In novel utterances, in which the utterance has never been made, saying 'I hereby promise...', will be taken as a promise if
one's audience knows the meaning of 'promise'; if one utters a performative that cannot be given an explicit form, then no
stipulation of a convention of an explicit performative of a circumstance to promise is workable. In this Ginet sees himself as
clarifying a notion in Austin, and again, the interpretation stemming from Strawson's work on Austin is brought up. Austin says
of perfoimatives that are not descriptions of one's acts but their instantiations, and Ginet agrees that uttering a performative
utterance in appropriate circumstances and with the correct intentions is to promise and so forth. He disagrees with the view that
one, in the performative, states that one performs the act. Ginet's essay is complex and fascinating, and may undercut the
conditions of Derrida on the obtaining of the conventions in the explicit performative formulations. It requires for greater
treatment than is here given.
52 Richards (1971) p524. He adds that Searle takes it that all sentences contain an illocutionary act device, or illocutionary force
potential.
3 Richards (1971) p525. There may appear in (A) sentences that contain more than one illocutionary act device, and thus which
havemultiple, simultaneously occuring, forces (potentially unrelated).
54 And, additionally, Richards (1971) p525, that conditions (l)-(4) specify essential characteristics of all sentences in (Al). This
is both convienient for the argument and "... it may well happen that at least for some cases the linguist will be able to isolate the
device into some part of the sentence. Whether or not this is actually possible, however, is really irrelevant to the point we shall
argue. What is relevant is that whatever we argue regarding the subset (Al) applies equally over the whole class (A). In effect,
whatever holds for sentences containing one illocutionary act device, we shall argue, holds as well for sentences containing more
than one illocutionary act device'.
55
Identifying members of (B) is equally difficult (Richards (1971) pp525-526). Some (unnamed) argue that all sentences belong
to (A), that is, that there are no sentences the force of whose utterance is not fully determined by its semantical rules. 'Of course,
to argue thus is virtually to argue that the force of uttering a particular sentence is never distinguishable from its meaning', an
argument Searle challenges with no counter-arguments.
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Searle adds to his first condition on promising that it is broad enough to allow that, with the other
conditions, it guarantees that H understands the utterance; that is, the illocutionary effect produced in H
by means of the recognition of S' s intention turns upon H's knowledge of the meaning of T. For fear of
misunderstanding he adds that the condition does not alone turn on the fact that H understands the
utterance (again, a purely perlocutionary effect). Cohen broaches some difficulties in this, and
concerning the obligation to sincerity undertaken in the speech acts Searle describes56. If one takes the
case of a warning, given say in the utterance, 'Beware the Ides of March', it is, Cohen says, surely
wrong to think that there is, as part of the meaning of the utterance, and carrying all of the force, a
further (unspoken) utterance, perhaps, '[i]n warning you I commit myself to your cause' (by speaking
truthfully and with your interests at heart), or some such. The difficulty is intuitive: this parsing of the
first sentence uses, or explicates, the force of the (unspoken) utterance, and the complexity of the
parsings will only grow, and potentially to absurd lengths, when applied to utterances with more
complex intentions. Furthermore, the forces applicable to these utterances cannot, Cohen shows, be
made vocal in an explicit performative. S might say, 'I warn you to beware the Ides of March', by
prefixing the performative to the bald utterance, but he can only take on a responsibility, commit
himself, by prefixing 'I commit myself to a sentence different from the bald utterance. In Austin's
theory such 'higher-order' forces utilise other, unuttered, or inexplicit speech acts, even those, '...that
require a different mood of the verb...and in complex and oblique cases speech acts reporting higher-
order forces can come to subsume or contain forces of lower order. Cohen takes from this that an
analysis of the effects of speech acts requires not a theory of conventional illocutionary force given by
reflection on the role of the explicit performative, but by reflection on the types of effects created in a
perlocutionary utterance. Indeed, none of the acts defined by Austin as illocutionary acts fulfil his
criteria for illocutionary force. They are rather, as Cohen says,
.. the implications of speech acts, where a speech act is said to imply that p if and only if
the speech act gives its audience sufficient reason to take it that p but it is not part of the
utterance's meaning that p.
Cohen adds that the implications of senses by speech acts are categorically not illocutionary forces, and
that although Austin and his followers correctly believe illocutionary force to be a part of an
56
Cohen (1964) pl31. The difficulties affect Searle's analysis in a more fundamental way, over and above that raised for the
specifics of the analysis by Richards' arguments.
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utterance's meaning, they miss the fact it concerns only an utterance's implication57. (Cohen's example
gives S asking a question in saying, 'I would like to know the time': the question, implicit though it is,
is implied, and still the utterance accurately describes what S wants to know. The point indicates the
role in any account of S meaning of implicature and implication)58.
Searle modifies his analysis to account for such oblique cases and for insincere promises (although in
truth he explains them away). In such cases S does not have the intentions a sincere promiser has, but
feigns having them: in short, S has no intention to perform the act promised. The new (amended
Gricean), analysis runs: the conditions must state that S takes responsibility for having the intention,
and not just that he claims to have it. The acceptance of such responsibility is seen in the fact that a
sincere S may not say 'without absurdity', that he promises to do A, but does not intend to. A promise
is a bond of responsibility for one's actions, captured in the sixth condition (above), and stating that, by
the utterance of T, S is made responsible for intending to do A. By discerning whether or not S has the
intention, the condition analyses the giving of promises, sincere or insincere. Essential for deciding
whether S is sincere or not is a set of rules for '...the use of the indicator of illocutionary force' (Pr),
and in stating this, Searle again countenances that there may be necessary alterations of the rules for
application to cases of illocutions other than promising. (These matters will be outlined when the
conditions have been introduced). Pr is to be uttered in contexts of sentences the utterances of which
predicates of S the fiiture act A. Firstly, Pr is to be uttered only ifH would prefer S's doing A to his not
doing A. Secondly, Pr is to be uttered only if it is not obvious to both S and H that S will do A (in the
normal course of events). Thirdly, Pr is uttered only in cases in which S intends to do A, and finally,
the utterance ofPr counts as the undertaking of an obligation to do A59. Searle now, he believes, has the
tools for a taxonomy of illocutionary acts, and he formulates some general hypotheses. Firstly,
whenever a psychological state is specified in the sincerity condition, the performance of the act is an
expression of the psychological state, regardless of whether the expression is sincere or insincere.
Secondly, only in cases in which the act can be read as the expression of a psychological state can
insincerity be possible60. One cannot, he writes, greet or christen insincerely. Thirdly, preparatory
57 Cohen (1964) pl33. Cohen calls implication the 'consequential element'. This might intimate to one the connections between
Searle (an avowed Fregean), and Cohen.
58 On weaknesses of Gricean conventional implicature, see Searle (1989) pp551 -553.
59 Searle asks where in a language these rules apply, given that a Chomskyan account of syntax and semantics is accepted. The
answer turns on the reduction of illocutionary acts to a taxonomy of basic types, which if possible strongly would suggest that
deep structure represents illocutionary type. (Searle (1969) p64). An excellent review of the main parties to the debate entailed by
the question is Katz, J.J.; 'Interpretative Semantics vs Generative Semantics', Foundations of Language, vol. VI, no. 2, pp220-
259,1970. On generative rules of syntax (and another case ofparasitism), cf. Miller (1975).
60 This might be applied to the accusations of presupposition in the Derrida/Searle exchange.
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conditions tell one, in part, what S implies in the performance of the illocutionary act, characteristically
that the preparatory conditions for the relevant act are satisfied, and Searle uses this condition for an
analysis of the notion of sayings in terms of their 'essential' rules. (He adds that one might be tempted
to argue that S should say, when wanting successfully to communicate, whatever is correctly specified
by the relevant essential condition; however, this is an incomplete analysis, for there is an as yet
unexplored connection between the illocutionary act performed in saying and Austin's constative class.
Analysis of saying accounts for statements but not for constatements)6'.
Searle's fourth hypothesis notes the possibility of performing an illocutionary act without invoking
any illocutionary force indicating device whatsoever: a saying in which the context and the utterance
show that the essential condition is satisfied. Searle offers as an example a case in which an utterance
taken by H as a promise is uttered in a context in which it is obvious that S accepts the associated
obligation. A similar case can be made for requests (that is, in which S plainly makes a request), for
instance, 'Could you do this for me?' Fifthly, the condition obtains that whenever the illocutionary
force of an utterance is not explicit it can be made so; this condition accompanies an addition saying
that whatever can be implied can be said, and furthermore, said with the intention of implying things
other than are explicitly said. In a related point, Searle adds that certain kinds of illocutionary acts are
special cases of other kinds of illocutionary acts, and Searle asks whether there exists a basic type,
'...to which all or most of the others are reducible...'. In the statement of the relevant conditions for
the performance of an illocutionary act, the essential condition, in general, determines the others; the
latter are its functions. If the relevant latter conditions reoccur in consistent ways in other illocutionary
acts, then the acts ought to be thought reducible to control types (and in this Searle refers to the lessons
of the preparatory condition stating non-obviousness). Searle believes that all sentences contain at least
one illocutionary act device, and Richards asks how this applies to (B) sentences, those, that is, in
which illocutionary force is not fully exhausted, or determined, by semantical rules. Richards writes,
...if every class-B sentence contains an illocutionary act device, i.e. at least one
illocutionary act device [by Searle's criterion it does], then clearly by definition the
semantical rules of every such sentence fully determine the illocutionary act(s) which can
be performed in uttering the contained device [because it can successfully be used, by
61
Perhaps, say, greetings. Searle (1969) p68. Austin's insight into the class of performatives is that utterances are not to be seen
as sayings but as doings as another kind. Searle writes that, this notwithstanding, there is a connection between saying and
constatives, for example, 'I (hereby) promise', a case in which one promises, and says that one does; this shall be seen to have
importance for Searle's class of declaratives (see III.5).
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Searle's argument, to perform that illocutionary act]. In effect, every class-B sentence is
such that for any occasion of its utterance (which is appropriate) it can be used not only
to perform the illocutionary act(s) determined by the semantical rules of its contained
device(s) but also to perform illocutionary act(s) for which it has no device(s) [because
illocutionary force is not fully exhausted by the rules governing the sentence].
Consequently, every class-B sentence can be used to perform multiple illocutionary acts
simultaneously; this is a necessary feature of every sentence in the class, given the
definition of illocutionary act device above®.
Richards also notes other of Searle's ambitions, those attendant on his search for a basic type of speech
act, one excluding, as parasites, non-standard illocutions. As Richards says, Searle envisages a
'hierarchy' of illocutionary acts, in which the 'semantically non-determined illocutionary act(s)
performed on a particular utterance occasion is some more specific type of the semantically determined
illocutionary act(s)', and this, as intimated in the above quotation, is at the core of Searle's theory of
convention, to which Richards turns63.
The forces of (B) sentences are determined by two factors, their semantical meaning and their context
of utterance. Richards asks a simple question: how does context determine illocutionary acts64? An
answer, and the correct description of illocutionary force, demand the statement of several different
principles of distinction: namely, the point or purpose of the act; the relative positions of S and H; the
degree of commitment made to the act undertaken; a statement of the illocutionary act's difference
from propositional content; a statement of the difference in the ways in which the proposition relates to
the interests of S and H, of the different expressible psychological states, and of the different ways in
which the utterance relates to the rest of the conversation. (With this, Richards adds, Searle identifies
several criteria of illocutionary force, yet without sufficiently clarifying their mutual distinctions). Each
of these principles, Richards argues, implies that the same utterance may perform an act with a variety
of intentions, or, that one utterance may be the performance of several different illocutionary acts (that
is, there may be several different non-synonymous illocutionary verbs that may characterise the
utterance). Holborow reckons the difficulties with this and with Searle's analysis and taxonomy of
illocutionary acts, connected particularly with the elucidation of constitutive rules. He notes that Searle
62 Richards (1971) p526.
63 Richards (1971) p526. On the distinction between standard and occasion meaning see Bach, K.; 'Semantic Slack: What is Said
andMore', pp267-291 in Tsohatzidis (1994).
64 Richards (1971) pp526-527: if context determines illocutionary force, then can one perform an act by saying nothing?
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gives his analysis of 'standard' cases of promising, leaving other (insincere) cases to follow by
'analogy', yet wonders mischievously why a special case is made of sincere promises when insincere
promises are still promises, made in coherent and mutually-understood speech acts65. He invokes
Strawson's distinction in questioning why Searle gives as a rule for the expression of a promise that S
intends to do as he has said: this is not a matter of 'linguistic propriety', but a moral imperative,
parsable only in Searle's terms if one takes the rule to read that S does not promise unless he, if
required, expressed the intention to do all he could to fulfil his vow66. (Schiffer adds this to his analysis
of Grice's conditions). Holborow adds that this muddies the analogy with games. Distinguishing
throwing a game (on the terms given above) from cheating, Holborow writes of the rules of a game that
they proscribe cheating, and of the rules of illocutionary acts (the linguistic rules), that they do 'not
[themselves] require sincerity'. The distinction Holborow makes, as it is stated, is unworkable, for the
mles of a game do not explicitly proscribe cheating, but his point is clear67. Searle's statement of
sincerity conditions is a mistaken attempt to insert conditions on the 'point and functioning' of the
practice in to the '...meaning rules of the words which can both denote, and be utilised in, a particular
reference under the auspices of the practice'.
With consequences for an assessment ofGricean analysis, Searle writes that some illocutionary verbs
may be defined in terms of the intended perlocutionary effect made in their utterance, and others not
so68. If one could make rigorous such an analysis, then the prospects for deriving a theory of illocutions
making no reference to extra-linguistic rules and conventions are 'increased', and language may be
regarded as a conventional means for securing natural responses or effects. The illocutionary act would
itself involve no invocation of rules whatsoever, and '[o]ne could in theory perform the act in or out of
a language, and to do it in a language would be to do with a conventional device what could be done
without any conventional devices [that is by gestures, semaphore, signal flares and so forth]'. On this
illocutionary acts would be 'optionally' conventional, but never normative. Richards writes that
achieving this outwith language requires a definite determining relation between the meaning of the
sentence, the context of its utterance, and the semantically non-determined illocutionary act performed,
and he suggests an analysis69:
65 Holborow (1972). It is worth emphasising in relation to Searle (1971b) p51 that defective, insincere promises are accounted for
by adding a responsibility condition to the analysis of sincere promising.
"The very same argument should be applied to Searle's statement of'sincerity conditions'. Cf. Holborow (1972) p466.
67 One should perhaps say that they give positive rules: they are not stated as things one does not do. Cf. Holborow (1972)
pp466-467.
68 Cf. Cohen (1964) pl29.
69 Richards (1971) pp527-528.
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Premises: (I) There is a class-B sentence a such that an illocutionary act A performed in
its utterance under conditions c is not determined by its meaning; (II) There is at least
one other sentence x such that its utterance on some occasion under conditions c is a
performance ofA; (III) The meaning of x does not determine A; (IV) a does not entail x
nor is entailed by it;
Argument: (V) The conditions for the appropriate utterance of the illocutionary act
device(s) in o are semantically determined and thus cannot determine A; (VI) Since A
cannot be determined by the meaning of a and thus by all the conditions c, it must be
determined by some subset of these conditions, c'; (VII) IfA is determined by c', then it
is performed solely in virtue of the fact that these conditions obtain; (VIII) c' have no
relation to a that they do not have to x; (IX) It is not a condition of c' that either o or x is
used to perform A; (X) If there were such a condition, then by hypothesis, c' would be at
least partly constitutive of the meaning ofa or x or both;
Conclusions: (XI) Therefore, there is no relation members of c' have to a or x which they
do not have to any sentence; (XII) Given that the conditions c' obtain, A can be
performed by uttering any sentence whatsoever.
Richards writes that one should not be inclined to accept an argument saying that, for every
illocutionary act, there are conditions in which the utterance of any sentence counts as a performance of
the act, and thus that Searle's argument for the necessity of the reduction of the illocutionary to the
perlocutionary is unconvincing, and that what must be attended to is the way in which the semantically
non-determined elements of acts can come to be determined™. It is argued in the following chapter this
requires a notion of social or institutional convention.
In closing his discussion of illocutionary acts, Searle repeats that illocutionary verbs differ as classes,
some classifiable in terms of the corresponding act's intended perlocution and some not71. (This, for
instance, marks a distinction between promising and requesting). The difficulties found in the reduction
of the illocutionary to the perlocutionary lead commentators (Richards, Holborow and Fraser), to
abandon altogether the idea of illocution as governed by linguistic convention, and Holborow writes
that this is strongly to suggest that the 'effect' of rule-governed illocutionary acts is irrelevant to
70 Searle (1969) p71. Searle claims that it is '...at this point that what might be called institutional theories of communication,
like Austin's, mine, and I thinkWittgenstein's, part company with what might be called naturalistic theories of meaning, such as,
e.g. those which rely on a stimulus-response account ofmeaning'.
71 Cf. Holborow (1972).
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whether they are guided by constitutive rules (for one may achieve the effect with a different act). He
adds that Searle would be on safer ground with the hypothesis that speaking a language can be rule-
governed even if all illocutionary acts could be performed without use of any linguistic rules (because
there are rules invoked in speech situations, governing conventions of rhetoric, euphony, intention,
emphasis and so forth), adding that in this there is the kernel of a Gricean reply to stimulus-response
theories of meaning72. In later work Searle examines how conventions apply to speech situations, and
considers the indirect and parasitical cases. He investigates 'insinuations', described as, '...the problem
of how it is possible for S to say one thing and mean that but also to mean something else'73. In such
cases illocutionary force indicators for the performance of one kind of illocutionary act perform 'in
addition' another kind of illocutionary act, or, in another instance, S, by his utterance, may mean what
he says yet mean another illocution with a different propositional content: ('Can you reach the salt?').
There is here the intention, on S's part, to impart the knowledge that he makes a request, by means of
getting H to recognise his intention, yet meaning cannot simply be read off, as per Gricean analysis. It
is to this later work on indirect cases that attention is now turned.
72
Apropos the discussion in II, Chomsky's response to Grice, and plausibly to Quine and B.F. Skinner, might be challenged on
the basis that he has overstated the manner in which Grice needs appeal to 'rules' and 'literal meaning'.
73 Searle (1979b) p31.
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4. Ulocutionarv Point and IHocutionarv Force
Searle admits that his early presentation is 'incomplete', and the improved analysis, accounting for the
felicitous performance of acts in indirect cases (strengthening the specification of the 'essential
condition' by means of, '...asserting or questioning one of the other conditions'), is made with a
variant ofGrice's cooperative principle1. Searle states a new hypothesis, that in indirect speech acts,
... S communicates to H more than he actually says by way of relying on their mutually
shared background information, both linguistic and nonlinguistic, together with the
general powers of rationality and inference on the part ofH2.
He stresses that there need be no addition of conversational postulates to his theory of illocutions, but
adds, '[w]e will see, however, that in some cases, convention plays a most peculiar role'3. In IV it is
argued that Lewis supplies the mutual knowledge condition on convention that Searle requires4.
The illocutionary acts discerned in an indirect case are dubbed primary and secondary; S performs a
secondary illocutionary act in virtue ofuttering a sentence with a literal meaning, '... such that its literal
utterance constitutes a performance of that illocutionary act', but for which the sentence uttered has a
direct, literal meaning such that S achieves his desired effect. Searle asks: how does H distinguish the
two5? The question goes deeper:
How is it possible for S to mean the primary illocution when he only utters a sentence
that means the secondary illocution, since to mean the primary illocution is (in large part)
to intend to produce in H the relevant understanding6?
Searle's method is again stated: he will study cases of'singular definite reference... to get clear about
other kinds of reference', and he gives some examples. The most obvious case of definite reference is
found with proper names, though they are, evidently, not all referential. Definite descriptions raise
further problems, for some can be read as referring expressions, some not, and others are indefinite
cases. (Searle refers to Quine's example of indefinite reference, contrasting, 'I did it for his sake', with
'I did it for his brother'. The former identifies no object or entity, the latter does. (A generative syntax
might say that 'sake' is here not a noun)). It is also the case that not all referential occurrences of
' Or another deep syntactic structure Searle (1979b) p31. See also Grice (1989a) pp26 and 28-31.
2 Searle (1979b) pp31-32.
3 Searle (1979b) p32. Cf. Searle (1983) plO.
4 The response ofLewis to Searle is even more telling with relation to (1971b) p46.
5 Searle (1979b) pp33-34.
6 Searle (1979b) p34. Searle's analysis gives conditions of cooperation, conversation, politeness, relevance and of preparatory
status to perform the act. These conditions suffice to explain the cases of indirect illocutions. Holborow (1972) is confased by the
comparison, in the passage quoted above, of institutional and naturalistic and of its ability to carry the distinction of institutional
and constitutive.
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singular referring expressions are categorical; some are hypothetical, and similar cases are derivable for
proper names7. Searle's analysis of definite reference proceeds along the lines of that offered for
illocutionary acts8. He states two axioms of referring and referring expressions, firstly, that whatever is
referred to must exist, and that if a predicate is true of an object it is true of anything identical with that
object; that is, in cases in which it is described with different intensions. Richards adds a third, a variant
of the principle of expressibility9. He chooses a sentence (Sb) from the subset (B,) to which belong
sentences containing one and only one illocutionary act device, and able to be used to perform one
semantically non-determined illocutionary act on any occasion of its utterance. He replies that in an
appropriate context what is meant by an utterance of Sb, according to Searle's principle of
expressibility, is either specified by a sentence belonging to (A), or, when there is no such sentence, by
a sentence written for the occasion, and so for inclusion in (A). Searle's two axioms of referring can be
regarded as tautologies, and both give rise to paradoxes. Russell removed some of the paradoxes in
denying reference to definite descriptions10, and more arise with reference to fictional characters or
events in fictional worlds, and Searle reiterates that these are, for him, parasitical forms11. Searle's own
7 Searle (1969) pp73ff. Searle says that not every occurrence of a referring expression is a referring occurrence, and that on some
occasions, expressions are talked about in discourse whether they refer or not. This matter causes the problems of use and
mention, illustrated in the examples, 'Socrates was a philosopher; and '"Socrates" has eight letters'. In a note that Searle here,
and elsewhere, ascribes to Tarski, the condition of the latter is thought not to be an occurrence of the word 'Socrates', but the
'proper name of the word', a word with radically different conditions. The new word is formed by placing quotation marks
around what would be the expression of if it were a use of the expression. Therefore, the word beginning the second sentence is
not 'Socrates' but "Socrates", and the word written is '"Socrates'". A regress begins. Searle rejects this analysis, and argues that
it is based on a misconception of how proper names, quotation marks, and other elements of language work. It has caused a
consequent infection of semantic philosophy, leading some to say that clauses beginning with 'that' are proper names of
propositions, '...on analogy with the orthodox account of use and mention', the latter which Searle rejects. The 'institution' (and
mark the use of this word following fiom Searle's earlier arguments), of proper names was established, for Searle, partly because
'...we need a convenient device for making identifying references to commonly referred to objects when the objects are not
always themselves present'. (There is no need to carry out this procedure when the object to be talked about is a stretch of
discourse, and therefore,'... is easily producible and does not require a separate linguistic device to refer to it'. Exceptional cases
are those of obscenities of sacred words, in which a speaker may simply give a token, without naming or referring to it). The
conventions of written discourse, and in particular in this case, those governing the use of quotation marks, are there to mark the
fact that the word indicated is the topic of discussion, or, to talk about things which are not themselves words, and which need
not be present on the occasions on which reference to them is made. 'The whole institution gets its point from the fact that we use
words to refer to other objects', and requires also that there be a difference between the name and the thing named. Searle offers
an example of referring to a word: 'The word which is the name ofPlato's most famous teacher has eight letters', giving the use
of a definite description. There are cases in which a proper name can be given to a word; in the example 'John' is replaced by
'Socrates', and the earlier sentence rewritten as 'John has eight letters'. However, it is the case that when one wants to talk about
a word it is, in most cases, possible to produce the word itself; the competing theories Searle dismisses as redundant or false.
Characterising the utterance of the first word in '"Socrates" has eight letters', one can say that the word is uttered, but not with its
'normal' use. The word is presented and talked about,"... and that it is to be taken as presented and talked about rather than used
conventionally to refer is indicated by the quotes'. The word is not referred to, and neither does it refer to itself.
8 Searle (1969) pp77-78 is explicit about the influence of Frege and Strawson. de Mulder (1994) p3 studies the way in which
linguistic meaning is '...combined with the meaning of the perceptual act that gives the object designated by the demonstrative'.
Searle is, for de Mulder, making a workable response to Kaplan and Perry, and making it on Fregean lines: meaning has a set of
conditions determining how the world must be for the speech act to successfully have been uttered (pl6). On pp3-4 de Mulder
argues that Husserl's and Searle's theories of intentionality suggest that the meaning of demonstratives is always dependent upon
other features of a theory ofmind ('other cognitive structures').
'Richards (1971) p529.
10 One might recall again the Kantian influence on Russell in his denial of existence as a property, and the remnants of the
Kantian influence (over the Hegelian), which characterised his early work.
11 Searle (1969) pp78-79 argues that one can refer to fictional characters because they exist in fiction: in contexts, institutions and
conventions identical in all relevant ways to those of the real world. A speaker fails to refer to Sherlock Plolmes in the real world
because there is no such person; in fiction one can refer to Holmes as a fictional character, in a world in which '... what I say... is
true'. Searle could not be more explicit; '...in real world talk one can refer only to what exists; in fictional talk one can refer to
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third axiom says that if S refers to an object, then he is able to identify that object for H apart from all
other objects. This is also a tautology, '... since it only serves to articulate my exposition of the notion
of (singular, definite) reference'. Richards says that, by the argument given, for a sentence of (Bi)
(described above) the semantically non-determined illocutionary act performed in uttering the sentence
on an appropriate occasion must be of the type of semantically determined acts, and concludes that the
relevant sentence from (A) will belong to a subset (Ai)12. Thus, Richards allows a sentence (Sa),
belonging to (Ai), the illocutionary rules ofwhich determine the two illocutionary acts, determined and
non-determined, performed in uttering (Sb) in appropriate conditions c. Richards studies . Searle's
terminology: the meaning of (Sa) exhausts the illocutionary force of (Sb) under conditions c, and the
notion may explicitly be formulated:
A necessary condition for the successful performance of a definite reference in the
utterance of an expression is that either the utterance of that expression must
communicate ['appeal to', 'invoke'] to H a description true of, or a fact about, one and
only one object, or if the utterance does not communicate such a fact S must be able to
substitute an expression, the utterance ofwhich does'3.
Searle lists three ways in which S can guarantee that this fact 'be communicated': firstly, that the
expression uttered must contain predicates true of only one object; secondly, that the utterance together
with its context gives an ostensive or indexical presentation of only one object; and thirdly, that the
utterance gives a mixture of indexical indicators and descriptive terms sufficient to identify one object.
If the expression uttered does not contain one of these referring terms, communication will only be
successful in conditions that S offers one of these referring expressions when requested: this Searle
sees as a generalisation ofFrege's theory that all referring expressions have sense14.
what exists in fiction (plus such real things and events as the fictional story incorporates)'. Such fictional conventions do not
change the meanings ofwords or other elements; parasitical discourse cannot have this effect..
12 Richards adds that if one grant the existence of a hierarchy of illocutionary acts and accept that language '... tends in the
direction of efficiency', one cannot plausibly object to a conclusion that only one illocutionary act device is necessary for the job.
Richards (1971) p529.
13 The question ofwhether the successful performance of a speech act involves reference to the capacities of H for recognition or
only an assessment of the constitution of the speaker's internal states receives attention in Davis, S.; 'Anti-Individualism and
Speech Act Theory', pp208-219, and Tsohatzidis, S.L.; 'The Gap between Speech Acts and Mental States', pp220-233 in
Tsohatzidis (1994).
14 Cf. Searle (1983) ppl97ff. Searle adds that his approach is '...a matter of revising and extending Frege's conception of "Sinn"
to intentionality in general, including perception and other forms of self-reference...'. He goes on to consider the
'intentionalistic', 'internalist' picture: that mental states with intentional content allow linguistic reference. For a full study see
Bar-Elli, G.; The Sense ofReference: Intentionality in Frege (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter) 1996. On the relevance of speech act
theory to classical (Fregean) semantic theory, see Price, H.; 'Semantic Minimalism and the Frege Point', ppl32-155, Recanati,
F.; 'Contextualism and Anti-Contextualism in the Philosophy of Language', ppl56-166 and Travis, C.; 'On Being Truth-
Valued', ppl67-186 in Tsohatzidis (1994).
de Mulder (1994) p argues that visual experiences are intentional on the very same terms as beliefs, desires and so forth,
because they are directed at states of affairs in the world. As the theory of speech acts distinguishes the statement or proposition
made from the illocutionary force with which it was made, Searle's theory of intentionality distinguishes the content of the state
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Types of referring expressions may be divided into four categories. Firstly, proper names, and
secondly, complex noun phrases in the singular: that is, paradigmatically, Russellian definite
descriptions. (A definite description may contain another definite referring expression, given perhaps
by an embedded definite description or by a proper name, and this allows one to speak of primary and
secondary referents). Thirdly, pronouns: 'this', 'that', T, 'he', 'she', 'it', and fourthly, titles, with close
affinities with definite descriptions and proper names. Searle considers the conditions necessary for the
utterance of one such expression to constitute successful reference, along with the question of the
function served by the propositional act of reference in illocutionary acts. As seen, Searle argues that,
in referring, S identifies a specific, particular object about which he goes on to say something. An
immediate difficulty is how the identification is communicated to H, and, for an answer, Searle
distinguishes (and Cohen's arguments should be recalled), between a fully consummated reference and
a successful reference: in the first case an identification is communicated, and in the latter S could, if
requested, give an unambiguous identification, and thus a consummated reference. In studying this
Richards again follows out the implications under his analysis of the principle of expressibility15. What
(Sb) in c means is determined by the semantical rules of (Sa), and the conclusion follows that the
meaning of (Sa) and of (Sb) in c is identical, or described by the same semantical rules, a conclusion
of affairs represented from the mode in which one represents the content. (In addition, they have identical conditions on word-to-
world and world-to-word direction of fit, cf. Searle (1983) pp 10-11. The hypothesis of the Background implies that there are
intentions prior to language, and particularly with reference to Grice, prior to intentions to communicate, and is supported by
Searle's examples of the ways in which one intend to represent without intending to communicate, but not intend to
communicate, but not intend to communicate without intending to represent. This is then of a part with Searle's theory of
meaning in communication (as criticised by Derrida): the primacy of representation is fundamental to the way in which all acts
have intentionahty. 'I make a noise through my mouth or I make some marks on paper. What is the nature of the complex
intention in action that makes the production of these marks or sounds something more than just the production of marks or
sounds?' (Searle (1983) pl63). Searle replies that intentions, along with their corresponding speech acts, have identical
conditions of satisfaction: in this case Searle adds that'... in the performance of the speech act the mind intentionally imposes the
same conditions of satisfaction on the physical expression of the mental state, as the mental state has itself. In communicating
one represents a state of affairs as existing and with sincerity; the intention that is communicated is that H should recognise that
the act was sincerely performed with the intention to represent. (It is worth remarking on the fact, in light of Derrida's remarks,
that Searle's theory of meaning makes use of the notion of communication, although of course, he adds that many intentional
states require the deliverance of language). H's response (in accordance with the contextual conditions of perlocutions), is
defined by conventions: H must respond in the appropriate or correct way. (Searle nicely avoids the responsibility of explaining
where the pre-intentional, non-representational practices of the Background come from, and how they are derived by an agent.
Are they derived by communication? For doubts, cf. Leilich, J.; 'Intentionality, Speech Acts and Communicative Action: A
Defence of J. Habermas' and K-O Apel's Criticism of Searle', Pragmatics, vol. Ill, no. 2, ppl55-170, 1993 and de Mulder, W.;
'Intentionality and Meaning: A Reaction to Leilich's "Intentionality, Speech Acts and Communicative Action", in the same
volume and number).
The question in relation to demonstratives is easily answered: by what conditions of satisfaction do they uniquely refer? de
Mulder (1994) p writes that the problem of indexicality would not be pressing for Fregean semantics if all it meant was that
indexicals refer differently than do definite descriptions, but the problem goes deeper, as Perry and Kaplan show: an individual
and his double in another twin earth both think that they are Hume (giving the same Fregean sense to I), but only one is correct.
Kaplan's (and by extension Perry's), remedy, the distinction of indexicals according to sense on each occasion and the sense that
changes with each use (namely, the 'character' and the 'content' or intension), points up the distinction of, as de Mulder says,
indexicals as 'directly referential' and of the propositions used as 'singular propositions', for a part of the proposition containing
an indexical is the object to which reference is made. As Perry and Kaplan argue, Frege cannot accept this theory of propositions,
for in his semantics propositions contain sense and no reference.
15 Richards (1971) p530.
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Searle could not accept16. Pursuing this, Richards makes the reasonable assumption that two sentences
have the same meaning, '... only if the propositions expressed by the sentences mutually entail each
other...mutual entailment is a necessary condition for sameness of meaning', and adds, as a
consequence, that almost every sentence expresses a proposition, and that, therefore, almost every
sentence expresses something that can be true or false17. He argues that, by Searle's theory, every
sentence contains at least one illocutionary act device, and adds that for all sentences with illocutionary
act devices, the proposition expressed is (partly), determined by the semantical rules for the device,
those which govern one or more illocutionary acts; that for any occasion on which the sentence is
uttered it is true or false that the act is performed; and, therefore, that in such cases the proposition
expressed (the state of affairs described), by the sentence is true or false.
Searle asks how this ideal scenario may be fulfilled: how words can come to identify things. He states
two conditions, firstly, that there must exist one and only one object to which the utterance refers, and
secondly, that H must be given sufficient means to identify the object from S's utterance. For an
example Searle turns to the utterance of a definite description: 'the man' in 'the man...', needs two
things for reference to be successful: there must be at least one object to which the utterance applies,
and there must be no more than one. The first condition is satisfied by a definite description, for the
expression contains a descriptor, and this is (or contains), a descriptive general term. This being so, it
describes the one object ofwhich the descriptor could truly be predicated. Of the second condition, one
might say, if one considers definite reference a kind of disguised assertion of a true, unique existential
proposition, that if there exists at least one object of which the descriptor can be predicated, it follows
that there is at most one object ofwhich it is true. Richards offers examples, of an explicit speech act
(semantically non-determined), and a predication18. 'I promise...', expresses a proposition which is
either true or false on occasions ofutterance. 'The cat is on the mat' also expresses a proposition, one
which is true or false on, 'every appropriate occasion' of utterance, namely, in the correct context. As
Richards writes, the qualification 'appropriate' is unnecessary in the first case, because, as a speech act,
the proposition expressed by the sentence determines the conditions of appropriate utterance. As said,
the semantical rules determining the meaning of (Sa) and those determining the meaning of (Sb) are
16 The proposition is represented (Richards (1971) p530): '(1) m(Sa) is equivalent to m(Sb) C. In addition, it follows from (1)
together with the fact that (Sa) is a member of the subset (Al) that the meaning of (Sa) is also equivalent to the meaning of the
utterance of (Sa) under conditions C, or simply (2) m(Sa) is equivalent to mU(Sa)C'.
"Neither consequence implies, Richards (1971) p530 says, that almost every sentence can be true or false or that every sentence
asserts something that can be true or false.
18 Richards (1971) p531.
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non-equivalent. The different sentences express propositions, and, again as established, although the
proposition expressed by (Sa) entails that expressed by (Sb), the identity does not hold from (Sb) to
(Sa), for Searle's analysis concerns only the semantically non-determined components. Richards argues
that this follows from the fact that the semantically determined illocutionary act in (Sa) is not the same
as that in (Sb). If (Sb) were a type of (Sa), as Richards' reductio shows, (Sa) would not be a member of
(Aj), or both (Sa) and (Sb) would be, and this traduces Searle's theory, for his account of semantically
determined illocutionary acts will not tolerate the presence of semantically non-determined elements.
Richards writes that, by the argument given, neither of the conditions Searle places on rules obtains;
more formally, and for later reference, p(Sb) does not entail p(Sa)19.
Searle's second condition on definite reference requires that H be able to identify the object referred
to from S's utterance, and here the lessons of the Gricean analysis are pertinent. While an identification
may, Searle writes, contain demonstrative or descriptive identifications, most identifications are a
mixture ofboth, or of another form of secondary reference from which H can derive an identification20.
Furthermore S must be able to supplement the pure demonstrative, "this" and "that", with
some descriptive general term, for when S points in the direction of a physical object and
says "this", it may not be unambiguously clear whether he is pointing to the colour, the
shape, the object and its immediate surroundings, the centre of the object, etc. But these
kinds of identifying expressions—demonstrative presentation, unique description, mixed
demonstrative and descriptive identification—exhaust the field.
The second condition is satisfied by S's ability to supply an expression of one of these latter kinds, an
expression uniquely to refer to the object to which he intends to refer, and in this Searle sees the
connection of the two conditions. Intending a specific object raises problems concerning whether S can
intend an object independently of the seemingly necessary condition of his intending a reference to it in
an utterance. Searle argues that S's ability to take the object as an intentional object is identical to his
ability to give it an identifying description, and part of his motivation is to overcome the problems of
referring to non-existent entities, or to those for which one cannot supply a description. Searle says that
the condition governing the giving of an identifying description is the 'vehicle for saying what is meant
in the reference'; this supplants the avowability condition expressed by Strawson, and furthers his
analysis of central cases for application to the indirect instances.
"Richards (1971) p531.
20 Searle (1969) p86.
214
On Richards' argument for the semantical rules determining the meaning of (Sa) and of (Sb) being
the same ((1) in Richards and expressed m(Sa) is equivalent to mU(Sb)C), there are propositions
expressed by (Sa) and (Sb), and by the utterance of (Sb) in conventional conditions C, for in the cases
of (Sa) and (Sb) the relevant conditions are invoked by the same rules, those constituting the
illocutionary acts specified by the semantical rules of (Sa) and by the utterance of (Sb) in conditions
C2'. Additionally, when (Sb) is uttered in C, the proposition expressed by (Sa) is true, and thus, as (Sa)
expresses a proposition, the utterance of (Sb) in C does also, as per the corollary and the principle of
expressibility. Searle argues that his axiom of identification for referring expressions follows from the
axiom of existence, adding that once considerations as to the means of identification are given, the
principle of identifying definite reference follows from either. When he repeats that the principle of
identification is a special case of the principle of expressibility, and that a 'limiting case' in this
instance is 'saying which involves showing1: '...that is, a limiting case of satisfying the principle of
identification and hence the principle of expressibility is indexical presentation of the object referred
to', Richards holds him again to the corollary and to the principle of expressibility, arguing that one is
justified in accepting that for almost any sentence, its utterance under definite conditions expresses a
proposition, and that the proposition expressed by the utterance need not be the same as that expressed
by the sentence, owing to its illocutionary force22. Richards' earlier deference to Leibniz's law is now
extended from the meanings of sentences to the meanings of the utterances of sentences, and this
compels the conclusion that (1) is true in case the proposition of (Sa) entails and is entailed by the
proposition expressed by (Sb) in C. What is more, the same applies to (2), forcing the conclusion that
the meaning of (Sa) is equivalent to the meaning of the utterance (Sa) in C (that is, m(Sa) is equivalent
to mU(Sa)C)23.
Searle considers other cases affecting the principle of identification. In a case of'ordinary' discourse,
H may demand no identifying description and be content with the expression offered. H proceeds with
the assumption that S could give an identifying description if requested; the expression giving
reference used is (because non-identifying), 'parasitic' on the correct, identifying description. Whether
or not his expression identifies depends on whether or not S has to hand an independent, unambivalent,
identifying description, and communication, Searle says, is not imperilled by this 'partially
21 Richards (1971) pp531-532.
22 Richards (1971) p532.
23 In Richards (1971) p532 this is presented:
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consummated reference'. In other cases a descriptor may not even be true of the object referred to, yet
H takes the reference, and the act of communication as successful. Some examples, Searle writes,
might 'fool' one into thinking that there must be more to referring than giving an identification in a
recognisable act of communication, that is, that there is a corresponding mental act, or that all
existential statements presuppose identity statements. However, context is sufficient to provide for
identifying descriptions, and Searle adds, '...the demonstrative "that" in "that..." indicates that the
object either is present or has already been referred to by some other referring expression and that the
present reference is parasitic on the earlier'. In the 'limiting case' of reference with ostension, the only
description S can give is to indicate their recognition of the object when it is re-presented to them.
However, not all identifying descriptions are of equal utility in achieving identifying reference: part of
the strength of the principle of identification is that the reference performed in the utterance of the
definite description succeeds in virtue of the fact that the expression indicates characteristics of the
object referred to; however, recognising that the point of definite reference is to identify and not to
describe the object referred to, the expression used best serves its purpose if the characteristics
indicated are important to the identity of the object and to the context of discussion24. However,
Richards' arguments apply here also25. On Searle's terms, every sentence contains at least one
illocutionary act device, showing that for any sentence the meaning of the utterance in appropriate
conventional conditions is partially determined by the semantical rules governing the illocutionary act
devices in the sentence, and Richards writes: '[hjowever, a much stronger thesis follows from Searle's
general theory, one which it seems is independent of this assumption', saying that while S can, in an
illocutionary act, mean more than he says, S must mean at least as much as he says, assuming that is,
that S means something by what he says. S can mean more by uttering (Sb) in C than what (Sb) means,
because, again, it is a semantically non-determined element, but he must mean at least as much as (Sb)
means if he is to mean anything, and there is nothing in the meaning of (Sb) which does not also
characterise the meaning of the utterance of (Sb) in C. Applying Leibniz's law, and the arguments
established, Richards draws the conclusions pU(Sb)C entails p(Sb), from which, because proposition
(Sa) entails pU(Sb)C, follows p(Sa) entails p(Sb), and pU(Sa)C entails p(Sb). All of the propositions
follow from Searle's theory, and all apply to subset (Bi); therefore, they all apply to (B), and thus
'... only if p(Sa) entails pU (Sb)C [and] pU (Sb)C entails p(Sa) are both true. Moreover, the same requirement applies equally to
(2); thus (2) is true only ifp(Sa) entails pU (Sa)C [and] pU (Sa)C entails p(Sa)'.
24 That is, an identifying description could fail to be a useful referring expression.
25 Richards (1971) p532.
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Searle is unable to accommodate, in his own theory, semantically non-determined, parasitical cases,
and, a corollary, the question of the size and constitution of (Bi) is obviated: it simply is (A)M.
Searle's 'idealised' model of the propositional act of referring has it that given that S utters the
expression R in the presence of H in context C, then in 'literal' utterance S successfully and 'non-
defectively' performs the speech act of singular identifying reference iff the following conditions are
present. Firstly, there obtain normal input and output conditions (defined); the utterance ofR occurs as
part of the utterance of some sentence T; the utterance of T is the purported performance of an
illocutionary act; there exists an object x to which reference is made; and R either contains an
identifying description of x, or (as before) S is able to supply one. Additionally, S must intend that the
utterance ofR will pick out or identify x to H; S intends that the utterance ofR will identify x to H by
means of the recognition of intention, and that this recognition also be achieved by means both ofH's
knowledge of the rules governing R and his awareness of C. (The semantical rules governing R are
such that it is correctly uttered in T in C iff the conditions obtain). Searle notes the 'abstract' character
of this analysis, and adds that the associated rules solve this problem27. Firstly, R is to be uttered only in
the context of a sentence the utterance of which could be the performance of an illocutionary act;
secondly, R is to be uttered only if there exists an object x such that either R contains an identifying
description of x, or S can supply such a description, and such that in the utterance of R, S intends to
identify x to H. This rule states, as above, that the axiom of existence and the principle of identification
26 Searle (1969) p89 draws together the principles of identification. Firstly, if S refers to an object then he identifies the object
apart from all others for H: from this is entailed the further consequence that if S refers to an object in the utterance of an
expression then the expression either contains a description true of the object, presents the object demonstratively, or identifies it
through a combination of demonstrative presentation and descriptive definition. The premise is again added that, failing this, S
must be in a position to substitute such a description on demand. Reference is made in virtue of the facts about the object that are
known to S; the utterance of a referring expression consummates the reference because it 'communicates' these facts to H. In this
Searle returns to Frege's ascription of sense to referring expressions. In some sense a referring expression must have 'meaning',
or 'descriptive content', for S to succeed in reference when he utters the expression: '[f]or unless its utterance succeeds in
communicating a fact, a true proposition, from S to H, the reference is not fully consummated' (p92). In this sense, Searle writes,
meaning is prior to reference. Searle distinguishes the sense of a referring expression from the proposition communicated by its
utterance. The sense of a referring expression is given by the descriptive general terms in or implied by the expression. In many
cases the sense is insufficient to communicate a proposition, and rather the utterance of an expression in a context communicates
the proposition. This distinction allows one to see how two different utterances of the same expression with the same sense can
refer to two different objects.
It is false to claim that there is a class of logically proper names, those whose meaning is the object to which they refer, for if
an utterance of an expression communicates a descriptive content, then there is no way of establishing a connection between an
expression and an object (p93). It is misleading to say that the facts one must possess in order to refer are in every case facts
about the object referred to, doing so would suggest that the facts are about an independently identified object. In satisfying the
principles of identification, existential properties play a crucial role, for the possibility of satisfying the principle by supplying an
identification of a non-existential proposition depends upon the truth of a existential proposition. Here one might say is another
form of parasitism, for '...underlying our conception of any particular object is a true, uniquely existential proposition' (p93). In
contrast to the view, as Searle explicitly notes, of the early Wittgenstein, objects cannot be named independently of facts.
Quantification here is potentially misleading, for it is tempting to regard the bound variable in the proposition (3x) (Fx) as
ranging over objects already identified, and to suppose that what it states is that one or more objects within the range of the
objects identified have a certain character. They will therefore be read: 'there is at least one instance...', to avoid 'misleading
metaphysical suggestions' (p94). For the reasons adduced, reference is of no logical interest: for such propositions containing a
reference one can substitute an existential proposition which has the truth conditions of the original, and, therefore, in
circumstances in which one is true the otherwill be so.
27Cf. Searle (1968) pp412-413.
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apply to all referring expressions, and shows that reference is an intentional act. Thirdly, the utterance
of R acts as the identification of x to H. Regarding this Fraser argues that Searle gives no clear
distinction of illocutionary from perlocutionary acts, from intimations carried in aspects of the
utterance, from S's ambition in trying, say, to persuade or to request, and from the conventional act of
H's recognising S's intention in an appropriate context, and his argument develops Richards'28.
Fraser states an 'Intent Condition', predicated upon S's fidelity to Austin's conditions upon the
performance of respective illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts, and, it might be noted,
approaching Strawson's distinction. It is defined:
Intent Condition-. S in performing the act has the intention of creating in H an
understanding of S's position toward a particular proposition (usually the proposition
expressed in the utterance but not necessarily so); Success Conditions: There are
objective criteria for determining (at least in principle) if S has been successful in
satisfying the Intent Condition in the process of uttering the sentence.
It is said, with reference to Gricean implication, that the proposition need not explicitly be expressed
because both S and H have mutual knowledge both of the prepositional content and of each other's
capacity for mutual knowledge (allowing both to know that the other knows the content of the act), or,
less exaltedly, because S believes H can work it out. Fraser elucidates the point, bringing the notion
into close contact with Millikan's 'illocutionary purpose'. Illocutionary effect is an understanding of,
'...the speaker's position toward the proposition he expresses in uttering the sentence' (ifH indicates
that his utterance is a response, one can say that H intended to perform the act of answering), and
Fraser suggests that the point of illocutionary acts be divided into two classes: those describing states
of affairs, and those changing, or bringing into being, states of affairs29. Success Conditions give
restrictions on the proposition and its utterance necessary and sufficient for illocutionary acts to have
successfully been performed. Searle's distinction between defective and non-defective illocutionary
acts illustrates that not all defects are able to 'vitiate' the acts, and, in cases of insincere promises, the
act is successful, yet defective: S indicating that he assumes an obligation to do something has
promised, irrespective of an intention to fulfil the obligation. Fraser agrees that Searle's conditions on
speech acts are successful, but remarks that some non-defective acts are assessed independently of the
28 Fraser (1974) says he 'goes beyond' Searle.
29 Fraser (1974) p437. Again, Fraser admits, a notion building on, but not owing to, Searle. In Fraser, B.; 'An Analysis of
Vernacular Performative Verbs', pp in Shuy, R.(ed.); Proceedings of SECOL VIII (Washington, Georgetown University) 1973
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criteria of Success Conditions, those for which there must occur mutual recognition for their success.
Mere observance of a conventional formula will not achieve this30. Fraser notes Searle's
acknowledgement that the essential condition is likely to command the others, and adds that each of the
conditions may be seen to be inferred from the standard, ordinary case, and hence Searle can call the
acts successful, yet defective31. However, this in itself is a derivation from a standard, paradigm case,
according to predicates of rational behaviour, and how may H realise this on Searle's theory? The
conventional relationship Austin makes so much of, that in which S is in an appropriate position to
launch ships, pass judgement and so forth, depends for part of its success on H's recognising this in S,
and this is, for Fraser, part of the Intent Condition through the Success Condition: H recognises S's
desire to get H to bring about the state of affairs expressed in the proposition, again, by virtue of S's
'position'. This covers all the cases for which Searle notes ambiguities in the derivation of the
conditions on speech acts, ambiguities which are removed with a theory ofmutual knowledge.
The third element of Searle's discussion which Fraser wishes to revise concerns the relationship
between sentence-meaning (the conditions of utterance of a sentence), and illocutionary force. It picks
up the point in the previous paragraph regarding the need for a theory of mutual knowledge and is
considered in IV. In the following section it is considered how Searle's theory, although missing (as
has been seen), the essential notion of mutual knowledge, can provide a fascinating response to
Derrida's notion of the parasitical as vitiating speech acts in literal and non-literal contexts alike.
Searle's distinction between the proposition and the illocutionary force indicating device, saddles the
latter with a raft of grammatical devices which properly belong to the proposition. Again, Searle wants
to establish, through analysis of'standard' cases, conditions for successful, non-defective illocutionary
acts, and, from this, to discern constitutive rules for the use of illocutionary force indicating devices.
Among the grammatical devices considered are the traditional cases, particularly the explicit
performative verbs ('I promise...'), and such cases (and the use of non-standard locutions, verbal or
not, as requests, promises and so forth), raise Searle's difficulties with indirect speech acts, and the
development of applicable rules; these are taken up in the following section32.
are listed eight attitudes one may take in an illocutionary act. He gives acts of declaiming, of evaluating, of expressing an
attitude, of stipulating (a naming convention), of requesting, of suggesting, of exercising authority and of committing.
30 Fraser (1974)
31 Fraser (1974) p writes that Searle might object to the dependence of preparatory conditions on the essential condition in cases
of ordering, in which appropriate context and conventions provide positions for S and H. Requesting differs, in that no such
structure exists.
32 Fraser (1974) p441. Fraser finds the most plausible response to the difficulties of the indirect cases is a Gricean theory of
conversational implication, one emphasising the roles in successful communication of rationality and mutual cooperation. While
the Gricean conditions do not elucidate the principles by which S makes the implications described, and do not clarify the
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construction of illocutionary acts (because it relates sentence-meaning to utterance-meaning). There are similar problems, though
for different reasons, in Searle's theory. (Fraser (1974) p444 raises the matter of the necessity of a condition of responsibility
upon S). Fraser describes a case ('...one of the many regularities of an indirect nature we find between classes of sentences and
associated illocutionary force'), of sentences with the form of performatives including the modal 'must'. In their analysis one
must again attend to Searle's later work on indirect speech acts and literal meaning. Fraser says that each such case features an
utterance attempting to wield the illocutionary act contained in the respective act; however, because of sentence meaning, the
examples have different meaning: in each the proposition gives the obligation that S is bound to perform the act denoted by the
verb.
Each example may be used as a request, but need not be. The sentence is thus not literally a request, unlike the associated
performative. Fraser gives two further example sentences:
Tomorrow, Johnmust request that you leave at 4pm
John must request that you leave at 4pm
and gives a, '...general rule of conversational interpretation...', namely, the 'Vagueness Principle'. 'Whenever the time of an
action predicated of a subject is left unspecified, it is generally assumed that the subject is expected to carry out the action at his
earliest chance'. The example, 'I must request that you leave at 4pm', carries no specification of time, but H can, by the
principle, expect S to perform his obligation at the earliest opportunity, that is, now, in the sentence itself.
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5. How to do (a Few) Things with Words
Searle gives a classification of illocutionary acts, developing upon Austin's taxonomy of verdictives,
expositives, exercitives, behabitives and commisives, aiming to show how these types are realised in
the syntax of natural languages'. He replaces the notion of illocutionary force, for 'it suggests that
different illocutionary forces occupy different positions on a single continuum of force'. The
illocutionary force of separate illocutionary acts is, rather, a network of, '...criss-crossing continua',
divisible into twelve distinct 'dimensions'. (The distinction between illocutionary verbs and
illocutionary acts is also marked).
The first dimension builds upon the notion of illocutionary point. The point of an order is to get H to
do something; of a description, to represent the way something is; and of a promise to undertake to do
something; they differ due to the presence of different 'essential conditions'2. Essential conditions are,
following Austin, the basis for a taxonomy, and the presence of 'illocutionary point' should not be
taken to mean that, '...every illocutionary act has a definitely associated perlocutionary intent'3.
Illocutionary point might be considered part of illocutionary force; the illocutionary point of requests,
in Searle's example, is the same as that for commands, namely, to get someone to do something; '[b]ut
the illocutionary forces are clearly different'4. It is considered, taking the arguments above, whether
Searle can achieve this (at least partial), conflation of perlocutions and illocutions; he goes on to say,
'...that the notion of illocutionary force is the resultant of several elements of which illocutionary point
is only one, though, I believe, the most important one'5. The second dimension examines 'direction of
fit' between words and world: for example, the illocutionary point of assertions is to get words to
match the world, of promises and requests to get the world to match words. An utterance gives, '.. .the
propositional content of the illocution and the illocutionary force determines how that content is
supposed to relate to the world'6. 'Direction of fit is always a consequence of illocutionary point'.
The third dimension identifies differences, articulated in utterances, between expressed psychological
states, differences between assertions and claims, threats or pledges, and orders, commands and
requests. The state expressed in the performance of an illocutionary act is just the sincerity condition of
1
Searle, J.R.; 'A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts', ppl-29 in (1979a) pi. The classification is offered as supplementary to that
presented (1969) and, it is argued in this section, obviates Derrida's criticisms of Searle. The dimensions are introduced on p2.
Searle emphasises the fundamental importance of illocutionary point in Searle, J.R.; 'Response: Meaning, Intentionality and
Speech Acts', pp81-102 in Lepore and van Gulick (1991).
3 Both themes from the early work.
4 Searle (1979a) p3.
5 An in-depth study ofperlocutions and their relation to illocutions is Schiffer (1972) p.
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Searle's early work, and the conditions are repeated, with the reminder that the utterance of a promise
stated as insincere ('I promise thatp but I do not intend that p'), can only explicitly be seen for all of its
incoherence in the first person performative. On most interpretations (Derrida's is no exception),
Austin gets only this far, and Searle credits the achievement; however, other dimensions are required,
and they are stated. The fourth says that illocutionary point can be reported with '... varying degrees of
strength or commitment'; the fifth that there is a difference in the status of S and H bearing on the
illocutionary force and thus the illocutionary point of the utterance7. Sixthly, there is a difference in the
way in which an utterance relates to the 'interests' of S and H, captured, say, in the difference between
celebrations and laments, or congratulations and condolences. Discernible differences are marked by
the fact of one or other being in the interests or not of S and H. In his taxonomy of illocutionary acts
Searle dubs a new category 'expressives', and says of their illocutionary point that they express the
psychological state, '...specified in the sincerity condition about a state of affairs specified in the
propositional content'8. In expressives there is no 'direction of fit', for S tries neither to match words to
world nor world to words; '...the truth of the expressed proposition is presupposed'. (In apologies, one
makes neither a predication nor a report)9. Seventhly, there are instantiated different relations to the
'surrounding context' of the discourse.
A connected point forms the eighth dimension: there is a difference in propositional content as
determined by the illocutionary force indicating devices: self-evidently, a prediction is about the future,
a report about the past10. The ninth dimension marks a distinction between acts which must always be
6 The utterance can again be non-verbal. Searle's example is of a man using a shopping list to select items from a shop who is
followed by a another man recording in writing the man's purchases. The lists will be identical but will fulfil different purposes;
the first list is written to get the world to match the words, the second to get words to fit the world (the actions of the firstman).
7 Recall the revolutionary grabbing the bottle and naming the ship Mr Stalin. The Searle of (1969) regards such matters as part of
the theory of preparatory conditions.
8 Searle (1979a) pl5.
'This Searle (1979a) pp22-23 sees reflected in the '...paradigm expressive verbs', in the corresponding performative utterances:
they will not form expressions with that- clauses, but demand a 'gerundive nominalisation transformation'. These are syntactical
facts, and the importance of syntactical arguments, presaged above, and to be utilised further in discussion of Schiffer, must be
considered in unison with a powerful argument to the conclusion that Schiffer's arguments are hamstrung from the start by their
use of gerundive constructions. For example, one says 'I apologise for stepping on your toe', and the expressive may be analysed
for its deep syntactic structure: 'I verb you + I/you VP —> gerundive nom'. This is required in the absence of direction of fit. This
is not to say that all of the permissible transformations are gerundive, only that, '...they must not produce that clauses or
infinitive phrases'. The 'paradigm' assertives have the syntactical form 'I verb (that) + S', but certain assertives verbs do not fit
the pattern, those which may be given the syntactical form, 'I verb NP+NP be pred'. Searle moots the idea that this might justify
the conclusion that these verbs are wrongly called assertives, and that this suggestion might take support from Austin's claim that
verdictives and expositives require separate classes. Searle writes that such a distinction is necessary, for in assertive discourse
one focuses attention on a topic for discussion (a propositional content is asserted), and one says things about the objects
referred to in the propositional content. 'But this very genuine syntactical difference does not mark a semantic difference big
enough to justify the formation of a separate category' (p25). Searle notes that the sentences in which the describing is done are
'seldom' explicit performatives, and that they are 'equally' in the 'standard' indicative forms so 'characteristic' of the assertive
class. Utterances are characteristically statements, in the making of which one describes, judges, identifies and characterises.
Searle concludes, following from his earlier statement, that there are two syntactical forms for assertive illocutionary verbs: one
to focus on propositional content and the second to focus on the objects referred to in the propositional context. Once again, the
connection to preparatory conditions is noted.
10 In Searle (1969) this appears in the conditions of 'propositional content'. Cf. Schiffer (1972) p.
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speech acts, and those which can, but need not, be performed as speech acts, and in such cases, '...no
speech act, not even an internal speech act, is necessary"1. In the tenth dimension are distinctions
linked to the institutional conventions Searle describes in his early work, some requiring 'extra-
linguistic' institutions for their performance and some not. S and H hold positions in extra-linguistic
institutions, but, Searle remarks, Austin was not always sensitive to differences between illocutionary
acts on this matter: one need only obey conventions of language to state that it is raining, not
conventions of practice12. The eleventh dimension states a distinction between acts for which the
corresponding illocutionary verb has a performative use, and those for which they do not. The
relevance of the distinction to a response to Derrida is important, for while most illocutionary verbs
have performative uses, one cannot (indeed as Austin says), perform acts of threatening by stating 'I
hereby threaten you'. (The role and understanding of illocutions in Derrida may again be brought into
question). Lastly, the twelfth dimension, considers the style in which an illocutionary act is performed.
A difference can be marked between, say, insinuating and confiding, not necessarily according to
illocutionary point or prepositional content, but according to the style in performance of the act.
Austin's 'paradigm' cases of performatives must also be revised in the light of Searle's taxonomy.
The problem is raised by those instances in which a state of affairs represented in the proposition is
realised, or brought into existence, by the illocutionary force indicating device ('I name this ship')13.
Though they are ostensibly identical to Austin's paradigms, they are, '...not adequately described in
the literature...', and their status as illocutionary acts is, '...usually misunderstood...'. They have a
vital role in a theory of illocutions, for their importance attacks the very basis of the paradigm/parasite
distinction: an argument can be made to the conclusion that the cases Austin (and Searle) push to the
periphery for want of a general theory are not so easily distinguished from the central cases, and that
Searle shows a sensitivity to the distinction not evident in his early work and the reply to Derrida, and
the means by which it can be overcome. Furthermore, the means of overcoming the distinction invoke
notions of surface and deep syntactical structure, and stress their importance in truth-conditional
semantics. The apparently paradigmatic cases are dubbed 'declarations' by Searle, and their 'defining
characteristic' given as the fact that their successful performance gives a guaranteed correspondence
between prepositional content, declarative force and reality: if one successfully performs the act of
naming the ship, the ship is named. In surface syntactical structure this is concealed due to there being
11 Searle (1979a) p7.
12 This is Strawson's distinction.
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no adequate distinction marked between propositional content and illocutionary force (again, one does
not threaten by uttering 'I threaten you'), and herein lies the difficulty14 Declarations show a
congruence of content and force in a unitary illocutionary act; the case for Searle's new type of
»
illocution demonstrates, with lessons taken from Millikan, that the relativisation to contexts
promulgated by Derrida plays no role in the assessment of illocutions, for it can be maintained that
contexts for speech acts are established by interlocutors in practice. If S, to take a familiar example, as
the appropriate dignitary, launches a ship, uttering the correct form of words (in (a potentially) explicit
performative), and breaking the bottle, the ship is launched. (Searle, in typically hard-headed fashion,
says that this occurs in identical ways, and without exception, in fictional cases). The act may be
frustrated (the bottle remains unbroken and so forth), but in these cases all appropriate conventions of
language are observed, an act with specific illocutionary force uttered, and, with the recognition of
intention, uptake secured. An act of promising, naming, wishing, indeed, of any act described as
illocutionary, in a performative utterance, carries, for Searle, both the utterance's content (as a promise
and so forth), and its force (as a speech act with the conventional force of a promise); there is set up an
unbreakable bond between the conventions of language observed in making an utterance with a
recognised illocutionary force and those appealed to, or utilised, in order to make it fully successful.
Searle, like Millikan, argues that the content and force of an utterance with an illocutionary intent are
contained in the one act, and that a relativisation to contexts of utterance bears no threat to this
structure (as is suggested in IV. 5 the forcing of a distinction between content and force is positively to
invite parasites). Contexts, or conventions, for utterances are, again as Millikan says, discerned in
social or institutional practices, in a theory of illocutions containing a distinction between K-I and K-II
acts, or making recognition of Searle's new illocutionary type, and as Lewis shows (described in IV),
such conventions may be established and discerned for literal and parasitical cases alike. For Searle,
declarations bring about alteration in the states of the objects referred to, '... solely in virtue of the fact
that the declaration has been successfully performed', and in this they are distinguished from the other
categories in Austin's taxonomy. 'In the history of the discussion of these topics since
Austin's...introduction of his distinction between performatives and constatives, this feature of
declarations has not been properly understood'. The original distinction between performatives and
constatives put declarations in the former group, and, Searle argues, when, in the development of the
13 The role of 'hereby' is here of the utmost importance.
14 Searle (1979a) pl7.
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theory of illocutionary force, the distinction is seen to collapse, or to have fluid boundaries, the oddness
ofthe relationship between prepositional content and reality should have been clear.
With regard to the importance of conventions, rules and extra-linguistic institutions, '...in addition to
the constitutive rules of language...the latter (as said), are not themselves sufficient for the successful
performance of a declaration. The former give S and H their places in institutions, and it is only given
such institutions that such acts may be performed15. (There are two classes suggesting exceptions:
'supernatural' declarations ('Let there be light') and, most importantly, those, '.. .that concern language
itself...' ('I define', 'I name' and so forth). This is not to say that all declarations require an extra-
linguistic institution, for they are, '...a very special category of speech acts', reporting the founding of
speech act conventions. In their utterance they obey no sincerity condition, and do not require the
authority of established attempts to get language to match the world, for they describe no existing state
of affairs, and do not attempt to bring about a future state of affairs. Rather they establish conventions
for contexts, guides for future use.
Some declarations overlap with assertions. In many institutional situations (say, Austin's repeated
examples ofjudges and umpires), one not only garners from speech acts facts about one's situation, but
requires an authoritative decision given, or verdict passed, upon the situation. Such examples show that
institutions often take on, with the force of declarations, the authorities of various kinds held in
illocutionary acts. (Assertive declarations have a sincerity condition, and Searle repeats the syntactical
form given above for the cases of peripheral assertions (those with a declarative element) to reject the
argument that they form a separate category). There are several forms for institutional explicit
performatives of declaration, and Searle lists the 'most important': 'I find you guilty as charged', 'War
is (hereby) declared' and so forth. This, for Searle, is the 'purest' form of declaration: S says, in effect,
that the state of affairs exists, and this 'bemusingly' simple structure is explained by the fact that some
verbs in their performative occurrence encapsulate both the proposition's declarative force and its
content16.
Skinner endeavours to find difficult cases, and refers back to Ziff s example of an illocutionary act
performed in an utterance, but in which communication is performed in another 'oblique' act". S
15 Searle (1979a) pl8. Searle's remarks on the exceptional case of language might be rejected if one accepts Lewis' theory of the
development of language (cf. IV).
16 Searle (1979a) p29 rejects the Wittgensteinian idea of a limitless number of language games, for with illocutionary point as the
basis for a theory of language use there are, in fact, very few things that one does with words.
Skinner (1970) pi 19 notes the hedging and finessing of polite communication, cases in which S might use, alternatively or in
addition, the explicit performative, but in which his interests are best served by not doing so. Such cases, he writes, acutely raise
the difficulties of the distinction of 'genuine' illocutions and non-serious illocutions.
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enquires in, say, a question, although the intention with which he speaks is that of requesting (or
demanding): S's intention is intended to be understood, yet is not explicitly avowed. Thau calls such
cases, in which illocutionary force is not clear, or is open to interpretation, 'illocutionary
breakdowns'18, regarding them as failures to make clear the illocutionary force with which an act is
performed. He notes appositely Austin's rejection of the performative-constative distinction, owing to
the propensity of utterances to infelicity, and its replacement by notions of phatic, rhetic and phonetic
acts, and the 'different types of nonsense' which may be created in an act's performance, the most
important ofwhich involve the performance of an intended illocution15. In such cases the addition of an
explicit performative seems positively to impair S's intentions, and Skinner offers, rather, cases in
which there is no possibility of making an explicit avowal, drafting the argument to elucidate the
difficulties of distinguishing illocutions and perlocutions20. He asks one to consider pairs of cases:
conciliating and coaxing, and luring and beguiling. One might say of S that he conciliated or beguiled
by an utterance, or better, that he achieved an effect with his utterance. In such cases, however (and
more so with coaxing and luring), one may decide whether S performed the act, as Searle shows,
without reference to any perlocutionary effect, for they may be considered on the model of paradigm
illocutionary acts, one which Thau examines21. The transference of the notion of infelicity or
breakdown (from the study of performatives to the study of illocutions), is not, Thau says, clear-cut, for
examples of 'unhappy' or unsuccessful speech acts may display no phatic, rhetic or phonetic failure
(again, 'I name this ship'). The sense and the reference of the utterances can be clear and
unobjectionable, and S mean (and intend) his utterance, say, as a naming, and in this they are unlike the
failures of illocutionary force as they are described by Austin.
18 Thau, S.; 'Illocutionary Breakdowns', Mind, vol. LXXX, no. 318, pp270-275, 1971. He borrows the term 'breakdown' from
Austin's classification of human actions according to their potential for infelicities.
19 Thau (1971) p has an important addition to make to the distinctions Skinner proposes (see below).
20 Skinner (1970) pl22 has numerous examples and pl23 considers his argument that there are some illocutionary acts with no
explicit avowals. He remarks on those that, one might say, cannot be performed verbally at all, say, 'ignoring' (or 'cutting'),
adding that Austin seemed to believe that 'cocking a snook' could be both a non-verbal illocutionary act and the name of a
genuinely illocutionary act. He adds that Austin '...may only have intended to point out that a non-verbal warning, for example,
is still the name of an illocutionary act, in the sense that there is a standard case in which to warn is to speak with a certain
illocutionary force. Ifhe intended the further claim, however, that there can be genuine illocutionary acts which never involve the
use of words, it is not clear how this squares with the stated intention... of concentrating on the relations between "saying
something" and the illocutionary force of such utterances'.
21 Thau (1971) pl24. Skinner (1970) pl24 writes that it may still be the case that S (as he intends) coaxes in what he says, even in
cases in which H is not coaxed by what S says. While doubt might be entertained about the status of such cases, Skinner offers
others which can be more easily assimilated (indeed, those given), which for contrast, might be considered alongside a case of
insulting. Insulting might seem similar to, say, cases of gloating, snubbing (or rebuffing), taunting (teasing), sneering, gloating
and so forth, but a palpable difference obtains in that insulting seems to be placed in '... an almost wholly perlocutionary light...'.
"The question, in the first place, of whether I am snubbing or rebuffing you in saying what I say is obviously a question
essentially for the speaker to answer, in a way that hardly seems to hold with the more perlocutionary question of whether I am
causing you to feel insulted'. S might endeavour to insult H and yet only succeed in amusing him; yet if he snubs H he has
snubbed him. To repeat a point made above on numerous occasions, there must always be a distinction between effects of
speaking and speaking for effect: '... the former is obviously a perlocutionary matter, but the latter (even if not illocutionary) is
not'.
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Skinner raises a similar point. His argument against the distinction of illocutions and their non-
serious, failed ersatz counterparts says that there is none to be marked, for all are '... fully-intended acts
of communication, and of genuine illocutionary acts'. If one considers a list of (apparently) paradigm
illocutionary verbs, he remarks, one might contrast the paradigm of, say, insulting, with the difficult
cases (noted by Austin), of snubbing or rebuffing, expressing a distinction between effects of speaking
and speaking for effect, coterminous with Austin's distinction between acts performed in saying things
and acts performed by saying things22. Problems with the class of performatives, in Strawson's gloss,
concern whether each included names an act of 'full and intended' communication in the sense
required by the theory of uptake of Austin's standard, conventional cases. As has been seen (in II.4-5),
they do not. Arguing that their mutual distinction is good, Skinner countenances that Austin's
'behabitives' and 'expositives' are consequently closer to the 'non-literal' uses, '...intuitively marked
off [for want of a general theory] from illocutions by Austin, and which Strawson's model can be used
to distinguish from illocutionary acts'. As established, illocutionary verbs, on Strawson's model, via
Millikan, all have the status of fully-intended communication, and are all equally genuine23.
Difficult cases for illocutionary status (coaxing, luring and so forth), are not straightforwardly
applicable to Strawson's theory, for one can conceive cases in which the success of the act (the
fulfilment of S's intention), turns on the non-avowability of the utterance, and the potential for this to
be exploited. Other cases are more amenable, and capture Strawson's response to Grice's canonical
analysis, yet Skinner wants a simpler theory24. He suggests an example case of a remark intended as an
insult. There is in such cases no intention that the means to evoke the response intended by S be kept
hidden: as Skinner writes, such partial communication is more likely to impair intentions to, say, cajole
or flatter and so forth25. Thus it is that the illocutionary verbs Skinner calls markers of this first class
(class A) occur in situations in which Gricean nested intentions are present. Infelicitous instances, say,
in which S intended to insult H, without caring whether the intended effect is understood, are
accounted for by a condition which says that the acts in question are indeed intended by S, but in which
recognition or 'uptake' is not secured. (Skinner is of the belief that there is a 'standard', or control, case
of such acts in which S intends his act of, say, insulting to be fully understood; in which there is an,
22 And Grice (1989e) p220 and Schiffer (1972) p.
23 Skinner (1970) pl25. 'None of them seems to fail in any of the ways that "expressive" usages (here the example Austin gave,
and to which Strawson applies his model, is "showing off'), or "non-literal" usages (here the example which has been considered
is "insinuating"), have been shown to fails as genuine illocutionary acts'.
24 Skinner (1970) pl25. Amenable cases being flattery and patronising.
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'...overall intention to be understood of exactly the character required by Strawson's model for a full
act of communication' and described by Grice's analysis)26. Thau raises a question: whether the two
kinds of act he describes (unhappy in illocution or in sense and reference), might simply be considered
illocutionary breakdowns27. He argues that Austin's definition of the types of error or misfiring that
may occur in an illocutionary act are not paradigms for '...any illocutionary breakdown', for while it
may be unclear in elucidating illocutionary force, say, whether what S says is meant as a statement or
as a warning, Thau asks whether this should not be considered a species of rhetic breakdown, an
instance of speaking 'ambiguously' or 'too elliptically'. In the cases of ambiguous, or 'inexplicit'
sentences (Skinner's and Strawson's), breakdowns may be prevented, firstly, by an appeal to the
context of the utterance aiding the communication of sense; and secondly, '...by using alternative,
more explicit sentences' (paradigmatically, the explicit performative). Thau echoes the point at the
heart of Searle's argument, that the taxonomy provided by Austin shows that rhetic breakdown and
illocutionary breakdown are qualitatively the same, and subject to the same ambiguities and infelicities.
Other less obvious candidates for illocutionary status (Skinner's class B), are classed by Austin as
innuendo, and Skinner suggests as examples, alluding or adumbrating, best analysed, Skinner says, by
a theory describing the 'non-literal' things done with words. He argues that both Austin and Strawson
note the difficulty (given by Searle), that an explicit avowal in such cases would be merely an added
description of the act performed, yet again acts of utterance are still acts of communication, for in
uttering to H, S might still intend to invoke, allude, adumbrate or indicate and so forth28. Such cases
show the existence of large numbers of illocutionary verbs (genuine and full acts of communication),
for which there can be no explicit avowal through the explicit performative and 'hereby'. Many such
verbs, Skinner avers, may not have a truly explicit performative formula, in that supplying it is not to
explicate the basic utterance, but to add something the need for which implies rather that the act of
communication itself has failed and needs supplementation by explications known to S and H,
regarding locutions and mutually-known, institutional, or social, convention29. Skinner writes: 'The
difficulty and the paradox lie.. .in the fact that the process ofmaking the intention explicit, in the case
25 Skinner (1970) ppl25-126. Additionally, there is no intention, as in the case of insinuating, that an intention to evoke an
intended response be suspected, for this is a different response entirely, although '...one which it is of course perfectly possible
to intend to evoke'.
26 One wonders why Skinner felt the need to state this, for it is surely not required by either his or Strawson's theory.
27 Thau (1971) p.
28 Skinner (1970) ppl26-127. Here one sees the importance of the case Strawson considers of S setting a rat, and the pertinence
ofMcDowell's insistence on the interpretation of 'getting one to know', or 'letting one think'. Skinner shows how an identical
analysis can be provided for his class A illocutionary verbs.
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of the verbs in lists (A) and (B), actually seems to defeat the intention itself, and again, that, '[t]he act
ofavowal, in all these cases, seems not (as in the standard case) to underpin, but actually to undermine,
the intended act of communication'30.
Skinner argues that cases of oblique illocutionary acts (paradigmatically, in hints, metaphors and
allusions), show that the distinction between the serious ('standard') illocutionary acts and the non-
serious ('non-conventional') illocutionary acts, is not one that can successfully be made, and that the
potential need Strawson sees for avowability in acts of communication is not served by putting
illocutionary verbs in explicit performative formulae31. Skinner lists two points, the first directed at
Cohen's dichotomy between illocutionary force and prepositional content (although as argued, the
dichotomy is more widely applicable), and the second, threatening the basis of Strawson's distinction.
Skinner argues that Cohen is committed to two things: firstly, in his faith in Austin's transference of
the notion of infelicity from performatives to illocutions, that it is part of the meaning of a performative
utterance that it can be used for advising, warning, gloating and so forth. However, Skinner argues, the
oblique illocutions are only tentatively part of the meaning of the basic utterance, and accounted for
only by the presence of social conventions. (Cohen's commitment to the forms of the illocutions as the
meanings of the performative utterances gives this argument its strength; it is not an argument against
Austin, for Strawson shows how faulty interpretation commits Austin to this notion). It is positively not
an argument against intentional analysis, the case for which is only stronger owing to the fact that, on
this, interpretation, understanding or meaning require that H be supplied with a means of interpreting S
in a context; as Skinner writes, echoing Derrida, it is '... odd to suggest that it is in virtue of its meaning
that it ['the basic utterance'] can equally have the oblique but no less intended (and intended to be
understood) force of, say, taunting or gloating33. Skinner's use of'basic' must here be understood (and,
in the light of Derrida's arguments): it gives no commitment to a metaphysical or reductionist
distinction between serious and non-serious, literal and non-literal; as the arguments presented show (in
II and IV), these distinctions may be overcome. Thau adds a consideration33. Cohen (and, one might
29 Skinner (1970) pl27 writes that Cohen does not see the implication of this fact of Austin's taxonomy, and one must add that
neither does Derrida. Searle's replacement for Austin's taxonomy is considered above in this section.
30 Skinner (1970) ppl27-128 writes that the terms in list B (allude, indicate, adumbrate and so forth), bring out the point
particularly well, '[f]or there simply is something irreducibly odd about avowing that "I hereby flatter you, patronise you", and
so on. It seems indispensable to the nature of the intended act of communication in all such cases that it should be achieved
without having in this way to be avowed. To avow, in fact, that I do intend in what I say to flatter, patronise and so on, may well
be to make explicit what I am doing, but it equally suggests that I have already in some way failed to do it'.
31 One must note again (as Grice before) that there is no distinction between spoken and non-verbal utterance being worked with
here. His conclusions have 'implications' for analyses of uptake and illocutionary force, and these points are of importance when
taken up in relation to Searle.
32 Skinner (1970) pl28. This constitutes no metaphysical distinction.
33 Thau (1971) p273.
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add, Derrida) fail to draw the distinction between the clarity in meaning of an utterance, and the
possibility of making the illocution clear (removing infelicities), with the explicit performative, and
reciprocally, it is on this distinction (as seen in IV) that any distinction between illocutions and
locutions should be founded. (Cohen is, secondly, committed also to the belief that oblique
communication has all of its specific forces, yet, Skinner replies, noting the case of innuendo, that it
can, say, be made in innocence, or with intent as a joke, even '...about the fact that it is not usually
uttered with complete innocence'. The classes of illocutionary acts are thus further contaminated.
Innocent expression is a different illocutionary act from intentional innuendo, and joking not an
illocutionary act at all)34.
Skinner's analysis raises some questions regarding Strawson's avowability condition. While
Strawson argues that the avowability of one's intentions in making utterances is 'essential' in
illocutionary acts (a condition read through the Gricean nested intentions), the cases Skinner notes (in
classes A and B) fulfil the conditions on recognition of intention, and yet are non-avowable or not
illocutionary. There follow consequences for Strawson's clarification of Austin's notion of convention,
and its replacement by Strawson's distinction. Austin argues that illocutionary acts are performed
according to conventions, and Strawson replies that this does not 'hold generally', for S may, say, issue
a warning without conventions (other than those of his language, in which his locutions are mutually
related by conventions). Thus, treating illocutions as conventional is myopic, identifying acts as
conventional because '...performed by the utterance of a form of words conventional for the
performance of that act'. The distinction is offered, Skinner writes, parsing Strawson, between acts
guided by 'convention-constituted procedures', and those '...in which it is not as conforming to an
accepted convention of any kind [other than those linguistic conventions which help to fix the meaning
34 Cohen (1964) ppl24-125. Restricting the discussion of Cohen to just those points relevant to the discussion undertaken here
does scant justice to Cohen, whose essay is wide-ranging and highly detailed. It is particularly good for exegesis of Austin, cf.
especially ppl20-125 on deep ambiguities in the notion of illocutions and perlocutions and of translations. The emphasis on
indirect discourse sets up some details of the discussion of Searle. Cohen foregrounds the distinction between illocutionary and
perlocutionary acts as that between conventional acts (those given in the explicit performative) and non-conventional acts. In this
he bases the securing of 'uptake'.
Cooper, D.E.; 'Meaning and Illocutions', American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. IX, no. 1, pp69-77, 1972, considers Cohen's
theory along with three others, those of Alston, Holdcroft and Austin respectively. He aims to reconcile the four positions, which
appear opposed. He takes first Alston's and Holdcroft's positions, namely that illocutionary acts are actual, and meanings are
explained by reference to them, and that illocutionary acts are actual, and that yet meanings cannot be explained in terms of
speech acts. The latter is given a proviso: unless, '...there is a way of telling what speech act has been performed which does not
involve making use of semantic information about L [the language in which the speech acts are uttered]' (p70). Holdcroft argues
that this 'criterion of adequacy' cannot be met, and his doubts centre on the elucidation of an act's illocutionary force.
Cooper finds two reasons for doubting the relevance of Holdcroft's arguments to Alston's analysis. Firstly, Alston works with
Austin's definition of illocutions, and so '... can hardly be unaware of the fact that most of the acts in Austin's list are essentially
verbal. Austin, indeed, makes that clear'. Secondly, Alston holds that a speech act cannot be identified from the locution used to
perform it: acts cannot be identified without 'semantic knowledge about the sentence' (pi I). Cooper next takes Austin's and
Cohen's theories: that there are illocutionary acts distinct from meanings, the former playing no role in explaining the latter, and
that there are no illocutionary acts, and thus they can play no r61e in explaining meanings.
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of the utterance] that an illocutionary act is performed'. This, palpably, is Strawson's distinction.
Skinner considers cases in which one enquires, yet validly intends (with Gricean nested intentions), an
order, and suggests that the success of communicative acts must 'to a considerable extent' be based on
the conventions of what counts as ordering. From class B examples Skinner derives the case of S
intending, and intending H to understand that he intends, to, say, patronise, without there being any
explicit avowal of this on S's part from the speech act made. Again, the conclusion is compelled that
the success of such acts depends on the satisfying of mutually-understood conventions ofwhat counts
as a speech act of a certain type35.
Skinner has two points to add to the difficulties raised for Strawson's distinction by non-standard
cases. The first (obvious for some time), says that such cases confirm the Strawsonian (and Austinian)
view that there is always a vast, shifting group of intermediate, difficult cases between explicitly
performable and non-conventional illocutionary acts. Skinner argues indeed that the non-standard cases
threaten the status of Strawson's non-conventional illocutionary acts, and thus the distinction itself, and
not least because Strawson (and Millikan) establish no means of how a non-conventional illocutionary
act can achieve successfiil communication in a context. Take the case of a warning issued, and
understood as such, in a standard or an oblique utterance. If a convention is to ease the act of
communication, there must be, over and above the shared linguistic conventions and appropriate
circumstances, 'mutually-recognised' conditions, such that S's utterance (again, verbal or non-verbal),
is able to be understood as a warning. Skinner writes, '...this seems to be a question essentially about
the nature and the extent of the social conventions which S may expect H to regard as appropriate for
the regulation of their social (and so verbal) relationships'. Skinner considers what follows from an
apposite case, one in which S is motivated not to carry out the intention to warn H in a situation in
which a warning seems proper. H might reason that an intended illocution might have an unintended
perlocutionary effect (say, of alarming or irritating) even if uptake is secured; there may be doubt
whether H will achieve uptake on the intended effect of S's utterance (S may abstain from warning for
fear that he be taken to be pleading or entreating); finally, S may wonder whether his intention may not
be taken as of a different type. In the most significant case, Skinner posits a situation in which S could
not '...gain uptake of the act as an act ofwarning simply because there was no convention at all that S
in uttering such an utterance could be understood as intending to perform that illocutionary act'. For the
35 Skinner (1970) ppl30-131 shows some applications of Strawson's distinction, to disabuse certain philosophers of mistaken
views of conventions in speech acts. He sees the distinction as 'genuine and important', and as one which 'Austin (and his
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solution of such cases Skinner writes that there must be (undefined) prior and mutually accepted social
conventions, which are 'clear and strong', allowing, say, a warning to be understood as a warning,
rather than as advice or admonishment and so forth. Skinner says correctly that this is neither an issue
of perlocutionary effects or of intended tone. 'It is firmly an issue about the part played by social
convention in the performance of any successful communication between S and H', and it is to Lewis'
work that one must look for the detailed analysis of the way in which such conventions (allowing the
establishing of standards for K-II acts, declarations and non-conventional illocutions), may arise36.
Lewis' work is a response to Quine's rejection of conventions for formal and natural languages, and the
details ofQuine's arguments are examined at the beginning of the next chapter.
followers)' have missed.
36 It is vital to emphasise that Skinner (and Strawson) share some important notions with Derrida and meaning-relativists, namely
those concerning that fact that conventions in speech acts cannot be understood in any simplistic manner as reporting
illocutionary effects that can be read for their accompanying intentions; however, countering peculiarly Derridean scepticism,
Skinner argues that conventions obtain in the broader social convention that he describes. Skinner (1970) ppl33-138 goes on to
describe some more complicated types of communication situation.
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IV I MUTUAL KNOWLEDGE
1. Analvticitv and Convention
For Stroud, Quine's work is characterised by the thorough rejection of conventionalism, a case in point
being his analysis of the status of logic and mathematics1. Quine writes that it seems platitudinous to
say that increasing advances in the exact sciences link assumptions to definitions, which, in turn,
become analytic truths, or, that '...what was once regarded as a theory about the world becomes
reconstrued as a convention of language': this seems a corollary of progress2. However, Quine repeats
the lessons of the indeterminacy of translation and the stimulus-response theory of meaning, saying that
there can be no conventions for theory formation, and that an argument that the logic binding the web
is through-and-through conventional is comprehensively challenged3. Quine questions the sense of
forcing a fruitless dichotomy between the rival theories, and his later criticism of analyticity has a
similar motivation, offering a general theory, one crystallised in the claim that all and every statement
1 Stroud, B.; 'Conventionalism and the Indeterminacy of Translation', pp82-96 in Davidson, D. and Hintikka, J. (eds.); Words
andObjections: Essays on the Work ofW. V. Quine (Dordrecht, Reidel) 1969.
2Quine, W.V.O.; 'Truth by Convention', pp70-99 in The Ways ofParadox and Other Essays (New York, Random House) 1966.
Quine gives the example of Einstein exploiting, to establish a convention, the possibility of simultaneity at a distance.
3 Putnam rejects the idea that the impossibility of radical translation follows from the rejection of the analytic-synthetic
distinction. Putnam, H.; 'The Refutation of Conventionalism', ppl53-191 inMind, Language andReality: Philosophical Papers,
Volume II (Cambridge University Press) 1975. He finds the common interpretation of Quine to be a misunderstanding, and
refutes the interpretation with the help of Quine2, the real Quine. Putnam argues that both Quine and Grtinbaum use a similar
notion of convention, the 'conventionalist ploy', and that it is the benefit of axiomatic method in mathematics that the
weaknesses in this can be indicated. Putnam shows that arguments for conventions are fallacious, and conceal forms of
essentialism (ppl62-163). The impossibility of achieving radical translation occurs, Putnam writes paraphrasing the
conventionalists, because all possible translations are always,'.. .part of the meaning of the notion of a metric [in Grtinbaum] or
of the notion of an analytical hypothesis', and, moreover, that '...any further condition that one might suggest would definitely
not be part of the meaning of the notion in question, and also would not be a "substitute law" about the notion in question (since
a "substitute law" would presuppose that the extension of the notion in question had somehow been fixed...' (pl63), a condition
the conventionalist would not accept.
Putnam (1975b) ppl64-165 distinguishes a trivial conventionality (the sound 'dog' means 'dog' and not 'telephone') and says
that given use and a meaning for terms, there is, following Quine, no fact of the matter as to how they are rendered true. Putnam
argues that Quine's conventionalism is thus trivial or false, and because all reference, again following Quine, is a function of
theory, and so is subject to the rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction. Putnam develops a theory of reference as maximal
coherence of terms, not as conventional, and Quine2 would accede. Quine's conditions on translation do not differ from 'meaning
postulates', and cf. 'The Analytic and the Synthetic', pp33-69 in (1975b).
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in language or theory can be revised in the light of'recalcitrant experience'4. In the image of the web of
belief any statement close to the periphery may be retained for pragmatic or utilitarian purposes,
potentially with the revision of relevant ('deeper') logical laws, and belief so conceived cannot tolerate
an analytic/synthetic distinction. In this Quine dismisses not merely a theory of necessary truths giving
a priori knowledge, but the possibility of such a theory, for there is an under-determination of
knowledge by experience, and it is a matter for decision as to which statements remain in the web, and
which are rejected5.
In his later work on analyticity Quine considers arguments for the making sense of language
possession and acquisition in terms of stimulus and response. Indeterminacy obtains here also, for a
mapping onto itself of the sentences of S's language leaves unchanged his 'dispositions to verbal
behaviour', but gives no definite, consistent equivalences of sentences and dispositions6. (The 'overall
pattern' of sentence associations and of non-verbal stimuli in the web remains the same). Many
manuals may be devised for the translation of S's native language into another, all apparently
accounting for S's stimulus conditions, but none of which are compatible, owing to their irreducible
underdetermination. Indeterminacy does not, for Quine, extend to observation sentences and truth-
functions, for each instance of a truth function must contain variables used in the language7. There is no
equivalent for a truth function in the language that would map onto itself leaving a disposition to
respond unchanged, and, Stroud continues: '[i]f Tx and T2 are not equivalent, and yet can be translated
on objective behavioural grounds, then the speaker's dispositions with respect to them must differ';
they must be different truth functions8. The translations of such statements is determinate, and in this
Stroud finds the kernel of Quine's later arguments against conventions and analyticity. For statements
to which there are 'no non-equivalent alternatives', Quine writes, convention or decision plays no part
in their acceptance or rejection because there can be written no appropriate conventions. Quine grants,
for the sake of argument, that if mathematics is constructible from logic, on the model of the truth
4 The beginning of Quine's study is made with an examination of conventional logical notation.. Cf. Putnam, H.; 'An
Examination of Gritabaum's Philosophy of Geometry', pp93-129 in Mathematics, Matter andMethod: Philosophical Papers,
Volume I (Cambridge University Press) 1975. Putnam examines Griinbaum's work on convention in geometry and classical
mechanics. The discussion is extended in 'Memo on Conventionalism', pp206-214. Davidson (2001) p313 writes that Quine
'saved' philosophy of language by categorically rejecting the analytic-synthetic distinction, and White (1952) p317 notes the
irony in the fact that it is formal logicians who have carried out this work. Recall that Rorty (1979) p7 says that his criticisms of
'analytic' philosophy are 'borrowed' from 'Sellars, Quine, Davidson, Ryle, Malcolm, Kuhn and Putnam'.
5
Rorty might say that here is evidenced Quine's thorough going pragmatism.
6
Quine (1960) and cf. 1.5.
7
Quine sees no discontinuity between 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' and Word and Object. In the former he is 'concerned to
stress general revisability', and in the latter 'sensory evidence'. Statements close to the periphery can be held true, and there are
none immune to revision. 'The sustaining force is observation'. The state of insusceptibility to revision is never reached, for, in




functions, then it is true by convention 'in a relative sense'9, and Quine adds that this may be all that is
meant by saying that mathematics is true by convention,'at least, an analytic statement is commonly
explained merely as one which proceeds from logic and definitions, or as one which, on replacement of
definienda by definientia, becomes a truth of logic'. However, the difficulty again concerns the account
given of the logical principles themselves, for they must, in turn, be true by convention for the
argument to work. The argument might be filled in: one wishing to argue for logic as non-conventional,
and diminish the number ofprinciples to be held true by convention, must add to the corpus of analytic
truths, but do so without standards to which one may appeal for one's decisions10, and this is to base
logic on a convention 'other than definition', for definitions (allowing the 'movement' defined above),
transform truths, but cannot, for fear of regress, found them. The connection to the arguments for the
indeterminacy of translation is clear".
While arguments have (in 1.5) been given against Quine, those from Stroud should be discussed.
Stroud asks whether the condition requiring that a statement's being revisable compels its
indeterminacy is a necessary one, and he remarks that the indeterminacy present in the case of the
logical truths is that relative to a given set of dispositions to verbal behaviour (the tribe (S) is disposed
to accept certain logical truths, revealed by scientists' observation), and that dispositions remain
unchanged even under indeterminacy. Quine shows that there are no equivalents to truth functions if
there are no alternatives to the tribe's verbal dispositions, but the conventionalist affirms precisely this:
that there are indeed relevant alternatives to verbal dispositions, for it is a convention that one speaks as
one does. Different dispositions would determine the acceptance of different truth-functions, or
'tautologies', and if the arguments of 1.5 are accepted and supplemented, the ontological relativity of
native and interpreter engendered by their differing dispositions can be overcome and relative
dispositions discovered and interpreted12. That scientists can discern S's truth functions does not mean
that they are those the scientists accept: indeed, in his argument that S's and the scientists' dispositions
could not conceivably be the same, Quine might be said tacitly to accept that there are alternatives to
the scientists' truth-functions for there are alternatives to their dispositions. Stroud conjures the image
that haunts Quine, of a board of syndics convened for the settlement of a social contract to ratify the
dispositions to speech of a language community, and finds no reason for fear; Stroud argues (and the
9
Stroud (1969) p87 and Quine (1966) pp80 -81. The same reference applies for the following quotation.
10 This problem is solved by Lewis. Cf. Hookway, C.; Quine: Language, Experience and Reality (Cambridge, Polity) 188,
ppllO-111.
1 Cf. Quine's foreword to Lewis (1969). On this, cf. Dummett (1976) pp79-83.
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same conclusion shall be offered with reference to Lewis), that it is only because a speech community
accepts standards (conventions) that it accepts truth functions13.
Stroud, echoing Lewis, writes that there is utility in the fiction of a contract setting down conventions
of language. One may examine cases in which dispositions differ: 'Lo, a rabbit!' might, in a foreign
tongue, report a stimulus provided by what one is personally disposed to call a tortoise. This, however,
unless it immediately overturns one's accepted convention, would have no consequences for one's faith
in what one accepts as truth-functions. The utterances report stimuli consonant with different
dispositions, but, as Stroud says,
[a]s long as there is only a class of stimulations prompting assent to "Rabbit", another
prompting dissent, and perhaps a third which inhibits a verdict, then whatever these
stimulations happen to be, the sentence "Rabbit and not-Rabbit" would command assent
under all stimulations that would elicit a verdict to "Rabbit" at all'14.
Stroud's argument says that is, one can share with the native stimuli to different dispositions without
harm to one's truth functions. All three responses (assent, dissent, no verdict) have associated stimuli,
and stimuli provoking the third would show the existence of compound sentences, describing truth
functions, to which S would not respond, formed by the components of the sentences to which he
expresses assent or dissent, even though they are translations of sentences to which the scientists assent
after stimulations which elicit responses to the components. By Quine's argument, if S has different
dispositions than those of the scientists, his remarks instantiate different logical truths, but if the
scientists discern the appropriate dispositions, reported in assent or dissent to the components of the
shared compound sentences, they may, it seems, provide a translation. However this may be, roles in
the web of belief for analytic truths, or their analogues, have been demonstrated, and if the scientists'
language contains resources to articulate S's alien disposition, then the capacity exists for them to make
the alien response, and in the language web there exist connections of stimulus and response to the
same logical truths, none ofwhich are different from their own15.
As argued in 1.5 it seems that there must be presuppositions, approximating analytic truths, in S's and
H's language, allowing the translation ofalien dispositions: but what might their status be? As seen, for
12 Stroud (1969) p87.
13 Stroud (1969) p88.
14 Stroud (1969) p88.
15 Cf. Camap's dismissal ofHeidegger. Also, among many other titles, Marhenke, P.; 'The Criterion of Significance', ppl39-159
inLinsky, L. (ed.); Semantics and the Philosophy of Language (University of Illinois) 1952. See also Friedman, M.; 'Carnap,
Cassirer and Heidegger: The Davos Disputation and Twentieth-Century Philosophy', European Journal of Philosophy, vol. X,
no. 4, pp263-274, 2002.
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Quine, a mapping of the sentences of a language onto itself, the possibility of the rejection of logical
truths, and of different stimulus-response conditions, are ruled out by the fact that all putative
alternatives are only conceivable in the language used. He argues not only that all alternatives are
viable, but that all are already in use, spread throughout the entire web, and that mutual dispositions to
language behaviour are incommensurable and untranslatable. To repeat, he argues that observation
sentences and tautologies are peripheral to the web, and are not subject to revision, but with Stroud's
response, and that of 1.5, in mind, one may leave this matter and attend to Quine's application of his
arguments to a rejection of alternative possible conceptual schemes. He proceeds from the premise that
the acceptance or revision of sentences occurs within the one and only language web; again, in the
mapping of a single language there is no possibility of conflicting conceptual schemes with differing
stimulus-response criteria.
To the same degree that the radical translation of sentences is underdetermined by the
totality of dispositions to verbal behaviour, our own theories and beliefs in general are
underdetermined by the totality ofpossible sensory evidence time without end16.
The one conceptual scheme, as and when it requires repair, is revised as a 'going concern'17, (and with
this image, of a ship being repaired while under sail, Quine makes clear his commitment to the
Carnapian project of parsimony in theory construction). The image of the web of belief shows that the
only way in which theories may explain experience, and the degree of parsimony invoked, is
articulated in the condition requiring that any alternatives are always already conceivable ways of
speaking open to one in one's language. He adds:
[wjhat is a possibility for us is always a function of our actual ways of thought and
speech and the state of our knowledge at the time, and so the notion of a possibility or a
possible world sub specie aeternitatis, without connection with any set of verbal
dispositions and beliefs, makes no sense18.
Adaptation or novelty is provided for piecemeal, and the 'bulk' (the 'going concern') of the language
remains unchanged. In time, as a cumulative effect, great conceptual change may result. One might ask




Quine (1960) p4. Quine introduces the metaphor ofNeurath's ship.
18
Quine (1966) p. It shall be seen that this argument does not apply to Lewis' possible worlds, for they are predicated on the idea
that they retain connections with verbal dispositions and beliefs. Indeed, Quine's remark might be thought compatible with
moderate realism about possible worlds, and, incidentally, demonstrates Rorty's point that Quine denies that epistemology can
appeal to any direct check with reality.
237
truths, in an alien conceptual scheme. Quine's argument that the translation of truth-functional logical
truths is determinate, and that thus they are not revisable, again raises the question of their status. As
has been argued, if the indeterminacy of translation is taken as a sufficient but not a necessary
condition for the revisability of statements, Quine's arguments against conventions are less potent, for
the logical truths are indeed, by these standards, revisable in different conceptual schemes or possible
worlds19. The arguments of 1.5 show that there must be present in the web, to allow the revision of
beliefs for which Quine argues, statements approximating conventions, or more tentatively, truths
analytic for that language.
Quine rejects the relativisation of truth and analyticity to possible worlds, arguing that there is no
position sub specie aeternitatis1*. The revision of one's corpus of accepted truths occurs piecemeal and
only in a language; the best is constantly reconstructed and always against a background of linguistic
usage; in extremis the only guide in the evolution of a new conceptualisation is its promise21. This,
Quine argues, demands nothing either of convention or of identities between conceptual schemes. He
offers an example of the identity, or individuation, of an object over time and according to different
conceptual schemes22. Objects are individuated by inhering in a prior notion of 'body', with
dimensions, orientation in space and so forth, for they may receive conflicting definitions in different
conceptual schemes offering different means of filling variables in quantification over objects. Quine
argues that this goes for quantification over individuals in possible worlds23. Quantification may be
made over all objects defined in a language, but in a predication the means by which objects are
identified is pertinent to the truth value of a sentence, and the means by which the subordinates of
'body' may be defined do not obtain in differing possible worlds, and thus another predication, like a
sentence, applies only in a context; in this is the heart of Quine's arguments against essentialism21. If
one assumes that a single property can be predicated of an object ((3x) NFx), and the quantification
extended to the identity of objects in other possible worlds, a further predicate is given (G) fulfilled by




Quine, W.V.O.; 'Identity, Ostension and Hypostasis', pp65-79 in (1980) pp78-79.
22 In this following Hintikka (1975). Hintikka also discusses the view of modal logic as (as Marcus said) conceived in the
confusion of use and mention. Cf. Quine, W.V.O.; 'Worlds Away', ppl24-128 in Theories and Things (Harvard University
Press) 1982.
23 Cf. especially Quine (1982) pl26. The Fregean heritage is acknowledged elsewhere in a discussion of the indiscemibility of
identicals, and Quine writes that failure of substitutivity shows that, '...the statement depends not only on the object but on the
form of the name.' The difficulties raised by opacity, and of contexts of quotation, are again detailed for their significance for
reference, and their ramifications extended to the modal contexts. Cf. 'Reference andModality', ppl 39-159 in Quine (1980).
24 Cf. White (1952) p327 for a similar example, pointing up the incommensurability of conventions. There is a palpable
connection with the indeterminacy of translation, and cf. Quine (1936) and (1951). Kazmi distinguishes Quine's notion of
referential opacity from his other theories of essentialism (following upon the analytic-synthetic distinction) and the of
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an x which instantiates NFx. The problem then is to give conditions for cross-world identity for x to
affirm its status as Gx. The same problems are seen to arise25. These arguments are of a piece with
Quine's rejection of the notion of quantifying into prepositional attitudes, and he states that identities
between objects in different worlds cannot be ascribed according to any view of intentionality
predicated on the modalities and prepositional attitudes26. Quine writes that,'... [ejach beliefworld will
involve countless beliefs that are not seperately recognisable objects of the believer's beliefs at all, for
the believer does believe still that there are countless such beliefs.' Reciprocally, quantifying into
prepositional attitude contexts will not account for all of these many beliefs, and Quine rejects such
idioms as any part of a canonical, scientific, extensional notation21.
There are two arguments still to be made, the first revisiting the remarks of 1.5 and of Stroud, and
fully making the case that the holistic web must include, to establish Quine's own arguments,
statements approximating, to all intents and purposes, analytic truths. Secondly, and extending into
IV.2-3, it is argued that Lewis' conceptions of possible worlds, of conceptual scheme and of
conceptualisation (the latter as in the stream of experience in the web of belief), are all immune to
Quine's arguments against conventions, analyticity and essentialism. Indeed, Lewis' theory of
epistemology. Kazmi, A.A.; 'Quantification and Opacity', Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. X, no. 1, pp77-100, 1987. Kazmi
offers a theory of prepositional attitudes without quantification into opaque contexts.
25 Those obviated, Quine (1982) pl27 says, unsuccessfully by Kripke's rigid designators. Smith and Mclntyre (1982) discuss the
difficulties of identity with reference to Quine's example in 'Quantifiers and Prepositional Attitudes', ppl83-194 in Quine (1966)
and the problems for the indiscernibility of identity, pp227-228 and pp232 and 244ff. The point is clear: an intentional act
intending more than what is prescribed in its Sinn reveals that each act is related to a horizon of other possible acts, '...whose
Sinne (the possible manifolds of perception), would tend to complete what is left open or indeterminate about the object in a
given intention of it'. (p229). See also on Husserl's notion of how a possible world may be completely determined, pp260-261ff
and Ideas §44, and on the development ofHusserl's notion of horizon pp233-240. Woodruff Smith and Mclntyre (1982) pp289-
300 detail Husserl's use of a possible worlds semantics and a metaphysics of possible worlds. They note a remark at Cartesian
Mediatations §60, speaking of a range of infinitely many possible worlds. The locus classicus of the metaphysics of possible
worlds is Lewis, D.K.; On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford, Blackwell) 1986. Woodruff Smith and Mclntyre (p304) find that
possible worlds are not essential to Husserl's theory of intentionality, but that a possible worlds theory carries with it an
assumption ofmeanings comparable to that in the semantic theory traditionally ascribed to Frege and Husserl (pp309ff). This is
expressed best of all on p316: 'In a sense, then, there is no "pure" possible-worlds theory of intentionality, if "pure" means
ultimately free from a life of Sinn'. Husserl writes that without horizon analysis intentionality remains 'anonymous', and on his
relation to Descartes, cf. Cartesian Meditations §20. He goes on to emphasise the Kantian influence, and cf. Woodruff Smith and
Mclntyre (1982) pp233-236, 274-275, 277 and 288. The temporal aspect of the perceptions constituting the horizon is discussed
in Woodruff Smith and Mclntyre (1982) pp258-261. The best study is Miller, I.; Husserl, Perception and Temporal Awareness
(MIT) 1984.
Woodruff Smith andMclntyre (1982) pp246ff discusses the pre-determination of an act's horizon, with reference to Husserl's
nascent notion of 'habitus', in comparison to Searle's The Background.
26 Cf. in development of the arguments given earlier, Hintikka, J.; 'Quine on Quantifying In: A Dialogue', ppl02-136 in (1975).
27
See Hookway (1988) ppl22-123. Modality has a tortured relationship within modem quantificational logic, best characterised
by both Russell's and Quine's omitting its terms from their ontologies; indeed, the paradigmatic example ofwhat there are not in
Quine's 'On What There Is', ppl-19 in (1980), are modalities, intensions and intentions. The indeterminacy of translation is, by
Quine's own admission, nothing but Brentano's irreducibility of intentional idioms, and for all Carnap's influence, Quine
remained sceptical of his Aufbau, that is, the writing of a thorough ontology ofmodality. A longer work would make the case that
Derrida's differance is rightly considered as nothing but the apotheosis of the conditions of possibility for reference, for what is
dijfirance but the necessary failure of intentional reference? On this cf. Harvey, I.; Derrida and the Economy of Differance
(Indiana University Press) 1986, p37.
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convention is expressly a response to Quine and White; before it is presented, Quine's substantive
arguments against analyticity must be detailed28.
Quine's arguments against the analytic/synthetic distinction are premised (as in the early work) upon
a puzzle regarding the way in which knowledge is acquired, and form a challenge to reductionism29. He
asks what concept of meaning is presupposed in the distinction, a question Kant did not ask. Meaning
is given not by checking the names of the constituent terms of, say, a statement 'x means y', for, as
Quine shows, names can agree in extension yet differ in intension30. The same goes for predicates,
('general' terms in Quine), as they are true of named entities rather than used to dub as yet unnamed
entities. The meaning of a general term cannot be identified with its extension, (its referents in all
possible cases), for, like names, they can apply to precisely the same things yet differ in intension.
Kant's presupposition is not easily seen when the cases under examination are names or extensions,
two fundamental concepts in the analysis of the constituent terms of a sentence, and paradigmatically
so in a subject-predicate sentence.
Quine rejects the theory of specific concepts belonging to individual essences. Essences can plausibly
be parsed in a number ofways, as Quine's examples of rationality and two-leggedness show, and as the
example (above) of defining an object has shown. He concludes from such cases that: '[mjeaning is
what essence becomes when it is divorced from the object of reference and wedded to the word'31.
Having established that meanings cannot be identified with names, extensions, or essences, Quine
states that one may accept that a theory ofmeaning can postulate nothing in the way of abstract entities,
but that analyticity may be defined in another way. Quine identifies two classes of potentially analytic
statements. The first gives statements true in all possible worlds: reinterpretations of constituent terms
(perhaps, translations), will still yield truths salva veritate. The second gives a truth with differing
constituent terms but which is still analytic, that is, terms with the same extension but different
intensions. (Better still: they could be given different intensions). Quine's examples are variants on one
another. 'No unmarried man is married', and 'No bachelor is married' respectively. Using synonymy to
28 Lewis' definition of analyticity is considered in Szorenyi, N.; 'Review of D.K. Lewis, Convention: A Philosophical Study',
Australasian Journal ofPhilosophy, vol. LIII, no. 1, pp75-82, 1975, especially p76.
25
Quine, W.V.O.; 'Two Dogmas ofEmpiricism', pp20-46 in (1980b).
30
Here, and throughout, he quotes Frege's example of the astronomer dubbing the Morning and the Evening stars. For 'general'
terms see p21. Elsewhere Quine considers Kant's question of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgements (Quine, W.V.O.;
'Carnap and Logical Truth', pplOO-125 in (1966b).
31
Quine (1980) p22. The rest of the quotations in this paragraph are from pp22-23.
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change the latter into the former is unacceptable to Quine, for the notion of synonymy is not logically
restricted, as the notion ofmeaning as essence is required to be32.
OfQuine's two stated versions of analyticity he considers the first to raise no significant difficulties,
for the statements in this class are true in all possible worlds. The statements of the second class require
more detailed treatment. Having discussed how definitions may generate synonymy in identical
contexts, Quine offers an alternative: abbreviate via notations. In a simple definition the definiendum is
unique, created specifically for the relevant purpose: there is, thus, no reliance on pre-existing
synonymies. There is here an intimation of Quine's holism, stated more clearly in a specific example.
Knowledge, paradigmatically mathematical knowledge, requires two things, firstly, an economy in the
number of terms used and a preference for simplicity, and secondly, a procedure by which the basic
terms can be applied to novel situations, in this case, a grammar. Quine marks a tension between these
two requirements: economy in the number of terms of the language will make more difficult the
transformations and combinations that the grammar specifies; combining the two in an 'inclusive
language', gives requisite economy in 'message lengths' but a potentially unworkable, primitive,
grammar and vocabulary33. Excepting the cases of newly-created notations, Quine concludes,
definitions depend upon a prior synonymy; the only plausible correlations between the primitive
vocabulary and the stated grammar are meant to mirror all that an earlier language can while showing
analyticity, and these conditions all depend upon synonymy.
By imparting this arbitrariness in the assigning of meaning to a term in the inclusive language Quine
makes the point that synonymy of terms is the vital notion in determining analyticity. The example of
'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' shows again that intension is the relevant consideration in
interchanging terms, although Quine countenances a way out through taking each of the occurrences of
'bachelor' as a 'single indivisible word', regarding interchangeability as applying to each separate
occurrence34. Turning analytic statements into logical truths simply by substituting synonyms for
synonyms will, it is claimed, show the real nature of analytic statements: that they are true by virtue of
meaning. However, Quine faces this with an example (i): 'All and only bachelors are unmarried',
which, considering cognitive synonymy, is analytic. One may derive from this (ii): 'Necessarily all and
32
Carnap's description of analyticity in terms of the assignment of truth values to non-compound statements of a language is
rejected (pp24-27). The truth value of a complex statement is, for Carnap, constructed by the combination of each of its non-
compound statements in accordance with logical laws, and Quine replies that to give a truth value to all specifiable non-
compound sentences would be to make them all mutually independent. In the case of 'John is married' and 'John is a bachelor'




only bachelors are bachelors', and, in turn, (iii) 'Necessarily all and only bachelors are unmarried men',
without alteration in truth value. This is to say that (iii) is true, and hence that (i) is analytic, and
'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' cognitively synonymous.
Quine objects primarily to the use of the adverb 'necessarily'; there could be no room for it in an
extensional language; it is an undefined term in a language constructed from first principles, and, more
specifically, from combinations of predicates and variables as atomic sentences, and complex sentences
formed by the inclusion of truth functions according to logic. There are no undefined terms, and any
two predicates which apply to the same things (have the same extension), are interchangeable. Quine
continues, however, that this could apply across a broad range of terms, and so cognitive synonymy is
not assured. Quine's suggested way around this difficulty builds upon a suggestion that analyticity can
correctly be brought out in an artificial language, obviating the difficulties of ordinary language.
Language L0 will, it is assumed, include a specification of all of the analytic statements of the
language; at least, Quine thinks it had better, for one is dealing only with 'analytic for L0'35. It could, to
take another tack, arbitrarily be defined, and the attribution rules be peculiar to the language itself.
Quine expresses a second problem, concerning the semantical rules of artificial languages being always
relative to other semantical rules. Artificial and hypothetical languages would need to incorporate
factors for the determination of analyticity. This, Quine says, is not defining analyticity, merely making
it an irreducible characteristic. Truths of statements must be looked for outside the domain of pure
linguistics: quite simply, a statement would have been false if events occurred differently from the way
reported in the statement, and sentence meanings are changed by the different interpretation of one of
the terms in the sentence. There is a 'factual component' to each statement, but Quine repeats that this
does not create a 'boundary' between the analytic and the synthetic36. A more sophisticated analysis
considers a verificationalist theory of meaning: the meaning of a statement is its method of being
empirically confirmed. By this definition an analytic statement should be true in all cases, and
synonymous statements will be confirmed by dint of synonymy. However, Quine rejects this
reductionism, and because it claims that all statements are translatable into new statements describing
the situation given in terms of sensory experience, that which the first statement described purely as
events in the world. There is an immediate ambiguity: the new language does not distinguish sense-




36 Quine (1980) pp36-37.
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data considered as qualities or as events. More pressing is the difficulty of the required term-by-term
reduction, necessary given the number of statements to be reduced. Quine suggests in reply that
statements about the external world are confirmed or refuted by sense-experience only as parts of a
'corporate body' (the Duhem-Quine hypothesis), and this disallows any distinction between analytic
and synthetic statements, for one's readjustments and shiftings in the web of beliefs proceed upon
rational, 'pragmatic' lines37.
A preliminary objection to Quine focuses on his use of the identity statement. Quine wishes to
establish by it the conclusion that meaning cannot be given by examining the names of the constituent
terms. That the Morning Star is the Evening Star is an a posteriori discovery made after checking
observations and astronomical data; it does not have, one might say, the same a priori status, and
hence, claim to analyticity, as does, say, 2+2=4. Difficulties in this approach concern the fact that there
is, potentially, no difference between discovering that the Morning Star is the Evening Star, and
'discovering' that 2+2=4, and the intuition behind the objection is that mathematical propositions have
a stronger claim to apriori status, or analyticity. The slack in Quine's theory allowing this objection to
arise, stems perhaps from the fact that his radical empiricism is taken to the extent of postulating the
web of beliefs, in which all propositions have no empirical content as individual propositions, and are
thus open to revision and rejection, and is largely unsupported by positive arguments; rather Quine
relies on attacking possible definitions of analyticity38.
Quine rejects intensions because they, as do proper names, have no specific set of referents; or, if
they do, the extensions cannot properly determine all that have the same intension. An illuminating
way into Quine's discussion of intensions and extensions is to apply an argument derived from Rripke
and Putnam, and aimed specifically at Russell's Theory of Descriptions. One significant criticism of
Russellian theory is that all potential descriptions of a particular 'natural kind' term could turn out to be
false3'. With a lead from Putnam's twin-earth thought-experiment the objection says that meanings can
be described as the potential uses, or scope, of a term, (its extension), because in all senses that one, in
this world, knows that tigers are cats, one knows it necessarily to be so40. For something to count as
being a tiger it must fulfil a series of stated criteria defining the concept of being a tiger. Extension can
be determined by intension. Self-evidently, Quine would reject this suggestion, giving as it does, a
37 Cf. Quine (1980) p44-46
38
As argued in Grice, H.P. and Strawson, P.F.; 'In Defence of a Dogma', ppl96-212 in Grice (1989).
39 As described in Strawson's objections to the theory of descriptions (footnotes to 1.4), it can be argued that one can never know
enough about the referent of a term to give it full description.
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possible criterion for analyticity. Some things are necessarily tigers; there are a series of logical truths
one could state about them. Here is an illuminating angle from which to examine Quine's rejection of
extensions as giving meanings, for he accepts the notion of logical truths, true under all
reinterpretations of constituent terms. The second class of cases raises the difficulty of analyticity, for
changing 'No bachelor is married' to 'No unmarried man is married' requires the notion of synonymy,
which is a further intensional concept left undefined. The concept of synonymy needs strict criteria;
without it analyticity cannot be elucidated. (Names and extensions have been considered and rejected).
There is a difficulty in seeing what Quine will permit if he will rule out as much as he does. His
attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction is wholly negative. Having ruled out intensions and
extensions as defining analyticity, one assumes that Quine wants alternatives to give a more adequate
explanation. The rejection of names and extensions force a conclusion which tends toward holism.
(Quine's ersatz of intensional notions in Word and Object is considered in context). Carnap's
suggestion of postulating an artificial language is rejected, not just because of the considerations
outlined, but because analyticity in this language will remain peculiar to it. The response might better
utilise arguments he gives against intensions and extensions, for if he is prepared to consider analyticity
in this language, then it could be given by any language, real or artificial. For a more formal response,
Quine offers his own 'extensional' language, one given wholly in logical notation: predicates and
variables in combination through logical constants. There are no undefined terms, and synonymy is
present in interchangeable predicates applying to the same things. This, however, only explains the
logical truths which Quine, correctly one must admit, says do not pose the real difficulties of
analyticity, and, besides, arguments against Quine's theory of logical truths are given above. On one
interpretation Quine has himself presupposed the notions of synonymy in claiming that his ideal
language is fully reflective of all an earlier language (or a now discredited conceptual scheme) can do.
In stating that logical truths are the fundamental building blocks of this extensional language the
construction of complex statements is said to proceed through combination of the basic logical truths.
Another interpretation says that the ideal language is to serve the purpose only of explication and not
analysis, but either way the problem of synonymy has not been overcome, just ignored. The
expressions holding in place of the variables may still arbitrarily be combined; their meanings need
never be the same, and so analyticity, statements synonymous with logical truths, is lacking. Quine's
40 Cf. Putnam, H.; 'The Meaning of "Meaning"', pp215-271 in (1975b).
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theory seems to import the intension and extension of the laws of logic. He speaks of building complex
sentences through the application of logic. The building derives from the most simple elements: the
construction of this language must still take regard of validity and soundness, necessitating tight
restrictions on the terms which can be applied. Quine certainly presupposes the extension of his logical
language. Quine could reply that logic has a clear extension, that is, all statements in a language. He
could say that logical laws are perfectly clear extensional terms. Of course, there must be a set of
restrictions as to which terms under this extension may be combined; it cannot be simply an arbitrary
process. However, Quine lets his notion of extensionality rest upon that of intensionality, for he claims
that any predicates that apply to the same things (have the same extension), are those which are
'interchangeable'. This process of interchangeability can only depend upon synonymy. The charge is
only made stronger when Quine goes beyond considering language in purely formal, logical terms, and
turns to its 'factual components', arguing that sentence meanings are changed by the different
interpretation of the terms in the sentence.
Quine's final argument against the analytic/synthetic distinction is embodied in his holism. Quine's
holism is a plausible intuition about the formation of knowledge, but to do what Quine intends it to do
it would have considerably to be strengthened. The image of the web of belief says that in principle all
beliefs are relevant to a particular question or experience, and are, subsequently, all equally revisable.
The mere fact that Quine singles out the logical laws for mention suggests their case is singular. One's
more simple, less sophisticated beliefs form the periphery: they are changed by sense-experience. That
is, the change is not voluntary, it is imposed upon one by experience conflicting with that which one
earlier accepted: 'recalcitrant experience'. This suggests that they are distinct, but Quine may reply that
any experience has a direct evidential link to the logical laws relevant in this situation, as it may
suggest an immediate change in an accepted constant. This description, however, suggests equally that
logical laws are at the periphery, something Quine is unwilling to say. Quine's argument that all
statements have both a 'factual' and a 'linguistic' component allows a second objection to his holism.
The periphery, that which confronts experience, can be said to have both components, but Quine says
that analytic statements are those without factual components, ones true by virtue of their logical
constituents; indeed, this is the only sort of analyticity Quine allows. Unless all have a linguistic
component, the beliefs in the web are being distinguished upon some criteria: an analytic/synthetic
distinction is being made.
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There is no reason to say that logical rules are closer to the centre if all rules share the same status. If
sense-experience and belief are changed by one's experiences, then the effect this has upon the logical
laws one accepts is unclear. This constitutes a further problem. Quine objects to the verification
principle on the grounds that there are no criteria for the translation of the terms of sensory experience
into those describing events in the world. One might suggest, however, that Quine's holism lacks, and
needs, criteria of translation for the periphery of sense-experience to the normative laws of logic. If
they are to be revised, then it must clearly be stated just how far the former bears on the latter. Quine
would say that his extensional, logical language is not in need of translation, for one constructs
sentences according to the laws of logic. This tends to the conclusion that the laws of logic are all-
pervasive throughout the web of belief. In turn, this suggests that, as logic is found both at the centre
and at the periphery, one revises logic on the basis of sense-experience. One should prefer to say, it can
confidently be claimed, that recalcitrant experience would be rejected long before one rejected the
logical law. The web of belief, postulated in the Duhem-Quine hypothesis, is a plausible theory, but
only on the condition that the web is adapted to contain a core of fundamental laws, analytic
statements, which one abandons only when faced with a mass of recalcitrant experience. Logical
principles may well apply throughout the web, but only in the sense that experiences are seen in the
light of a distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. Necessarily 'bachelor' and 'unmarried
man' are cognitively synonymous, for one cannot define synonymy, an intensional and an extensional
term, without appeal to other intensional terms. Some definite meanings must be taken as analytic41,
and Lewis shows how synonymies may be established without fear of regress.
41 This, in turn, lends support to the Kripke/Putnam theory of reference. Putnam (1975b) gives a foil to Frege's theory of sense
and reference. (See Yourgrau, P.; "The Path Back to Frege', pp97-132 in Yourgrau (1990) plOO and also Salmon, N.; Frege's
Puzzle (Harvard University Press) 1986, p. One's of the reference of one's words, it is argued, is not the specification of what is
truly the referent (the semantic referent). In Yourgrau (1990) plOl the claim is made that Putnam's twin-earth is a possible
world, explicitly in opposition to Leibniz's and to the between Leibniz and Kant on the constitution of space. See Hanna, R.;
Kant and the Foundations ofAnalytic Philosophy (Oxford, Clarendon) 2001, p, and Mates, B.; 'Leibniz on Possible Worlds',
pp335-364 in Loux (1979). Kant's categories, for Yourgrau, give a commitment to the ideality of space (for he argues that
distinct, yet symmetrical, cross-world counterparts exist in a distinct yet symmetrical universe). The problem of identifying
across possible worlds is simply that of the absolute versus the relational theory of space. (See Kemp Smith, N.; A Commentary
to Kant's 'Critique ofPure Reason' (London, Macmillan & Company) 1923, ppxxv-xxxiii. (One might consider the question of
which is conventional). The necessity of both intuitions and concepts for knowledge and the existence of a distinct yet world
allows space to be only an intuition (it is the form of an intuition and thus prior to conceptualisation). Corollaries of this are that
there is no one thing of which one could say that it is the correspondent of one's world or description of space, and that one, in
using such words and descriptions is speaking of a possible world and of nothing resembling an actual world. As Lewis argues,
one always refers to possible worlds. On the of a theory of intentionality for any theory of space, cf. Wittgenstein, L.;
Philosophical Remarks (University of Chicago) 1975, his response to Russell, B.; The Analysis ofMind (London, George Allen
&UnwinLtd) 1921. This should be read with Husserl's work on geometry andMerleau-Ponty's response.
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2. Convention and Coordination
Lewis describes Convention as his 'effort to rehabilitate analyticity', and Quine states his reservations1,
writing that appeal to an analytic/synthetic distinction, '...is a characteristic and crucial case of
appealing to convention where there can have been no thought of convening'2. Quine says that
contractualist theories of government, settled by avowed convention, present fewer fears of regress
than the case of language does3; while both raise problems of 'latent content', the problem is acute in
the case of language, for the founding of language by overt convention is 'unthinkable', and '[w]hat is
convention when there can be no thought of convening'4. Philosophers exploiting an analytic-synthetic
distinction place logical truth paradigmatically in the former group, and the regress begins, for
conventions for logical truth need logic to derive individual instances, and this circularity is for Quine
unacceptable5. Lewis, however, shows that convention does not require convening, and that no regress
of conditions begins6.
Lewis considers the seeming platitude of language conventions. Words in a language have come to
mean what they do and not another thing, and '[w]e might change our conventions if we like".
Convention obtains, yet Quine and White argue against it in theories for both formal and natural
languages8. Lewis ventures that it 'must' at least be that which elicits a response of recognition in those
1 Lewis (1969). Quine's comments are contained in a Foreword, ppxi-xii.
2 Lewis (1969) pxi.
3 Cf. Deleuze, G., Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory ofHuman Nature (Columbia University Press)
1991. Deleuze studies Hume's theory of convention in ethics and political economy (pp37ff), and makes the connection to his
own work on creativity in philosophy (p46). See also Colebrook, C.; Gilles Deleuze (London, Routledge) 2002, pp63ff, and on
creativity and repetition (ppl 18-122). Hume (1985) p opposes conventions to laws. Schiffer (1972) p makes the link between
Rawls' and Searle's notion of constitutive rules as conventions and Austin's illocutionary acts. Rawls, J.; Two Concepts of
Rules', The Philosophical Review, vol. LXIV, no. 1, pp3-32, 1955 and A Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press) 1999.
Many important secondary sources are contained in Daniels, N. (ed.); Reading Rawls: Critical Studies ofA Theory of Justice
(Oxford, Blackwell) 1975. See also Nozick (1997a) and (1997c).
4 Lewis (1969) pxi.
5
Quine (1966a) pp81ff postulates a notation derived from as much definition ('movement') as possible, and from which all
idioms may be derived with the addition of truth-functions. He proceeds to consider the arguments for the conclusion that logic is
true by convention. He lists the derivations, of'not', of'if-then', and so, of 'or', and so forth; additionally, with reference to the
Carnapian project of simplicity in theoiy construction, Quine says that definitions may be framed in many different ways,
depending upon one's choice ofprimitive devices. For example, primitive 'or' joins statements to form new statements, and may
be given definition by 'not' and 'if. Quine goes on to argue that a suggested set of recalcitrant mathematical expressions, or
those in empirical science, resisting explanation by the logical primitives, can also be rendered true by convention. All of Quine's
many examples proceed along the lines of first or overt convening for a notion of convention. He gives contextual definitions of
each of his primitives, allowing the definition of all logical devices from the primitives and the truth functions. Determining
contexts in which said constants are true and in which they are false can, Quine shows, be thought to render logic true by
convention. On pp96-99 he gives an explanation of the regress set up by the accounts to which Lewis responds.
6 Lewis' work is coming to have influence far outside philosophy of language, with applications in the political and social
sciences. Its brilliance as a work of philosophy is undoubted; both Blackburn (1984) pi 19 and Gilbert, M.; On Social Facts
(London, Routledge) 1986, p329 describe Lewis' work as 'beautiful'. Cf. White (1956) pp!52-154. Lewis answers the many
questions White asks, and especially pi63.
'Lewis (1969) pi.
8 White's work is less well-known than Quine's. In 'The Analytic and Synthetic: An Untenable Dualism', pp272-286 in Linsky
(1952) he shows himself to be as chary as Quine of the definition of 'logical truth' as applied to paradigmatic analytic
propositions (p is p), and of 'synonymy' between the substituted terms. As in Quine's criticism of the distinction, and taken up in
Grice and Strawson (1989), White remarks that those appealing to the distinction do not themselves understand 'synonymy'
(pp320-322, and cf. White, M.; Toward Reunion in Philosophy (Harvard University Press) 1956, especially pp133-135 on the
'jargon' taught by teachers ofphilosophy). White says that the distinction between 'analytic' in a logician's formalised language,
and 'analytic' in a natural language entails the impossibility of attributing analyticity to any statement which is not codified in the
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sharing a common language, and from this premise he begins9. On Hume's account (credited by
Lewis), convention is:
...a general sense of common interest; which sense all the members of the society
express to one another, and which induces them to regulate their conduct by certain rules.
I observe, that it will be for my interest to leave another in the possession of his goods,
provided he will act in the same manner with regard to me. He is sensible of a like
interest in the regulation of his conduct. When this common sense of interest is mutually
express'd, and is known to both, it produces a suitable resolution and behaviour. And this
may properly enough be call'd a convention or agreement betwixt us, tho' without the
interposition of a promise; since the actions of each of us have a reference to those of the
other, and are perform'd upon the supposition, that something is to be perform'd on the
other part10.
Use of language is a 'coordination problem'11. Lewis offers eleven illustrative examples, and one is
chosen for description12. S and H talk on the telephone until they are cut off. Both wish to resume
conversation, and one must call back and the other wait. Both are indifferent as to who calls back, but
formalised language, and so the application to ordinary languages is rendered difficult. Philosophers appealing to the distinction
might fall back on arguing, "... that people using natural languages behave as if they had made rules for their language just like
those of... [formalised languages]...', but White asks,'... how do we establish when people behave as ifthey had done something
which they haven't done?' This raises, White says, the difficulties of counterfactuals (p328). In (1956) pi 35 White contrasts the
use of a child taught the terms 'analytic' and 'a priori', and a philosopher 'corrupted' into thinking that they are synonymous. On
pl37, White says that the former need fear no 'guilt by association'.
White (1952) does not fear the regress Quine states, but is adamant that before the terms 'analytic' and 'synthetic' can be
applied to natural languages, the ways in which convention can be found in a language community must be explained (pp323-
324 and cf. Lewis, CI:, Mind and the World Order (New York, Dover) 1926 and Quine (1960) p). White (1952) p324 sees a
'dodge' in appealing to a notion of synonymy 'in the sense'; cf. White (1956) ppl 33-134, pi 57 and Quine (1980). White (1956)
ppl58-163 asks whether there is a property of sentences making them statutes, and requiring prior discovery before they are
accepted as legislation. He answers, surely not, and asks why one should think the case is different for sentences deemed
analytic. White adds that different conventions give different statutes. White (1952) is keen to show that his rejection of the
analytic-synthetic distinction is in the spirit, and not necessarily to the letter, ofDewey's. He gives examples of logical truths (p
or not p) and of predications (all bachelors are unmarried), and argues that the distinction between analytic propositions, in
logical truths, and definitively synthetic, contingent propositions is not easily made (pp326-330). Again, the difficulties of
defining what a language community is ('... who are we...'), and of conventions defined for specific communities, are raised. He
finds an analogous case in determining relevant criteria for the writing of substitute predicates; how does one describe the way in
which predicates are assigned or withheld? (Cf. White's example: 'All men are featherless bipeds', p326). Fascinatingly, he
makes the connection between 'modem' dualists, and the scholastic distinction between essence and accident.
9 Lewis (1969) p3. Through Lewis Schiffer is inspired. Cf. Schiffer (1972) p.
10 Hume (1985) p. See also Locke, J.;An Essay ConcerningHuman Understanding III.ii.1, andDeleuze (1991) pp37ff.
11 The term, and the motivation, are derived from the theory of games and rational decision. However, Lewis (1969) p3 adds that
the theory is 'scaffolding', and that a theory of convention can be written without it. The canonical source is von Neumann, J.
and Morgenstem, O.; Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour (Princeton University Press) 1944. Lewis' greatest
acknowledged debt is to Schelling, T.C.; The Strategy ofConflict (Harvard University Press) 1960, and especially chapter four.
Schelling (p91) writes, 'The coordination game probably lies behind the stability of institutions and traditions and perhaps the
phenomenon of leadership itself. On p260 conventions are not analogies for limiting cases but themselves limiting cases. Von
Neumann and Morgenstem developed game theory for modelling in economics after finding unsatisfactory abstract models in the
hard sciences. Bach (1994) pl55 notes the need for a theory of salience in such theories (Lewis' difficulties with the notion shall
be detailed below). Bach describes the introduction of the notion by Schelling, and offers Sperber and Wilson's relevance theory
as a workable alternative (ppl55-156). The similarity between Lewis' theory of convention and mutual knowledge and Sperber
and Wilson's is implied in Hirst (1989) pl40.
12 Kirk, R.; 'Convention: A Philosophical Study by David K. Lewis', Philosophical Books, vol. IX, no. 2, ppl4-15, 1970, gives a
concise summary.
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each chooses whether to call or wait on their assessment of what the other will do13. Cases of
coordination, in which parties achieve their desired outcome, are 'equilibria'; no result could be more
satisfactory14. (Lewis offers further examples of coordination problems in which S and H are indifferent
to the equilibria, are not indifferent to the same equilibria, and those in which no outcome can be
unqualifiedly best for both)15. He writes that the apparent difference between equilibria in which agents
do the same and those in which they act differently is spurious, for one says that agents' actions are the
same if they are 'of the same kind', that is, instances of a common description, none with claim to
primacy (they are conventions, they can be changed), and this will come to be a vital distinction.
For any combination of actions, and a fortiori for any equilibrium combination of
actions, there is some way of describing the agents' alternative actions so that exactly
those alternative actions in the given combination fall under a common description16.
A description of a combination as one in which each performs the same action 'depends merely on the
naturalness of that classification'17, and consequences follow for the definition of coordination
problems as situations in which agents aim for equilibrium, for equilibria may be achieved by luck or
13 Lewis (1969) p5.
14 Lewis (1969) pp8ff. Results could be more satisfactory in cases in which the agents act differently.
15 Lewis (1969) pp8-l 1. Lewis offers 'payoffmatrices' to describe coordination problems between agents. An example may be
represented in a grid in which Ri, R2 and R3 are the actions of S in going to one or other of three places in which he hopes to
meet H, and Ci, C2 and C3, the actions of H in going to these places with the same ambition. S's and H's relative preferences
regarding the potential outcomes are represented by numbers. Equilibria are those situations in which S and H go to the same
place and meet, thus:
Ri,;Ci: 1, meet, 1
R,, C2: 0, 0
Ri, C3: 0,0
R2,Ci:0,0
R2j C2: 1, meet, 1
Rj, C3: 0, 0
R3, Ci: 0,0
R3, C2: 0, 0
R3, C3: 1, meet, 1
R2, C2 is an equilibrium by Lewis' definition for S prefers it to Ri, C2 or R3, C2, and H prefers it to R2, Ci or R2, C3.
Lewis (plO) changes, in his next example, the preference ranking regarding the places to which S and H go, although, as he
emphasises, not so as to affect the their mutual preference formeeting.
16 Lewis (1969) pi 1.
17 For illustration Lewis (1969) ppl 1-12 returns to a simple payoff matrix. There are two action descriptions to be considered,
firstly in which S and H, in actions Ri and Ci, choose to call back and to wait respectively, and secondly in which they choose




Ri, C2: 0, 0
Lewis adds that if one has in mind the actions descriptions, Rf or Cf: calling back iff one is the original caller and R2' or C2':
calling back iff one is not the original caller, one can draw the matrix:
R,', C,': 1, 1
R,', C2': 0, 0
R2', C,': 0,0
R2', C2': 1, 1
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with no knowledge ofwhat others will do18. Success is more likely, Lewis argues, through, '... a system
of suitably concordant mutual expectations', or, 'precedent': on the balance of past evidence of similar
or identical situations, assessment of typical behaviour, and the nesting of higher-order expectations of
S's and H's intentions, they call back or wait as appropriate". (Sincerity conditions are one case of
mutually known dispositions, and Lewis takes up a discussion below)20.
Conventions arising from cooperative social practices, and the utility of theories of rationality in their
execution, preoccupy Heal21. The complex, Gricean intentions describing mutual knowledge that
require account from II are rejected, and a distinction made between 'dispositional' and 'occurent'
knowledge22. Dispositional knowledge is, as Lewis says, a vast network of capabilities and practices,
and it is man's limited capacity for developing it that suggest to Heal the weakness of Lewis'
arguments. Dispositional and occurent knowledge, and Heal's arguments, are considered below. Some
of Lewis' points are summarised: once established, disseminated and learnt, a convention can
indefinitely persist or be replaced. No convention defines behaviour in its entirety: in language one
may remain silent, yet still conform to the conventions of a language. For Lewis, a working language is
a convention between users to use it23, and the conventions of language are regularities restricting one's
operations with its,'.. .verbal utterances and inscriptions'24. One conforming without reason, or by luck,
is not party to the convention. For Gilbert, these tenets of Lewis' theory belie an, 'underlying abstract
argument', and she lists the premises25. Lewis writes that conventions are, by definition, arbitrary; they
are regularities in behaviour, in the interests of all party to them, obtaining between rational agents (as
defined), sharing mutual knowledge. Gilbert remarks that Lewis never defines the sense of 'arbitrary'
with which he works. The platitudinous definition of convention as arbitrary because another equally
The equilibria in this case are no more natural explanations of S's and H's actions than are those in the first matrix, and, Lewis,
asks, what difference would be marked by the fact in the case that they were? This goes to show that the important notion
regarding the study of coordination is not the uniformity or familiarity of action but their resulting in equilibria.
18 Lewis (1969) ppl2-27 considers situations of conflict between agents and the ways in which they may be represented so as to
make the payoffs to S and H add up to zero in each case (in which S's losses are H's gains and vice versa). He examines
coordination equilibria in games of pure conflict, the presence of non-coordination equilibria (ppl5-16), the presence of
dominant choices determining (not necessarily coordination equilibria, pl7), and, most importantly, the requirement, to avoid
cases of coordination by chance, for S's and H's choices to be, as it were, based upon expectations about the ways the other will
act (pp21-22 and 27). It is worth repeating, again apropos the quotation from Hume, that the '...theory of games is scaffolding';
the theory of convention can be stated without it.
" Lewis (1969) pp27ff describes the way in which one may develop, and reason from, (mutual) expectations about others'
behaviour, cases in which one replicates others' reasoning; he introduces the notion (so vital below), of salience.
20 Lewis (1969) pp36-42 considers the force of precedent ('...one important kind of salience...'), as a motor of coordination. The
depth and sensitivity of Lewis' analysis is impressive (cf. p40).
21 Heal, J.; 'Common Knowledge', The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. XXVIII, no. Ill, pp 116-131, 1978.
22 Heal (1978) pi 17. Heal also states a theory of intention for a theory of reasons for action, surveying the tradition from
Aristotle. On pi 18 it is suggested that a theory of rational action may help elucidate the 'phenomenology' of common
knowledge, and the link to prisoner's dilemma situations is made (pl23). Cf. Evans and McDowell (1976), and Weissman, D.;
DispositionalProperties (Southern Illinois University Press) 1965.
23 Lewis (1969) pp49-51. That is, it is not, say, a convention that Welshman use Welsh, but that they have, and continue to,
coordinate in the use of a language that the world calls Welsh.
24 Lewis (1969) p51.
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suitable might have been chosen counsels indifference, and conventions are not matters for
indifference, but of '...judgement, decision or will'26. However, this is an unworthy objection. The
sense of 'indifference' with which Lewis works allows merely that situations for which conventions
arise are not chosen or, necessarily, willed. They arise in all manner of everyday situations, and compel
those party to them to discover, or to create, a means with which to deal with them, and this indeed
requires judgement, decision and will. It is not a convention, in Lewis' sense, that Welshmen use
Welsh, for the rules of a well-developed, natural language are instantiations of the ways in which signs
may come to mean, and it is at this prior stage that Lewis' theory of convention works. The rules of
Welsh were settled, for the most part, without agreement, but by the convergence, over time, of a
language community on a series of practices, which through dissemination and codification, became
settled27. The language continues to tolerate some change, but is, now, substantially stable; the Welsh
might have alighted on a different language, or still yet decide to change the one they use, but if they
were to this would demand that the previously Welsh speaking community settle some conventions for
future communication. In the use of all languages there arise situations for which new conventions are
required, and these are accommodated without any threat to the going concern that is the stable
language. The process of settling conventions is the same as that required for all languages or systems
of communication28.
Mutual knowledge of others' behaviour consists of first- and higher-order expectations
(communicated in 'indications', described in Grice's meanings), and Lewis asks how the regress is
stopped; that is, how indications are curtailed to issue in belief or action29. A higher-order expectation
(say that H recognise that S intends him to recognise his intention), is formed according to assumptions
25 Gilbert (1986) pp328 and 340ff.
26 It is replied in what follows that Lewis' errors are, at best, of infelicity and surely not of substance. None of Gilbert's points
evade Lewis' analysis (cf. Lewis (1969) pp40-42). Gilbert (1986) pp340-341 writes that one can find numerous examples of
social conventions that are not obviously conventional in the sense that there can be equally good alternatives, and she suggests
conventions of, say, replying to the host with thanks after a party; this is not a saliently arbitrary course of action and can be
considered a convention without contemplating whether there are alternatives equally acceptable from another reasonable point
of view. She goes on to consider other poor objections to Lewis' definition of convention.
27
Armstrong (1971) pp436-437 utilises Lewis for his argument that conventions are not agreements, tacit or explicit, but
regularities promulgated and disseminated. Notions of the primacy of practice (Wittgenstein's, Bourdieu's, Dreyfus' and
Heidegger's), are discussed in Stem, D.; 'Practices, Practical Holism and Background Practices', pp53-69 in Wrathall and
Malpas (2000b). Stem raises issues pertinent for a theory of dwelling (in Heidegger's sense) and intentionality, see especially
Fs60'
Lewis, D.K.; 'Languages and Language', pp3-35 in Gunderson, K. (ed.); Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science:
Volume VII, Language,Mind and Knowledge (University ofMinnesota) 1975, p makes the connection between languages, as per
the functions described, and language, as a '...rational, convention-governed human social activity'. As in (1969), Lewis
discusses what it is for a language to become the functional system used in a specific community, and the conditions of
truthfulness and trust are again described. Cf. Warnke (1997) pi 12 and the Gadamerian/Davidsonian reply to these points on
ppl 13ff. Habermas considers the ways in which consensus can be skewed by power, ideologies and the lack of trust or sincerity,
and a fuller study would reveal the ways in which Lewis' conventions can allay Habermas' concerns. Rawls and Habermas
debate the original position and the roles in it that individuals may play, in Habermas, J.; 'Reconciliation through the Public Use
of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls' Political Liberalism', ppl09-131, and Rawls, J.; 'Reply to Habermas', The Journal of
Philosophy, vol. XCn, no. 3, ppl31-180, 1995.
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of rationality, and issues in belief or action when there are no further, deeper expectations or intentions
to which S and H may infer; the force of precedent, or 'regularity', brings common assent to
coordination. Extrapolation to future instances of like or identical coordinations allows conventions.
Each convention is self-perpetuating as conformity is seen to maximise benefits and satisfy desires30.
Lewis' first 'rough' definition is as follows:
A regularity R in the behaviour of members of a population P when they are agents in a
recurrent situation s is a convention if and only if, in any instance of s among members of
P, (1) everyone conforms to R; (2) everyone expects everyone else to conform to R; (3)
everyone prefers to conform to R on condition that the others do, since s is a coordination
problem and uniform conformity to R is a coordination equilibrium in s31.
The nesting of higher-order expectations, and the need for coordinated intentions to issue in actions
demands the addition of a common knowledge condition, and thus Lewis gives an 'amended'
definition:
A regularity R in the behaviour of members of a population P when they are agents in a
recurrent situation s is a convention if and only if it is true that, and it is common
knowledge in P that, in any instance of s among members ofP, (1) everyone conforms to
R; (2) everyone expects everyone else to conform to R; (3) everyone prefers to conform
to R on condition that the others do, since s is a coordination problem and uniform
conformity to R is a coordination equilibrium in s32.
It should be emphasised that coordination on this analysis covers cases of coordination over time, and
even in the absence ofH. The situation, say, might be one in which a new member (x) of a P meets the
practices of P, or of a certain (S) of P (whom, say, x never meets), settled long before. The neophyte
learns the appropriate behaviour regarding S in experience, trial and error and so forth. In this also is
the solution to the situation in which S chooses to call or to wait33. (After further refinements a third
definition is given)34. The consideration of 'abnormal instances of S' compels a further analysis for the
exclusion of inapplicable cases, and with this Lewis arrives at his final definition:
25 As Grice before him, Lewis finds no viciousness in the infinite regress. It is chain of implications, not of one's reasoning.
30 Lewis (1969) p40. This is, of course, in a world without freeriders. Additionally, actions conforming to conventions are
'... unrestricted as to time...'.
31 Lewis (1969) p42.
32 Lewis (1969) p58.
33 Lewis' theory deals with the cases of absent S by dint of being a theory of convention. The context is supplied by H owing to
his shared knowledge of identical and similar situations.
34 Lewis (1969) p76. The definition runs: 'A regularity R in the behaviour of members of a population P when they are agents in
a recurrent situation S is a convention if and only if it is true that, and it is common knowledge in P that, in any instance of S
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A regularity R in the behaviour of members of a population P when they are agents in a
recurrent situation s is a convention if and only if it is true that, and it is common
knowledge in P that, in almost any instance of s among members of P, (1) almost
everyone conforms to R; (2) almost everyone expects almost everyone else to conform to
R; (3) almost everyone has approximately the same preferences regarding all possible
combinations of actions; (4) almost everyone prefers that any one more conform to R, on
condition that almost everyone conform to R; (5) almost everyone would prefer that any
one more conform to R', on condition that almost everyone conform to R', where R' is
some possible regularity in the behaviour of members of P in s, such that almost no one
in almost any instance of s among members ofP could conform both to R' and to R35.
Gilbert questions the faith Lewis, and Grandy, have in the role of precedent, or example, as a guide
for assumptions of rationality and the course of future action36. This concerns precisely the importance
of repeated, nested reasoning: what Gilbert calls 'reason-replication'. Why should S call back, as he
has done before, in this instance? The force of precedent must be explained. S, to attempt coordination,
must ask whether he should observe precedent, on condition that H does, and thus replicate H's
reasoning. However, H must carry out a similar replication of S's reasoning, with similar failure37. By
Lewis' theory, if two rational agents act similarly in an equilibrium (as defined), then neither could
have improved the outcome, yet there is no compelling reason why they should so act, and the
complications of this for Lewis' main concern, the conventions governing communication, must be
considered. To repeat, it is the core of his study to reveal how signs come to have meaning, and it is not
good enough to say that actions become signals when one arbitrarily assigns them meanings (this is as
Lewis repeats, an impoverished view of convention), for communication is a coordination problem38,
with S and H finding success, and communication, if equilibria is secured; in time equilibria become
conventions, invoked and used without further explicit convening39.
among members of P, (1) everyone conforms to R; (2) everyone expects everyone else to conform to R; (3) everyone has
approximately the same preferences regarding all possible combinations of actions; (4) everyone prefers that everyone conform
to R, on condition that at least all but one conform to R; (5) everyone would prefer that everyone conform R', on condition that at
least everyone prefers that at least all but one conform to R', where R' is some possible regularity in the behaviour ofmembers
of P in S, such that no one in any instance of S among members ofP could conform both to R' and to R'.
35 Lewis (1969) p78. The definition appears in Lewis' addendum to (1969), namely (1975). Lewis writes that R' allows for the
condition of arbitrariness in conventions, and this, contra Gilbert's objections, is still a matter ofjudgement, decision and will.
36 Gilbert (1989) pp339ff, and Grandy, R.E.; 'Convention: A Philosophical Study by David K. Lewis', The Journal of
Philosophy, vol. LXXIV, no. 2, ppl29-139, 1977.
37 Gilbert (1989) pp347-348.
38 The one described by Lewis happens to be begun by an explicit agreement.
39 In this, as Lewis (1969) pl22 says, meaning can be left to Took after itself. Lewis describes a coordination problem between S
and H according to a set of contingency plans. Whichever contingency plan is chosen, they achieve coordination (Ri, Ci; R2, C2;
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Lewis describes a signalling problem. It involves S, H and a series of alternative states of affairs
(s,...,n), with S aware of which holds. H can respond in one of several ways (r,...,n)40. Both S and H
want the latter to follow from the former. 'There is a certain one-to-one function F from s; onto i) such
that everyone prefers that each member ofH do F(s;) on condition that Sj holds, for each Si'41. S can do
one of a number of actions (signals), o...n, and neither he nor H has preferences skewing the
dependency of responses upon states of affairs. S has a 'contingency plan' (items to be arranged for
conventional communication in innumerable ways: flags, sticks, lanterns, scorch marks, reporting any
possible way in which a signal depends upon a state of affairs), with a function Fc from Sj to <5yri. Fl's
contingency plan is any possible way in which a response depends on S's signal: a function Fa from
part of ok to rj43. In the case that S acts according to Fc and H acts according to Fa, the latter's response
depends on the state of affairs holding according to function Fa | Fc44. When Fa | Fc =F over the class of
signals, H's response is performed in the state of affairs in {s;} obtaining, and so both parties act for the
best given each others' contingencies and all possible states of affairs. This is a 'signalling system'*5. In
R.3, C3) if the message intended to be communicated is sent and received, according to mutual expectations about the other's
choices.
Rj.Ch: 1, 1
R,, C2: 0, 0
R,,C3: .5, .5...
R2, C,: 0, 0
Rr, C2: 1, 1
R2, C3: .5, .5...
R3, C,: .5, .5
R3, C2: .5, .5
R3,C3: 1, 1...
In such cases there may occur conditionally successful communication (Ri, C3), in which S may or may not give the correct
signal depending upon what information he is fed; and also failures in which, invariably, the wrong signal is given (Ri, C2).
Lewis argues that he has described a case of signalling without reference to the meanings of the signals and adds that such two-
sided coordination problems are directly applicable to one-sided problems (in which there is only one agent, S or H, choosing a
contingency plan), and for those in which one- and two-sided problems are mixed.
40 H might be a collective, or an audience, but for simplicity Lewis (1969) pl30 considers two-sided problems. Cf. Mtlller, H.J.;
'Negotiation Principles', pp211-229 in O'Hare, G.M.P. and Jennings, N.R. (eds.); Foundations of Distributed Artificial
Intelligence (New York, John Wiley and Sons) 1996. MUller discusses notions of coordination and collective decision and the
tacit ideas of negotiation needed to arrive at them. Numerous other essays in the volume are vital for developing a possible
worlds theory of intentionality for distributed systems.
41 Lewis (1969) pl31.
42 Lewis (1969) pl31. The preferred response, Lewis says, is to be the same for all members ofH. 'This may seem restrictive, but
it is not. If the preferred action of a member of the audience depends on his circumstances, his role in the situation, or anything
else besides the state of affairs {s;}, that dependence should be built into the specifications of the responses {rj}. If a warship is in
distress, another warship's preferred response may be this: to take her place in battle if it is possible to do so effectively;
otherwise to come to her aid. We count this as one response, specified by a pair of conditionals'.
S acts according to Fc if, for each s;, he does Fc(sj) if he sees that Sj holds; he is in a position to see Sj holds, and as he acts
according to Fc(sj) he is able to act according to any Fc contingency plan. Lewis calls 'admissible' an Fc which gives a one-to-
one function between Sj to ak. (One might consider the part that might be played in Lewis' theory by unconscious actions).
43 Lewis (1969) pl31-132 gives a treatment identical to that given for Fc (described in the previous footnote), for Fa, H's
contingency plan.
44 Lewis (1969) pl32. Lewis adds that for any two functions f and g and any argument x such that g(x) is in the domain of f,
f|g(x) is defined as f(g(x)), and that f|g is undefined for other arguments. He offers (ppl32-133) two formal proofs for




choosing which signal to send and which response to make, a coordination problem is established, with
payoffs for combinations dependent upon payoffs for each state of affairs and their probabilities'".
Heal objects to the definition; it presumes conditions of common knowledge between S and H: of
similar background knowledge, of powers of observation and inference, and of the state of affairs in
which they find themselves as, '...good evidence that both...have good evidence that the set-up
exists'47. (Heal gives the implicit reasoning: '"Because things are arranged in this way, it follows that
each...can see that they are arranged in this way'"48; this is central to a theory of mutual knowledge.
Shared abilities to reason and infer allow S and H, from this base, to carry out an, '...indefinitely
extended chain of reasonings'®. What is more, the knowledge that both can do this, is shared; they can
'replicate', reasoning50. For Heal, this raises the problem of the way in which dispositional knowledge
may issue in occurent knowledge, and the difficulties are discussed later in this section. Suffice to say
that in the theory as presently described, occurent knowledge of the situation is possible (that S means
that p) without H realising so), that is, without reference to a disposition.
Lewis defines a signalling convention as one in which S and H participate in a signalling system by
acting according to their contingency plans, chosen as the best rational solution to a coordination
problem51. He raises two difficult cases: the first of S not blindly following his contingency plan for a
46 Lewis (1969) ppl33-135 writes that, for some combinations, S must consider what he expects members ofH to do in response
to signals not in the domains of the functions given by their chosen contingency plans. He also shows that some 'inadmissible'
contingency plans (those for which there are workable, equally useful, alternatives), may be coordination equilibria. He adds that
'...if the audience has just one member, then no combination of one admissible plan and one inadmissible plan can be an
equilibrium; for another combination on the same row or column would be a signalling system and would be preferred to the
given combination'.
Lewis defines a signalling convention as a convention in which members of P in a coordination problem do their parts of a
signalling system by acting according to their contingency plans, and remarks that if some coordination problems have an
equilibrium that is not a signalling system, then one must conclude that there are conventions that are not signalling conventions
'... even though they govern the choice of contingency plans in a signalling problem'.
47 Heal (1978) ppl25 and ff. Taylor's doubts about notions of common knowledge are well-known, and in the immediate context,
cf. Taylor, C.; 'Review of Linguistic Behaviour by Johnathan Bennett', Dialogue, vol. XIX, no. 2, pp290-301, 1980, and
'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man', The Review ofMetaphysics, vol. XXV, no. 1, pp3-51, 1971. In relation to the history
of philosophy, see in the same issue, Maclntyre, A.; 'Praxis and Action', pp737-744, a review of Bernstein, R.J.; Praxis and
Action: Contemporary Philosophies ofHuman Activity (University of Pennsylvania) 1971. In another work Maclntyre notes the
'unfashionable' nature of explanations of human societies in which rationality and reason are opposed to irrationality. There is an
air of colonialism, even racialism, in the work of Frazer, Tylor, and latterly, of Trevor-Roper, see Maclntyre, A.; 'Rationality and
the Explanation of Action', pp244-259 in Against the Self-images of the Age: Essay's on Ideology and Philosophy (London,
Duckworth) 1971. On Weber's notions of reason and rationality see Gellner, E.; Reason and Culture: The Historic Role of
Rationality andRationalism (Oxford, Blackwell) 1992.
Kolm, S-C.; 'Meanings and Rationalities in Social Choice Theory', pp79-103 in Andler, D., Baneijee, P., Chaudry, M. and
Guillame, O. (eds.); Facets ofRationality (London, Sage) 1995 considers theories of social, utilitarian choice and of preference
and rationality in groups, with particular reference to the work of Kenneth Arrow. Gibbard, A.; 'What Rational Could Mean in
the Human Sciences', pp58-78, and Raghuramaraju, A.; "The Project of Rationality and the Discipline of Social Sciences',
ppl31-140 in Andler, Baneijee, Chaudry and Guillame, O. (1995) consider alternatives to positivist models of rationality in the
humanities.
Relevant notions of the 'background', and Searle's and Dreyfus' conflicting notions, are discussed in Wrathall, M.A.;
'Background Practices, Capacities and Heideggerian Disclosure', pp93-l 14 in Wrathall and Malpas (2000b).
48Heal (1978) pl26.
49 Heal (1978) pl26.
50 Heal (1978) p.
51 Lewis (1969) ppl35-139 tabulates the nested, replicated, reasoning of S and H acting in conformity to signalling conventions,
and in cases in which they solve a coordination problem by agreement, salience, precedent and so forth. Lewis (1969) pi41
emphasises that both this and the condition describing the choice of contingency plans are not representations of 'actual
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specific coordination problem, but deliberating on the outcomes of many possible actions and doing
that which is best: is this a choice of a whole contingency plan or merely of a part dealing with the
present contingency? The second features S following his procedure absent-mindedly, knowing that it
gets the job done, for H accordingly follows a pattern. Such justifications, or motivations, explain
choices, regardless of whether the justification is ever explicitly given52. In a passage which must be
read with his later comments on intention and convention (in a discussion of meaning}®), Lewis writes
that,
...it is a fact of human nature that we tend to act in ways justified by our beliefs and
desires, even when we do not think through the justification. I may put it negatively:
whatever may be the habitual processes that actually do control our choices, if they
started tending to go against our beliefs and desires they soon would be overridden,
corrected, and retrieved by explicit practical reasoning53.
Lewis writes that exemplary signals are speech acts and writings, used for verbal expression and
signalling54. Communication between two agents may use such a conventional system, and in cases in
which H sends, '...a piece of paper on which marks are inscribed', without use of code or cipher, the
verbal signal is indistinguishable from ordinary use of language55. Natural language, though more
sophisticated, has such verbal signals, and when they are used, they are conventional. The objection,
mooted by Heal, that occurent knowledge of conventional use in a situation may arise, on Lewis'
analysis, without either S or H realising, may be returned to. The problem is acute in cases of meaning,
in which S means p in a situation in which H has occurent knowledge without H realising, and Heal
objects that Lewis cannot conceivably claim that mutual knowledge obtains in such situations56. A
further remark of Heal's has a Strawsonian air. If S proceeds, mistakenly, as if H remains ignorant of
his actions in, say, setting a rat in his house, S does not (or fails to), draw the inference that the
reasoning', but justifications that could be supplied. The notion of representations in both Fodor and Sperber and Wilson is
discussed in Leslie, A.M.; 'Review ofRelevance: Communication cmd Cognition by Sperber and Wilson', Mind and Language,
vol. IV, nos. 1 and 2, ppl47-150, 1989.
52 Lewis (1969) pl41. One might consider the case raised in Grice (1989d) p222 of a man who acts as per an original intention,
having conceived a later intention to act differently. Here the notions of intention and convention arise, returned to in Lewis'
discussion ofmeaning™. An excellent discussion of this is in Heal (1978) ppl 18-122.
53Lewis (1969) pl41.
54 Fie adds, Lewis (1969) p!42, that '[officially, the signal is the action. But we usually need not be careful to distinguish the
action, the string of sounds or marks produced by the action, and the verbal expression uttered or inscribed; all three can be
called the signal. We can also allow "uttering" to cover inscribing as well as vocal uttering'.
55 Lewis (1969) ppl42-143 considers a hypothetical verbal community with verbal signalling conventions for various uses and a
number of ad hoc expressions. An interpreter or translator will discover the significant deficiencies in the language, namely, that
every verbal expression used was conventionally linked with '...some readily observable state of affairs, or with some definite
responsive action, or with both'. They can use only finitely many verbal expressions, and the conventions governing their
signalling can be described "... by mentioning each expression they used'. We human speakers, Lewis adds, are similar in the use
of signalling conventions, but we do so much more with language.
56 Heal (1978) pl25.
256
situation is one of common knowledge, even though it is one. H might infer (again, mistakenly), that S
does not share similar abilities and background knowledge: there is here, as before, nothing to get S or
H from dispositional to occurent knowledge. Both may continue working out that the other can carry
out this reasoning ad infinitum, but nothing says that they arrive at common knowledge or
communicated meaning57.
Lewis turns to the meanings of signals, a stage on the way to his theories of truth and convention in a
language, given via a theory of moods58, o is a signal which, when used in accordance with a
convention, is a conventional signal that the corresponding state of affairs (s) holds: more simply, a is a
conventional signal to give a response (r). What then does a mean? When is it, say, indicative or
imperative? The distinction between them (and of the 'natural' signal: one which might be a directive -
to or -that), is in the intentions motivating S and H (plans Fc and Fa), and the 'deliberation' required of
S in choosing the appropriate course of action to compel FI's correct response. (Lewis dubs this the
degree to which they are 'discretionary'). When Fa is discretionary and Fc not, a is indicative; when Fc
is discretionary and Fa not, o is imperative; when neither, c is neutral. Meanings occurs if S intends
his action to produce in H an effect by means of the recognition of intention. (Lewis adds only that, as
above, cases of natural meaning elicit H's response according to an established signalling convention).
With a as a signal of a conventional signalling system (Fc, Fa), s a state of affairs, and r a response
such that a is Fc (s) and r is Fa (a), in a classic signalling problem with a given according to a
convention with s holding, S means^ in uttering o59. As noted in II, one may meanNN but deceptively
(that is, a signal accepted as conventional in the language common to S and H is not in conformity to
the appropriate convention of signalling): S might issue his signal in the mistaken belief that it adheres
to a convention, and so fail to produce an intended response. With reference to Searle's example of the
captured soldier, Lewis writes that the difficulty of H's interpreting S's utterance are obviated, and to
Strawson, that S (and H) may think they are not conforming to a convention in the rat case, a
description of their behaviour requiring only a theory of'salience' and not 'precedent', for, as Lewis
says, an analysis of mutual knowledge need make no appeal to reason replication60. Furthermore,
Searle's desire to capture the intentional and the conventional in communication is satisfied by Lewis'
57Heal (1978) pi27.
58 A deeper study would reveal links between Lewis' notion ofmood and Recanati's rejection of illocutionary force as syntactic
mood. See Recanati (1986). Cf. Dummett (1976) p73.
59 Lewis (1969) pl55. Lewis applies the very same reasoning as he does in the explications of mutual knowledge and of the
discerning of relative contingency plans.
60 Lewis (1969) pl59. Lewis thinks the regress ofmutual, nested reasoning ends.
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theory, for the conventional accounts for the intentional in that it is a theory of what S may plausibly
(intend to) mean by an utterance, and what H may take S to (intend to) mean61.
Heal rejects Lewis' argument that the condition starting the regress (for both Lewis and Schiffer,
virtuous), can be delegated to mere 'salience'®. Her argument is predicated on the assumption that all
that is required for study of the mutual knowledge conditions, and to demonstrate the circularity of any
attempt to isolate a singularly salient condition, is a short initial segment of the regress of duplicated
reasoning. Heal asks how an instance of successful coordination can result in mutual knowledge, for
neither interlocutor can ascertain whether the other acts entirely at random or not, and, moreover,
whether this justifies persevering with the choice in the hope of achieving equilibrium in future
qualitatively similar cases63. If S thinks H has no means of deriving laws from their successful (random)
correlation, he will conclude that H chose without reason: in the circumstances this is surely rational.
S's only reason for his choice is that he thinks H will respond to it in an appropriate way, and thus (as
described above) his reason is never made in confidence64. Augmentation of the segment raises the
same problems. Gilbert concurs, arguing that Lewis writes as if conformity to successful precedent is,
simply, a mark of rationality65. Lewis' earlier remarks, she says, sound an equivocal note, for elsewhere
he writes that precedent is the source of mutual knowledge (of salience), and of, 'conspicuous
uniqueness', a concession, perhaps, that rationality is not enough. All the same, Lewis argues that
mutual knowledge of reasons for action give expectations that others will act in similar ways; he speaks
also of tendencies to act set by precedent, and it is Gilbert's contention that with this Lewis introduces
further caveats to his theory of rationality, for neither tendencies nor expectations are characteristic of
the reasoning faculty. Gilbert paraphrases Lewis' argument: '... if a certain strategy has been successful
in the past in a given coordination problem, CP, then failing any reason to do otherwise, a rational
agent will use it in future occurrences of CP', and Gilbert replies that this traduces a basic tenet of
game theory, namely, that demanding a condition of rationality, for agents now have an, 'a-rational
61 Cf. Dasenbrock, R.W.; Truth and Consequences: Intentions, Conventions and the New Thematics (Pennsylvania State
University) 2001. Dasenbrock argues against the conventionalism of Fish, Rorty and Foucault, and for the reasons adumbrated
by Davidson and Putnam (described in 1.1). Dasenbrock suggests in its place (explicitly contra Derrida), a new approach to
intentionality for literary criticism. As will be argued, Lewis' theory of convention is rigorous, bearing none of the difficulties
Derrida describes, and Dasenbrock notes this, cf. p267, fti. 4. It is precisely to avoid objections to an intention and convention
theory, as voiced by Fish (1980) pp203-204, that the theories of attitudes and of Lewisian conventions are developed in this
dissertation.
62 Heal (1978) ppl21-122.
63Heal (1978) ppl22-123.
64 Heal (1978) pl26.
65 Gilbert (1986) pp336-337.
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tendency' to follow the successful procedure66. What works, or proves successful, Gilbert writes, is not
necessarily rational.
Heal considers a scenario: having achieved a random success, S and H choose the same again,
notwithstanding that there is no compelling reason. Even with the addition of nested conditions, there is
still no justified choice: the point from which the justification grows remains an 'irrational impulse'67.
She writes:
[b]ut either the existence of this impulse is necessary to justify coordination even in
undoubted situations of common knowledge, which implies the strange conclusion that
those lacking this impulse could not rationally cooperate in such situations, or the
justification provided...by the line of argument sketched above is not the same as that
provided by common knowledge and so we lose reason to say that ...[the irrational
situation]... is one of common knowledge68.
What is more, the knowledge in irrational impulse situations cannot guarantee the justification of
coordination, for the irrational impulse can be removed altogether: if S or H makes the same choice on
a second occasion, but fails to achieve coordination, there is no justification, and because of the doubt
in the interlocutors' minds, no impulse69. (Heal remarks on the fact of Lewis apparently tolerating an
irrational impulse to govern salience conditions). She argues that although the impulse may be
suppressed or frustrated, this need not prevent coordination, for salience may be accounted for without
it. The notions Heal considers for a theory of common knowledge prove too demanding (of an
omniscience, requiring knowledge of an infinity of conditionals), or too weak (simply not establishing
mutual knowledge), and Heal suggests a middle way, demanding that parties to a coordination know
that, '...reasons for believing a certain class of propositions are available and will be utilised if need
be'70. This demands neither that the parties believe in the propositions nor that they have reasons for
believing them, but only that each, knowing that minds are transparent, can 'replicate' the other's
reasoning. This is the basis of cooperative action. Lewis' account is correct, yet incomplete; it requires
65 Gilbert (1986) p337. Gilbert (p338) writes that Lewis' references to tendencies seem to make no distinction between actual,
motivating tendencies that S might have to repeat successful behaviour and, say, '...possibly false expectations that people have
such tendencies', and she adds that surely even rational agents (on Lewis' terms), can be fed false information. 'However, if the
agents are allowed to be wrong about the springs of one another's actions, we have moved quite far from the original game-
theoretical picture in which the workings of each agent's mind are available to the others'. See also Gilbert's example (pp338-
339 making a stronger case against the possibility of reason-replication).
67Heal (1978) ppl24-125.
68Heal (1978) pl24.
69 Heal (1978) ppl24-125.
70Heal (1978) pl28.
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the addition of a clause establishing that S and H are both aware that certain, mutual knowledge is
attainable. The full analysis runs:
It is common knowledge between S and H that p iff:
(i) S and H share reasoning standards;
(ii) S and H know that (a) a certain set-up exists (b) its existence is for them good
evidence that p (c) its existence is for them good evidence that both know that the set-up
exists;
(iii) on the basis of his knowledge of the set-up and of the shared standards of reasoning,
S and H each knows that:
(I)P;
(II) what he can infer from the existence of the set-up using (i), (ii) (b) and (ii) (c) the
other can infer also;
(III) each thus has available the same class of beliefs about the existence of the set-up,
the fact that p and their mutual knowledge on these matters;
(IV) hence for any belief in this class, it is not possible that some shared purpose makes
it important for one person to have the belief and the other to know he has it, while there
is also uncertainty or error about whether this desired state ofaffairs obtains71.
An instance of coordination results in common knowledge and repeated action because both S and H
know that coordination requires that they pick out, by focusing on a prominent or salient feature, as
Lewis says, one course of action above all others. Each course of action is uniquely identified in that is
the course of action it is and not another; it is identified by both S and H according to its 'prima facie
salience'72. (Indeed, on this, a previous, chance, coordination counts as an instantiation of a prima facie
salience). Heal emphasises the way in which any course of action (A) tending to coordination must be
tested for relative significance to S and H: ifH is ignorant of A's salience to S, then salience to S will
produce nothing. This ramifies through all of the conditions ofprima facie salience, for, as above, no
finite sample of the common knowledge conditions can result in certainty that salience to S is not
rendered useless by H's ignorance. (Prima facie salience to S being based on knowledge that A is
prima facie salient to H, and H's confidence on his knowledge that A is prima facie salient to S, in a
71 Heal (1978) ppl28-129. Heal adds that in this analysis infinite, potential knowledge appears but only as the object of 'finite',
'actual' thought.
72 Heal (1978) pl29.
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regress ad infinitum). The virtue of Heal's addition to Lewis is that it rules out the difficulties of
ignorance, because it is not founded upon reason replication73.
Gilbert's arguments against the force of precedence lead her to consider, following Heal, the role of
salience, and her fears are, as seen in the following section, allayed in similar fashion74. The idea that a
successful combination is uniquely salient turns, in Lewis' work, on an unuttered assumption. IfH calls
back according to successful precedent, then 'from a purely logical point of view', not calling back in
identical circumstances is the unprecedented case, and the distinction is important for psychology not
for analysis, for there is no greater reason to choose the precedented over the unprecedented case75.
Choosing the salient as the only way of coordinating satisfies neither Lewis' conditions on equilibria,
for they tolerate 'a-rational' tendencies, nor gives reasons for acting. Acting to achieve a non-salient
combination in a coordination situation, having no mind for, or ignoring, one's interlocutor's actions, is
equally rational; what is asked for is a reason for both agents (independently, in the limiting case), to
choose the only correct course of action76. As Gilbert says, mere conspicuousness is no guide77. Gilbert
looks to cases of non-trivial decision situations (ones requiring nested intentions), in which the
structure of preferences written to give a coordination problem as defined is absent, giving an example
of the difficulty of coordinating one's decisions to reasoning of what others will do: with the
introduction to the example of preference rankings, one encounters a coordination problem containing
S and H (two invitees to a party). S may regard as the ideal situation, S's wearing a dinner-jacket with
black tie and H's wearing a dinner-jacket with white tie, or their both wearing clown suits. Other, less
favoured preferences follow, down to a least favoured. H has a similar ranking, though with no two
preferences congruent with S's. However, there is in the example no case in which there is two
competing, typical coordination equilibria, and the desired convention, it may reasonably be concluded,
73 Heal (1978) ppl30-131.
74 Gilbert (1989) p332 asks two simple questions: does a previously successful combination of actions make them salient, and if
so, why, again, should rational agents care?
75 Gilbert (1989) pp332-333 considers the prospects for a salience condition in a society of '...highly nonconformist...or
determinedly creative people...'; the fact that something has been done in the past would not recommend it to such people. What,
Gilbert asks, could be expected of a rational Martian? She goes on to argue that it is generally not the case that salience of
precedented combinations is engendered by common knowledge of successful precedent, even given common knowledge of
rationality.
76 Gilbert (1989) pp333-334 says that arguments for the necessity of a condition of salience are often presented as fait accompli.
Owing to the fact that rationality will not provide a reason for action in 'one-off cases, what clues can be given to direct
coordination? Concluding that there are such clues to be found is to say '...maybe instincts or psychological propensities which
have nothing to do with rationality could operate in a situation with this preference structure, so that beings of the relevant
psychological type, at least, could cope with it. In itself this kind ofmove seems permissible... What I [Gilbert] am arguing is that
within the framework ofgame theory the assumption that some point is salient gets us nowhere. That is, it does not move the
agents' reasoning on to the conclusion: act this way'. On p337 Gilbert rejects the idea that agents may simply carry out
inductions from S's act to an appropriate response.
77 Gilbert (1989) pp334-335 adds that there are cases to make her point. Firstly, in one-off cases, reasoning that does not appeal
to salience dictates a course of action to S and to H. Secondly,
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arises by chance. (It is also to be added that, again, there is here more than one equilibrium in which S
and H would, each individually, be better of!)78.
Heal's and Gilbert's work makes the substantive points against Lewis' arguments made in critical
assessments. It is argued in the following section that the rejection of the notions of salience and
precedence, and of arguments doubting the abilities of S and H to reason to others' intentions and
conventions in acting or understanding are of no threat to Lewis' theory. Heal's replacement, the theory
of unique salience without reason replication, is unnecessary, for Lewis' conventions are, as required
by the absence in Gricean theory, descriptive of mutual knowledge and of S intention. More
importantly, the theory is applicable to elucidating conventions of language. As Heal says, the
problems of nested intentions, or reason replication, obtain for even the shortest section of reasoning
regarding S's intentions, and in the following section there are two main points to be made, each with a
common root. Firstly, Lewis shows how a possible worlds theory of intentionality makes no claim for
the necessity of H's settling upon one certain course of action or interpretation in response to S's
utterance. Lewis does not require that a course of action be uniquely salient in the sense advocated by
Heal and Gilbert, but that S's act be interpreted as a type of action (as above), performed in different
equilibria, the congeries of which constitute successful coordination. Equilibrium conditions in
different coordination equilibria describing the same coordination problem, are each describable as
actions with a common description, namely, as successful coordinations given the intentions of S and H
in the state of affairs instantiating the coordination problem. (This, it should be recalled, is of the
definition of convention, for all coordination equilibria in a coordination problem are conventional
under a certain description). That is, there is no fundamental meaning, or unitary connection to reality,
in a speech act (one that can easily be frustrated in parasitical or non-denoting utterances), but a host of
plausible contexts for accommodating utterances in different, near and far, possible worlds or states of
affairs. This, the second point, shall be seen to show that H can reason to S's likely meaning in a
speech act without fear of Heal's and Gilbert's objections to the notion that conventions can arise




3. Conventions and Language
The core ofLewis' work is his theory of possible languages, with which he offers an eloquent reply to
the problems of demonstratives and a workable theory of analyticity for language. Both Quine's
arguments against conventions and Derrida's for the relativisation of language to an illimitable number
of contexts are challenged1; indeed, in response to the latter, Lewis' theory says that language assigns
interpretations not to its sentences, but to the possible occasions of utterance of its sentences, conceived
not as contexts but as instantiations in possible worlds: in this the condition that conventions for uses of
language be applicable to specific utterances in specific situations is obviated2. As said, the signalling
language Lewis describes (presented in IV.2), is limited in its application to contingent states of affairs
(ones that do not draw upon enduring conventions), and Lewis begins his theory of possible languages
by moving to solve this problem.
Lewis describes language L as a replacement for the signalling language. The latter fails for it
contains no way to create new, true sentences, and introduces truth-conditions as applying only to
specific sentences reporting corresponding states of affairs. It allows no idle conversation: all sentences
are spoken to a specific purpose of coordination, and the governing conventions in these cases are
defined relative to an interest in the 'short run'3. It offers no provision for opinions or hypotheses,
argument and speculation. Most importantly, L requires moods other than the indicative, and provision
for indexicals and demonstratives, and Lewis argues that he accounts for these additions4. Such
additional required moods and revised truth-conditions allow for the fact that truth is not, as in the
signalling language, a correspondence of gestures or acts to conventions to which the particular use of
language applies, for there is no longer '...any special situation to which the language applies', but
rather conventions established and disseminated, modified and changed, mutually-known between S
and H, and applicable to novel and varied contexts and situations5. Lewis defers to his analysis of the
1 Fish (1980) pi99 rejects the arguments for a babel of interpretations as promulgating a 'standard story'. In Fish (1989) he
speaks of all communication as mediated.
2 Lewis (1969) pl63. Possible occasions being a pair of a possible world and a spatio-temporal location in the world.
3 Lewis (1969) pl60. No standard or language convention can develop, for a non-conformist will elicit a confused response given
the corresponding state of affairs.
4 Lewis (1969) ppl63-164 considers possible languages, at first without reference to their form in use. The signalling language
derived from Grice (seen as a function giving all expressions in a language a mood and a truth condition), is described as per the
definition outlined above. Kirk (1970) pl4 makes abundantly clear the distinctions for which Lewis argues. He does not specify
truth and analyticity for a language, but gives a means by which a language may be used in a population, and defines truth and
analyticity relative to those using the language. The relation to the two types of convention defined by Strawson and Millikan is
clear. Kirk marks Lewis' distinction between mood and truth-conditions but is, however, surely wrong to say that, owing to
convention requiring mutual knowledge of alternatives, S could only use a language if he knew there were other speakers. Kirk
also argues that the notions Lewis uses to underpin his theory of analyticity in possible languages: conformity to a convention of
truthfulness, reasoned expectation and rational preference, are all subject to Quine's arguments against analyticity.
5 Lewis (1969) pl63 and Kirk (1970) pl4.
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ways in which conventions may be established for a description of how statements in possible worlds
come to have conventional meanings, writing that one can,
.. .take a truth-condition to be a set of possible worlds: the set of those worlds in which,
as we say, the truth-condition holds. IfL assigns an interpretation <p, x> to a sentence o,
then x is the set ofworlds in which a is true in the sense appropriate to p.6.
Considerations of indexicality require that L assign interpretations to sentences when relativised to
individuals or locations, and this is defined by Lewis as a unity of a possible world and a location
within it at which a is uttered. (From this may follow definitions of the type of S speaking, the H aimed
at in his intention, and the context in which the utterance occurs)7. In the signalling language the
meaning of a sentence is given by an interpretation without reference to the occasion of utterance, but
as seen in the presentation of Gricean analysis, no such interpretation assigns meanings ('...or even a
meaning...'). In the function assigning possible worlds to interpretations, all ascriptions ofmeanings to
sentences proceed from the study of the features of the occasion of utterance8. The description of some
linguistic properties, such as communication and S meaning, can it may be argued, be given in terms of
the signalling language described by Grice, but indexicality and ambiguity need separate treatment.
The semantic properties of sentences of possible languages are described by a function obtaining
between four elements: the sentence a, the language L, an occasion utterance (o) of a, and the
interpretation <p, x> assigned. Lewis defines eternity, ambiguity, indicativeness, and truth and falsity
in the language9.
S is true in L on o under <p, x> iffL assigns to <a, o> a set of interpretations containing
<p, x> and the truth condition x holds in—that is, contains—the possible world w in
which the possible occasion o of utterance of a is located.. .o is false in L on o under <p,
x> iff L assigns to <o, o> a set of interpretations containing <p, x> and the truth
condition x does not hold in the possible world w in which o is located10.
6 Lewis (1969) pl63.
7 Lewis (1969) pi64 is not ignoring the difficulties caused by potential ambiguities. In such cases L must assign not a single
interpretation but a set of interpretations: when the sentence is unambiguous on an occasion, the set contains one interpretation,
and when it is ambiguous, the set contains finitely many interpretations. There are cases in which a set contains no
interpretations, and this Lewis says, provides one means of dealing with difficult, ungrammatical cases ('quadruplicity drinks
procrastination'), on all occasions of their utterance. Treating such cases as non-sentences would, as Lewis says, make
sentencehood relative to occasions of utterance, and he adds, one might pursue another option and treat such cases as one would
self-contradictory sentences, and assign interpretations with empty truth conditions. Lewis adds that all of the interpretations
given to a sentence on occasions ofuse cannot be thought to have the same mood.
8 It is also the case (Lewis (1969) ppl65-173), that one cannot stipulate that the set of sentences of L is finite. This is central to
the theory of possible world semantics. Cf. pl71 and pl72.
9 The definitions are on Lewis (1969) pl73.
10 Lewis (1969) ppl73-174.
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Truth conditions given by the function may apply in all, some (one or many) or no, possible worlds,
and there follows a definition of occasion analyticity, syntheticity, and contradiction". The final, fullest
definition is, 'a is analytic in L iff L assigns to a on every possible occasion of its utterance a single
fixed interpretation <p, t> and the truth condition x holds in every possible world'12. Lewis' most
urgent question is how a population comes to use and accept the conventions of a language, and,
relatedly, to accept and to know that others use them. They must, argues Lewis, be used, 'in a certain
way', the clarification ofwhich way shows how sentences are given interpretations13. In his developed
Gricean signalling language Lewis sees a convention of truthfulness found also in L. Taking first the
sentences of L as indicatives, and temporarily ignoring the problems raised by indexicality and
ambiguity, the function gives each sentence an interpretation. (In discussion of this, and indeed
throughout, it shall be seen that the core of Lewis' theory is the holding of mutually-known sincerity
conditions)14. Being truthful is to speak true sentences in L; it is also to engage in collocution, knowing
11 Lewis (1969) pl74. The analysis gives an essential notion of partial analyticity, describing truth conditions holding in some
worlds but not others. He describes syntheticity for L on occasions and under interpretations: 'o is synthetic in L on o under <p,
t> iff L assigns to <a, o> a set of interpretations containing <p, t> and the truth condition t holds in some possible worlds but not
in others'.
12 Lewis (1969) ppl75. On ppl75-176 Lewis considers some conditions on his definition. Unambiguous indexical sentences may
be true in L on every occasion of its utterance but not be analytic on any occasion (Lewis suggests T am here now'). He adds that
such sentences are assigned truth conditions that hold in the world in which the occasion of the utterance is located, but not in
others. This is the kernel of the theory of analyticity that Lewis advocates.
A further difficulty arises in the case of an unambiguous indexical sentence analytic on one possible occasion of its utterance
but false on another. (In this case he suggests 'It is a perfect square'). 'Take an occasion of its utterance on which the only entity
under discussion... was the number 49, referred to by the numeral '49'. Then I take it that the truth condition assigned to our
sentence on that occasion will hold in every possible world in which 49 is a perfect square—that is, in every possible world. So it
is the universal truth condition. The sentence is analytic in English on that occasion. But take another occasion of its utterance in
which the entity under discussion was the number 48, referred to by the numeral '48'. On that occasion, our sentence is not
analytic in English; it is false, and indeed contradictory, in English'. This is not a problem for Lewis' theory of analyticity;
although the sentence is analytic in English on certain occasions, it is not analytic simpliciter by the definition. Others
('Yesterday is past'), are not only analytic in English on occasions of use but analytic in English simpliciter. 'Any possible
occasion of utterance of the sentence "Yesterday is past" is located on some day d. The truth condition assigned to the sentence
on that occasion holds in every possible world in which day d-1 precedes day d; this is the universal truth condition, no matter
what d is. So our sentence is assigned a single fixed interpretation on every possible occasion of its utterance, and this
interpretation contains the universal truth condition'. Further quotation can be provided to demonstrate Lewis' method in
deriving his theory; one can only be struck by the sheer brilliance and, one must say, brio, with which he works. 'Customarily, a
sentence of any mood may be called contradictory; but only an indicative sentence may be called analytic. I have ignored this
pointless restriction: analyticity—like contradiction, truth and falsehood—depends on the truth condition assigned by L, without
regard to the accompanying mood. An analytic imperative is "Wear a hat or else don't!" An analytic commissive is "I promise to
remain unmarried as long as I am a bachelor". An analytic permissive is "You may respire whenever you breathe'".
13 One cannot assign interpretations simply by putting one's mind to the task; there is, as Wittgenstein says, a deep need for the
convention. Lewis (1969) pl77 refers to Wittgenstein (1958) §510, and his challenge to say that 'it is cold here' and mean 'it is
warm'.
14 Lewis (1975) gives a richer account of convention, containing the addition of a condition of speaker-hearer coordination,
following Grice. Lewis remarks upon the condition in his analysis stating a general preference for conformity to R (or R'): this is
given as a means of explaining the 'rational, self-perpetuation' of conventions, and, as Lewis says, this issues in a theory of
reasoned preference as giving reasons for action, and not an, '...epistemic reason for believing'. Thus conventions are given as
'regularities in action'. 'It made no sense [in (1969)] to speak of believing something in conformity to a convention. (Except in
the peculiar case that others' conformity to the convention gives one a practical reason to conform by acting to somehow produce
a belief in oneself; but I knew that this case was irrelevant to ordinary language use)'. Lewis returns to the core of his theory,
which he sees in the theories of coordination, or signalling, between S and H. In response to issues Bennett raises, Lewis
considers that in a case of signalling there may, for instance, be no action for H to take when belief is imparted; there may be
disagreement about the appropriate response, or confusion. In (1969) signalling cases distracted Lewis, he confesses, from the
emphasis on speaker/hearer coordination, and the required associated beliefs. A theory of coordination between present speaker
and the community of (mostly past), speakers by whom he was taught is, while not wrong, incomplete, for the condition of
truthfulness in L means that speakers conform, and learners leam as they, in turn, become speakers. Bennett's work shows Lewis
how to state a convention, '... not in terms of preference for conformity but rather in terms of reasons for conformity offering
'practical or epistemic reasons'. In this way does H's trust in S's sincerity become part of a convention.
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that silence renders one a non-user of the convention. There is, as there was not in the signalling
language, what Lewis calls a 'positive' and a 'negative' truthfulness. In an actual language silence is
not outlawed, but the continuation of the language as a going concern requires the utterance (the
vocalisation) of true sentences. Speakers pursue a conventional regularity of trying to achieve
truthfulness in L, a regularity given by mutual-knowledge, and upheld by all members of the language
community on the condition that it is upheld by all others. Communication is thus facilitated, for there
has, in such cases, been prior coordination and observance of conformity to a convention15.
Lewis reviews the arguments of Austin and Grice for indicatives as the direct (face-to-face, or ideal)
communication of a situation16. He adds that language L allows the writing of more (and more real),
situations in which one communicates with an absent receiver, and with, in many cases, no knowledge
of those who will receive one's truthful communications. It is not necessary that there be a specific
belief or intention formed by S in speaking, or action taken (as on Grice's and Schiffer's accounts)17.
While all conventions have alternatives, other regularities of truthfulness in alternative possible
languages, alternatives in adjacent possible worlds must never be too close approximations, for they
must never allow shifting at will between a convention and an alternative18. For indexicals, Lewis
restates the convention for truthfulness in L, yet with provision for the dependence of words and truth
conditions upon occasions ofutterance. P is a population, and x a member:
He details some benefits of the change in the definition, again suggested by Bennett. What if a language has one speaker, yet
several who understand? Is this a population? Is there a difference between one who does not speak a particular language because
he is never in the appropriate population, and one who does not speak because he has nothing to say? 'Both are alike, so far as
action in conformity to a convention of truthfulness goes'. In the later work Lewis thinks the condition on the predominant
coincidence of interest too restrictive; it is now enough that S and H agree in the preferences of general conformity to R rather
than 'slightly-less-than general' conformity. (Of course, Lewis does not deny that widespread non-conformity to R may be
preferred more). All who believe that at least almost everyone else conforms to Rwill want the others to conform.
Lewis (1975) states the Gricean mechanism. The motivation behind Lewis' follow-up to his book is to meet criticisms of
Bennett (1973). He gives a potted version of his theory of convention: one complies because there is widespread conformity, or,
'...has been... or will be', and reasons for conformity are reasons for belief; they are premises 'tending to confirm the truth of the
belief in question'.
16
They are qualitatively different to the cases considered in the signalling language as so far considered. On Lewis' theory the
'face-to-face' permits that this process can proceed by metonymy: that is, the passage of intentions from S to H can persist over
time.
17 Lewis (1969) pl80. Lewis, echoing Davis, writes that forming beliefs is normally involuntary, and not in conformity to any
convention. Even in cases in which H should perform an act in response to S's utterance, the act may not serve purposes common
to S and H, may not be the one S intended H to perform and so forth. In such cases the act may not be described as bound by
convention. 'No doubt there is a continuous spectrum from verbal signalling to idle chat, and two-sided and one-sided
coordination may be mixed in various proportions. But generality is served by concentrating on the one-sided coordination
among communicators which is present in all conventional indicative communication, not on the occasional two-sided
coordination between a communicator and his audience'.
18 Lewis (1969) ppl80-181 adds that not every other possible language is a suitable alternative. Lewis has not (yet) ruled out of
consideration as languages many 'bizarre entities'. Indeed, as things stand, one cannot define truth in any possible language, but
only in one restricted to one with indicative, imperative and commissive moods and little ambiguity. This allows that there will
be, for example, languages without grammars, trivial languages, languages that cannot be pronounced, or learned, languages
without any discernible use, and even those with sentences so long that the effort required to speak it is such that decides not to
bother. On pp181-191 Lewis describes some objections that might be made to the theory of conventions of truthfulness in a
language.
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If a is a sentence ofL which would be indicative in L on an occasion o of its utterance by
x to an audience in P, then x tries to make sure that he utters a on o only if o would be
true in L on o19.
(The definitions are amended for imperatives and commissives). In respect of ambiguity Lewis
considers two options: that L may be a language of P iff there exists a convention saying that in L
unambiguous sentences are true, and that this inheres in a more general convention of truthfulness.
Secondly, one might write a standard of truthfulness for sentences to which are given multiple
interpretations (say, those containing demonstratives): minimal truthfulness may result from taking any
one of the given interpretations '... and doing whatever one would have to do to be truthful in L if that
interpretation were the only one assigned to c on o by L'. Thirdly, and a 'higher standard', Ss in L
might give conditions showing the ways in which ambiguity is resolved in conversation, a principle
making reference to S's purposes20. As Davidson before him, Lewis maintains that in a population P
there is a convention of truthfulness in their language, sustained by the need for mutual coordination
and communication, and, he conjectures, this goes for actual languages21.
Given this, Lewis offers relations of expressions in actual languages to populations offering
interpretations sustainable by the languages, predicated on the model of the relations of expressions to
possible languages. He again offers definitions of eternal, ambiguous, mood-relative, true (and false),
and most importantly, analytic, sentences22.
a is analytic in P on o under <p, x> iff there exists a possible language L such that L is an
actual language of the population P, and such that L assigns to <o, o> a set of
interpretations containing <u, x>, and the truth condition x holds in every possible world.
(Likewise for contradiction and syntheticity).
19 Lewis (1969) pl92.
20 Lewis (1969) pl93, and these depend upon S's and H's mutual, and mutually-known, opinions about conversational purposes.
One can, for example, Lewis writes, ignore interpretations that are conversationally pointless (in more Gricean terms, it serves
none of S's conversational intentions). One can also ignore those that are blatantly false, or those that both S and H fail to notice
has a specific interpretation. All methods of resolving ambiguity, Lewis adds, are crude, and they are not1... part of the content of
our convention of truthfulness in a language'. They result not from such conventions but from the 'common sense' that
accompanies their use.
21 Lewis (1969) pl95. The conventions of a population of inveterate liars are peculiar, and palpably unclear, but in that case they
can be settled '...in whatever way we find convienient'. 'We can happily admit, of course, that they are cases in which a
language is, in an extended sense, an actual language of a population; this is simply to say that they bear important resemblances
to cases in which the condition given in the definition is satisfied'.
22 Lewis (1969) pl96.
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Simplicity is gained by writing the definition in Gricean terms, adding the condition that one might see
in the occasion o that S wishes to communicate with H, and find a language population in which this
may occur23. The simplification runs,
£ is analytic on o iff there exists a possible language L and a population P such that the
communicator and intended audience on o belong to P, L is an actual language of P, and
L assigns to <o, o> a single interpretation <p, x> whose truth condition x holds in every
possible world24.
In analysing the words of a language, and the ways in which they may be interpreted by a population,
Lewis defines a function linking L with a grammar T, and with the population P and the assignment r to
4, and finds it ambiguous, for there will be more than one viable grammar2S. However, he replies that
conventions of truthfulness link speakers with their utterances, and not with the constituents of their
utterances: given this, the problem is solved. He writes, '[conventions are regularities in action, and
there is no such action as adopting a grammar or bestowing an interpretation (or if there is, it does not
occur in normal use of language).' While a best grammar may emerge (on Chomskyan lines), as a vital
element in the explanation of S's truth-observing and truth-expecting operations with language, the
practice of coordination over time elicits a 'method of evaluation', determining the grammar which,
Chomsky argues, is immanent in S's internal representation.
Lewis offers his theory of convention as a response to Quine's arguments for the incommensurability
of conceptual schemes, the inscrutability of reference, and the indeterminacy of translation, for all of
which, Quine argues, no conventions can be described26. Lewis' postulated conventions of truthfulness
(or sincerity) in communicative acts are 'limiting case[s]' of conventions in the language chosen of a
23 Lewis (1969) pl97: one can, if necessary, provide for ambiguity and interpretation by examining o, and so identify S and H,
and look for an actual language of a population to which they belong. This gives semantical relations between a verbal
expression a and an occasion o.
24Lewis (1969) pl97.
25 Lewis (1969) pl98. Different grammars for L interpret and assign constituents differently. They may even analyse sentences
differently into constituents, but, Lewis remarks, such differences cancel themselves out, for the grammars give the same
sentences with the same interpretations. The question is how one selects a convention of truthfulness for a language of a
population.
26 Lewis (1969) pp200-201. Lewis summarises the importance of his conclusions for a theory of analyticity. Lewis has, he
believes, shown the way in which a verbal expression can be analytic or conventional in a population, and yet c[i]t remains open
whether any verbal expression ever is analytic in any population. Analyticity as described so far might be a perfectly intelligible
status which happens not to be occupied. Similarly, we may know what it would be for a possible language L to be the actual
language of a population; but we do not know that this ever occurs. And I strongly suspect that it does not'. Saying analyticity is
not 'sharp' is not to say that it is unintelligible (Lewis writes that in any language population there are mostly synthetic
sentences, some clearly analytic and a vast number, all of the interesting ones, that are somewhere between), but how may one
accept the possibility of partial analyticity? Firstly, because the conventions of language are conventions 'to less than the highest
degree', and fewer cases of untruthfulness, firmer confidence in the truth of others and a smaller class of indefinite cases would
not make the analyticity allowed for in a language any sharper. Secondly, although the number and variety of possible worlds is
unfathomable, the property of analyticity as truth in every possible world, and that of uncertainty about the possibility ofworlds
potentially reflecting a greater uncertainty about the analyticity of sentences, shows that there is more to 'unsharp' analyticity.
'Sometimes we cannot tell whether a sentence is analytic—say, one of the principles of dynamics—because we cannot tell
whather it is true in our language in some hypothetical world that clearly is possible'.
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'tight' cluster: two tokens of an utterance type (one sincere, one insincere), may share the same
interpretations, yet correspond to different truth conditions, owing to their occuring in different (but
adjacent) possible worlds on the criteria given by Wittgenstein and described in 1.4. The two tokens of
the utterances, given by S and S', may report on the same state of affairs (S sincerely and S'
insincerely), and they may, additionally, share the representation of a combination, in a state of affairs,
ofatomic simples. However, in speaking insincerely, S' is speaking in a different possible world to that
in which S speaks and in which the state of affairs ofwhich he speaks obtains. By the conventions for
the language of S, established on Lewis' terms, and the congruence of an utterance with a state of
affairs represented (established by Wittgenstein), S' is using different conventions to S and is speaking
a different language: there exist in the respective languages different truth conditions. Thus it is that the
condition of salience to which Heal holds Lewis may be found to be unnecessary, for in endeavouring
to achieve coordination with H, S chooses not merely the course of action he thinks is most likely to
succeed, but an entire possible world in which he thinks H participates and in which his action is
coherently interpretable. The possible world contains many states of affairs pertinent to interpreting the
action, say (in the case of a speech act, and in the example Wittgenstein considers), those that obtain
when the utterance is part of a negation, equivalence or inference and so forth, each ofwhich, by virtue
of appearing in 'logical space' is indefeasibly carried in S's act. (H will equally, if in the same world as
S, know of these indefeasible connections). In the same way, S, in issuing his speech act, instantiates
each of the worlds in which the state of affairs ofwhich he speaks obtains and all of the forms in which
it may appear. The act he chooses to issue, if sincere, must appeal to one such world and one such
form, and thus S must appeal to a mutually-known convention to achieve coordination with H.
However, the utterance itself carries no inherent conventions of usage, it merely, and inevitably,
appears in a possible world (or a logical space), instantiating conventions appropriate for, in this case,
negating, drawing equivalencies and so forth. It is argued in IV.5 that possible worlds are, as Lewis
says, established by conventions as he conceives of them. The analogy of distance between possible
worlds may usefully be continued. Less accessible possible worlds interpret the sentences of S's and
H's language in a single possible world as true and false, and so are more resistant to change, and thus
Lewis allows the status of some statements as 'partially analytic. (Lewis' modal realism says that
analyticity is absolute in one of the infinity of possible languages; that is, each statement has a world in
which it is analytic).
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Furthermore the acceptance of the existence of many possible languages allows that a theory of
communication is preserved. Truth of S (given as correspondence to the existing state of affairs), is
secured in some languages, but not those, say, in which S acts or dissembles, yet divergences in such
cases are between closely-allied languages, and are overcome by the institution of conventions, ad hoc
and temporary if necessary. Thus language is flexible, with room for change in the light of progress,
and even to suit, when the convention is required, S's, '...opinions, tastes, and conversational
purposes', all of which can be accommodated. It is incorrect to view convention as relative to
occasions of utterance and their contexts; with a theory of language as a cluster of shifting, augmenting
possible languages, each constituted by myriad states of affairs, there is indeed little or nothing to be
said for the idea of a permanent convention conceived of as requiring anything of the resources or
construction of a natural language. The less exacting each Lewis convention is, the greater scope it
leaves its fuller acceptance. A child coming to a language has only what he hears to develop his own
competence as a speaker: it may be some time before he is able to identify and distinguish the language
he uses from others in (remote) possible worlds. The conventions he is inured to will be resilient, and
thus identifying other candidates for truth, analyticity, indicativeness and so forth, will be difficult, but
this is as it should be, for it is the condition of progress. A convention of truthfulness in a single
language, premised in Derrida's response to Austin, is inconceivable, preventing the progress of
learning and of self-sustainability; because of its incompleteness it is open to the very tensions (owing
to the conditions on demonstrative uses and insincerity and parasitism) that Derrida diagnoses in any
such theory. The theory of communication with appeal to mutual knowledge is examined by Schiffer
for its application to Gricean arguments, and it is with this that one can begin to see the way in which
Lewis' conventions fill the gap in Grice's theory of meaning-intentions, concerning how conventions
for speech acts can arise without circularity. Schiffer begins by examining some difficulties in Grice's
work, and primarily the sense of 'meaning' relevant for the explication of communication27. The
utterance 'x means something' may be true in at least two different ways; Schiffer gives as examples S
meaning something, and a sign meaning something28. He contends that S did something (performed an
act), by which meaning is communicated, and that the sign did not. (The sign has meaning, be it
27 Cf. Kemmerling, A.; 'Utterer's Meaning Revisited', ppl30-155 in Grandy and Warner (1986). Kemmerling begins his analysis
of utterer's meaning on the premise that the Schifferian mutual-knowledge conditions, derived from Lewis, are accepted and
common currency (ppl30-131). The 'legalistic' view of Austin on convention is rejected (pl33). Taxonomies of speech acts
should be 'vertical' as well as 'horizontal', ordering them according to their importance for communication and 'basicness'.
28
This, it should be recalled, being precisely the point at which Ziff begins his analysis of Grice.
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correctly understood or not; S performs or reports an act with meaning)29. The two cases are designated
meanss and meansx respectively. Schiffer asks: how does someone means and something meanx? In the
first case, there is a condition that there is something someone did (not necessarily intentional), the
articulation ofwhich meant something30. The uses report the message, or information, conveyed by an
utterance in the first case, and its sense or intended meaning on an occasion of its appearance in the
second. Substituted for the '...' in the following analysanda (in the first case) are grammatically
complete sentences (complete thoughts or actions), and in the second, '...a word, a phrase, or a
sentence31. Schiffer offers two analysanda:
S meant something by (or in) producing (or doing) x.
(S meant [that]...by (or in) producing (or doing) x), and S meant something by x (S
meant "..."by x)32.
He adds: '[t]he part in parentheses is to remind us that we do not want an account of what it is to mean
something which does not enable us to specify what was meant.' There are difficulties immediately.
Wertheimer suggests a case in which S says what he means: on Schiffer's theory, 'S meant that x by
saying "x"' is true, and 'S meant that x by "x"', is false or ungrammatical, yet, Wertheimer argues, the
converse is true, and Schiffer's mistake is a 'handicap'33. He is again mistaken to think that Grice's
work bears on the first sentence, for it bears only on the second, and Wertheimer writes: while S says
what he means by saying what he says, he does not mean what he means by the act of saying it.
Schiffer's work, ventures Wertheimer, impacts only on the first sentence. Wertheimer looks to
Schiffer's two formulations. In the first a gerund is given to follow 'by', but no means suggested as to
how it is to be read, or, when supplied, how x is specified. Any such gerund will be ambiguous,
meaning either, 'performing an act of (GP) [gerund phrase]' or, 'the act of (GP) S performed'. Only the
latter identifies an event produced by S, and yet gerunds in Schiffer are (paradigmatically, considering
the desire to write a theory of S-meaning), 'uttering and this is not a gerund of the second type.
29 Schiffer (1972) pi. He also considers a possible counter-example. 'If [the first sentence] is true, then it is most likely that S did
something. But if [the second] is true, it is unlikely that the mark did something. If [the second] is true, then it will be true that
the mark has meaning. But if S means something it is unlikely that he has meaning. (Unlikely but not impossible. S may mean
something in the same way that, say, a signal flag means something. Thus, a lighthouse keeper might communicate to ships at sea
that there is a hurricane coming by putting his son S on the top of the lighthouse, in which case any sailor worth his salt would
know that S meant "there is a hurricane coming"'). Cf. Loar (1981) p245.
30 These may have been metaphorical or analogical uses: Schiffer's example is 'S meant "his male parent is inexperienced" by
"his father is green'". (p2).
31 Schiffer (1972) p3. There are, in addition, cases in which S means something by the production of x without meaning
something by x, and in which S means something by x without meaning something by the production of x. It is, 'in general' the
case that in an utterance made meaning p, S means p by the utterance (this covers cases of ironical utterances, and of metaphors
understood and misunderstood).
32 Schiffer (1972) p3.
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'At any rate, in normal speech S usually does not mean anything by his act of uttering acts of
uttering words are not usually signals, gestures or the like... '34. It is shown in what follows that Schiffer
(and Lewis), owing to the amenability of their analyses to a pragmatist interpretation, can overcome
this objection.
Schiffer turns to consideration of meaning x by an utterance. He gives four paradigm cases, and a
condition of timeless meaning. Firstly, the class of 'whole-utterance types' (sentences and signals);
secondly, whole-utterance tokens; thirdly, part-utterance types (words and phrases); and, fourthly, part-
utterance tokens. Criteria for inclusion in each class are defined: x is a whole-utterance type iff x means
(timeless), and the only substitutes for "..." are grammatically complete sentences; a token of this
type is a whole-utterance token iff x is a token of a whole-utterance type. A type x is a part utterance
token iff x means (timeless), and the only substitutes for "..." are words or phrases; a token of a
type is a part-utterance token iff x is a token of a part utterance type. Schiffer countenances other
senses of 'meaning' not directly relevant to the explication of language and communication; he deals
with them as either reducible to analysanda offered, or as at least connected with the senses of 'mean'
to be discussed. As Schiffer ignores them they will be merely referenced, as not pertinent to the
argument to be made here35. Schiffer asks which is prior, the whole utterance type or the part utterance
type. He writes that a first consideration is that the meaning of a sentence is at least in part a 'function'
33 Wertheimer, R.; 'Meaning by Stephen R. Schiffer', The Philosophical Review, vol. LXXXIV, no. 2, pp267-270, 1975, p. Such
cases are, Wertheimer says, 'perforce the normal case'.
34 Wertheimer (1975) p. Wertheimer suggests alternatives: firstly, to presuppose that in the act of utterance S meant something
(somethingv by somethingw). The question: what did S mean has two meanings, one giving an identifying description of v the
other of w; the answer to what did S mean by '...?' correlates with the description for v. 'S meant „ only if S intentionally
produced W; S meant v only if S intended to produce V', in the case that S meant somethingv by a gerund of the first type (one
that does not refer but identifies w). If S meant somethingv by a gerund of the first type then S produced intentionally the event
allowing the description of w. (Recall that the second type of gerund is the description referring to w). S produced the event with
the intention of producing it for the description of v. 'But S may fail and then V will not exist'. From this it follows that answers
one might give to: 'what did S mean by a gerund of the first type?' are varied, none give a referring expression but all identify.
They have 'correlative transfers' that refer, and by an application of Leibniz's law (most commonly, 'to VP (verb phrase)' with
'V' referring (if it exists) to the same event as 'W'—therefore V=W). Other 'ordinary' answers must be transferable into a VP
construction.
The second alternative is that S meant something by x, and this appears in the second formulation of Schiffer's premise. In this
case the expression following 'by' is a noun phrase referring to w, usually an 'ellipsis' of the description of the event. 'W [the
event] may be anything S can intentionally produce that can have a meaning'. The '...' in 'S meant is a referring
expression, an ellipsis of 'V'. W may ormay not have a meaning: it may be a 'sentence-token or a yawn'; regardless, in virtue of
S's meaning somethingv by W; W means what S means by W, but 'W' is independent of S's intention of producing W. For a
description 'W' a description 'V' can be given describing w in terms of S's intention in producing W. (Wertheimer notes Austin's
distinction between phemes and rhemes). Therefore, while W (the event) may or may not have meaning, V means what S means
by W. Wertheimer offers the example in which S meant somethingv by x; S meant'...' by W (it was produced intentionally), and
with the intention of producing V, and considers its significance as a translation argument: the argument ' is not confined to
particular utterances of a particular speaker. '"W" means V"="S means V by W"', and 'V=W' are always true, and context
determines how 'S', 'V' and 'W' are to be read, and in this there is appeal to standard, conventional meaning. Giving the
meaning of a word is identifying the word (this includes signals, gestures and so forth). Understanding the meaning of a word is
understanding the word. Proper names have no meaning and cannot be understood.
35 Schiffer (1972) p5 offers, for example 'I meant what I said when I said that I hate you', 'Your love means more to me than all
the tea in China', and 'I meant to scare you by throwing the knife'. One might suspect that Schiffer is, in this, covertly disposing
of difficult cases ofmetaphorical ormetonymical utterances.
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of the meaning of its words36. However, he adds, there are cases of 'non-composite' whole-utterance
types without the structure of sentences, showing a real independence in a significant number of
instances37. Furthermore, this is not a two-way dependency, for something is a part-utterance type iff its
combination with other grammatical parts gives a whole utterance type, and yet the constitution of
whole utterance types need not require a combination of part utterance types (say, in cases such as
'Stop!', 'Observe!').
The case of S meaning something by x cannot, for Schiffer, be prior to the case considered as
meanings S can mean '...' by x iff he believes that x means'...', and study of this must precede any
analysis ofmeanings. This is, it has been argued, not achieved by Grice, and, once again, because of the
missing theory of convention. (One might reply: meanings may seem prior to meaningx for the simple
reason that an utterance type means only if S is able to mean what is communicated by it in its
utterance). Additionally, one might look to cases in which it is possible to communicate with H (to
mean something by an utterance), even when the utterance itself has no meaning, and Schiffer notes
that Grice does not make a necessary distinction, namely, between an account of what it is for S to
mean something by an utterance, and the senses in which S can be said to have meant something
(palpably Strawson's distinction)38. Schiffer writes this into his theory, and so extends the application
ofmutual knowledge and of the way in which meanings can come to be conventions on Lewis' terms.
Schiffer shows that clarity concerning Grice's theory requires some distinctions. The condition that S
meant something by an utterance iff he intended it to produce a specific effect in H can be understood
in three ways, owing to an ambiguity affecting accounts of S-meaning and ofH-understanding. It might
refer to an effect produced in H such that S meant something by the utterance iff he intended it to
produce the effect; to S meaning something iff he intended there to be an effect that his utterance will
produce, or, more plausibly, to S's meaning being conditional on there being an effect in H which S
intended to bring about by the utterance. All one can maintain, Schiffer says, is that meaning is carried
(communicated) in instances in which the effect S intended to produce is discovered in some way: H
must recognise S's intention to produce a specific response, and the ambiguities described show that
this needs more than simply a study of S's utterance. Further ambiguity is found in the condition that
36 A distinctly Gricean comment.
37 Schiffer (1972) p6 writes: 'A whole utterance type x, we may say, is non-composite just in case there is no "proper part" of x,
y, such that both y means something and the meaning of x is determined in part by the meaning of y'.
8 S might communicate to H that he is angry by uttering 'Grrrrrr'. Schiffer (1972) p7 is here alive to the priority of an account of
S meaning, and he turns to consideration of Grice. Schiffer adds the Gricean condition to his analysis (above) that 'utterance'
will include non-linguistic behaviour, and this is in accord with Grice's analysis.
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the response is necessarily to be made 'in a certain audience'; that'... S means something by uttering
x only if there is an audience H and a response r such that S intends his utterance of x to produce r in
H'. (Schiffer's responses have arisen elsewhere: the H for whom the utterance is intended may not
exist, and it is not a condition for S meaning something by his utterance that he intends a response in a
particular H)39.
Schiffer raises other counter-examples to Grice's analysis. With reference to Strawson's example of
S setting a rat (described in II.4). Schiffer states that S satisfies the necessary and sufficient conditions
for meaning something by his (non-verbal) utterance, but that there is no process of intentional belief-
transmission. S intends H to think his house is infested, and indeed, H (unbeknownst to S), seeing S
setting the rat, infers, even though S thinks he has issued no intentionally-guided utterance, that it was
issued with the intention of making him think that the house is infested (by the recognition of
intention). (Schiffer echoes Strawson in saying that this is not 'attempted communication' in the sense
Grice studies). Schiffer calls Strawson's ad infinitum condition a requirement that H should recognise
S's intention that he infer (at least in part), from the fact that x is f that S uttered x with the intention
that H respond (by recognising that x is f), and adds that this requires a notion of how H may, and S
may expect H to, reason regarding nested intentions. Schiffer notes further difficulties, seen by
examining Grice's, and Gricean, examples. S intends (in the case of the avaricious man), that H believe
that S plans to get rid of him by throwing the money, but in truth S intends that H's reason for leaving
is his recognition of the intention. Notwithstanding the fact that H does not recognise the intention and
pursues the money, H is intended to take as his reason for leaving the fact that S wants him to leave40.
Strawson writes, echoing Schiffer, that here there must be, for satisfaction of the thesis that S-meaning
requires the communication of intentions, recognition by H of a further intention of S, namely, that his
intention that H's recognition of the utterance to produce a response should be (in part) H's reason for
his response (cognitive or otherwise), and again one may see the role being given to mutual knowledge.
Schiffer gathers his points into a formal analysis ofmeaning which runs41:
S meant something by (or in) uttering x iff S uttered x intending:
(1) that x have a certain feature f;
(2) that a certain audience H recognise that x is f;
(3) that H infer at least in part from the fact that x is f that S uttered x intending
39 Schiffer (1972) p9 says that S, while drowning, may shout 'help!' to any one is listening.
40 A Gricean would, in such cases, defer to the notion of conventional implicature.
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(4) that S's utterance of a produce a certain response r in H;
(5) that H's recognition of S's intention (4) shall function as at least part of H's reason
for his response r;
(6) that H recognise S's intention (3);
(7) that H recognise S's intention (5).
The conclusion drawn is that for S to mean not only must he utter x with the dual-aspect intention seen
to be necessary for Grice's theory, but intend H to recognise that he does so, and this requires mutual
knowledge. This can only occur, Schiffer says, if S expects H to recognise that S intends to produce the
desired effect r in him by means of recognition of intention; in cases in which S intends to deceive H, S
must frustrate or confuse H's inferences '...as to the means by which S intends to produce r...\ On
condition that S is not intending to deceive, it is necessary that he, to satisfy the primary intention to
produce r in H, must expect H to think that he intends H's reason for r to be S's intention to produce r
in H. Schiffer gives an example. If S intends H to think that he uttered x intending H to think that p, S
must think that H thinks that S thinks his utterance will be sufficient to this end, 'in the circumstances'.
This requires the appending of a reason (owing to a sincerity condition), and, Schiffer adds, H will not
think that S uttered x unless he thought the utterance was one such reason. (Grice's example of Herod
presenting Salome with St John the Baptist's head is a case in point. Schiffer adds, the connection is
here to the recognition of primary and secondary intentions (counselling sincerity), on the basis of
mutual knowledge). '[I]n general...S thinks that H thinks that the utterance is a reason for thinking p
only if S thinks that H has beliefs which cause him to think p having understood S's utterance. It is also
the case that 'ordinarily' S is justified in thinking H has such beliefs only if S thinks H has a 'certain'
belief that will compel the conclusion. Consequently, H thinks S uttered x with the intention of giving a
reason for r iffH thinks there is a certain belief (shared in a context), that S thinks H has, and that H
thinks the utterance warrants drawing conclusion p. Schiffer argues that this compels two possibilities
in the case that S utters x intending to get H to believe p through recognition of intention. Firstly, that S
expects H to think that S intends H's reason for thinking p to be the fact that S uttered x intending to
get H to think this; and, secondly, that S expects H to think that S thinks that H will have reason(s)
other than the recognition of the intention as his reason for thinking p on the basis of the utterance,
namely, those given by mutual knowledge conditions. The second case points up a discrepancy
41 Schiffer (1972) p!9.
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allowing for cases of deceptive meaning between the reason H is intended to have for thinking p on the
basis of S's utterance, and the reason he is intended to think S intends him to have42.
A further type of 'deception' may obtain. S again sings with the intention of getting H to leave, and
with the intention that H recognise S's intention by inference from the fact that S is singing (woefully).
An intention is added, requiring that H's reason for leaving is truly his recognition of S's intention, but
the case is more complex. S intends that H should think S intends him to leave because of his appalling
singing, but S also (really) intends H to leave by recognition of S's intention to get him to leave. (In the
previous examples there was an intentional discrepancy between the reason S intended H to have for
leaving, and the reason he was intended to think he was intended to have; yet in this case, H is intended
to think that there is an intentional discrepancy, though there is none). In such cases Grice questions the
mounting complexity of the analysis: 'For how could S reasonably expect such a complicated inference
to be made from the fact that he is singing "Tipperary"?' Schiffer has no doubts that Grice's suggested
'special circumstances' (for ending the regress of intentions), can be gerrymandered, and he
(facetiously?) offers a case in which, having sung his first song, S has another person tell H his plan,
apparently in strictest confidence, with S knowing nothing. Thus when S sings again, H sees the
intention, communicated and recognised, that S sings with the intentions animating the first song. (It is
plainly unsatisfactory for the meaning of all utterances to be revealed only by reference to other
utterances. This merely begins a further regress, and Schiffer sees that this analysis may issue, in cases
in which S is taken to (following the above analysis) intend (7) that H recognise S's intention (5), and
which do not appear to be cases of meaning, in infinite regresses of nested intentions of mutual
knowledge (to the nth order))43. Schiffer uses Lewis' conditions on conventions to halt this regress.
Schiffer repeats that Grice argues that a regress of intentions is avoided, for there is a stage at which
S knows H could not infer his complex intention, and '... since one cannot, in general, intend to bring
about a result one knows one cannot bring about...', there will appear an n'1 order intention saying that
H could not possibly understand one more complex. Schiffer is dubious about the chances of reaching
this 'cut-off' point in all cases, and one must concur that it is decidedly ad hoc. (He notes Grice's
remark that the difficulty posed by the regress is that it nullifies all potential counter-examples, and that
this merely goes '... to show that there will come such a point in all cases of communication', for
logically it must always arise). Schiffer grants that there will arise such difficulties in 'cases of
42 Schiffer (1972) p21.
43 One might recall Strawson (1971c) pl57 (and II.4).
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deception', in which S could always fall back on a later intention, but that it is 'false' to conclude that a
'corresponding intention' in the 'standard case of communication', shows the same conditions, for here
'there is no deception': 'everything is out in the open', and Schiffer argues again that, by Grice's own
theory, mutual knowledge is unattainable, for, as Davidson would ask, how are the conventions
established for the standard cases, those allowing H to infer to S's intentions44? There will have
occurred, Schiffer says, in any successful standard case of communication, reasoning to S's intended
meaning, and the reasoning required, as Schiffer says, is palpably the same as that for deceptive cases.
It is argued (in IV.4-5) that Schiffer's argument, with its inspiration from Lewis, can account for both.
For qualification, Schiffer refers to the difficulty H must find in inferring a complex, nested intention
(as in one of the above counter-examples), by contrasting it with the inference in 'straightforward'
cases, say, in which S utters 'Leave the room'; the number of inferences required might differ but there
is no difference in the complexity of the nested inferences that must be carried out for second
intentions, ones Grice accepts must occur for the recognition of first intention. To Grice's examples of
'apparent' intention two objections follow: firstly, that no such intention could be provided with
logically sufficient conditions, because of a greater 'ingenuity' and 'subtlety' in one's interlocutor; that
is, there may be a stopping point, but it could, quite plausibly, never be fixed upon45. This being so, if
one takes as a necessary condition of S meaning something by X that he have an (n+1) intention that H
recognise his nth order intention that H recognise his (n"1) intention, then it follows that a necessary
condition of S meaning something by X is that H recognise an intention that he could not possibly
recognise. If one demand only that S intend H to recognise S's intention as per Grice's analysis (his ("'
') intention, and regarding only first intention), one of Schiffer's counter-examples is untouched, and
the consequence drawn that, '...only the two most subtle and intelligent beings alive could mean
anything, and they could only communicate with one another.'
Grice's suggested addition, that the analysans 'vary' with the nature of the intended response and the
circumstances in which the attempt to derive the response is made, still, Schiffer says, results in S
demanding ofH both more than H could give, and more than '...is necessary for [S's] meaning...'.
Schiffer gives examples, their force lying in the fact that S intends to deceive. Schiffer attends to the
Gricean condition: that a requirement be made that S not have certain, devious intentions, or, as Grice
has it, '...there is no inference-element E such that S uttered x intending both (1') that H's
44 For all of the quotations in this paragraph see Schiffer (1972) p24.
43 Schiffer (1972) pp24-25.
determination of r should rely on E and (2') that H should think S to intend that (l1) be false', and
Schiffer argues that this will not diffuse all counter-examples. In the first of the singing examples S
intends H's belief that he wants H to leave to be an inference-element speeding his departure, and it is
true that S in addition intends H to think that S does not intend H's belief that S wants H to leave to be
an inference-element, disguised more or less successfully by his singing. However, it could still be
remarked that H thinks (correctly, but contrary to S's plan), that S intends him not to have the belief
that S wants him to leave as his inference-element. In such a case meaning will be communicated, but
without mediation of S's intentions.
Schiffer states a theory in response to these cases, making no requirement on S that he not have
certain intentions; before giving his analysis he considers Searle's example of the captured soldier46. He
makes the intuitive objection (considered above), that '...it would be wrong, or at least not quite right,
to say that S meant that he was a German officer (or anything else) by uttering "Kennst..."', but to
make his case as strong as can be, moots that S does indeed intend H to take the utterance as meaning
that S is a German officer47. On both interpretations (this, and that saying that S intends to imply by
speaking German that he is German), S utters his sentence intending H falsely to think that it has a
certain feature; however, only the interpretation Schiffer considers has it that S intends H to have a
false belief as part of his reasoning in concluding that S uttered the sentence intending to produce a
definite response in H, namely, for H to think that S is a German officer. Schiffer writes that this is not
a sufficient condition for meaning, and asks that one consider H's interpretation of S's utterance when
it is a malapropism: in such cases S means something, and what he means (on Gricean analysis), is that
described in the utterance of the malapropism, '...and this despite the fact that H was intended [owing
to the malaprop] to have the false belief about the meaning of"..." as his basis for inferring what S
meant from what S uttered'. (It should be clear that Schiffer can read this back over the analysis of
inference elements contained in the singing example). S's utterance in Searle's example is (owing to
46 Schiffer (1972) p27 adds merely that since there is no reason why S should not want these intentions recognised (and intended
to be so), the self-reflexive intentions in his developed Gricean analysis may be thought acceptable.
47 Schiffer (1972) pp27-28 finds that Searle's reasons for the conclusion that the utterance should not count as an example of S-
meaning are unconvincing, for numerous simple counter-examples may be found. Searle (1971) p44 gives the reason: [w]e have
here a case where I am trying to produce a certain effect by means of the recognition ofmy intention to produce that effect, but
the device I use to produce this effect is one which is conventionally, by the rules governing the use of that device, used as a
means ofproducing quite different illocutionary effects'. Schiffer replies: 'This explanation will not do. At a boring party Miss S
might say to her escort, Mr A, "Don't you have to inspect the lemon trees early in the morning?", and mean thereby that she
wants to leave'.
Schiffer offers another example, derived from Grice: an Arabic-speaking prostitute utters, as seductively as she can, and with
the intention of picking up an English-speaking sailor, words that, translated into English, mean 'You filthy pig of a sailor'. She
means something by her utterance (though something she either did not want translated into English or that she hoped would be
taken as a sweet nothing); the soldier in Searle's example speaks, using the only sentence of German that he knows, with the
intention that the utterance evince a belief that he is a German, owing to the captors' knowledge.
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the ambiguity in its interpretation), issued with an intended discrepancy between the basis that H is
intended to have for thinking S uttered it intending to produce a specific response in H, and the basis
that H is intended to think he is intended to have. (No discrepancy obtains with the malapropism, for
the belief that, say, 'flamingo' means 'flamenco' is both the basis H is intended to have and the basis
he is intended to think he is intended to have. One might say that one does not consciously ask another
to dance a flamingo). Grice's postulated recognition condition will not stop the regress of intentions
given by his analysis (and stated in II. 3), for as Schiffer shows, many counter-examples obtain making
reference to further required intentions. The regress obtaining in literal and deceptive cases (the singing
example and Searle's soldier), can be stopped, but only by a version of Lewis' mutual knowledge
theory, giving necessary conditions for the performance of an act of communication'18. Mutual









Schiffer declares that such a case, described in an example, is one ofmutual knowledge, depending on
the ascription to both parties of 'normal' faculties, of rationality, and of associated Taws' of reasoning.
The phenomenon described is a 'general' one, obtaining whenever and wherever '...S and H know that
p, know that each other knows that p, and all of the relevant facts are "out in the open'". Schiffer's
claims are greater still: 'in general', for a person x and a proposition y, if x knows that y, then there is a
property A '... such that being A is sufficient for knowing that p, being A is sufficient for knowing that
being A is sufficient for knowing that p, and so on': for example, we 'normal' people know, and
mutually know, that snow is white, and this procedure of analysis and confirmation can be applied to
all of one's stock of'common, general' knowledge50. The possession of such mutual knowledge, as
Lewis shows, can be accounted for in conventions established without explicit convening and
manifesting a conventional procedure by means ofwhich S can articulate his intentions in such a way
that he knows H will, in sincere cases, respond (owing to the structures Millikan describes), with the
48 Schiffer's analysis is palpably the same as Lewis'. (See (1972) pp30-31).
49 That is, S and H mutually know....
50 Bach and Hamish (1979) p identify the means providing the mediating relationship between S and H as 'mutual contextual
beliefs'. See also Loar (1981) p248.
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action (or belief) directed by the convention. SchifFer takes on this argument from Lewis and shows
how, when applied to speech act theory, it can provide an argument to the conclusion that in describing
and assessing the contexts of speech act as correct or meaningful by convention the emphasis on S
intention and the situation in which S's utterance appears need not be regarded as unavoidable
contingencies. It can be shown that conventions for speech acts can be established (on Lewis' terms),
without fear of the relativisation of all contexts to those containing parasitical, quotational or otherwise
'insincere' utterances; all that is needed is a willingness to participate in a conventional coordination
situation, those which can, as suggested in IV. 5, be thought of simply as Deweyan stimulus conditions.
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4. Mutual Knowledge and Language
Schiffer has a yet bigger claim to make, namely, that 'in general', '...if one knows that p, one will
know how one knows that p...'; '...in most cases in which one knows how one knows that p, one
would not know that p unless one knew how one knew that p...'. Schiffer says that he interprets
knowing how one knows that p as knowing that having '...a certain property is sufficient for anyone's
knowing that p\ and this he applies to the knowing of a putative proposition X, adding that for
propositions such as X, if they are sufficient for knowing that p, then they are sufficient for knowing
that being X is sufficient for knowing that p. In turn he considers the elucidation ofmutual knowledge,
and, having given further examples to emphasise its dependence on conventions, states some general
conditions. Again, the possession of the knowledge that X gives knowledge that p, and in cases in
which S knows that H knows that X, S knows that H knows that p. The general conditions are given
through an example, in which it is suggested that the X-property of both S and H (that they know X),
entails that they share the same general properties, and if in both cases the X-properties are both
sufficient for knowing that p, then they are both sufficient for (S and H mutually) knowing that it is
sufficient for knowing that p, and, furthermore, that each is individually sufficient for knowing that the
other is sufficient for knowing that p. The '...two properties do not differ relevantly, since S and H
share all of the purely general properties entailed by either V orW [the X-properties]'.
To this Schiffer makes two objections. One might say that S and H do not possess mutual knowledge;
they know only that by following analogous procedures each may acquire knowledge of the kind
described; additionally, there is nothing in the example to say that mutual knowledge obtained before
S's and H's coordination was identified, or described, as evincing mutual knowledge. (These
objections, as the connection drawn (in IV. 5) between Lewis and Dewey shows, raise no difficulties).
Schiffer indicates two facts for a putative reply, and which begin the improvement of the Gricean
analysis. Firstly, one may not argue against the mutual knowledge condition in 'S knows that p' by
stating a case in which S states p but has never had the thought that p: that is, in which he must be
brought to the realisation that he knows that p. To see the difficulty one need only study the recognition
conditions in the Gricean analysis of communication. The conditions on mutual knowledge vary from
the examples of Schiffer, Strawson and Searle, but the 'paradigm' case of communication in Grice
contains a mutual knowledge condition: S and H know that the utterance has a certain feature, and that
the possession of the feature is evidence that the utterance was made with the intention of producing a
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definite response by means of the recognition of intention, and that the utterance was made with the
intention of its being mutual knowledge that S uttered the sentence with this intention. In 'making sure
everything is out in the open', S increases the chances of his achieving his first intention, and since, in
standard cases, the utterance is made in good faith, the recognition of the intention can only be
achieved if it is mutually known by S and H that the utterance was made with this intention. On the
Gricean analysis, a regress (harmless Schiffer would repeat), of mutual knowledge conditions is
established. The Gricean analysis, however, cannot easily be amended as Schiffer wishes, for counter¬
examples hold: most simply the case in which S utters x intending it to be mutual knowledge for
himself and H that the fact that he uttered x is evidence that he uttered x intending to produce a certain
response through the recognition of intention, but in which he intended H to think that it was not
intended to be mutual knowledge1. Additionally, Grice's analysis cannot tolerate a requirement that S
intend it to be mutual knowledge that the fact that he uttered x in the circumstances is evidence that he
intended the fact that he uttered x to be mutually known as evidence that he uttered x intending to
produce a certain response in H through the recognition of intention; that is, S might utter x with these
intentions, but with the additional intention that H think S intended the obtaining of mutual knowledge
itself to be evidence. Schiffer's arguments are succinctly stated:
So long as a proposed account of S-meaning requires S to have some intention i such that
the analysans does not secure that it is impossible for S to intend H to think that S did not
utter x with intention i, then the analysans will not be sufficient. In other words, if S is to
mean something by uttering x, then all of the intentions necessary for his meaning
something must be out in the open; there must be no possibility of "hidden" intentions
which are constitutive of an act ofmeaning something2.
Schiffer reconstructs Grice's account: it should read that S meant something by uttering x iff he
uttered it intending to report a state of affairs intended to be sufficient for S and H mutually to know
that it obtains; or, that it is conclusive evidence that S uttered x with the intention of eliciting a certain
response in H, and of intending that recognition of this intention is 'at least part' of H's reason for his
response, and to realise state of affairs E. Concerning this Boer and Pappas argue that from a counter¬
example Schiffer moots and rejects follows a fundamental revision of the 'epistemic' principles on
which his argument is based. Schiffer wonders whether the conditions on his analysis allow S to utter x
1 Schiffer (1972) p38 refers back to Strawson's example of S setting a rat in H's house.
2 Schiffer (1972) p39. Cf. Strawson (1971c) pl63.
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without intending to produce r in H. The principle writing 'good evidence' into the final version of the
analysis says that S intends its conditions3, and Boer and Pappas write that unless one accepts the
reasoning behind the 'good evidence' condition, one can state counter-examples: they offer one in
which S has the intentions Schiffer lists but does not fulfil Schiffer's own conditions on meaning.
(Once again, the holding of sincerity conditions is paramount). S has a reputation for lying: it is mutual
knowledge between S and H. For self-interest he, on this occasion, tells H the truth on a matter he
invariably lies about. However, H, knowing S's reputation, proceeds on the basis that S is lying,
ignoring the apparently good evidence (in the case S invariably lies about), that S has a first intention
of speaking truthfully. However, S does not have the first intention of so speaking, for he surely did not
mean that H should believe his utterance, for he was capitalising on his mutually-known reputation as a
liar. Boer and Pappas require that Schiffer prove the strength of the 'good evidence' conditions through
those on mutual knowledge, and write that S cannot think the realising ofE is good evidence if it is not
intended. Mutual knowledge still eludes cases of deception. Their objection, Boer and Pappas add, is to
a general principle, which Schiffer appears to accept, namely, that '[i]f S knows that it is not the case
that q, then S cannot think that E is good evidence that q'. (One might here consider an analogy with
one ofGrice's examples: that of S posting a letter, and only subsequently realising that he had formed a
further intention not to send it. S has at the time he posts the letter, and for some time prior to posting
it, no thought of his further intention, due to distraction or absent-mindedness4, and Boer and Pappas
appeal to the ubiquity of such cases). Schiffer has a good reply, arguing that a theory emphasising
mutual knowledge and convention can, as Lewis says, account for the intentional, and it shall be shown
that the nesting of reasoning in second intentions can be accounted for in a Gricean theory containing a
mutual knowledge condition.
The foundation ofGricean analysis, H's recognition of S's intention to produce a response, is subject
to doubt, Schiffer writes, due to 'standard instances of S-meaning', in which S utters x intending to
produce the response, but in which it is not part of his intention that any part of H's reason for his
response be that S intended its production5. Thus, while the condition of the recognition of intention
may be necessary 'for performing an act of "telling"', it is not for S meaning something (by an
3
Schiffer (1972) p57: mark the additions of 'p' for a variable marking reasons, and of 'p(t)' for a variable giving p as a truth-
supporting reason. There is, additionally, a description for 'causes in H the activated belief that p/p(t)' (p58), and for, 'causes H
to y/p' (p59). Holdcroft (1978) pl33 writes of the definition that it is necessary but not sufficient, and precisely because of
Strawson's counter-examples. He also writes that in its bald form it is vulnerable to counterexamples in which S wants to
deceive, to disguise his intention. He adds that, as Schiffer notes, the difficulty arises if S intends H to realise that S intends to
ipve H reason to think that S intends H to believe p.That is, S might, while distracted, entertain thoughts at odds with his intention.
283
utterance); it is incorrect, Schiffer writes, to argue that Grice's analysis derives from cases of telling
('that...', and 'to do...'). Furthermore, on Gricean analysis, there lies unspoken the fact that S intends
H to take the fact that S intends H to think that p as evidence that S thinks that p, and to take this as
evidence that p is the case, yet Schiffer rejects this, adding that, since one cannot intend to bring about
that which one knows impossible, it follows that if p is such a proposition, no one can mean p6.
However, as Boer and Pappas show, such arguments are made and meant, and in their analysis one sees
the kernel of Schiffer's treatment of indirect, parasitical cases. If S utters x with the first intention of
eliciting a certain response (rj) through the recognition of intention, and with the intention that the
production in x of n be sufficient for the production in H of a further response r2, then the intention to
produce r2 in H is not part of a description of what S meant in uttering x. Again, a mutual knowledge
condition is required. Boer and Pappas add a third case for assessment of Gricean analysis, and state a
counter-example. One never exposed to, say, an aspect of higher mathematics would have none of the
concepts relevant to the field; he would lack the ability to formulate intentions and explanations
concerning the subject; Boer and Pappas doubt that one could say that the subject, in speaking, never
intends to explain the aspect of higher mathematics: he simply does not know the mathematics7.
Additional counter-examples to Gricean analysis are found in cases of'reminding' and 'pointing out',
in utterances. In these cases it need be no part of S's intention that the response be elicited by means of
H's recognition of S's intention to produce a specific response, thus allowing for metaphors, hints,
allusions and pretence in speech. The importance of such cases may be seen in those for which the role
of getting H to see could not be played by recognition of intention, but in which S still meant
something8. In some cases the belief p is produced, and in some it is activated, and of all the cases of S-
meaning considered, Schiffer chooses for study, following Austin and Grice, that in which S utters x
intending to bring it about that H has in mind the belief that p, adding that it should be noted that
'... although only in some [specific] cases does S actually intend to provide H with the belief that p'.
Schiffer considers two ideas from which objections to his analysis may proceed. One might argue
that in the cases Schiffer offers there is a further response saying that the utterance is indeed 'derived'
5 Schiffer (1972) p42.
6 Schiffer (1972) p says that there is a class of propositions for which no amount of empirical evidence gives the truth, because
what is needed for the statement of their truth is not such evidence. If, therefore, Grice's analysis of meaning intentions and their
appeal to conventions is correct, no one could mean that p in cases in which p is such a proposition.
7 Boer and Pappas (1975) pp210-212 provide an elaborate example for the making of their case and to protect it against
objections.
8 Schiffer (1972) p44 offers: 'H: "A necessary condition of someone's meaning that p is that he utter a sentence which means 'p'.
S: "But then one could never mean that p by uttering a sentence metaphorically". Here S utters x with the intention of getting H
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from the Gricean cases, and that S intends to produce in H some recognition of intention, and that
consequently S means something by uttering x with appeal to mutual knowledge. Schiffer makes two
responses, noting the case in which S means that p on certain known premises; firstly, that S intends H
to think that S thinks p and intends that part of H's reason for thinking this is S's intention, and
secondly, and pending the addition of bonafides given by S to convince H that p, that S does not intend
H to accept the bona fides owing to S's acceptance, but rather for H's reason for accepting them to be
that S intends him to do so. Schiffer responds that even if the suggestions were true, they could not
apply in Gricean theory, for accounts of what it is for S to mean something by an utterance must be
correlated with an account of what is meant by uttering x, one for which the condition of the
recognition of intention does not, on its own, allow. Both suggestions, Schiffer adds, are also false, for
it is not decided by an intention and its recognition, in most instances, that mutual knowledge obtains
between S and H as to S's belief that p. If required, S could articulate his intention, and, if x is not
understood, one might say that he would have to, and this demands that there are mutually-known
conventions of language. The second suggestion claims for an intention conditions which make it
practically untenable: such an intention (distinctly non-Gricean), would apply only to a limited range of
cases, and application to all '...would commit one to saying that the conditions necessary for S
meaning that such-and-such is the case vary from one type of case to the other".
A better response, Schiffer ventures, is to argue that his counter-examples are themselves 'parasitic'
upon the canonical Gricean cases of telling, and are thus 'departures' from 'primary' cases of S-
meaning (although passably similar), those perhaps in which, though S does not intend to elicit a
response by recognition of intention, he means (something). One such case is a 'pretending to tell', but
SchifFer asks, '...what kind of explanation could be given to show that the above examples are
dependent upon cases of "telling" for their status as instances of S-meaning?' Furthermore, the
requirement for the addition ofmutual knowledge has taken the analysis ofGricean meaning theory far
from simple cases of telling, and has shown the need for a workable theory of nested, second intention.
Boer and Pappas make another suggestion. Grice's letter writer (in the example considered above),
may be at pains to say something to H; he writes at the peril of being misunderstood, thinking he
to see, or ofpointing out to H, that p (that such-and-such is a consequence of H's statement), but S does not, and indeed could
not, intend to bring about this effect by means of recognition of intention. Still, we should want to say that S meant something'.
9 Schiffer (1972) p47.
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knows his intentions, but is simply mistaken10. (What is more, they suggest, S may know of such
suppressed intentions without being 'explicitly aware'). As Schiffer says when describing the
sufficiency of his theory, S need not have or be aware of any of the complex, Gricean intentions in the
analysis; it is the task ofmutual knowledge to account for them".
Schiffer wants to retain the Gricean condition that S meant something by an utterance only if S
uttered it intending to produce a response in H. With this and the argument established for the necessity
of mutual knowledge conditions, there are two problems for which Schiffer must account before
writing his alternative theory of S-meaning. The first concerns Grice's implication that what S means
be determined by the value of H's response 'r'; Schiffer argues that this is not an adequate criterion,
determining at best that which must be determined if one is to determine what S meant, and not what S
meant. The second condition, given in the counter-examples above, concerns the fact that the restraint
on the way in which S must intend to produce the response in H allows only one type of instance of S-
meaning, that requiring the creation of a perlocutionary effect (the recognition of intention) in H.
Schiffer accepts, following his earlier point, the Gricean condition that S meant that p by his utterance
iff it was made with the intention of causing in H activated belief that p (though this is not, he repeats, a
sufficient condition for S meaning that p, as the counter-examples show), and this raises again the
question of whether the mutual knowledge conditions are required merely for S to be telling H that p,
or whether they are required for all cases of S meaning that p. For illustration, he suggests a case in
which, it might be claimed, a sufficient condition for S meaning that p by his utterance is that he
uttered x intending to remind H that p. Schiffer offers counter-examples, in which S reminds H that p,
but does not mean that p, and similar cases are summarised (to make the case for mutual knowledge),
in which S intends to point out that p or to convince H that p on the basis of prior premises, or in which
S utters x intending to produce the activated belief that p, but in which S does not mean that p12. In
response, Schiffer states necessary conditions. S meant that p by uttering x iff he uttered x intending to
realise a certain state of affairs E which is (intended) such that E's obtaining is sufficient for S and H
mutually knowing that E obtains and that it is conclusive evidence that S uttered x intending (1) to
cause in H the activated belief that p; (2) to realise E. These conditions, however, are not sufficient for
10 Indeed, Boer and Pappas (1975) p213 writes that it is '...not infrequently the case that people are mistaken about their
intentions in doing and saying various things'. (This is precisely one ofDerrida's objections to Searle)
11 Boer and Pappas (1975) p214.
12 The most complex ofwhich is on Schiffer (1972) p52. S intends that a bowl of roses he places in H's room remind H that x's
name is Rose, only '... S intends H to reason: "S intends me to think that he intends me to think that he put the roses in my room
purely for decorative reasons, but I recognise that he really intends me to recognise that his intention in putting the roses in my
room was to remind me that x's name is Rose'".
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S meaning that p, as given in the example of S (a neuroscientist) and H his assistant. S doctors H in
such a way that by striking a certain chord on a piano, causing a sound of a certain frequency in H, H
comes to recall the first word he learned. S knows this, that H is of the appropriate type, and
(independently) what word H first learned (all of this constitutes their mutual knowledge). S strikes the
chord intending H to recall his first word (say, 'stichomythia'), and with mutual knowledge conditions
obtaining, but he surely does not mean, by striking the chord, that 'stichomythia' was H's first word.
Schiffer goes on to contrast two sets of (distinctly Gricean), cases, showing S meaning that p in a
verbal and a non-verbal utterance, and in which the necessary conditions are fulfilled. In the examples
of non-verbal utterances (S again strikes a chord), intending to cause H to recall that p, in only one is
the chord intended to cause H to recall that there is a relation between the chord struck and the belief
that p. In those of verbal utterances, it is contended that S intends the utterance to cause H to recall the
fact by virtue ofH's recognition of the utterance as '...a conventional means for making known one's
intention to produce in an audience the belief...'13. (Holdcroft writes, in response to these examples,
that Schiffer's mutual knowledge conditions are not applicable in the counter-examples given by
Strawson, and in those cases in which S deceives about his intention. Additionally, he counters
Schiffer's application ofmutual knowledge conditions to cases of S meaning, questioning the analysis
saying that in cases in which S intends his utterance to produce a state of affairs, S and H mutually
know both that it obtains, and that the fact that it obtains is evidence (good or very good), that S intends
H to believe that p. Holdcroft argues that there is no distinction between the problems with which the
first and the second points are to deal, and that the possibility of mutual knowledge is not proven1". This
is discussed in context, and the reply made that, on the contrary, the fact that there is no distinction
between the problems is to the benefit of Schiffer's analysis).
Schiffer writes that a case of S uttering x with the intention of, say, thereby reminding H that p is a
case of S meaning that p by uttering x iff S makes the utterance intending to cause in H the activated
belief that p, and the utterance is a cause ofH's having the activated belief at least partly by virtue of
H's recognition that x is related to the belief that p. From this, he continues, one may conclude that S
meant p by x iff he uttered it intending to cause the activated belief that p and intending that his
utterance be a cause ofH's having the activated belief at least partly in virtue ofH's recognition that x
is related in a certain way to the belief p, and Schiffer adds this to the reconstructed analysis. (The same
13 Schiffer (1972) p53.
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considerations apply to cases of 'reminding' as to 'pointing out', 'calling up' and 'argument'; this
shows that, following Grice, in cases of 'telling' there is at least one additional (perlocutionary?)
relation between x and p that S must intend H to recognise if S is to produce the belief that p, namely,
that x was uttered with the intention of producing the belief). It is vital to note that Schiffer believes
that the intention and convention conditions of the Gricean analysis are not 'erased' by the
development of the mutual knowledge conditions. Indeed, one can see that they remain at the core of
his arguments, making the case that, explicitly in response to Derrida's scepticism, intentions and
conventions can be founded for simple speech acts. Schiffer continues, firstly, the fact that x is f is not
a means to make known to H the response S intends to produce in H unless the fact that x is f relates
'...x in a certain way to the type of response to which /' belongs'. (Schiffer says that this goes for cases
in which H thinks that there is a relation). Secondly, if this additional condition is necessary for S-
meaning, then H will not take the fact that S uttered x as evidence that he meant that p unless H thinks
that x is related in a specific way to p. This additional condition has a fascinating 'double life': if S
meant that p by x, and if he succeeded in satisfying the Gricean intentions with which the utterance was
made, then x will have been related in a certain way to p, and in virtue of this will S's utterance have
caused H's having the activated belief that p, and been evidence that S uttered x with the intention of
producing the belief.
There are difficulties for Schiffer's reconstructed analysis, raised by cases of admirably Derridean
nature, such as those in which S means something and intends to cause belief that p, but does not mean
that p. One might refer back to the case of Herod presenting Salome with the head of St John the
Baptist, and Schiffer adds, with respect to the cases of nested, mutual knowledge, the case in which H
holds up a bandaged leg in response to S's request that he dance15. In neither case is there a difficult
inference, and Schiffer is confident he can exclude examples of this type by specifying that the relation
H is intended to recognise must not be such that the utterance gives H evidence that p without '...the
mediation of an intention on the part of S to produce in H, by uttering x, the belief that p', but that
Gricean analysis needs emendation to account for the ways in which Lewis' conventions can become
settled in speech. If S sincerely means that p by uttering x then he intends to produce the belief that p
and that H have reasons for the belief that p. (This does not say that S supply H with reasons for p). It
14 Holdcroft (1978) ppl34-135 writes that cases of the neuroscientist type, while ambiguous as to the permissible ways in which
x can be related to beliefs, reveal important conditions.
15 Of. Holdcroft (1978) pl32. Schiffer does not find it 'wildly implausible' to say that in presenting the head Herod meant that
John was dead. (It might be noted that Schiffer's examples are invariably instances of non-verbal utterances).
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is, Schiffer ventures following this, 'almost always' the case that if one holds p as a reason for p, one
will think p in some way grounds for p: p is, for Schiffer, 'truth-supporting'16. Schiffer introduces
notation: '"S intends to produce in H the response r/p" = df. "S intends to produce in H the response r
for which he intends H to have the reason(s) p". If the reasons are intended to be truth-supporting for
H's belief, then this is notated p(t)'. Therefore, S means that p by x in cases in which 'S intends that
there be some p such that his utterance of x causes H to have the activated belief that p/p(t)'. This,
'...captures the demand that meaning and communication be rational in a certain way...', and that,
'...communication, in general, aims at the production of knowledge and not merely belief17.
Holdcrofl (as broached above) sees a difference between the p-identifiable, Gricean class and the
p(t)-identifiable class. Analysis of the latter, by applicable conditions for mutual knowledge, leaves
behind the analysis of S-meaning, for it says that S has an additional intention that it be mutual
knowledge that S intended H's reason for believing that p to be of a specific sort, and this is, he argues,
supplied by the context of utterance contained in the p-identifiable class on terms derived from Austin
and the theory of illocutionary force18. Holdcroft asks which features of an utterance, 'in a particular
case', indicate to H the belief S wants him to adopt: how is the utterance related to the belief? What are
the relationships that can be instantiated by x, and on what conventions do they depend"? Holdcroft
considers the example of utterances spoken with a literal meaning and an intention to communicate
meaning, but in which S intends an implied, oblique meaning. This raises, for Schiffer, further difficult
cases. S says and means that Morris has one leg, and his utterance offers no evidence that S's first
intention be that H take from the utterance that Morris should not be prop-forward. The oblique
intentions, Holdcroft notes, can only be carried by the context of the utterance, and are superadded to
its meaning: pace Austin, they give (in the Morris example), the utterance the force of an objection.
Holdcroft finds many difficulties with Schiffer's argument that the intentions requiring elucidation in a
study of illocutionary force, in addition to those for S-meaning, are those descriptive of the intention
with which S performs a p(t)-identifiable act, and a case in point is Schiffer's inclusion of the
16 There may, for instance, be moral or prudential reasons for holding that p. Cf. Gilbert (1989) p. One might find reasons to
criticise Schiffer for his too frequent use of the 'almost always' construction.
17 Schiffer (1972) p58. A congruent formulation is seen for the case in which S meant that H was to do something, and in the
elucidation of illocutionary force. The definition can be revised once again, to take the case in which there is to be a p such that
S's utterance ofx causes in H the activated belief that p/p(t).
18 Holdcroft (1978) pl39 adds that the necessity of the additional intention is highly plausible, '...since it seems unlikely that
there is any feature of an actual utterance of, for example, "They are in retreat", when it is used to make a report, which indicates
that S intends H to believe that they are in retreat because S himself believes this having seen them'. There must be some 'easily
noticeable feature' of the context which S intends will bring H to realise that there exist reasons for believing the utterance.
'Indeed, if some feature of an utterance of "They are in retreat" indicated to H what reason he was meant to have for believing
that they are, then, on Schiffer's account, S will come perilously close to meaning that they are in retreat, and I intend you to
believe that this is so because...' (ppl39-140).
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illocutionary act of affirming in the p-identifiable class. From this it follows, Holdcroft argues, that
affirming something requires that there be a p such that one means that p, and that p be of a specific
form for inclusion in the Gricean analysis, but Holdcroft returns to his example (ofMorris), and allows
that one may be affirming, or expressing a belief that p, but that following the counter-examples, one
cannot possibly mean that one expresses a belief p20. Holdcroft writes that Schiffer takes features of the
context of utterance indicating implicature as guides as to what the sentence means, thoughtlessly
eliding the two; Holdcroft finds that the mutual knowledge condition cannot fully account for the
difficulties he describes21. He argues (correctly), that mutual knowledge was added to deal with the
regress of intentions left by Grice's theory of S-meaning, seen particularly in cases of deception (say,
in which S has intentions he does not want recognised), and to combat Strawson's counter-examples.
To exclude others, and to give a more intuitive theory, Grice adds (as seen in II), that S should not
intend that any of his relevant intentions go unrecognised, a point to which Schiffer objects. In
response Holdcroft also appeals (in counter-examples), to cases in which there is a discrepancy
between the reason H thinks S has for getting him to leave, and the reason S wants him to have for
leaving22. Furthermore, Holdcroft argues that the first of the two pertinent conditions in Grice's analysis
writing in the condition that S's relevant intentions not go unrecognised, and saying that S's utterance
(x) has a feature, taken as evidence that x was uttered with intention to produce a definite response,
may hold, and yet it not follow that S intends H to think that S intends the first condition to be false,
say, in cases in which (studied by Schiffer), H thinks and S does not intend H to think that S intends to
be rid ofH by singing for it is the most likely method, but to think that S sang not caring whether H
would leave. The case seems utterly intractable, for Grice's analysis fails to cater for those cases in
" One might examine Holdcroft's own example (Holdcroft (1978) pl40).
20 There is in Holdcroft a refusal even to consider that S's utterance 'Morris has only one leg', might best be analysed as an
example of a metaphorical utterance. S may utter the sentence knowing that it is not a conventional means of expressing any
belief; on this occasion it has the force of an objection, but it may be used in other ways if necessary (Holdcroft (1978) ppl40-
141). No feature of the sentence correlates it with the illocutionary force of objecting, and so with the relevant S belief. By saying
'Morris has only one leg', S means that the fact that Morris has only one leg is a reason why he should not be prop-forward
traduces one of the tenets of Schiffer's own theory, namely that the utterance must be related to the belief that S is trying to
communicate to H. Cf. Burkhardt, A.; 'Searle on Metaphor', pp303-335 in Burkhardt, A. (ed.); Speech Acts, Meanings and
Intentions: CriticalApproaches to the Philosophy ofJohn R. Searle (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter) 1990. Bach and Harnish (1979)
are as confident that their analysis applies to literal, non-literal and indirect utterances. There is, however, no significant role for
convention in their theory.
One might utter the sentence literally, and, if S means anything (and means H to recognise that he means anything), he means
that Morris has one leg. In such a case, S's primary intention cannot be said to be that H come to believe that Morris should not
be prop-forward. On ppl41-142 Holdcroft raises similar problems for cases of commissives.
21 Holdcroft (1978) ppl42-143 suggests further difficulties with the theory that if an act is illocutionary, then in performing it S
must mean that p or that H is to <p. S may beg, pray or shout out 'Leave me alone!', without in truth wanting H to leave. With
regard to the distinction set up by Strawson, Holdcroft writes of Schiffer's assigning acts performed in literal utterances of
imperatives to the p-identifiable class is questionable in light of considerations that the function of the imperative is to indicate
that, for S, there is a reason, promulgated by utterances in a context, why H should perform an act. For Holdcroft, this requires
that intentions other than those required to mean something in a locution and those bearing on the type of reason S intends H to
have adopting a certain belief, are determinants of illocutionary force
22 He gives a version of Grice's second definition, version B. Cf. Grice (1989b) pp99-100.
290
which S wants H to reason in a certain way, but to think that he is not to reason this way, and
(Schiffer's addition), those in which S does not intend H to think he is to reason in a way he is meant
to, and Holdcroft asks whether mutual knowledge can possibly account in such cases. With an
application of his notion of the truth-supporting condition Schiffer introduces his means of dealing with
these cases.
Schiffer gives a formulation similar to that for 'S means that p' for cases in which S meant that H was
to do something, or to have a belief, wishing further to elucidate the connection with illocutionary
force. The definition for 'S means that p', must be revised, to take the case in which there is to be a p
such that S's utterance of x causes in H the activated belief that p/p(t), and Holdcroft objects to the
latter as he does the former, arguing that the meaning of the proposition stating the first mutual
knowledge condition for S-meaning, taken from Grice, is that there is a truth-supporting reason
accompanying S's utterance of x affecting H, allowing it to produce an activated belief that p. For
Holdcroft, it follows that S intends the state of affairs produced or indicated to be evidence that there is
such a reason, and that this renders otiose Schiffer's neuroscientist counter-example (described above)
and similar. What is more, even if S makes the utterance intending that mutual knowledge be invoked,
and that H's recognition of the fact that the utterance reaches out to the belief described in the state of
affairs is imperative for H coming to believe this, still S may not mean anything by the utterance23. The
examples that the second mutual knowledge condition are to exclude are those, in Grice, in which S's
utterance directly causes a beliefwithout an intentional correlation (that is whether or not H recognises
any of S's intentions). Those that the first is to exclude always include this correlation: H is to see that
S's utterance is correlated with the belief p, and come to believe p, and in this case, whether or not H
recognises the intentions with which S makes the utterance. Holdcroft asks how the cases differ; how
the second depends for its meaning on anything other than analysis of Gricean S-meaning, given that,
Schiffer writes in explicating the second condition, Gricean analysis always includes a condition of
mutual knowledge on relation R that it cannot hold directly between the utterance and H's belief4.
23 Holdcroft (1978) pl37.
24 The cases that show the need for truth-supporting reasons such that S's utterance causes H to have activated belief, and that S
intends his utterance to be good evidence that it is correct to have activated belief that there exists such reasons are described by
Holdcroft (1978) ppl36-137. One such shows a man S, supposing H to be in all respects normal, who utters 'Turn right!' with
the intention ofgetting H to turn right, and that 'Turn right!' being conventionally related to the action plays some part in getting
H to perform it. 'The trouble is that H is so constituted that he cannot help turning right once he realises that an "utterance" is
correlated by R [the conventional relation] with that action, no matter what S's intentions are'. S does not know this, and so it is
difficult to say precisely why this does not describe a case of S-meaning. 'For since S assumes that H is normal, he cannot be
relying on this particular fact about H's psychology to play any part in getting H to turn right'.
In cases in which S knows this peculiar fact about H, the case is confused. If he cannot then mean that H is to turn right, this is
because he cannot be seen to intend that H recognise his intention to make him turn right as the satisfaction of a mutual
knowledge condition.
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Holdcroft concludes (a point with which one must concur), that Schiffer's conditions on mutual
knowledge must account for the way in which utterance and reported belief are related. The effects of
deceptive, parasitical cases still remain.
Schiffer's analysis for S means that H is to cp (to do something) runs25:
S meant that H was to cp by (or in) uttering x only if S uttered x intending thereby to
realise a certain state of affairs E which is (intended by S to be) such that E's obtaining is
sufficient for S and H mutually knowing (or believing) that E obtains and that E is
conclusive (very good or good) evidence that S uttered x intending: (1) there to be some
p such that S's utterance of x causes H to cp/p; (2) satisfaction of (1) to be achieved, at
least in part, by virtue ofH's belief that x is related in a certain way R to (the act-type) cp-
ing; (3) to realise E.
It is imperative to note that here, and so in the conditions for S meaning that p, that still S meaning that
H is to cp allows that S may mean this by his utterance even though S intends his utterance to provide H
with a reason for cp-ing, '...without the mediation of S's intentions' as they are given in Gricean
analysis26. It is equally important to note that, referring again to Herod-like cases, Schiffer observes that
the relation between the utterance and the act-type cp-ing which H is to recognise, 'must not be such
that the utterance will provide H with a reason for cp-ing without the mediation of an intention of S to
cause H to cp'. (As shall be remembered, Grice writes that in the Herod example, and similar oblique
cases, no 'mediation' of intentions occurs. Herod's intended meaning cannot be communicated).
Schiffer suggests a different analysis. Once again, if S utters x with the intentions Schiffer specifies,
then S means that p, and by uttering x, that he intends to cause in H the activated belief that p, H to
have reasons for the belief, and this (partly) in virtue ofH's recognition that x is related to p in a certain
way27. However, following Herod-like cases, if S means that p by uttering x with the intention of
causing H to cp by Schiffer's conditions, it will not be the case that he also meant that he uttered x
intending to produce the belief that p, for as numerous objections have shown, the conditions are not
jointly sufficient, and the intention guiding the utterance reaches beyond mediation of the mere
The need for truth-supporting reasons regarding S's utterance is challenged by such cases. Scepticism regarding whether the
case described could possibly exist is made more difficult by the fact that it is not a certain sound that causes H to turn, but that
he recognises that the sound is correlated in some way with the action of turning. Thus, it seems that whenever H recognises the
correlation he will turn.
25 Schiffer (1972) p59.
26 Schiffer (1972) p59.
27 Schiffer (1972) p60. This may continue for the other beliefs, in addition to p, that S must intend to produce in H.
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utterance to appeal to H's mutual knowledge28. The same objections are good for Grice's analysis of S-
meaning, and Schiffer gives an alternative: that whenever S utters x intending to produce response r in
H by means of recognition of intention, there are always beliefs other than the intended primary
response: that '...it follows from Grice's account [as described in II] that whenever S means something
he will mean a lot more than he bargained for'29. These beliefs, Schiffer says, must be theorised as what
they are, necessary parts of S's act ofmeaning that p, and not corollaries. They accompany primary and
secondary intentions, and they are identified as follows. When a person acts a distinction may be drawn
between the intention with which the he acted, say, in issuing the utterance, and other intentions he had
in performing the act. The first describes his reasons for doing the action, and the latter those
containing its successful performance; the relation between the two types of reasons is asymmetrical
(as Millikan says, the former depend upon the latter but the latter do not depend upon the former), a
fact that, for Schiffer, applies equally to S's intention to produce in H the belief that p, and explains
why, in uttering x, S means that p and not that he uttered x intending to produce in H the belief that p.
(Schiffer allows that S, in certain cases, may have more than one primary intention in acting, and that
S's primary intention may not easily be identified). In considering the consequences of his analysis
Schiffer offers an example (Searlean though unacknowledged), regarding the indirect, non-literal cases
for which, it shall be argued, mutual knowledge can account. There are cases in which S makes an
utterance knowing that he will not cause H to y30. In such cases, Schiffer asks, does S intend that his
utterance cause H to y? (Boer and Pappas add, as above, the condition that S's knowledge in such
cases must be 'occurent' or 'active'). In response Boer and Pappas consider sudden outbursts: 'Stop,
thief!', and so forth. It is argued that S does not intend that his utterance will halt the thief, and
exclamations and curses are not publications of intention, for S could hardly be said to have wanted to
communicate the intention that he wants H to stop, for, on Schiffer's conditions, he must have wanted
to produce the belief in H that he wants him to stop, and it is plausibly the case that this is known: H is,
after all, taking flight. Orders are prone to the same arguments: if S did not intend the utterance to
cause H to stop it did not function as an order31.
28 The same objection can be made, as Schiffer (1972) p61 says, for the analysis of'S meant that A is to cp'.
29 Schiffer (1972) p61.
30 Schiffer (1972) pp69-70. A parent might issue a warning to a child, warning them against doing that which they in truth want
them to do, and so exploiting a rebellious streak in their offspring.
31 Boer and Pappas (1975) p216 write that, however, it is not necessarily true that S ordering H to y must intend so. 'Suppose S is
a general who is seriously concerned with the welfare of his troops. S's superiors command him to order an attack which he
privately regards as suicidally stupid. But since he has an ailing wife to support and is only a month away from retirement and a
fat pension, he does not dare to disobey. So he orders the troops to attack, hoping—indeed, intending—that his men should see
the gross stupidity of the order and refuse to obey, thereby bringing his superiors to their sense and saving him from moral and
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A consequence of this example is that if S utters x with the intentions in either condition of the
definition ofmutual knowledge, then he cannot mean by uttering x that his primary intention in uttering
x is to produce the belief that p, for if he says 'Stop, thief!', as Boer and Pappas show, this articulates
an already apparent belief, and this being the case the utterance appeals to no mutual knowledge
condition. Schiffer suggests a further case in which S uttered x with the due intentions, and that what
he uttered was 'op My primary intention in uttering this sentence is to produce in you—by means of
recognition of intention—the belief that p', one in which S's chances of producing belief are more
likely than in, say, 'I believe p', to jeopardise the communication of meaning and intention. This
circumvents both Gricean conditions of mutual knowledge, for it gives no truth-supporting reason, and
displays no intentional correlation as they are conceived by Grice. Objections might still proceed from
considerations concerning the fact that S's may be a parasitical utterance, and attention to this must be
left to IV. 5, and the introduction of a further feature of S-meaning for which account must be made,
and owing to the Gricean rejection of the possibility of pre-linguistic intentionality, namely, that what S
means is not determined by what is uttered. This allows no licence for S to mean what he wants by
what he says, for x must be uttered with intentions '...relevant...', to making the utterance. Whatever
the nature ofx be, it is 'essential' for Schiffer's account ofmeaning that if S can 'reasonably expect' to
utter x with the intentions said to be necessary and sufficient for meaning that p (with conventions
established on Lewis' theory, without regress), then he will truly mean that p, and this can be achieved
by a unitary speech act appealing to first intention alone. Furthermore, truth-supporting reasons for x
arise not in additional or supplementary reasons between S and H for believing x, and describing or
explaining the nested reasoning through which S and H must work to arrive at coordination on
communication, but in speech act conventions established by Lewis conventions, which, again, can
account for first intentions. Such speech acts carry with them their truth-supporting reasons. Schiffer
writes32:
The importance of this condition is that if it were the case that what S meant by uttering
x were determined, even in part, by the meaning of x, then this would, on the face of it,
render circular an account of what x means in terms of what is or would be meant by
uttering x. And the serious problem with the objection raised is that, if true, it would
economic ruin'. With this, Schiffer draws together the final revisions of the two definitions. Schiffer (1972) p63 holds over for a
subsequent discussion the revision of the definitions for the cases of soliloquy or,'... utterances in the absence ofan audience.
32 Schiffer (1972) p65.
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show that what is meant by uttering x at least sometimes is determined by the meaning of
x33.
One might consider the case in which S utters simply 'p' (cr2 in Schiffer's example). It does not seem
correct, again following Herod-like cases, to say that what S meant by uttering O) was what he meant
by uttering a2; the relevant intentions are not present34. However, one might deny that S can utter O)
with the intentions specified in the definition, firstly, by stressing the intimate connection between o,
and o2, emphasising the fact that were S to utter ci his intention would be to produce by recognition of
intention the belief that he uttered Gj intending to produce in H the belief that p. In the case of o2 S's
intention is to produce in H by means of recognition of intention, the belief that p, and Schiffer writes
that this is impossible without a prior convention, but this, he shows, could never be provided by the
explicit performative. With reference to a further (like) example Schiffer denies that in uttering O; S
means that his primary intention is to produce in H the belief that p, and following this it is seen that
Boer and Pappas' concerns, regarding the estrangement of intentions from S's utterance, are obviated35.
Schiffer offers a3, meaning the same as O], but which cannot be used to mean that S's first intention is
to produce in H the belief that p. If examples of such sentences could be found they would give
grounds for denying that by oi S meant that his primary intention was to do as he said, '...for it seems
highly reasonable to assume that if two sentences have the same meaning, then what would be meant
by "subscriptively" uttering the one would also be meant by "subscriptively" uttering the other'. The
model for a3 is Austin's explicit performative, 'I (hereby) tell you that p'. In uttering c3 S does not
mean that he tells H that p, S means p, spoken in the utterance; S is not saying that he performs the
speech act of telling H that p, rather, he is performing the act of telling H that p (he is meaning that p);
such utterances are not descriptions, reports or contentions, and they are neither true nor false. As
Schiffer says, one might contend that an utterance of o3 is not a constatement of p, but still that S means
that he tells H that p. Schiffer responds by saying that this is unacceptable, for '... surely our inclination
to say that by uttering Oi S meant that his primary intention was [as stated] is inextricably bound up
33 As Frege says, these cases give rise to the problems of sense and reference.
34 Schiffer (1972) p65. The example excludes at least one case of S meaning that p, and offers up at least one case in which what
is meant is determined by the meaning of the sentence uttered. If in uttering Oi S meant that his primary intention in uttering his
sentence was to produce in H, by means of the recognition of intention, the belief that p, and if S uttered oi with the intentions
thought by Griceans to be necessary and sufficient for meaning that p, then not all of the conditions are necessary, for '... the
analysans will then exclude at least one case of S meaning that p'. Furthermore, if in uttering Oi S meant that his primary
intention was to produce in H, by recognition of intention, the belief that p, and if in uttering o2 S did not mean that his primary
intention was to do this (and the only difference between the cases is in the means used to make explicit the intentions, then
'... we have at least one case where what is meant is determined by the meaning of the sentence S uttered, and this would seem to
call into question the whole enterprise we [followers ofGrice] are engaged in'.
35 Schiffer (1972) p6b. This does not prevent one from saying that by 'My primary intention...', S meant "My primary
intention.
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with our inclination to say that when he uttered oi S said that his primary intention was [as stated]'36.
Ignoring irrelevant changes of syntax, the explicit performative (a3) has the same meaning as Ci, what
is meant by an utterance of oi is identical with what would be meant by an utterance of o337. This being
so, what is meant by uttering C| is identical with what is meant by uttering c3, and, correspondingly, if
it is the case that in uttering o3 S does not mean that he tells H that p, then it follows that in uttering O]
S does not mean that his intention in speaking is to produce in H the belief that p. This notwithstanding,
problematical cases arise when the response S intends to produce is neither activated belief that p nor
H's (p-ing, and in which an utterance is made in the absence of any H. Firstly, one might cite cases in
which S means that p by his utterance, but not care whether he is believed; it does not follow that x was
not uttered with the intention of causing H to believe that p. There are also (Gricean) 'momentary'
intentions: cases in which S forgets his 'standing' intentions; cases of S performing an act, with
intention, knowing or believing that he cannot bring about the result; cases of counter-suggestion, of
telling and of confession, and of S letting H know (surreptitiously) that he knows. (All such cases,
Schiffer writes, following Austin, are cases of S meaning that p, '... derived from and dependent upon
the primary case captured in the definitions'. For instance, counter-suggestive utterances are
'...directly parasitic upon primary and standard acts of meaning'; the deception is itself, '...dependent
upon its being at least generally the case that one who means that H is to cp intends H to q>'. S could not
pretend unless '...the imperative mood were conventionally correlated with an intention to produce
action...'38. Schiffer describes a way in which the definitions may be altered to accommodate parasitic
cases, but adds that,'.,. since such degenerate cases have been noticed and accounted for it is probably
best to leave the formal definitions unaltered so that they will provide a schema more directly for the
standard and primary cases'. The same applies to cases of 'telling', and thus to analogous cases of
confession, for, '[c]ommunicating that p is a paradigm of bringing the fact that p "out in the open", and
by acting as though he were communicating that he did such-and-such the confessor purports to show
that he is willing to have it out in the open that he did such-and-such'). In the following section there
are presented reasons for rejecting Schiffer's conditions on the explicit performative, and the argument
made that, in a theory of speech acts containing a mutual knowledge condition, the failure of Austinian
36 Schiffer (1972) p67.
37 Another application ofLeibniz's law.
38 Schiffer (1972) pp71-72. One might, Schiffer adds, speak of pretended X-ing as X-ing, especially in those cases '...where
what one does is exactly the same as what one would do were one actually X-ing (in our case, meaning such-and-such)'. One
might, for example, say that in the primary sense of 'applying artificial respiration', one does so only if one intends to restore a
patient to normal breathing, but in the context of a first-aid class S might 'quite naturally' request H to apply artificial respiration
to another student. See also Schiffer's two further conditions (the third and the fourth) on pp71-72.
296
and Searlean theories to account for distinctions between literal and parasitical contexts of utterance is
not repeated, and that it is not the case that such distinctions constitute fatal flaws at the heart of any
attempt to write conventions for language.
dHHSawEBaa
5. Conclusion: Conventions and Practice
Cases of S-meaning in the absence of an H, Schiffer writes, divide into two types: those in which S
utters x because of the possibility of producing a response in a (type of) person and a (type of)
situation, and those in which S utters x with no H-directed intention at all. The first type is (as seen
below) exactly equivalent to that appealed to by Derrida in the examples of the shopping list and
concert note, and Schiffer adds a further example, of a diary writer recording an event for the reference
of his future self. With consideration of further cases, of utterances made with the belief that S will
very likely not inform H of his belief and of the mutual knowledge conditions obtaining, Schiffer
arrives at redefinitions '...which should accommodate all of the cases considered so far'; they differ
only in the addition of provisos to the definitions of mutual knowledge: they are spoken as 'parasitic'
on the 'standard and primary' cases. In cases in which there is no H-directed intention,
[w]hat we want to find are examples of S meaning that p or examples of S meaning that
H is to cp where S has no intention to produce a response in some actual or possible
audience (including himself on some later occasion)'.
Schiffer notes further truculent cases, adding the case of S thinking through a problem, occasionally
noting ideas for clarification, to which he will never return. Schiffer asks whether this be a case of S
meaning that p by utterance (or inscription) x, and adds, suppose there was no act ofwriting, and that S
only ran the thoughts through his mind, concluding, '[b]ut then why should the fact that he did not
actually write or utter aloud the sentence constitute a relevant difference?2' In line with his analysis of
S-meaning, Schiffer writes that such cases, and those above, are qualitatively the same as the standard,
adding that denying that the cases are the same '...would not win many converts, and for at least this
reason I shall henceforth assume that we do want to say of these cases that in uttering x S meant that
p'3. Schiffer finds an analogy in joking, utterances with an additional (perlocutionary) intent to amuse.
The model of the previous examples is followed: S (now a dour man) alone in his room writes down a
joke; it amuses neither himselfnor anyone else, for it shall be shown to no one4. The utterance is a joke
'... in virtue of S's uttering x with the intention of uttering something which would amuse a certain type
of audience (ifuttered in certain (types of) circumstances)'. However, Schiffer adds that this analysis is
incomplete, for there exist cases in which S utters x intending that the utterance fulfil this criterion, that
1 Schiffer (1972) pp76-77.
2 Schiffer (1972) p77.
3 Schiffer (1972) p77.
4
(This is another case ofnon-verbal utterance).
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it would produce the desired response if it were uttered in a non-parasitic context, but in which it is
false to say that S meant something by the utterance. (Schiffer suggests: a lieutenant, aware of the joy
he gets from brutalising an anxious private (X), mutters to himself, in the privacy of his home, 'X, run
your bayonet through yourself, enjoying the thought that if he were to do this in the presence ofX he
would do as he was ordered. He surely does not mean by his utterance that X is to do this). What is
more, private utterances directed at specific individuals, which in non-parasitic contexts would issue in
the specific desired response, may still not be cases of meaning. (Schiffer offers another example: a
purist, determined never to produce a false sentence, practices utterances with an exemplar (say, 'Snow
is white'), with an intention to produce a true sentence, one that could be used to tell someone else that
snow is white. However, as in the first case, he does not mean that snow is white)5. In the case of S
reflecting on a problem, Schiffer finds no reason to doubt that S means that p by his utterances. S
formulates an argument which could, at some future time, be produced to convince H (conceivably
himself) that p: it is essential to the example only that S's intention is to convince H that p. In cases in
which S means that p by his utterance and in which he has no H-directed intentions, '... S's utterance x
will be part of some activity directed towards securing some cognitive response in himself, and... it is
in virtue of this significant resemblance to the standard case that we class these cases as instances of S-
meaning'. (As before, Schiffer extends the arguments to cases in which S meant that H was to 9, and
gives the example of notes to self to direct one's future actions: '...my intention in writing what I wrote
was to secure that I would have in mind a network of intentions')6. This intention may be secured
5 Both examples are from Schiffer (1972) p78.
6 Schiffer (1972) p80. Cases in which 'S meant something by (or in) uttering x' are derivative of the analysis of'S meant that p'
(or 'S meant that H was to 9'). Schiffer notes the 'cutting' example in Grice. If the ill-feeling communicated in the example is a
key to a relevant response of distress in an account of S-meaning, it would be the case that S means something, and that what he
means is necessary or sufficient for S meaning that p. If what is meant in the example is that S wants nothing to do with H, then
on the definition of 'S meant that p', the only relevant response is H thinking that S wants nothing to do with him, and this is
surely S's intention in wanting to cause H distress (p82). Regarding this, Schiffer writes that the eliciting of responses, described
in propositional attitudes, are all,'... definable in terms of belief or intention...and that'...we seem, as intended, to be left with
only belief and action (intention) as the relevant types of response' (p83). Schiffer concludes from this that S can mean
something only by virtue of an intention to produce (activated) belief or action, distinguishing this from Grice's arguing that the
difference activated beliefs and propositional attitudes is written in the distinction between having reasons to believe (or
motives), and deciding to believe. Schiffer allows no element of deliberation or decision in the affective attitudes, for one does
not decide to be offended. Kemmerling (1986) pl32 gives a study of propositional attitudes in Grice. He argues that an analysis
such as Schiffer gives effectively reduces the number of mutually-known intentions that must be known, and emphasises the
problems Davidson finds in Grice, those of trust, rationality and cooperation and convention. He argues that Schiffer's nesting of
intentions cannot easily be done, for they are possessed only by 'rational agents' and are far too complex (pl37).
Schiffer turns next to utterances making explicit appeal to convention, taking 'a' as any well-formed English sentence:
I [Schiffer] want to say that if S utters o with its full conventional force, then, for some p, H, and 9, what S will
mean by (or in) uttering a is either that p or else that H is to tp (Schiffer (1972) pp83-84).
To establish this Schiffer requires two contentious distinctions, the first, marked by, '...pauses, intonation, linguistic context,
etc,', between sentences and non-sentences. A sentence is '_The cat is on the mat._' (it has full conventional force); a non-
sentence is 'the cat is on the mat', and is a conventional utterance. A sentence has full conventional force iff the utterance is 'The
cat is on the mat.', and it means that the cat is on the mat; an utterance of a with full conventional force is to utter a and to mean
what one says. Schiffer can here return to the formulations of 'S means that p', or 'S means that H is to 9'. Schiffer, '[f]or
convenience' ignores problems of 'ambiguity' (p84). If a is well-formed, then it will be in the indicative, subjunctive, optative,
imperative, or interrogative mood, and Schiffer gives instances in each of the moods, each with the rider that S means what he
says. An indicative with full conventional force may give difficulties in the case of explicit performatives, and Schiffer reminds
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owing to the possibility ofwriting enduring conventions for certain speech acts (those, that is, that the
hermetic philosopher and the sadistic lieutenant may use in their solitary musings or the typist in his
practice sentences).
Lewis' conditions on conventions show that taking as the model for coordination situations that of
two agents (S and H) in explicit collocution is otiose, for S can inaugurate a convention on his own,
the reader that, '...meaning being what it is...', S cannot mean, in uttering a request, that he is requesting H to do something
(p85).
The conclusion of S-meaning as the condition in which S uttered x iff for some p, H and 9 by (or in) uttering x S meant that p
or that H was to <p follows with the addition of this final premise to the definitions of mutual knowledge. BoSr and Pappas (1975)
p218 object to Schiffer's argument that if S utters a well-formed sentence, in one of the grammatical moods, and with 'full
conventional force', S means something by the sentence, but that, in truth, Schiffer exploits a feature of the language in which he
writes (English) to draw conclusions with, he must be prepared to argue, application to all languages. (Boer and Pappas speculate
that Schiffer works with a thesis saying that there exist irreducible moods, ones from which others may be derived. However, this
is unstated, and they add, one could hardly discern the irreducible moods without substantial argument. For this Boer and Pappas
must turn to Lewis). Schiffer (1972) pp83-84 writes,'[1]et O be a "dummy" for any expression which can complete the sentence
fonn "S meant that...by (or in) uttering x", and Boer and Pappas (1975) p217 reply that, if by uttering x S meant that ®, then
there is some (English) sentence o such that if S utters o with its full conventional force, then S will mean that ® by uttering a'.
Boer and Pappas ask whether Schiffer appeals to a translation thesis, again unstated; they state a plausible version:
We English speakers are justified in believing that M is a modal construction of L only ifM is explicable in
terms of the modal constructions exemplified in English, i.e. only if sentences of L containing M are adequately
translatable into English.
They suggest that if Schiffer can make this stand his argument works. If a language is postulated that fulfils the conditions on S-
meaning, but in which S can utter a sentence without meaning that p or that PI is to y, one may ask in what way M is a modal
construction of L, for if one translates the sentence into English, then S can mean the point of the first sentence only in its
English translation, that is, in a language different to that in which S spoke. If there is no translation, then there is no compelling
reason to think that M is a modal construction of L. (Boer and Pappas (1975) p218 describe examples of the tendentiousness of
Schiffer's translation thesis).
Holdcroft states the main objection to Schiffer's mutual knowledge condition, that one could not carry out the complex
reasoning required, but, '...at best... a piece of reasoning which will have this as its conclusion', and (pp 146-147) states clear,
well-reasoned counter-examples. Lewis' theory avoids this difficulty. The existence of property LI in Schiffer's analysis, telling
how one knows that one knows, is more problematical than he thinks: if being H is sufficient for knowing that p, then being H is
sufficient for knowing that being H is sufficient for knowing that p, a raft in the theory of mutual knowledge. Holdcroft rejects
the thesis and its context: one might, say, know x but not know the property one possesses that is sufficient for the possession of
knowledge x (Holdcroft (1978) ppl47-148 gives examples). What is more, knowing H leads to a regress; if, in Schiffer's
example, Kxp implies (3H) (KxHx & (y) (Hy-»Kyp & Ky (z) (Hz—>Kzp)..., then to know p requires that one know H, and
knowing this requires that one know (3G) (KxGx & (y) (Gy—>Kyp & Ky.... Holdcroft (1978) ppl48ff turns to a revival of a
Gricean definition ofmeaning to resolve the situation, namely, Grice (1989b) pp99-100. The definition is presented in II.
Schiffer (1972) pp89ff attacks Austin's notion of the conventionality of illocutionary acts for the same reasons as Strawson.
The examples Austin gives are 'special' and 'peripheral' cases. What is more, the account of S-meaning gives acts of meaning
not as conventional acts; they are, again in line with Strawson's example, '...non-conventional acts usually performed by the use
of a conventional means'. On the cases of illocutionary acts thought by Austin to be conventional Schiffer emphasises
Strawson's doubts, and writes that such speech acts are,'... from the point of view of the theory of language and communication,
of marginal interest only'. Part of the Strawsonian analysis gives necessary and sufficient conditions for '...performing a
standard non-conventional illocutionary act'. Schiffer gives his own analysis of illocutionary acts, retaining the idea from
Strawson that they are not essentially conventional. He divides the class of illocutionary acts into two subclasses, the assertive
and the imperative respectively: they correspond to ' S meant that p' and ' S meant that H was to 9'. (The analysis of the meanings
of speakers in performing illocutionary acts given by Schiffer (1972) pp95-104 might be thought to constitute a further and
different response to Derrida's treatment of speech acts). Cf. Loar (1981) pp245-247.
In an assessment of non-composite whole utterance types, those 'historically' prior to composite whole utterance types (see
above), Schiffer develops the idea that x means something in G as a matter of convention. He asks first what it is for x to be a
non-composite (nc) whole utterance type which means (timeless) 'p' in G. ('x (nc) means "p" in G'). With affinities to Quine,
Schiffer writes that one should suppose that in a certain community a type of sound (nc) means something specific. In another
community it may mean something different. It seems there is a connection between what x means in G and what the members of
G do, could potentially do, or mean, by an utterance of x. This is a necessary but not sufficient condition for x (nc) meaning 'p'
in G. What precludes a noise from meaning p is, aside from its facility for successful communication, that the feature in virtue of
which an utterance of the noise is evidence that S meant p is a natural feature, and therefore a non-conventional means for
communicating. There is, of course, and following Grice, a difference between a conventional and a non-conventional means for
communicating p, and for elucidation Schiffer looks to the mutual knowledge condition, and the possession of a relevant feature f
of x as being of a certain type, specifically not one which is true of x independently of'... people meaning something by uttering
x'. The relevant feature might be taken to be the fact that members of G have meant or do mean that p in uttering x, and this
looks to the mutual knowledge conditions obtaining between S and H, and to a rational action condition borrowed from Lewis.
The augmenting, self-perpetuating nature of mutual knowledge conditions makes them identical to Lewis' conditions on
convention. Schiffer claims that if x meets the conditions described for (nc) meaning "p" in G then x will be in G a conventional
means of communicating that p. His theory of convention in a group applies equally to composite whole utterance types, and not
just to the non-composite cases described. One must consider Lewis' analysis of coordination problems as the means to solve
these recurrent dilemmas.
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without (even tacit or implicit) convening with H. If the convention is successful in its role, if it does
useful work in a way more amenable to H than a prior convention (for what might be a variety of
reasons), H will, very likely, fall into the practice of following S's convention. (It might be added that
such a convention can remain private between S and H or become that of a larger community). To
illustrate what can be achieved with Lewis' thesis one may return to Schiffer's example and take the
case of a convention directing the use of an explicit performative (say, o3, 'I (hereby) tell you that p').
As Schiffer shows, c3 does not mean that p, that S means that p, that he constates p or any number of
other illocutions: S, in uttering a token of a3, thereby performs the act of telling. One could, Schiffer
adds, reasonably say that in uttering oi S means that he tells H that p, for when one says of S that in
uttering C] he meant that his 'primary intention in uttering this sentence is to produce in [H]—by means
of recognition of intention—the belief that p', one's motivation to say that he meant what he said is
driven significantly by the fact that he said so, in apparently as unambiguous a way as he possibly
could. However, the telling difference between the two statements, Schiffer argues, may be discerned
in examination of their respective syntax. That of ci, he argues, adds nothing to the illocutionary force
of the act of telling (immanent in a3), it merely tolerates irrelevant changes: Oi means the same as o3,
for what is meant by the utterance of either (what is intended to be communicated), is palpably the
same (they, Schiffer says, 'subscriptively' mean the same), and yet, he continues, this being the case, if
in o3 S does not mean that he tells H that p, but performs the act in the utterance, an utterance of oj
(with none of the immediacy of a3), can hardly be said to carry an intention to produce the belief that p,
for the reason that, for Schiffer, one cannot mean by it that p, the form of words in which it is couched
being merely a contingency. This is not a compelling example, and a criticism is offered below.
Schiffer's conclusions offer a sop to Derrida and a response. Derrida might be thought correct to say
that performative utterances (and particularly so, explicit performatives), cannot carry S intentions, for
the 'subscriptive' identity between o3 and oh meaning that by an utterance of the former (and because
one cannot mean by it that one says that p), one cannot mean by oi that what one says is that one means
to instil p by means of recognition of intention, assuredly gives no good reason to assume that o3 is the
more appropriate utterance for performing the act. One might reply to Schiffer that while one may not
be able, by Oi, to mean p immanently, as in a3, that it seems perverse to argue that an utterance of Oi
will inevitably fail to mean that p, and a theory of speech act conventions established on Lewis' terms
is offered (below) in support of this view. Only a theory of meaning committed to taking the explicit
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performative as the exemplar of a meaning utterance could be offered to support Schiffer's view, and
Derrida's objections to such theories have been described; in what follows it is suggested that this
assumption regarding the explicit performative is unnecessary, and, reciprocally, that defining a
meaning-relativism in response to theories containing such an assumption is correspondingly
superfluous. An alternative theory can draw upon what has been argued for a means of supplying the
missing theory ofmutual knowledge in Grice.
One might suggest that the difference between Oi and cr3 is that between a meaning statement
couched in the explicit performative and one explicit enough to function as a performative (utterances
of either could, of course, fail ofuptake), and that Schiffer's conclusion saying that because S does not,
by an utterance of a3, mean that he tells H that p, he equally does not mean by that he says that p,
derives from a false and unnecessary premise. The differences between o3 and a, are, as Schiffer says,
irrelevant changes of syntax (although they 'subscriptively' mean the same), and this, rather than
compelling one to draw the conclusion that the convention of the explicit performative (o3) is uniquely
applicable to, in this case, an act of telling, can as simply show that the communication of the meaning
that p in speech acts requires nothing of the structure or context of the corresponding respective
utterances. If o3 means that p, and Oj cannot, for Schiffer, attain to this because the syntax of the
utterance cannot mimic the force of o3 (again, notwithstanding that they 'subscriptively' mean the
same), then rather than making an unargued, unwarranted and unnecessary case for the convention of
the explicit performative as basic, one might demand of Schiffer that he, in the light of Lewis' remarks
on convention and mutual knowledge, heed the ramifications of his argument that the differences
between oi and a3 lie in irrelevancies of syntax, and allow that Lewis' conditions on the ways in which
conventions arise be considered. Lewis shows that conventions for illocutionary acts may be
established without presupposition of any basis, or basic type, from which the writing of such standards
begins. The knowledge to which S appeals in issuing an act with which he wishes to achieve
coordination with H is, as Lewis says, that which he knows H will, or come to, recognise as
characterising and compelling the convention for the associated response; this, as Schiffer (like
Millikan and Strawson before him) sees, requires nothing of a theory of convention for language, but
rather one describing the ways in which conventions arise in cases Grice regards as typical of
meaningNN. The knowledge to which S appeals may derive from a convention inaugurated, say, after S
and H see that they have typically behaved in certain ways in certain situations in the past and wish
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formally to dub their practices, or, say, one in which S, wanting to establish a convention by a
particular utterance or inscription, appeals to typical likely forms or shared procedures; in both cases,
and even in instances of the most primitive exchange, there is no contingency requiring that the
meanings of the utterances or inscriptions issued in the acts be supplied by a prior dubbing or
convention. Typical coordinations grow, as Lewis shows, from the use, in practice, of repeated
procedures, and a broader consideration of this thesis shows farther ramifications, shown admirably by
returning to the problem, derived from Grice, of supplying conventions for speech acts.
A Deweyan would object to Grice that meaning-intention theories obscure the nature of human
interaction in the case of language, and that the uses of words (for Dewey, tools), cannot be described
by conventions. Such a pragmatist argument would continue that the meaning, of a voice or inscription,
cannot be found in a contingent relationship to an arbitrarily assigned standard, guiding transport
between S and H, and add that Grice conspicuously holds to the thesis that there can be intentionality
without language, seemingly advocating, in the theory that S means in a speech act according to the
recognition by H of the intention with which he speaks, that the ideas communicated in speech acts all
have prior, independent existence described by conventions7, or, that some expressions come
conventionally to be linked with specific intentions, assigning meanings, and thus constitute 'frozen
signs'8. For Grice, in a Deweyan gloss, one is able to read conventions in speech acts because words or
gestures are outgrowths of prior mental states, and Tiles writes that a Deweyan response to Grice (and
Bennett) may be extended to Lewis. The project of meaning-nominalism, such as practised by Grice,
Bennett and Lewis, endeavours to account for the ways in which communication and language arise in
a community, yet Tiles argues (following James), that this demands notions of prelinguistic
intentionality, asking how, in an 'initial' scenario, S could possibly know what act to issue to
communicate a specific meaning, and, indeed, how H could recognise an act as carrying a specific
intention. Neither S nor H could account for the appropriateness to convention of an act issued, not
having respectively, in an 'initial' scenario, the language to express and to recognise a conventional
7 in response Dewey offers his theory of language as stimulus and response (cf. Tiles (1988) p86). Notwithstanding his
Darwinian influence (see below) Dewey was keen to emphasise his distance from Darwin on the matter of explaining emotional
expression as the outlet of a prior mental state; for Tiles Dewey would say that Darwin here forgets '...the requirements of the
explanatory principle which had been introduced by his own theory of natural selection'. The countenancing of prior mental
states causing emotional expressions, when consistently adhered to, becomes, Tiles writes paraphrasing James, the
countenancing of subjective, or immediately present, aspects to experience. Dewey would charge Grice with holding such a
theory, for '...the intention on a given occasion [of speaking] constitutes the individual mental state corresponding to a
Darwinian emotional state, and which finds its expression in a linguistic utterance corresponding to an emotional expression'
(Tiles (1988) pp86-87).
8 Tiles (1988) p87.
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meaning utterance®. What, Dewey would ask, could possibly serve to guide meaning between S and H,
and allow one consistently to say that S intends and H recognises10? Tiles says that, for a response,
Dewey would ask the eminently Darwinian question of how emotional expressions have evolutionary,
adaptive value, for in reply to the notion that language, with all of its conventions, carries intentions
from S to H, he argues that language itself makes thought possible, and, as an intersubjective
phenomenon, demonstrates its utility by facilitating group coordination and the gaining of strategic,
selective advantage". For Tiles, Dewey shows that,
neither intention nor the recognition of intention is necessary to sustain a coordinated
pattern of (social) behaviour. All that is necessary is that the members of a group of
animals should stimulate one another to appropriate behaviour at the appropriate time12.
In illustration of his thesis he suggests the example of a flock of birds alighting from a pond after the
movement of one offering a stimulus to move (in the form of a sign), and expressing, say, fright or
pending danger and so forth. The sign, for Dewey, is mute between the birds, for it does not itself
communicate that one has taken fright and so alighted, and that the others are wise to follow; alighting
is a mere stimulus to which the flock responds with, again, stimuli to action. Dewey argues that this
will serve for the explanation of the human interaction in language, for one could not possibly respond
to another's often complex, nuanced and even disguised intentions in speaking if one is not already
able to respond to instances of their behaviour as stimuli to action or belief, unless, that is, there is a
prior stimulus condition guiding appropriate behaviour in specific situations; without this any signal
issued with intention to communicate will remain mute or utterly ambiguous, and the consequences for
a theory of language that Dewey and his followers draw from this thesis are that meanings never come
into being without language, and that meanings require the deliverance of a mutual coordination
between the users of a language13.
It is difficult to see what Lewis could find objectionable in the pragmatist thesis, for the conditions on
mutual exchange in a language community for which Dewey argues are precisely those that Lewis puts
on convening in a coordination situation. It is the case that Lewis' conventions are as amenable to a
pragmatist analysis of meaning as they are useful to completing the Gricean project of describing
9 Tiles (1988) p87 raises a number of these problems.
10 Tiles (1988) p88 writes that Grice, Bennett and Lewis commit, in ascribing to agents antecedent mental states, intentions and
beliefs, the psychologist's fallacy of assuming that language expresses thought, rather than making thought, reflection, prediction
and recollection possible. It might be suggested the some of the force ofDewey's argument stems from his retaining a vestige of
his early Hegelian influence.
11 The question is one, as Tiles (1988) pp88-89 shows, that Darwin himself did not ask, and for the reasons Dewey describes.
12 Tiles (1988) p89.
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meaning intentions, for again Lewis, contrary to Tiles' insubstantial arguments against his work,
requires no notion of a prior intention or guiding standard in the establishing of conventions. He
requires only that S and H mutually settle on practices for achieving the most acceptable, useful,
efficient, or beautiful (and so forth) means of facilitating coordination and exchange. One might look to
Lewis' paradigm example of the inauguration of a convention: if S and H wish to be reconnected when
cut offwhen speaking on the telephone, one must initiate the process of calling back and the other wait
for the reconnected call. In a case without precedent (an 'initial' scenario) there must be choice by
each, in isolation, of the role they wish to play; over time, after repeated instances and the repetition of
the roles played from the beginning, as Lewis says, a convention emerges. The act of calling back is as
mutable a sign as that of the bird alighting from the pond, and it does not in itself mean that S has
called back, rather it is the act of calling back, or, a stimulus to which H will respond with his part of a
mutually-known practice (waiting to receive a call), having seen its utility in facilitating coordination.
Such practices are established in use, as the solutions to coordination problems, and the development of
conventions for language occurs in palpably the same way. S and H (for convenience sake, a whole
language community), can alight on conventions for the meanings ofwords in mutual exchange: over
time, as, say, an object comes to fulfil a role or purpose it is established as an object for that purpose,
and named, classified and so forth. The conventions for naming and describing draw upon no prior, or
literal, meanings for naming or describing (the object); a convention emerges from practice, and the
adventitiousness of language changes nothing of the structure of assigning conventions. A convention
of naming is no different, by virtue ofbeing a convention, from a convention derived from a mutually-
understood stimuli and describing the response of birds alighting after the movement of one. The
matter of the ways in which conventions in language utilise the evolutionary human capacities for
speech and writing is purely a matter for physiology, anatomy and ethology.
This adventitiousness of language, for Derrida, shows up in stark relief the problems with Austin's
presumption of the explicit performative as the model, for each illocutionary act, of congruence
between an utterance and its conventional meaning. It allows that the notion of determinate context, for
Condillac and Austin, is one that may be applied to uses of language in illocutionary acts, bearing
witness to enduring conventions, deviations from which are abnormalities or parasites, and Derrida
replies (as described in Introduction), that the fact of such abnormalities is the condition on the
13 Tiles (1988) pp90ff considers further details ofDewey's response to meaning-nominalism, and some criticisms ofDewey.
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possibility of meaning or communication in primitive (oral and gestural) collocution and writing alike
(thereby illustrating the problems raised in cases, say, of communication with absent receivers), and yet
that Austin allows no 'surplus' in his theory of convention, nothing outside the scope of the explicit
performative allowing it to evince a sensitivity to its use in non-serious, non-literal contexts, and
consequently rendering the model it instantiates inapplicable to many communicative uses of ordinary
language. It is, as Derrida says, more profitable to conceive of the uses of speech acts as able to be
cited without harm to their '... allegedly rigorous purity...as permanently estranged from the contexts
that could supply their conventions. However, one might make a case, drawing upon Lewis'
conventions and possible worlds semantics, to say that the notion of defining a meaning-relativism in
opposition to the explicit performative, and by emphasising the prevalence of cases for which it cannot
account, is simply unnecessary, for as Lewis' theory of mutual knowledge shows, the explicit
performative need not be the model of a convention for a speech act. Using a (Lewis) convention in a
non-literal or figurative way is (as seen in IV.3) an insincere report of a genuine state of affairs; for it to
appear to function as a genuine representation, one might say, with Millikan (in II. 5), it must ape or
mimic the structure of reality immanent, as Wittgenstein says, in genuine reports; more
straightforwardly, there is a simple homology between the fact reported in a true representation (in a
'logical picture') and the corresponding state of affairs. Again as Wittgenstein says, all of the elements
in a picture that have representing properties are direct correlates of atomic objects; when the elements
are pictured in combination in a report of a state of affairs, this is, if true, an accurate representation.
(Recall that the atomic objects are independent of states of affairs, being the ultimate simples from
which they are constituted). Wishing that p, or promising, or, indeed, performing any other
illocutionary act over p, shows the combination in logical form of the atomic simples directing the
conventions for wishing, promising and so forth, but again, insincere or non-literal utterances are not,
as has (admittedly crudely) been said, genuine. A condition on the success of insincerity or deception
is, in the Wittgensteinian terminology of1.4 and IV.3, that the contents of a logical language are always
non-empty (a true report of a state of affairs in a world bearing an honest representation, and a false or
insincere report instantiating the conventions of another world: logic is, as Wittgenstein says, prior to
all experience), and consequently that all reports, genuine or insincere, are derived from the same
simple objects in combination (or again with Wittgenstein, an 'imagined' world has a form in common
with the actual world). Acts of wishing, promising, negating and so forth each instantiate different
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intentional relationships over the same ultimately simple objects, drawing upon conventions
established for the correct combination for each relationship in a possible world; insincere or fictional
utterances report upon no genuine states of affairs in this world; they instantiate none of its
conventional logical structures. One might take a familiar example: aRb and not-aRb report a state of
affairs and its negation in a world; bRa, in the same world, states a falsehood, or, following Lewis, a
convention for a different world. One might, as per Lewis' definition of convention as arbitrary (and
not Heal's and Gilbert's misunderstandings), settle upon bRa as one's convention, or adopt it upon
seeing it to be a better alternative; but this is to choose to occupy a different world, and, again as Lewis
shows, such conventions need not be chosen as relative to any prior scheme determining the
appropriate means of articulating specific intentions, but they may emerge in practice. In this there is a
first response to arguments claiming that the effects of insincere or fictional reports negate or render
parasitical the apparently conventional structures of a language, for giving an insincere or fictional
report in a world is neither to negate nor render parasitical any of the conventional structures of a
language of a possible world (such structures being rendered by Lewis' conventions), but to speak of a
different possible world and its constituents'". Each such world allows, as argued in 1.3, that the shared
structure of ultimate simples is intrinsically intentional, being able to underpin all logical relations
described by conventions in different worlds; as Hintikka has it, such conventions convey information
compatible only with the particular world in which the states of affairs on which it reports appear. In
his contribution to possible worlds semantics Hintikka wants to prove that the phenomenological
reduction in Husserl, and his own theory of informational intentionality, require that noemata and hyle
be always available to consciousness in noeses. He ventures that one conceive of hyle in eminently
Wittgensteinian terms, as sense data, not simply as the unmediated given in intentional acts, but as
always structured according to the constitution of each possible world, and as thus conveying
information regarding the structures (the states of affairs) of that world, and that, indeed, for Husserl
hyle are the bases for senses and conventions to mediate references, they being unperceived and
unmediated, and the basis of all sound, enduring meanings, and so immune to frustration by infelicity
or the vagaries of perception. It follows from Husserl's thesis that the perceived in acts are objects in
states of affairs constituted by conventions, those, as Derrida shows, which fail of establishing timeless
meanings; for Husserl, in each intentional act (one, that is, in which one has an intentional object: say,
A truthful fiction, one that is a report of actual events true in every particular, could be discerned as true or false according to
Millikan's criteria (II.5), as, say, the solutions to two different coordination problems (one of genuine engagement, truth and
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as in the example above, a perception), each experienced content 'yields a new "content of
consciousness"...', one that, when collated with all others and the appropriate conventions to form the
manifold, gives the objective correlate, or, the being of the object forms. The theory of informational
intentionality presupposes no such basis of timeless conventions for the establishing of meanings for a
language, the acceptance of the facts both of a distinction between states of affairs compatible with a
world and those incompatible, and of worlds or mediated contexts as always structured by the
knowledge of the properties of objects and their interrelations learned in past conditioning and
experience, being enough to show that its meanings may be founded on Lewis' model. (What is more,
sense data are, by being always structured, subject to phenomenological reduction, for they themselves,
as Wittgenstein argues, exist only in the combination in states of affairs (or, the fulfilling of truth
functions) of one datum with another).
As Hintikka and Lewis argue, the writing of conventions for a language is not hindered by the
prospects of insincere or fictional contexts rendering parasitical any of its conventional structures,
these, again, being established by Lewis conventions; however, one can now make a stronger point,
drawing upon the connections established between the informational theory and the possible worlds
theory of intentionality. They both speak of the mediation of reference by sense according to
conventions established for a language, and exclude as 'incompatible' or delegated to another (near)
possible language, reports of states of affairs without reference in the language. One might be tempted
to ask how such references can be spoken of as different or separable, and the argument (so bemusing
to Derrida) upheld that a parasited utterance is not a contrariety to the conventions that it misuses. For
an answer one might accept that talk of possible worlds and possible languages is not always
appreciated and recast the debate in familiar terms. The descriptions that constitute the conventions for
a language for Lewis, or a mediated context for Hintikka, are, as has been said, combinations (or states
of affairs) made over an unchanging basis of ultimate atomic simples (monads), each of which
possesses the capacity to represent, or to combine with, all compatible (or compossible) others, and so
to instantiate the relationships of states of affairs in a world or logical space. The incompatible states of
affairs are relative to worlds for, as Wittgenstein says in demonstrating that in speaking or, indeed,
performing any intentional act, one invokes, in an utterance, a range of possible worlds or states of
affairs compatible with that reported in one's speech act. In the example given, one may perform a
falsity and binding consequences, and one in which none of these properties obtain).
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great number of acts over the simples aRb (wishing, promising, negating and so forth), and in the
performance of an act one circumscribes the logical space that may be occupied by acts containing
aRb. This is, as Hintikka says, equally to exclude from this logical space those states of affairs that are
incompatible (incompossible) with those in it, those, that is, that report no genuine states of affairs (in
this world), or combine simples in incoherent or unrecognised, novel ways. By the conventions for
speaking in this world, established, again, on Lewis' terms, fictional or insincere contexts obtain in a
language or a context other than that of the world of genuine reports, their status as literal or parasitical
established, as the debt of Hintikka to Evans (described in 1.3) evinces, by a function of sense
determining the way in which the reference of terms is given. Singular terms, as Evans shows, may
have reference without the mediation of a guided intention or a context of utterance (a theory making
equally compelling criticisms of Fregean semantics and Husserlian phenomenology); they rather
manifest in their use the conventions that Hintikka (Wittgenstein and Lewis) regard as functions of




In the dissertation are considered a number of ways in which one may discern, write and analyse
conventions and intentions for the illocutionary forces of speech acts, and meanings, senses and
references for statements and utterances, with the objective of suggesting alternatives to what is dubbed
meaning-relativism. It is argued that the paradigm of the explicit performative is inexpedient, for it
need not be considered the model of the congruence between content and force in an illocution, and the
scepticism evinced by Derrida regarding the possibility and purpose of writing such conventions is
correlatively challenged. (Discussion of respective arguments for the writing of senses and references
for statements and utterances in truth-conditional semantics occupies most of chapter I, and develops
themes shared with the discussion of speech acts contained in the introduction, and picked up in
chapters II-IV. Derrida sets up qualitatively similar arguments in his study of the use of indexical or
demonstrative expressions, considered in relation to Fregean semantics and Husserlian phenomenology
in chapter I sections 2 and 3). The central thesis presented makes both a substantive argument and a
related metaphilosophical point: firstly, the problems of indeterminable intentions and of non-saturable
conventions can be resolved, and the fount of Derrida's (and Rorty's) work, viz. the failure of
intentionality to mediate, or orientate, communication, self-consciousness and meaning, is contested by
the theory offered, a theory, in the second point, rendering profitless Rorty's distinction between the
'objective knowledge' of traditional systematic (semantical) philosophy and less privileged discourse
('edifying' or 'historicist' philosophy).
Derrida denies that the meanings given to the word 'communication', and vouchsafing the
metaphorical application to definitions in semantics, semiotics and 'real' or 'gestural' collocution, can
be settled by a priori definitions, or conventions. The consensus required to direct each such
convention of communication, he argues, could never be found, or would remain irredeemably
metaphorical, as the incomplete and illegitimate extension of a paradigm of rule or law to which it
could never attain. This may be seen in the reshaping of speech acts in indexical, demonstrative and
quantificational constructions, in the estrangement from speakers' intention brought by appearance in
quotational contexts, and in the tolerance of insincerity, conditions rendered ubiquitous, Derrida
continues, by the extensions of 'ideal' speech situations tolerated by writing. Derrida asks how writing
and communication may confront these problems, and, a related point, how intentions in writing and
communication can be read off from their reports in conventional (paradigmatically explicit
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performative) formulae. The effect of the relativisation to non-literal, fictional, or quotational contexts
for Derrida, is to render incomplete all conventions and motivating intentions for locutions and
illocutions, for they are perennially spliced to constructions for which they cannot account, and to the
vocalisation of intentions indefeasibly more complex than those for which they were written. The
arguments of chapters II-IV consider the ways in which Grice, Strawson, McDowell, Searle and Lewis
address these problems, and the conclusion is drawn that conventions and intentions for locutions and
illocutions can be written, via Lewis' conventions, without presupposition of any standard to which
they must conform, and without the inevitable relativisation to literal and non-literal, fictional, or
quotational contexts. (There is, it should be said, insufficient attention given to Derrida's reasons for
holding that the explicit performative is the exemplar of a statement with illocutionary force).
Rorty's arguments against theories of intentionality exhibit a similar motivation and tenor. Rorty
denies that mentality, in its functioning and in its description, carries processes apt to be described by
intentions and conventions, and his work is considered in the second section of the introduction. There
is no problem of intentionality for Rorty, because man's faculties and operations with knowledge and
language are, in their complexity, irreducible to cognitive or 'representationalisf models; there is, he
argues, nothing gained by imposing such structures. An epistemology and a philosophy of mind can be
written for man without any call upon 'representationalisf theories, and Rorty makes the case for a
Deweyan, pragmatist conception of knowledge as justified belief in conjectures, best guesses, surmises
and opinions that help '...us to do what we want to do'. (In chapter IV this is compared to the
derivation and enduring of a convention as conceived by Lewis). To suggest difficult cases for Rorty's
survey of systematic and edifying philosophy appeal is made to Leibniz as both a systematic
metaphysician and yet as a critic of the Cartesian and Lockean traditions to which Rorty objects.
Analogues of the details of Leibniz's response to dualism are found in Deleuze, and the role and
importance, in any theory of intentionality countenancing possiblia, of notions of compatibility,
incompatibility, compossibility and incompossibility, are presented. The applications of a possible
worlds theory of intentionality are explored in chapter I sections 3 and 4, and the discussions raise an
incidental matter of some importance: the desire throughout equally to consider the lessons of the
semantical and the phenomenological traditions, with the ambition of, at the very least, intimating that
Rorty's caricatures do no useful work. One example must suffice for illustration: in section 2 Evans'
arguments concerning the notion of the mediation of sense by reference in Frege's semantics are
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considered, and, in section 3, an application of his conclusions made to matters derived from a
discussion of Husserlian noema. It is shown that one can, by the selfsame reasoning, derive a case,
contra Derrida, for conventions ofmeaning in a truth-conditional semantics.
In chapter I section 1 the case is made for an extensional semantics as conceived by Davidson, by
way of intimating a means ofdefining conventions for language without the presupposition of standard,
constituent or enduring meanings. Anomalous monism is presented as a theory of intentionality holding
none of the concerns that, Rorty argues, such theories inevitably raise; it is palpably not a
'representationalisf or dualist theory, and is a powerful response to typically Rortyan post-structuralist
scepticism concerning meaning and truth. The debts of anomalous monism to Tarski's truth definition,
and of the informational theory advocated in chapter I section 3 to principles of charity, are defined,
and the prospect mooted of describing a possible worlds theory of intentionality for distributed systems
as a development of models provided by Tarski semantics. (Reasons for advocating an informational
theory are explored also in relation to Lewis' description of the structures of convention and of possible
worlds). In recommending anomalous monism as a theory of intentionality Davidson allows no strict
psychophysical laws between mental and physical; the mental and the physical perennially fulfil
'disparate commitments'; the irreducibility of the mental derives neither from the property of
intentionality, for such interdependence is compatible with there being a correct way to interpret
speakers without relativisation to conflicting translation manuals, nor from the existence of many
equally plausible manuals, for this is compatible with their arbitrary selection: the contrast aptly sets up
the choice between Kripke or situation semantics and Tarski semantics.
In section 2 Evans' arguments for the role of singular terms in Fregean semantics are presented, the
better to make a case, in section 3, against Derrida's objections to the possibility of achieving the
mediation of sense by reference or context in Husserlian phenomenology. The notion, central to
Fregean semantics, of the context of a sentence as the modulus of meaning, is soundly challenged by
Evans, for, he shows, the sense of singular terms in Fregean semantics need not be given in the
determination by a reference: singular terms (empty or not) can carry sense without the mediation of a
reference, in literal and fictional contexts alike. In section 3 the correspondence between Fregean Sinn
and Husserlian noema is presented, specifically to make the case that intentional acts do not require the
mediation to which Derrida objects. Conditions as strict as Derrida demands of Sinne and noema do
indeed make Fregean semantics and Husserlian phenomenology unworkable as theories of
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intentionality, but one need not countenance such strictness. It is argued that Hintikka shows a way in
which Husserl's difficulties with a foundational phenomenological notion, namely that reduction reveal
all mediating noematic acts as open to consciousness and reflection, can be resolved, and consequently
that Husserl's equivocations regarding the presence and importance of hyle in connecting up sensation
and sense can be eliminated. Arguing against a conception of intentionality as mediated or directed
there is suggested, as a sound and fruitful alternative, an informational (or intensional) theory, one, it is
noted, allaying the fears of Sartre and Ricoeur regarding hyle and the presentness to consciousness and
cognition of perceptual acts. A connection to Merleau-Ponty and his work on intentionality and the
situated body is ventured, aiming to compel the abandonment of Husserl's form-matter distinction; for
Merleau-Ponty matter always contains and precedes form; the perceived world constitutes the basis of
rationality, value and existence, even a 'nascent logos'. (There is missing a compelling argument to say
that the intrinsic intentionality or mediation of hyle allows that senses may arise without the mediation
of a noema as do singular terms in Fregean semantics, asper the discussion of section 2).
The description of possible states of affairs in worlds as instantiating, with greater or lesser success,
the constitution of the actual world {viz. that of the speaker), requires a means of discerning the ways in
which reports of states of affairs can be declared true of the world or incorrect or false, and it is the
burden of section 4 to suggest a way in which this may be provided. Developing Hintikka's possible
worlds theory in which descriptions of sense are descriptions of possible states of affairs, the picture
theory of the early Wittgenstein is considered for its contention that statements reporting possible states
of affairs can be proxies for the state of affairs themselves, or substitutes for their direct experience,
sharing as they do, the logical form of the atomic structure of the world in which the statements are
made. If accurate, a report both mirrors, with all due Leibnizean conditions on compossibility, the state
of affairs described, and, it is argued, limns the forms in which sense-data may cognitively be received:
in Wittgensteinian terms, as always under the aspect of states of affairs or ways of seeing. (This is,
again in response to Rorty, an avowedly 'representationalist' theory. There are, it should be said, a
number of equivocations, in both sections 3 and 4, on 'sense-data', 'sensation' and 'sense'). The
argument of Hintikka and Hintikka, that the lessons of Husserlian phenomenology are evident in the
work of the early Wittgenstein is broached, and some of the themes of the theory of intentionality as
developed in his middle period works considered.
Another source of arguments against Rorty is examined in chapter I section 5, arising from his
advocating Quine's holism as the best response to theories of intentionality countenancing necessary
conditions of linguistic and mental representation and analyticity, and from Quine's reply that his claim
that there is no first philosophy is not a naturalistic but a holistic claim. Quine's stimulus and response
theory of meaning is presented, and the argument made that he cannot disregard intentionality, but
must appeal to what Christopher Norris calls 'a priori structures of mind', provided in Quine's late
acquiescence to anomalous monism. Quine is, on Rorty's terms, an historicist, offering, in his holistic
theory of meaning and knowledge, an eminently pragmatist position, and it is argued that while this
should be well taken, it need not engender scepticism about meanings and intentions or repudiation of
the semantical tradition. The voices of the excluded for which Rorty makes the case are surely to be
heard, but not at the price of an unthinking relativism or anti-realism. The debt of Davidsonian holism
to semantical and pragmatic theories for the writing of the cooperative function of the principle of
charity (in which there is equally no first philosophy but in which there are conventions of practice),
reveals Davidson's debt to Grice, and the details ofGrice's work are considered in chapter II.
A number of ways in which the content and force of a speech act may be written, divined and
analysed are surveyed in chapter H The discussion is focused by examination and criticism of Grice's
theory of meaning intentions and of critical work on Grice and Gricean theory, and the need is
established for enduring (or, as per Grice, 'timeless') conventions for meanings in communication.
There are a number of matters which would be recast in a differently formulated argument, but the
important matter to be taken from the discussion arises in Strawson's response to Grice in his work on
truth theories and speech act conventions and intentions. Strawson writes that Austin's notion of the
form of the explicit performative is not the unequivocal, unambivalent formulation to which Derrida
cleaves in interpretation, and that there are two pertinent facts to be noted regarding Austin's theory of
illocutions. Firstly, it is sufficient but not necessary that a verb being the name of an illocutionary act
permits it to appear in the first person indicative as an explicit performative: Strawson illustrates his
point with reference to a plethora of counter-examples to make the case that there are prototypical
illocutionary acts that can have no performative formula. (Skinner gives a taxonomy of central cases).
Secondly, Strawson considers that Austin was fully aware of this, for he sees that, in the affirmation of
the conventional nature of illocutions, explicitly in contrast to the production of perlocutionary effects,
Austin is never unequivocal. Indeed, on the first statement of the conventionality of illocutions,
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Austin's profound insights regarding the performative and its functions are importantly qualified: he
writes that illocutionary force is conventional in the sense that it can in some singular cases be made
explicit by the performative formula, and, with regard to prototypical illocutions without performative
constructions, Strawson examines the verity that there exists an insufficiently understood
supererogation in the potential force of an illocution, a surplus of what is called, in an awkward
portmanteau, extra-linguistic convention.
Strawson draws a distinction in light of these remarks between the semantically-determined
conventions of a locution, those, say, determining a single, unitary illocutionary force, and their non-
semantically-determined conventions (being those that permit the designation of an illocution when no
performative is appropriate, or compel its capacity to articulate other illocutionary forces when used in
different contexts, or in quantificational, demonstrative constructions). As Strawson writes, the forces
not exhausted by semantically-determined meaning (the non-semantically determined conventions)
may themselves be determined by conventions (those of mutual, social coordination, collocution and,
following Davidson, of charity), and it is discussions arising from matters relating to this thesis that
occupy the rest of the dissertation. Chapter IV describes Lewis' account of the emergence of
conventions for communication and for tensed and mood-relative language from such elemental
notions ofmutual, social coordination, but to complete chapter II an argument is considered to the end
that in cases in which expression in no abiding conventional, performative formula is applicable or
possible, a speaker can make clear his intended meaning. Millikan writes that speakers may be thought
of as fulfilling not intentions but 'purposes', the latter being reproduced functions or figures good for
communication, and completed by further repeated acts of mutual recognition by hearers; by virtue of
being repeated and disseminated such figures become established as means of achieving relevant
purposes, while requiring nothing of a paradigm or archetype of literal or semantically-determined
illocutionary force. New means of achieving communication may emerge or become attached to
established means, but this is only by grant of mutual agreement on terms, and not to the discerning of
a priori standards; non-literal illocutions are, for Millikan, divined in context or found to do no
enduring, useful work and classified accordingly. The Millikan arguments are given too much space,
their points being better made by Strawson and Lewis, to the discussion of whose work they still serve
as a prelude. The argument of the chapter, and indeed the deeper exploration of themes from Derrida,
might better have examined the debt ofMcDowell's work on meaning and intentions to Tarskian truth
theories, a debt that significantly tempers Strawson's doubts regarding Davidson's anomalous monism;
nevertheless, the strength of the argument made against Derrida and Rorty is that Davidson, Grice and
Lewis write an analogue of Strawson's distinction into their theories, while it yet eludes Derrida, and
vitiates his work on convention and intention.
Chapter in is an examination both of the detail of Searle's theory of illocutionary force, and, with
greater focus, of the roles of conventions of semantically and non-semantically determined illocutions.
It is shown that Searle's theory contains a core, fundamental ambiguity. One is asked to consider again
illocutions articulated in locutions, both those whose force is fully denoted in a description of their
semantically-determined content (that is, paradigmatically, in explicit performative formulae), and
those locutions that may instantiate more than one illocutionary force in discrepant contexts (or the
illocutionary forces ofwhich may fulfil more than one non-semantically-determined role). A summary
of the argument made against Searle follows: a sentence (Sa), the semantical rules of which fully
determine or exhaust the force of the utterance (U), may also determine the force of an utterance (Sb)
in a context (C), one which may, in another context, articulate another illocutionary, non-semantically
determined force. This is so by Searle's principle of expressibility, to every detail of which the
argument holds Searle; the principle says that for any meaning and for any speaker, whenever the
speaker intends the meaning in a speech act, it is the case that there may be given an exact expression
or formulation of the meaning (one might suppose that this is, again, the explicit performative). On this
the meaning of (Sb) in C is fully determined by the sentence of (Sa), or the 'exact expression' of the
force of the utterance (Sb) in C. By an application of a Leibniz's law type equation, that (Sa) is an
utterance which fully determines the illocutionary force of (Sb) in C entails that the meaning of the
utterance (Sa) is equivalent to the meaning of the utterance of (Sa) in C. From Searle's addition, viz.
that all sentences contain at least one illocutionary act device, and the argument that the proposition of
(Sa) entails that of (Sb) in C, a similar determination of illocutionary force (from (Sb) to (Sa)) does not
follow, (Sb) bearing the force of potentially many locutions. In the idioms of critical work on Searle, a
speaker may mean more than he says in a speech act, owing to the articulation of illocutionary force in
discrepant contexts, but he must always mean as much as he says: as Searle has it, he must report at
least the force of one illocutionary act device. By the argument, the meaning of (Sb) in C is exactly
expressed by an utterance of (Sa), and if the proposition (p) expressed by (Sa) entails the proposition
expressed by (Sb) in C, then pU(Sa) is equivalent to pU(Sb). The thesis motivating the argument
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questions whether Searle could accept that the utterance of a sentence (fully semantically-determined)
can determine the forces of utterances in non-semantically determined contexts.
The chapter concludes with an uneven consideration of Searle's later work on speech act
conventions. Searle argues that a type of speech acts, dubbed declarations, and in which semantically-
determined content fully determines the act's illocutionary force, function as models of the way in
which conventions arise for locutions and illocutions. Again, the fullest treatment of the ways in which
illocutions may be conventional is taken up in chapter IV; in III the structure of declarations is
examined for its consequences for study of the conventionality of locutions. Declarations may, Searle
continues, require the Austinian (extra-linguistic) conditions on appropriate utterance, viz. that speakers
be in suitable positions of authority, have sanction to order, pass judgement and so on, but, in the
condition that recommends their significance, it is, Searle maintains, difficult to discern sincerity
conditions for declarations: their content and force are carried in their grammatical form or syntactical
shape. They obey the authority of no prior, established attempts to match language to the world, and
the questions raised by the cases Searle considers are indicated as of importance in stimulating
responses to Derrida's arguments, although, as presented, the connection may be opaque. The
discussion would benefit from a clearer exposition of the way in which such locutions might come, as
per Lewis conventions, to have illocutionary force, or to be settled upon as conventions, without the
regress of intentions or perennial ambiguity discerned by Derrida. Some of the discussion of Skinner is
redundant; the compelling theme that arises is the argument, following Searle's, that any theory
regarding the explicit performative as the model of the way in which illocutionary force is articulated is
incomplete, there being a palpable distinction between the clarity in meaning, sense and reference of a
proposition and the means of making the sense of the locution, and its author's intention, clear with a
paradigm (explicit performative) speech act. Far more of the elemental structure of illocutions, and of
the machinery pertinent to the understanding of speech acts arises, as Skinner aptly shows, in the
patterns ofmutual exchange in contexts of utterance.
The discussion of chapter IV revisits Quine's arguments against analyticity and the possibility of
writing meanings or intensions for cognitive synonymy, and offers Lewis' theory of convention as a
means of establishing appropriate equivalences. Lewis' theory is avowedly a means of rehabilitating a
theory of analyticity and replaces the relativisation of utterances to a standard of illocutionary meaning
with a relativisation to possible occasions of utterance in mutually accessible and perpetually available,
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compossible possible worlds. Theories of intention and convention, and a compelling reason for their
description by Gricean analysis, await the deliverance of Lewis' work. Lewis argues that a theory of
the conventional in language simply accounts for the intentional, and his work is predicated purely on
the notions of rational, social interaction, mutual knowledge and cooperation, and, it is argued, solves
the sceptical regress of intentions feared by Derrida and Quine, and brought fully to view by Grice. The
study of practical reasoning to compelling conclusions in the application of singular, appropriate
intentions and guiding conventions, underpins research into the philosophical foundations of heuristic
models in distributed or multiagent systems, and Lewis describes the structures of convention good for
modelling social interaction in coordination situations in both persisting or long-term coordination
games and for ad hoc measures for present needs: structures that equally describe agents' modalities in
computational or information processing hypotheses. The constitution of conventions for information
states and their enrichment or contravention in communicative acts (couched in symbols or utterances
under interpretation), demands the convergence of agents on strategies, meanings or intentions
(properly, strategic information, or control states), and drives the evolution of pragmatic or
illocutionary and perlocutionary meaning. Lewis' presentation of possible languages, a unique
application of possible worlds for intentionality, constitutes the final, eloquent reply to Derrida, and
offers a theory of analyticity for language responding to Quine's objections. The mutual knowledge
conditions described by Lewis, when applied by Schiffer to the rigorisation of Gricean speech act
theory, gives the fullest such theory, one, it is argued in conclusion, immune to pragmatist objections to
theories of meaning-intentions. In the discussion of the nature and application of mutual knowledge
conditions arise further compelling problems. If, as is maintained, Lewis' theory describes a way in
which conventions can come to direct unforced, mutual agreement on reasons for action without
reference to any predetermined, definitive standard (in Lewis' specific case for the dissemination of
communicative meaning), then an application to matters of social interaction (partly undertaken by
Margaret Gilbert and Michael Bratman and motivated by the appeal ofLewis' work to sociologists and
jurists), raises many issues regarding the ways in which parties to agreements or contracts can attain
equitable consensus without coercion or duress. (In a footnote Lewis' coordination situations are
compared to those obtaining in Rawls' original position, and the solutions they offer recommended to
those following Nozick's desire for an epistemology without coercion). Such a theory of convention
might also begin a compelling reply to the pragmatic liberalism advocated by Rorty, or better still to
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the relativism in social policy and philosophy of science evinced by some post-structuralists; more
specifically deriving from the work undertaken, a deeper study then has been made by speech act
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